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Title State of Affairs on the Korean Peninsula:Assessment of 2020, Prospects for 2021
Category Sourcebook
Year 2020
Written by

IFES,Kyungnam University writer

Date of Isste 2020.12.10


Ⅰ. Overview
1. Evaluating the State of Affairs on the Korean Peninsula and
Prospects for Change
■ Evaluating the Changes in the State of Affairs on the Korean Peninsula
in 2020
■ The 8th Party Congress, New US Administration, and Korea’s Choices
in 2021
2. The State of Affairs in Northeast Asia and the Strategic
Competition between the US and China
■ Changing US Policies toward China: “Competitive Co-existence”
vs. “US-China Cold War”
■ The Chances of Military Tensions and an Arms Race in Northeast Asia
■ The Biden Administration and the State of Affairs in Northeast Asia
Ⅱ. Evaluating the State of Affairs on the Korean
Peninsula and Prospects
3. Evaluation of Politics of the Kim Jong-un Regime in 2020 and
■ Political Tendencies of the Kim Regime in 2020
■ Characteristics of Change in the Kim Jong-un Government’s Politics
■ Changes in North Korea’s System and Responses in 2021
4. Evaluating North Korea’s Economic Sphere through the ‘Frontal
Breakthrough’ Strategy and Prospects
■ A Year of Quarantines and Natural Disaster Recovery
■ North Korea Suffered More Broadly from COVID-19 than from
■ Lackluster Progress of the Frontal Breakthrough Strategy and Building
the Foundations of an Autonomous Economy
■ Predictions of a “Frontal Breakthrough Strategy 2.0” to Neutralize
5. Progress in the Inter-Korean Relationship and Prospects
■ Stagnation in Inter-Korean Affairs and the Status Quo
■ Expected Messages from North Korea’s 8th Party Congress: Whether
to Talk to the US or South Korea First
■ The possibility of improvement in inter-Korean relations in the second
half of the year is higher than in the first half, so in the first half of the
year, it is necessary to focus on ROK-US cooperation and for bilateral
agreement to come about, and to manage the situation and seek active
approaches to North Korea so that North Korea does not engage in
strategic provocations.
■ The Restart of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation to Protect the
Lives and Security of People in the Two Koreas
6. Prospects for the Biden Administration’s North Korea Policy and
US-DPRK Relations
■ Evaluating North Korea’s Frontal Breakthrough Strategy and USDPRK
Relations/US Presidential Election in 2020
■ The Gap between the Biden Administration’s Policies toward North
Korea and North Korea’s Policies toward the US
■ Prospects for a Restart in US-DPRK Talks in 2021
■ A Need to Focus Efforts on Prioritizing (Progress in) Inter-Korean
Relations to Move US-DPRK Relations Forward
Ⅲ. Evaluating the State of Affairs in Northeast Asia

7. Evaluating the Impact of US-China Strategic Competition on
the Korean Peninsula and Prospects
■ US-China Strategic Competition in 2020 Will Prolong Negative
Cycles Across All Spheres
■ The Prolonged Nature of US-China Competition and Uncertainty
about the Korean Peninsula Issue
■ Where South Korea Should Head Amid US-China Strategic Competition
during the Biden Administration
8. Evaluating the Impact of Continuing ROK-Japan Conflict
■ The New Japanese Prime Minister: Yoshihide Suga
■ ROK-Japan Relations and DPRK-Japan Relations after Suga’s
Rise to Power
■ The Links and Fissures between the Abe and Suga Administrations
■ The Tasks and Proposals to Improve ROK-Japan Relations
■ Suga’s Ability to Improve Relations with North Korea Will Be Tested
9. The DPRK-Russian Relationship and Russia’s Moves to Expand
Influence in Korean Peninsula Issues
■ Russia’s Successful Constitutional Revision, Russia’s Moves in Foreign
Policy after the New Constitutional Amendment, and Its Response to
the US Presidential Election
■ COVID-19 and DPRK-Russia Relations
■ Russia’s Traditional Policy toward the Korean Peninsula: Six-party
■ The Tokyo Olympics and Russia’s Attempt to Increase Its Presence
in Northeast Asia
■ Russia’s Policy toward the Korean Peninsula Centers on Economic