온라인 국제학술회의
International Online Conference

북한과 세계: 코로나19 사태 이후 재평가, 다시보기, 재연결

North Korea International: (Re)Evaluating, (Re)Viewing, and (Re)Connecting in a COVID World

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YouTube 실시간 중계

2020년 10월 7일 수요일 13:45 ~ 17:00 (한국 시간 기준)
Wednesday, October 7, 2020 (Korean Standard Time GMT+9)

YouTube Link : https://youtu.be/MU6gHEJrRFo

Organized by 경남대 극동문제연구소 The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University FRIEDRICH NAUMANN FOUNDATION For Freedom.

프로그램

13:45~14:00	**개회식** 개회사 **이관세** (경남대 극동문제연구소 소장) 환영사 **크리스찬 탁스** (프리드리히 나우만 재단 한국사무소 대표)
14:00~15:30	**제1회의: 북한과 세계: 관계와 제재의 '재'평가** 사 회: **황지환** (서울시립대 부교수) • 발표자: 코로나19 사태 이후 북한과의 관계 및 외교의 재평가 · **김태경** (북한대학원대 연구교수), **구갑우** (북한대학원대 교수) • 제재에 적응하기: 부정 행동 차단과 협력 촉진 · **박준의** (한국연구재단 학문후속세대연구자) • 코로나19 사태 이후 남북관계: 정책 및 전망 재평가 · **리프-에릭 이즐리** (이화여대 부교수) • 북한과 세계: 유럽의 역할 재정의 · **테레자 노보트나** (EUROPEUM/베를린자유대 선임 연구원)
15:40~17:00	**제2회의: 향후 관계 초석을 다지기 위한 북한 '다시'보기** 사 회: **딘올렛** (경남대 극동문제연구소 부소장) • 발표자: 북한과의 인도주의적 관계 재설정?: 역사로부터의 교훈 · **나자닌 자데-커밍스** (호주 디킨대 인도주의 리더십 센터 연구 부소장) • 온라인 북한: ICT를 활용한 북한과의 '재'연결 · **강하연** (정보통신정책연구원 다자협력연구본부 본부장) • 북한의 국립공원, 보호구역과 생물다양성 담화: 국제적 협력을 위한 기회 · **크리스토퍼 맥카시** (경남대 극동문제연구소 초빙연구위원) • 북한에서의 근무 경험: 상황적 경험 공유 · **제임스 반필** (경남대 극동문제연구소 초빙연구위원)

Program

13:45~14:00	**Opening Session** Opening Remarks – **Kwan Sei Lee** (Director, IFES) Welcoming Remarks – **Christian Taaks** (Head, FNF Korea Office)
14:00~15:30	**Session 1: North Korea International: Re-evaluating Relations and Sanctions** Panel chair: **Jihwan Hwang** (Associate Professor, University of Seoul) • Reassessing Relations and Diplomacy with North Korea in a COVID-19 World: Challenges and Prospects · **Tae-Kyung Kim** (Research Professor, University of North Korean Studies) and **Kab-Woo Koo** (Professor, University of North Korean Studies) • Adapting Sanctions: Blocking Bad Behavior, Facilitating Cooperation · **June Park** (Next Generation Researcher, National Research Foundation of Korea) • Inter-Korean Relations in a COVID World: Re-evaluating Policy and Prospects · **Leif-Eric Easley** (Associate Professor, Ewha Womans University) • North Korea and the World: Redefining the Role for Europe · **Tereza Novotna** (Senior Associate Research Fellow, EUROPEUM/Free University Berlin)
15:40~17:00	**Session 2: (Re)Viewing North Korea to Build the Foundation for Future Exchanges** Panel chair: **Dean J. Ouellette** (Vice Director, IFES) • Resetting Humanitarian Engagement with North Korea?: Lessons from History · **Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings** (Associate Director, Centre for Humanitarian Leadership at Deakin University) • North Korea Online: (Re)connecting through ICT with North Korea? · **Hayun Kang** (Executive Director, Division of International Cooperation Research, Korean Information Society Development Institute) • National Parks, Protected Areas and Biodiversity Conservation in North Korea: Opportunities for International Collaboration · **Christopher McCarthy** (Visiting Research Fellow, IFES) • Lessons for Working in North Korea: Sharing Situational Experience · **James Banfill** (Visiting Research Fellow, IFES)

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참석자 소개

Introduction

이관세 경남대 극동문제연구소 소장
Kwan-sei LEE Director, IFES, Kyungnam University

극동문제연구소의 소장이다. 통일부 대변인, 정보분석국장, 통일정책실장, 남북회담본부장 및 17대 통일부 차관을 역임했다. 18차, 19차, 20차 남북장관급회담 대표를 역임했으며, 제2차 남북정상회담 준비접촉 수석대표 및 남북정상회담 선발대 단장을 맡았었다. 남북총리회담 예비접촉 수석대표, 대한적십자 총재 특별보좌역(남북교류담당), 개성공업지구지원재단 자문위원장을 역임했었다.

Kwan-sei Lee is Director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. He has served as the 17th ROK Deputy Minister of Unification, Head of the Office of Inter-Korean Dialogue, Director General for Unification Policy, Head of the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau, and Ministry of Unification spokesperson. He also served as a representative in the 18th, 19th, and 20th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks, and was the head of the advance team for the Inter-Korean Summit. He is a member of various governmental advisory committees such as the Gaeseong Industrial District Management Foundation.

크리스찬 탁스 프리드리히 나우만 재단 한국사무소 대표
Christian TAAKS Head, FNF Korea Office

2004년 프리드리히 나우만재단(FNF)에 합류하여 아시아본부 대표, 유럽 및 대서양본부 대표, 국제정치부의 이사 대행을 역임했다. 2010년에서 2015년까지 FNF 장학 프로그램의 소장을 역임했다. 1980년대 후반부터 개발협력 분야에서 일해왔다.

Dr.Taaks joined FNF in 2004 and had a.o. posts as head of the Asia division and head of the European and Transatlantic Dialogue division as well as twice being the acting director of the international politics department. From 2010 to 2015 he was the director of FNF scholarship programs.

황지환 서울시립대학교 교수

Jihwan HWANG Professor, University of Seoul

현재 서울시립대 국제관계학과 교수로 재직 중이다. 서울대 통일평화연구원 선임연구원, 명지대 북한학과 교수, George Washington University 정치학과 강사 및 Catholic University of America 정치학과 방문학자를 역임하였다. 국무총리실 및 외교부 평가위원, 통일부 및 육군 자문위원을 역임하였으며, 현재 대통령 직속 정책기획위원회 평화번영분과 위원으로 있다.

Dr. Jihwan Hwang is Professor of International Relations at the University of Seoul, Korea. He was visiting scholar at the Catholic University of America and aso taught inter-Korean relations at the George Washington University. He has served as several advisory positions in the Korean government, including Presidential Commission on Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Unification.

김태경 북한대학원대학교 연구교수

Tae-Kyung KIM Research Professor, University of North Studies

현재 북한대학원대학교 남북한마음통합연구센터에 연구교수로 재직하며 남북한 사회통합 및 한반도 평화과정에 대한 연구를 진행하고 있다. 2018년 서울대학교 정치외교학부에서 "북한 '사회주의 리얼리즘의 조선화(Koreanization)': 문학에서의 당의 유일사상체계의 역사적 형성"을 주제로 박사학위를 받고, 북한 국내정치, 대외관계, 남북관계 관련 다양한 연구에 참여하고 있다.

Tae-Kyung Kim is currently a research professor at the University of North Studies, Seoul, South Korea, conducting researches on the inter-Korean social integration and the peace process in the Korean Peninsula. She is a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from Seoul National University, with her dissertation on "The "Koreanization of Socialist Realism" in North Korea: The Making of the Monolithic Ideological System of Party in Literature."

구갑우 북한대학원대학교 교수
Kab-Woo KOO Professor, University of North Korean Studies

현재 북한대학원대학교 교수이다. 일본 토야마 대학 외래교수, 릿교 대학 방문연구원을 지냈다. 연구분야는 국제정치경제, 북한외교, 남북한 문학이다. 지은 책으로는, 『비판적 평화연구와 한반도』(2007), 『국제관계학 비판: 국제관계의 민주화와 평화』(2008) 등이 있고, 논문으로는 "The Discursive Origins of Anti-Americanism in the Two Koreas"(2017), "북한 핵 담론의 국제정치"(2017), "평창 '임시평화체제'의 형성 원인과 전개"(2018), "평창 임시 평화체제에서 판문점 선언으로"(2018), "두 '평양시간'"(2019) 등이 있다.

Kab-Woo Koo is a Professor of Political Science at the University of North Korean Studies. He was a visiting professor at the University of Toyama and a visiting researcher at Rikkyo University in Japan. His research interests include international political economy, North Korean foreign policy, and Korean literature. His publications include *Critical Peace Studies and Korean Peninsula*(2007), *A Critique of International Relations*(2008), "The Discursive Origins of Anti-Americanism in the Two Koreas"(2017), "Origin and Development of the Pyeongchang Provisional Peace Regime"(2018) and "Two Pyongyang Times"(2019) etc.

박준의 한국연구재단 학문후속세대연구자
June PARK Next Generation Researcher, National Research Foundation of Korea

박준의는 정치경제학자이다. 조지워싱턴대학교 엘리엇 국제관계대학 동아시아 국립자원센터 EAVI 연구원이자 한국연구재단 학문후속세대연구자이다. 미국과 동아시아 뿐 아니라 유럽과 중동을 포괄한 지역의 무역, 에너지, 기술 갈등을 연구하고 있다. 또한, 남북한 관련 정책 연구를 하고있다. 주요연구주제는 왜 그리고 어떻게 국가간 갈등이 일어나는지이다. 거버넌스 구조를 분석함으로서 왜 국가들간 다른 정책적 결과를 가져오는지를 연구한다. 첫 책 발간을 앞두고 있다. (도서정보: TRADE WARS & CURRENCY CONFLICT: China, South Korea and Japan's Responses to U.S. Pressures since the Global Financial Crisis)

Dr. June Park is a political economist working on trade, energy, and tech conflicts with a broader range of regional focuses not just on the U.S. and East Asia, but also Europe and the Middle East. She also conducts policy-oriented research on the two Koreas. She is currently an East Asia Voices Initiative (EAVI) Fellow of the East Asia National Resource Center at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, and a Next Generation Researcher at the National Research Foundation of Korea. Her grand theme of research is why countries fight and how, using what. She studies why countries have different policy outcomes by analyzing governance structures– domestic institutions, leaderships, and bureaucracies that shape the policy formation process. She is finalizing her first book manuscript, TRADE WARS & CURRENCY CONFLICT: China, South Korea and Japan's Responses to U.S. Pressures since the Global Financial Crisis.

리프-에릭 이즐리 이화여자대학교 부교수
Leif-Eric EASLEY Associate Professor, Ewha Womans University

이화여대 국제학과 부교수이다. 국제안보 및 정치경제를 가르치고 있다. 연구분야는 중국과 북한 관련 미-북-일 삼각 관계, 국내개혁(특히, 한국과 미얀마)의 지정학적 함의이다. 스탠포드대의 동북아시아 역사 연구원이었으며, 일본 국제문제연구소 방문학자를 지냈다. 다수의 논문을 게재했으며 다수의 신문에도 기고했다(자세한 사항은 http://leifeasley.net참고).

Leif-Eric Easley is Associate Professor of International Studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul. He teaches international security and political economics. His research includes U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral coordination on engaging China and North Korea, and the geopolitical implications of domestic reforms (especially in Korea and Myanmar). Dr. Easley was a Northeast Asian History Fellow at Stanford University and a visiting scholar at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo. His research appears in academic journals and volumes (available at http://leifeasley.net), supplemented by commentary in major newspapers.

테레자 노보트나 EUROPEUM/베를린자유대 선임연구원
Tereza NOVOTNA Senior Associate Research Fellow, EUROPEUM/ Free University Berlin

EUROPEUM 선임연구원이자 베를린자유대 마리퀴리 연구원이다. 과거 서울대 KF 방문교수였으며 브뤼셀자유대 유럽학연구소에 있었다. *How Germany Unified and the EU Enlarged: Negotiating the Accession through Transplantation and Adaptation* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 의 저자이다. 진행하는 프로젝트에 대한 자세한 정보는 웹사이트(https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/euskor) 혹은 트위터(@TerezaANovotna)를 참고하면 된다.

Dr. Tereza Novotna is a Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow at Free University Berlin where she works on her "EUSKOR" research project about the EU's foreign policy towards North Korea. She is also a Senior Associate Research Fellow at the EUROPEUM, a Prague-based think-tank. In 2017-2018, Tereza was a Korea Foundation Visiting Professor at Seoul National University and collaborates with the Institute for European Studies, Université libre de Bruxelles where she worked from 2012 to 2017. She is the author of the monograph *How Germany Unified and the EU Enlarged: Negotiating the Accession through Transplantation and Adaptation* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). You can visit her project website at https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/euskor and to follow her on Twitter at @TerezaANovotna.

딘 올렛 경남대 극동문제연구소 부소장

Dean OUELLETTE Vice Director, IFES, Kyungnam University

경남대 정치외교학과 부교수와 경남대 극동문제연구소 국제실장을 겸하고 있다. 영문 계간 학술지인' 아시안 퍼스펙티브(Asian Perspective)'의 편집장이다. 북한관광, 북한 내 NGO활동, 남북교류 등의 연구를 하고 있다.

Dean Ouellette is also Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, and serves as the director for international affairs at IFES and managing editor for the journal Asian Perspective. His research interests include North Korean tourism, NGO activities in the DPRK, inter-Korean relations, North Korea's foreign relations, and peacemaking, among other topics.

나자닌 자데-커밍스 호주 디킨대 인도주의 리더십 센터 연구 부소장

Nazanin ZADEH-CUMMINGS Associate Director, Centre for Humanitarian Leadership at Deakin University

호주 멜번에 위치한 디킨대 인도주의 리더십 센터(CHL) 연구 부소장이다. CHL의 연구전략을 맡고있다. 주연구분야는 북한의 인도주의적 차원의 대응이다. 최근 프로젝트에서 인도주의적 단체들 관련 대북제재의 영향에 관해 연구했다.

Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings is Associate Director of Research and Lecturer in Humanitarian Studies at the Centre for Humanitarian Leadership (CHL), Deakin University in Melbourne. She leads the CHL's research strategy, which seeks to inform humanitarian practice through relevant, timely, impactful, and collaborative inquiry. Her own research often focuses on humanitarian response in North Korea. Her most recent project explored the impact of sanctions against North Korea on humanitarian agencies.

강하연 정보통신정책연구원 다자협력연구본부 본부장

Hayun KANG Executive Director, Division of International Cooperation Research, KISDI

주요 관심 연구분야는 무역통상정책, 디지털경제 무역규범, 무역과 개발, 남북ICT 협력 등이다. 지난 14년 동안 정부 FTA 및 WTO 통상협상에 전문가로 협상에 참여 또는 자문을 하였으며, 최근에는 디지털무역규범의 국제적 확산 연구 및 4차산업혁명 분야 남북경제협력 관련 연구를 진행 중이다. 정보통신부장관 표창, 기획경제부 장관표창. 방송통신위원회 위원장 표창을 받았다.

Dr. Kang's main research interests are in trade rules of the digital economy, inter-Korean cooperation in ICT matters, ICT policy development of developing countries. Dr. Kang served as expert adviser and negotiator for the Korean government for various international trade agreements and provided expertise in international organizations such as OECD, APECTEL, UNCTAD etc. Dr. Kang has ministerial citations from the Ministry of Information and Communications, Ministry of Finance and Economy and from the Korea Communications Commission, Republic of Korea.

크리스토퍼 맥카시 경남대 극동문제연구소 초빙연구위원

Christopher MCCARTHY Visiting Research Fellow, IFES, Kyungnam University

경남대 극동문제연구소 초빙연구위원이다. 생물다양성을 접목하여 어떻게 북한이 국제적 타겟을 획득하는지에 대한 새로운 시각의 연구를 진행하고 있다. 동아시아와 아프리카의 작은 마을들의 밀렵 방지와 생계수단 확보를 위한 교육, 마을발전 등을 지향하는 Humanity and Wildlife Foundation을 2019년 설립했다.

Christopher McCarthy, PhD, is a visiting research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, South Korea. His current research involves investigating the different pathways for how North Korea can achieve international targets concerning biological diversity conservation. In 2019, he founded The Humanity and Wildlife Foundation, an organization that works with local communities in East Asia and Africa to prevent poaching and improve livelihoods through microfinance, education and community development. He is originally from La Jolla, California.

제임스 반필 경남대 극동문제연구소 초빙연구위원
James BANFILL Visiting Research Fellow, IFES, Kyungnam University

경남대 극동문제연구소 초빙연구위원이다. 북한에서 관광, 문화 프로젝트, 과학적 교류 등 다방면에 관여하며 일을 했었다. 지난 10년간 북한을 30회 이상 방문했다.

James Banfill is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University. He has previously worked in North Korea in various capacities, including tourism, cultural projects, scientific exchange, and aid monitoring, visiting the country more than 30 times in the past decade.

Opening Session Speakers

Kwan-sei Lee is Director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. He has served as the 17th ROK Deputy Minister of Unification, Head of the Office of Inter-Korean Dialogue, Director General for Unification Policy, Head of the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau, and Ministry of Unification spokesperson. He also served as a representative in the 18th, 19th, and 20th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks, and was the head of the advance team for the Inter-Korean Summit. He is a member of various governmental advisory committees such as the Gaeseong Industrial District Management Foundation.

Christian Taaks joined FNF in 2004 and had a.o. posts as head of the Asia division and head of the European and Transatlantic Dialogue division as well as twice being the acting director of the international politics department. From 2010 to 2015 he was the director of FNF scholarship programs. He received his Ph.D. from Free University Berlin and has worked in the field of development cooperation since the late 1980s.

Panel Chairs

Jihwan Hwang is Professor of International Relations at the University of Seoul, Korea. He was visiting scholar at the Catholic University of America and also taught inter-Korean relations at the George Washington University. He has served as several advisory positions in the Korean government, including Presidential Commission on Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Unification. His publications include "The Paradox of South Korea's Unification Diplomacy," "The Two Koreas after U.S. Unipolarity," "the Political Implications of American Military Policy in Korea," etc. He is a graduate of Seoul National University and received his Ph.D. in Political Science from University of Colorado, Boulder.

Dean Ouellette is also Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, and serves as the director for international affairs at IFES and managing editor for the journal Asian Perspective. His research interests include North Korean tourism, NGO activities in the DPRK, inter-Korean relations, North Korea's foreign relations, and peacemaking, among other topics.

Panelists

Tae-Kyung Kim is currently a research professor at the University of North Studies, Seoul, South Korea, conducting researches on the inter-Korean social integration and the peace process in the Korean Peninsula. She is a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from Seoul National University, with her dissertation on "The "Koreanization of Socialist Realism" in North Korea: The Making of the Monolithic Ideological System of Party in Literature." Her recent research interests include diverse discourses and practices in North Korea, in the context of the Soviet "peaceful coexistence" policies during the early Cold War, covering various themes of disarmament, confederation/federation of the Korean Peninsula, and peaceful economic development in line with international cooperation (with the Socialist bloc as well as the Third World). In addition to the studies on past alternatives in North Korea, once purged but carrying potentials to be revisited in reform, Tae-Kyung is participating in the researches on the post-COVID-19 inter-Korean relations, examining the recent changes in North Korea in terms of human security issues.

Kab-Woo Koo is a Professor of Political Science at the University of North Korean Studies. He was a visiting professor at the University of Toyama and a visiting researcher at Rikkyo University in Japan. His research interests include international political economy, North Korean foreign policy, and Korean literature. His publications include *Critical Peace Studies and Korean Peninsula*(2007), *A Critique of International Relations*(2008), "Towards a Working Peace System on the Korean Peninsula"(2011), "Civil Society and Unification Movements in South Korea"(2011), "Reproduction of Post-Colonial Divided States: A Comparative Analysis on Social Partition between Two Koreas and Ireland-Northern Ireland(2012), "A Protype of Nuclear Discourse in North Korea, 1947-1964"(2014), "The Discursive Origins of Anti-Americanism in the Two Koreas"(2017), "Origin and Development of the Pyeongchang Provisional Peace Regime"(2018) and "Two Pyongyang Times"(2019) etc.

June Park is a political economist working on trade, energy, and tech conflicts with a broader range of regional focuses not just on the U.S. and East Asia, but also Europe and the Middle East. She also conducts policy-oriented research on the two Koreas. She is currently an East Asia Voices Initiative (EAVI) Fellow of the East Asia National Resource Center at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, and a Next Generation Researcher at the National Research Foundation of Korea.

Her grand theme of research is why countries fight and how, using what. She studies why countries have different policy outcomes by analyzing governance structures – domestic institutions, leaderships, and bureaucracies that shape the policy formation process.

As EAVI Fellow, she will pursue the publication of her first book manuscript, TRADE WARS & CURRENCY CONFLICT: China, South Korea and Japan's Responses to U.S. Pressures since the Global Financial Crisis, and the launch of her second book project, EUROPE's CHALLENGES & RESPONSES: Between Faustian Bargains with China and U.S. Pressures since Brexit. Using a framework of *institutional variance*, her first book manuscript attempts to answer why the three countries have not acted the same upon encountering U.S. protectionism, and provides a mechanism for predicting policy moves. Her second book project also utilizes the framework of *institutional variance* to examine the varied policy responses from Germany, France and the UK post-Brexit to China and the U.S. in the era of geoeconomic conflict and artificial intelligence. For specific deliveries to the GW EANRC, Dr. Park will be proceeding with her standalone project on COVID-19 and tech wars in the form of peer-reviewed journal articles, and presenting her work in webinars related to the topic. On this endeavor, she will be working with Professor Susan Aaronson, who heads the Digital Trade and Data Governance Hub at GWU.

Dr. Park earned her BA and MA in political science with a focus on international security from Korea University, received her PhD in Political Science with a focus on international political economy from Boston University as a Fulbright Fellow and completed a postdoctoral fellowship at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the

National University of Singapore. She wrote her masters thesis on U.S. and UN sanctions based on her internship experience at the United Nations Headquarters Department of Political Affairs Sanctions Subsidiary Organs Branch between 2005 and 2006, where she worked on several sanctions committees. She has been providing significant media commentary on North Korea since 2015 and is a member of the 'Multilateral Sanctions Dissected - Lessons Learned from Margaret Doxey' book project led by Dr. Andrea Charron (University of Manitoba, Canada) and Dr. Clara Portela (EU Institute for Security Studies).

Leif-Eric Easley is Associate Professor of International Studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul. He teaches international security and political economics. His research includes U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral coordination on engaging China and North Korea, and the geopolitical implications of domestic reforms (especially in Korea and Myanmar). Dr. Easley was a Northeast Asian History Fellow at Stanford University and a visiting scholar at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo. He is involved in U.S.-Asia Track II diplomacy with the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and is an alumnus of leadership programs with the Pacific Forum, the Korea Foundation, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research appears in academic journals and volumes (available at http://leifeasley.net), supplemented by commentary in major newspapers. He completed his B.A. in political science with a minor in mathematics at UCLA and received his M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University's Department of Government.

Tereza Novotna is a Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow at Free University Berlin where she works on her "EUSKOR" research project about the EU's foreign policy towards North Korea. She is also a Senior Associate Research Fellow at the EUROPEUM, a Prague-based think-tank. In 2017-2018, Tereza was a Korea Foundation Visiting Professor at Seoul National University and collaborates with the Institute for European Studies, Université libre de Bruxelles where she worked from 2012 to 2017. Tereza received her doctorate from Boston University in 2012 and other degrees from Charles University Prague. She is the author of the monograph How *Germany Unified and the EU Enlarged: Negotiating the Accession through Transplantation and Adaptation* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and has widely published on EU foreign policy in, among others, *Journal of Common Market Studies, Studia Diplomatica*, and on the EU-(North) Korea relations in *38th North, The Diplomat, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9DashLine* and others. Tereza has been a frequent commentator for media outlets such as Indus News, Czech TV and NK News and You can visit her project website at https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/euskor and to follow her on Twitter at @ TerezaANovotna.

Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings is Associate Director of Research and Lecturer in Humanitarian Studies at the Centre for Humanitarian Leadership (CHL), Deakin University in Melbourne. She leads the CHL's research strategy, which seeks to inform humanitarian practice through relevant, timely, impactful, and collaborative inquiry. Her own research often focuses on humanitarian response in North Korea. Her most recent project explored the impact of sanctions against North Korea on humanitarian agencies. Nazanin holds a PhD from the City University of Hong Kong, and Master's degrees in International Humanitarian Assistance from Ruhr University Bochum/Université catholique de Louvain and International Relations from the University of Edinburgh.

Hayun Kang's main research interests are in trade rules of the digital economy, inter-Korean cooperation in ICT matters, ICT policy development of developing countries. Dr. Kang served as expert adviser and negotiator for the Korean government for various international trade agreements and provided expertise in international organizations such as OECD, APECTEL, UNCTAD etc.

Dr. Kang is a graduate of the University of British Columbia, Canada, and completed Ph.D. in international relations at Northwestern University, USA. Dr. Kang has ministerial citations from the Ministry of Information and Communications, Ministry of Finance and Economy and from the Korea Communications Commission, Republic of Korea.

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James Banfill is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University. He has previously worked in North Korea in various capacities, including tourism, cultural projects, scientific exchange, and aid monitoring, visiting the country more than 30 times in the past decade. James holds a MS in Soil Science from the Pennsylvania State University.

Session 1

북한과 세계: 관계와 제재의 '재'평가

North Korea International: Re-evaluating Relations and Sanctions

코로나19 사태 이후 북한과의 관계 및 외교의 재평가

Reassessing Relations and Diplomacy with North Korea in a COVID-19 World: Challenges and Prospects

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김태경 북한대학원대 연구교수, **구갑우** 북한대학원대 교수

Tae-Kyung Kim Research Professor, University of North Korean Studies, **Kab-Woo Koo** Professor, University of North Korean Studies

< Abstract >

이 글에서는 북한이 스스로 "방역국가 (quarantine state)" 화 함으로써, 전 세계적 유행병 상황에 적응해오고 있음을 주장하고자 한다. 북한은 계속해서 자국이 "코로나 청정국"임을 주장하고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 북한이 엄격한 봉쇄 정책과 선별적 국제협력을 시행함으로써, 이 전례없는 전염병으로부터 주민과 정권을 보호하기 위한 전국가적 총력을 다하고 있음은 부인할 수 없다. 북한은 의료시스템과 인프라가 부족하여 특히나 전염병에 취약하다. 이에 북한은 국제인도적구호 단체들과의 파트너쉽을 제한적이나마 유지하면서, 바이러스 확산 방지를 위해 상대적으로 빠르고 철저한 조치를 취해오고 있다. 북한이 "방역국가"로 자체 변환했다는 점에서 다음과 같은 함의점을 찾을 수 있다. 전염병의 전세계적 대유행하는 상황에서는, 현존세계질서상 가장 고립된 국가라할지라도 타국과 똑같이 영향을 받을수 밖에 없다는 것, 그리고 타국이 추구하는 바와 같이, 북한도 코로나 이전에 우선시되던 사항들을 조정함으로써 주민의 생명과 안전을 지키고자 한다는 것이다. 판데믹으로 인해서, 새롭게 부상하는 안보 문제들을 분석하고 거기에 대응할 수 있게 하는, 가령 인간안보접근법과 같은 새로운 사고와 접근법이 힘을 얻고 있다. 이같은 접근법은 정체된 한반도 평화 프로세스를 재조직 하는 새로운 기회를 창출하는데 기여할 수 있을 것이다. 인간안보라는 공동의 문제에 맞서, 국경을 초월하는 협력이야말로 포괄적 안보문제 해결에 가장 큰 역할을 할 수 있을 것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 증대되는 인간안보문제들을 다룰 때는 전통적 국가안보 접근방식과 상충될 수 있기에, 중대한 도전 과제를 야기시키고 있다.

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This presentation argues that the DPRK has adapted to the pandemic world by self-fashioning as a "quarantine state." Even as the DPRK keeps claiming itself a "coronavirus-free country," it has undeniably taken all the national-scale efforts to protect its people and the regime from the unprecedented zoonosis with stringent lockdown and/or international cooperation. The DPRK, with particular vulnerability to the epidemic due to the under-equipped healthcare system and medical infrastructure, has implemented relatively rapid and thorough measures to prevent the spread of the virus, while sustaining a partnership, if constrained, with international humanitarian relief networks. The implication of the self-transformation of the DPRK as a version of "quarantine state" is that: under the pandemic, the most secluded state in the existing world order has been equally impacted; and shares the common objective of protecting people's life and safety while adjusting the pre-COVID-19 priorities. The pandemic has envigorated new ideas and approaches to analyze and respond to the emerging security problems, e.g. human security approach, which might contribute to new opportunities in reorganizing the halted peace processes in the Korean Peninsula. In the face of the common human security problems, transnational cooperation will best serve the comprehensive security issues. Nonetheless, while engaging with the growing human security problems can conflict with the traditional, national security approaches, leaving significant challenges.

1. Introduction

On July 25, 2020, Kim Jong Un, president of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), declared a "maximum emergency" in the urgently convened Politburo meeting of the WPK. The enlarged Politburo emergency meeting was held to handle the first-ever suspected novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) case in the DPRK, which compounded the already exacerbated inter-Korean relations, since the suspected case was alleged to cross the border from the Republic of Korea (ROK).[1]

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) issued a top-level alert in line with the "maximum emergency anti-epidemic system" and the lockdown of the city of Kaesong. The shift to the highest level of emergency was from the previous "state emergency anti-epidemic system," which has taken effect from January 24, right after the DPRK sealed off its borders with the People's Republic of China (PRC) on January 21.

Since the Arduous March during the 1990s, the DPRK, one of the weakest states in food security, water and sanitation, and health and hygiene, which are fundamental Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) under the UN 2030 agenda, has been severely affected by natural disasters and climate change. As a result, the DPRK government has increasingly brought enormous and unprecedented efforts to preparing and readying itself for the upcoming threats by climate change.

Then, the present coronavirus crisis has accelerated the course of the DPRK's recent transformation and established it as a form of the "quarantine state," which resulted in the fundamental rearrangement of policy priorities in state security and sustainable development. The new, evolving zoonosis of the coronavirus facilitated the need to speed up the DPRK's rearrangements in development policies and the official rhetoric addressing the people's needs, which we argue, leads to a change in its self-characterization as the 'quarantine state': a state, capable of implementing effective anti-epidemic policies.

In Table 1, we categorize two sets of choices the 'quarantine states' are faced with amid the crisis of COVID-19. The first is between totalitarian surveillance and civic empowerment. The second is between nationalist isolation and global solidarity. The following Table 1 shows different forms of the quarantine state classified by these two sets of choices.

Table 1. Types of Quarantine States.

		Foreign Policy	
		Nationalist Isolation	Global Solidarity
Measure of Quarantine	Totalitarian Surveillance	North Korean type	Chinese type
	Civic Empowerment	American type	South Korean/European type

[1] The June 16 explosion of Joint Liaison Office in Kaesong materialized the already deteriorating relations between North and South Korea, which traced back to the unsuccessful Hanoi Summit in February 2019.

The American quarantine state, which leaves an issue of wearing a face mask to individual choice, has become in fact a 'failed' quarantine state. The actions of the United States pursuing nationalist isolation while its hegemony has been in decline, become an obstacle for international cooperation during COVID-19. The United States has left the World Health Organization (WHO), which leads to global anti-epidemic cooperation.

By contrast, China attempts to quarantine itself through totalitarian surveillance but seeks multilateral cooperation at the global level.

The South Korean quarantine state, claiming slogans of openness, transparency and democracy, also has been actively involved in global solidarity. Examples of global cooperation include the World Trade Organization's statement that addresses the need for more free-trade regimes in the era of COVID-19; the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund's commitment to supporting underdeveloped countries threatened by COVID-19; and the COVID-19 Law Lab, a database of laws that countries have implemented in response to the pandemic.

On the other hand, the North Korean quarantine state, which claims so far to have no cases of COVID-19, has mobilized extreme containment and isolation measures, persisting cooperation with China or Russia and international humanitarian aid networks, while abandoning the open, multilateral cooperation against the pandemic.

2. The Situation on COVID-19 in North Korea

On January 21, 2020, in Korea Time, Pyongyang placed the temporary hold on the flight to/from China from the DPRK, suspending the foreign tourism.[2] The timing was right after the PRC State Hygiene Health Commission publicly announced the decision to respond to the virus that broke out in Wuhan, as like a first-degree (甲類) infectious disease, while defining it as a second-degree (乙類) infectious disease on January 20. The gist of the January 20 statement based on the third field review by the PRC state was a call for the fundamental change in the previous anti-virus work, admitting the person-to-person contagion. After the January 20 statement, the Hubei province, including the city of Wuhan, was locked down.

The unusual, fast-enough seal off of the border between China was accompanied by the declaration of the peace-time, "state hygiene and anti-epidemic system" into the "state emergency hygiene and anti-epidemic system" on January 24.[3] Not only the border with China was blocked, but also the historic, inter-Korean channel of the Joint Liaison Office in Kaesong was closed by request of the North out of fear of the virus spread. Furthermore, on January 30, the day WHO declared the Public Health Emergency of International Concerns (PHEIC), the DPRK suspended all flights and trains with China.

2 Smith and Zhang 2020; Koen and Boem 2020.

3 Rodong Sinmun 2020a.

The rapid, extensive measures enforced by the state resulted from the gravity of the party elites' threat perception on the epidemic. After stringent measures implemented to blockade the borders against the spread of the virus inside the DPRK, Kim Jong Un, upon the authorization of the Central Committee of the WPK, convened the Political Bureau meeting on February 29, on implementing the anti-epidemic work.

Externally, Kim's manoeuver of the anti-epidemic diplomacy drew attention as Kim sent letters to President Xi Jinping at the end of January, President Moon Jae In in March, and U.S. President Donald J. Trump, sending condolences and encouragements.[4] More importantly, in the Political Bureau meeting and the following Supreme People's Assembly meeting on April 11-12, respectively, the primary focus was on the anti-COVID-19 efforts, based on the re-assessment of the external environment due to the global pandemic.

The significant changes decided in April by the Party and the state include readjusting of the previous policy priorities formerly tuned in the 5th Plenary meeting of the 7th Central Committee at the end of 2019 in line with the changing pandemic world, and allocating more budget to healthcare while freezing the military budget. The budget bill passed in the Supreme People's Assembly Meeting raised the portion of its budget of public health by 7.4 percent, while increasing the expenditures for national defense only 1 percent from last year.[5] The April's turn toward a more thorough anti-epidemic work, authorized by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and bolstered by the approved budget plans by the Supreme People's Assembly, evidences significant changes in the national priorities of the DPRK.

At the end of July, the national emergency anti-epidemic system against the pandemic has only escalated to the "maximum emergency" due to the alleged, first suspected coronavirus case of a returned defector. Through the summer, what has extended and intensified the national emergency anti-epidemic system were the successive flooding by typhoons. Under the guidance of the non-permanent national emergency disaster prevention committee, the central and regional quarters for disaster prevention were organized and implemented for disaster management. The national emergency disaster prevention system went hand in hand with the working national emergency anti-epidemic system, reinforcing the priorities of the effective anti-epidemic work in the middle of natural disaster situations requiring quick, large-scale restoration.

Kim Jong Un announced that no external assistance for the flooding disaster is allowed in the context of national-scale anti-epidemic warfare in the August 13 Politburo meeting. The DPRK keeps insisting on the air-tight quarantine measures, disallowing loosening up on the extended, anti-epidemic system. In the ongoing national emergency anti-epidemic system, the most crucial decision was made in the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the WPK on the August 19: The Eighth Party Congress

4 Kim Jong Un not just sent a personal letter to Xi Jinping but with condolence money for the Chinese people in their heroic fight with the virus. Rodong Sinmun 2020b. In May, Kim once again sent a letter to congratulate China's successful anti-epidemic work. Xi sent a reply to Kim, appreciating the DPRK's concerns and promising persistent cooperation and solidarity between China and the DRPK in the anti-epidemic front. Xinhua 2020; Mo 2020. On the Kim-Moon exchange of letters, see KBS World 2020; on the letter Trump sent to the DPRK regarding the COVID-19 assistance, Reuters 2020.

5 Rodong Sinmun 2020c.

was announced to be held in January 2021. The significance of the decision on the future Party Congress has been more highlighted with the frank, self-critical tone of Kim Jong Un, recognizing the failure of the existing Five Year Strategy under the unexpected, tough, internal, and external circumstances. A series of high-level party meetings concerning the current anti-epidemic emergency and the natural disaster emergency show a definite trend of shifting priorities under the pandemic, rearranging the state strategy on the premise of the longer-term quarantine.

Meanwhile, the long-term economic prospects under the sanctions, the pandemic lockdown, plus the burden of severe flooding pose the problem of the North Korean quarantine state's sustainability amid the crisis. Due to the effect of sanctions against the country, North Korea's trade with China has decreased significantly since 2018, and due to the COVID-19 pandemic, exports to China fell by 82.5 percent year-on-year and imports to China fell by 64.8 percent year-on-year in the first four months of 2020. North Korea attempts to overcome the economic crisis caused by the sanctions and COVID-19 through the 'localization' of both consumer and producer goods. North Korea's consumer prices have reportedly risen 5.4 percent year-on-year from January 2020 to May, right after the outbreak of the pandemic, but have since stabilized. However, it is still unclear whether North Korea would adopt the expansionary fiscal policy that other quarantine states have adopted, although the budget for the health sector has increased among social expenditures. Although the issuance of 'People's Life Bonds' has been reported, no confirmation has been reached on it yet.[6]

In addition to the governmental measures against the spread of the pandemic inside the DPRK, the link the DPRK has sustained for more than twenty years with the UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs should be acknowledged to understand the "quarantine state" of North Korea.

The DPRK has contested that based on continuous testing, it had zero cases of the coronavirus so far.[7] WHO has received reports from the DPRK on the numbers of people tested in and out of quarantine.[8] Dr. Edwin Salvador, the WHO Representative to the DPRK, confirmed the fact that the DPRK had been reporting "weekly updates" via the Ministry of Public Health, stating that the country has the capacity to test COVID-19 in its national reference laboratory in Pyongyang.[9]

As of April 2,709 people (11 foreigners and 698 nationals) have been tested, resulting in no confirmed case of COVID-19. The number of people in quarantine was 509 (2 foreigners and 507 nationals). In total, 24,842 people have been released from quarantine since December 31, 2019, among which 380 were foreigners.[10]

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6 Chang 2020; Byrne 2020.

7 On July 30, the official newspaper Rodong Sinmun confirmed that the DPRK continued to be a "coronavirus-free state," which was the first coverage after Kim Jong Un on January 26 declared the "maximum emergency anti-epidemic system." Rodong Sinmun 2020d. On August 5, Dr. Salvador, WHO representative for the DPRK said North Korea's declared test result on the first suspected case was "inconclusive." Farge and Smith 2020.

8 Nebehay 2020.

9 Ibid.

10 According to Dr. Salvador's interview with Reuters, WHO has been informed that the DPRK acquired primers and probes for use with PCR diagnostic tests from China in January. Ibid.

The WHO released official data on April 17 confirming that 740 people have been tested for the virus and 25,139 were released from quarantine.

The June 30 news coverage of a South Korea news outlet on North Korea reported that 922 people have been tested and 25,551 people in total were released from quarantine as per the update on June 19, citing the email by a WHO representative in Pyongyang.[11] Later, WHO stated that as of July 16, the DPRK had tested 1,211 people and 696 nationals were under quarantine.[12]

The fact that the DPRK has attempted to cooperate with the WHO, reporting "weekly updates" on the statistics of testing and quarantine, shows that the DPRK has been at least conscious of and responsive to the significance of information sharing and international cooperation for the global anti-epidemic work. Though the DPRK has not acknowledged a single case so far, it has seriously interacted with UN humanitarian agencies and international NGOs for the preparedness and responses to the coronavirus.[13]

According to the WHO Preparedness and Responses Progress Report, the funding of $941,120 was distributed by WHO to the DPRK as of June 30.[14] WHO and the neighbours, including China and Russia, provided humanitarian assistance to the DPRK for preventing, preparing, and responding to COVID-19. UN agencies such as FAO, WFP, and UNICEF under the UN Resident Coordinator, have continued their humanitarian missions in the face of UN sanctions and COVID-19. Also, the international relief organizations, like the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), MSF, and the Eugene Bell Foundation, persisted their long-term humanitarian aid despite further delays due to the COVID-19 lockdown plus sanctions.[15]

Besides the assistance vital for testing and treating COVID-19 , humanitarian relief programs for nutrition, food security, water and sanitation, and health and hygiene also have been carried out under the UN Strategic Framework (2017-2021).[16] The annual report of the DPR Korea Needs and Priorities 2020, issued in April, assessed urgent humanitarian needs and an estimated number of people in need of such assistance. The report estimated that 10.4 million people are in need, among which 5.5 million people are targeted in the response plan of the UN.[17] The UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) also developed a Country Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan (SPRP) with the DRPK government reflecting the impact of the COVID-19 to humanitarian needs in the country in April.[18] The plan emphasizes the continued prioritization

11 Kim 2020a.

12 Cha and Nebehay 2020.

13 Ahn 2020; Kim 2020b.

14 Worth Health Organization 2020, 12.

15 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2020a. Kim 2020b.

16 United Nations DPR Korea 2017.

17 The number of people targeted with assistance show a 45 percent increase, which rose from 3.8 million in 2019 to 5.5 million, as a result of WHO coverage expansion to children under 15, from the previous standard of children under-five and adults. United Nations DPR Korea 2020.

18 Ahn 2020.

of food security, nutrition, health, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions.[19]

Since the early phases of the pandemic the UN humanitarian agencies and INGOs have raised their dreading concerns over "unintentional consequences" of the UN sanctions that only are aggravated with the pandemic blockage.[20] Recent reports on the humanitarian agencies' rehabilitation work after the Typhoon Lingling in 2019 offered a good picture of the current humanitarian relief works were implemented and monitored under the double predicaments of COVID-19 quarantine and the UN sanctions as well as bilateral ones.[21] Such barriers have forced the resident humanitarian agencies to rely on even the DPRK government in carrying out payments to suppliers and logistics providers to continue their relief missions.[22]

The DPRK's anti-epidemic efforts can be sustainable only with the consistent collaboration of the humanitarian aid networks. In a sense, global humanitarian assistance functions as a necessary condition for the North Korean 'quarantine state,' for protecting the life and safety of the North Korean people.

3. Re-Building Relations with North Korea in a COVID-19 World: Challenges and Chances

As seen above, North Korea's responses to the pandemic have shifted itself toward a version of "quarantine state" in its way. The COVID-19 has not only transformed the states' priorities and behaviors in international politics, but also facilitated new thinking, approaches, and paradigms on peace and security. The human security approaches have particularly attracted attention in the pandemic world since the concept of human security and the relevant policy agenda well fit in the current global health crisis accompanied by economic, social, and political hardships.[23] In specific, the present North Korean situation mobilizing the national emergency anti-epidemic system against the pandemic in combination with the national emergency disaster prevention system against the typhoons and flooding, makes a good case for the human security approach.

In reassessing the relations and diplomacy with North Korea in the pandemic world, we have to face the new, emerging agendas which are significantly associated with human security problems. At the same time, we cannot and should not evade the traditional security problems, while appreciating and finding ways to resolve the new, human security issues. Our attempt to analyze the current anti-epidemic efforts of North

19 United Nations DPR Korea 2020, 5.

20 Park, Kim and Jong 2019.

21 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2020b; 2020c; Zadeh-Cummings and Harris 2020.

22 White 2020. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2020c; on the growing opinions of the international society against UN sanctions on the DPRK, Park, Kim and Jong 2019; Babson 2002; Smith 2020; Zadeh-Cummings and Harris 2020.

23 The UN Human Development Report (1994) defined human security as to include "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the pattern of daily life." The concept was expanded to encompass economic, health and environmental issues as well as the physical security of the individual human being. According to Acharya, what differentiates human security from traditional national security derives from the distinct, key questions the human security approaches pose: 1) "security for whom?"; 2) "security against what?"; and 3) "security in which areas?". Acharya 2003.

Korea as a self-transformation of "quarantine state" would help to understand North Korea in the pandemic from the human security approach. As in other states in the globe facing the pandemic, North Korea has transformed its national priorities to prevent the spread of the infectious diseases effectively, and in so doing, share a common ground with the world of focusing on the human security problems.

In what follows, we point out some challenges and opportunities in rebuilding the relations with North Korea in the post-pandemic world.

1) Challenges

- Global Leadership Deficit (G-Zero) in Urgent Need of Global Cooperation against the SARS-CoV-2

- Escalating the US-China Strategic Rivalry
  - In the face of the pandemic, the strategic rivalry in the region and the world has accelerated, instead of joining in the global cooperation against the coronavirus. Ex. The debates on the "origin of the pandemic."
  - With the adoption of lockdowns and border controls, the 'de-coupling' was debated and promoted as an alternative to globalization. The options of rearranging the global value chains and organizing regional or domestic value chains have been considered. Besides, the US's pressure of the Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China has been growing in the region.

- Stalled denuclearization and peace regime talks
  - The halted peace processes in the Korean Peninsula after the Hanoi Summit re-demonstrated the fundamental, historical disagreements on the methods and processes for denuclearization and peace architectures between the US and the DPRK.
  - For the peace processes to be resumed, the confirmed gaps between the US and the DPRK and the disparities in the perceptions and roles among the states in the region should be bridged via consultation and concession.

- The national security problems and paradigms persist with dominant power in Asia, conflicting with new thinking and policies regarding the human security approach.

- Even in the changing regional security environment after the pandemic, the traditional security dilemma will remain to be resolved. If the pandemic impacts on the gradual changes in new thinking on peace, it should eventually shift the traditional considerations, priorities, and beliefs regarding the denuclearization roadmaps.

2) Opportunities

- Evolving New Ideas and Approaches on Post-COVID-19 Peace

- The pandemic has ushered renewed, vibrant policy debates on the human security agenda in Asia and the Korean Peninsula, where national security approaches hold sway.
- With broadened landscapes and approaches in terms of security, initiating new cooperation in the region from the global health crisis can be possible.

• Empathy for the Initiatives for Preventing the Humanitarian Crisis in the Korean Peninsula
- The shock of the pandemic diffused the understanding of the seriousness of the humanitarian crisis that would accompany the health crisis, especially the humanitarian situations in North Korea, under the overlapping pressesures of sanctions, COVID-19, and natural disaster.

• Growing Appeals for Multilateral Cooperation in terms of Human Security Issues -

• New paradigms, including the human security approach, increasingly obtain more appeals in the policy-making groups and society.

• The remaining problem is whether the new perceptions in the urgency and significance of human security problems, such as multilateral cooperation against the pandemic, might develop a common identity for continuous, stable cooperation. Whether or not the need to develop an association, union, or whatever type of power-sharing governance in terms of human security problems can precede the need for allying in terms of traditional national security problems and overcome the given regional order remains to be seen.

4. Conclusion

The relations and diplomacy with North Korea in the post-pandemic world should be considered and evaluated based on the current developments in the DPRK, which demonstrates its own way of anti-epidemic efforts. The DPRK, in its way, has developed stringent anti-epidemic measures and limited but ongoing international cooperation with UN humanitarian agencies and global NGOs.

However, its foreign policy is still bent on nationalist isolation, which leads to grave concerns about economic and social deterioration under continuous sealing off of the border. Even if the DPRK keeps on relying on humanitarian assistance from the UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs, in terms of urgent assessment kits, PPEs, and essential medicines, the economic predicaments would not be relieved without the significant restoration of the trade with China or the lifting of the sanctions.

The pandemic has broadened the boundary of ordinary peoples' understanding of security, confirming the human security paradigms which were debated in the academy or in some specific issue areas. The lesson from the global pandemic is that, for the two political entities in the Korean Peninsula, within such close distance bordering each other, one side of the widespread of the infectious diseases also means the other's disaster. The pandemic awakens newly defined interest in the human security problems, with every state's

priorities converging in the quarantine work, emphasizing the value of protecting the individual human life. The new ideas and approaches to post-pandemic peace, including human security paradigms, can lead to more comprehensive cooperation based on the "community of life" in the Korean Peninsula, forwarding the higher, common identity beyond the two Koreas. However, the remaining influences of the national security paradigms that traditionally dominates in the region should first be challenged to go beyond.

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제재에 적응하기: 부정 행동 차단과 협력 촉진

Adapting Sanctions: Blocking Bad Behavior, Facilitating Cooperation

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박준의 한국연구재단 학문후속세대연구자

June Park Next Generation Researcher, National Research Foundation of Korea

< Abstract >

북한의 나쁜 행동을 차단하기위한 필수 조건은 무엇인가? 2006 년 북한 핵실험에 대응하여 미 재무부 해외 자산 통제국의 방코 델타 아시아 사건 (북한의 금융 자산 거점을 효과적으로 조준했으나, 실질적인 성과를 내지 못함) 이후 제재는 어떻게 발전해 왔는가?

이 발표에서는 대북 데땅뜨 및 외교적 외교적 수단이 성공을 거두지 못하는 동안, 최근 수년간 제재가 어떤 방식으로 발전되어 왔는지를 살펴본다. 이는 글로벌 금융체제와 사이버 공간에서의 북한의 불법적 경제 활동을 추적하는 것이 북한의 나쁜 행위를 막는데 가장 중요한 요소가 되었기 때문이다. 이러한 노력은 비대면 경제가 규범화되고 디지털 환경이 북한 해커의 온상이 되어가는, 지리경제학적 격동의 코로나 시대에서는 필수적이라 할 수 있다.

유엔 안전보장 이사회는 유엔안보리 결의 718조에 따라 설치된 유엔안보리 제재위원회의 활동을 통해 제재이행의 주된 주체로 자리잡고 있으나, 미국은 일방적인 대상 설정 및 제재 행사에 있어 계속해서 핵심적인 역할을 해오고 있다. 부시행정부 하의 9.11 테러이후, 미 재무부는 미국의 대테러방지 노력의 일환으로 금융제재를 주도하고 있으며, 북한의 금융자산을 대상으로 부분적이나마 성공을 거두기도 했다. 그러나, 여러 요인들 (미국 재무부와 국방부 조직간 갈등, 북한의 제재회피에 있어서 중국의 지속적인 개입, 북한 전술의 정교화등)로 인해 그 효과가 확대되지 못했다.

이 발표에서는 1) 우선 시기별 제재의 배경을 설명하고, 2) 어떻게 회피 기술을 다룰것인가에 대한 연구 질문, 즉 급속히 비대면화 되는 글로벌 경제하에서 제재를 어떻게 조정할 것인가에 대해 다루고자 한다. 그런 다음, 3)자금 세탁및 사이버해킹 분야에서 크게 발달해온 제재회피 방식으로 계속되어온 북한의 불법행위에 대한 유엔과 미 재무부의 제재에 관해 개괄한다. 그리고 4) 가능하다면 정책적 여력이 있는 영역에서 협력을 유도해야 할 것인가를 묻고, 한미 양국이 차례로 리더쉽 교체기에 접어들고 해수부 공무원의 갑작스러운 사망으로 인해 남북관계 교착상황이 더 악화되는 이 시점에서의 제재완화가 야기할 수 있는 문제점을 다루고자 한다. 이같은 상황과 관련해서, 5) 한국과 미국의 국내정치, 즉 대권의 향방이 달린 한국 여론의 역할과 미국 대북제재의 주요 주체들간의 권력 투쟁에 주목하게 된다. 끝으로, 중국이 중앙 은행에서 발행 한 세계 최초이자 유일한 디지털 주권 통화를 출시할 준비가 되어 있기 때문에, 중국의 국가 지원을 통해 제재회피 기술이 새로운 차원으로 발전할 수 있다는 점에(이는 미 재무부의 금융제재 효과를 상대적으로 약화시킬 수 있다) 대해 조심스럽게 경고하면서 발표를 마치고자 한다.

◆ ◆ ◆

What are the essential conditions for blocking bad behavior by North Korea? How have sanctions evolved since the aftermath of the case of Banco Delta Asia by the Office of Foreign Assets Control at U.S. Treasury in response to the North Korean nuclear test in 2006 (which effectively targeted North Korea's financial stronghold but did not yield substantial results)?

This presentation explores the ways in which sanctions have evolved in recent years during the failed détente and diplomacy on North Korea, as tracking North Korea's illicit economic activities in the global financial system and cyberspace have become the most crucial elements in blocking its bad behavior. Such efforts are essential in a geoeconomically turbulent era under COVID-19, whereby the contactless economy becomes the norm and the digital environment becomes a breeding ground for North Korean hackers.

While the United Nations Security Council stands as the main actor in sanctions implementations with activities by the UNSC Sanctions Committee established pursuant to UNSC/RES/1718, the U.S. continues and strives to be the key player in exercising unilateral, targeted sanctions. Since the 9.11 Terror during the Bush Administration, the U.S. Treasury has led its war in financial sanctions in line with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and had reaped partial success in targeting North Korea's financial assets, but the effects were not magnified due to multiple reasons (e.g., inter- organizational conflict between the U.S. Treasury and the State Department, continued involvement of China in sanctions evasions by North Korea, sophistication of North Korea's tactics, etc).

The presentation 1) first lays out a background of timeline of sanctions, with 2) the research question of how to deal with the art of evasion – in other words, how to adapt sanctions in a rapidly evolving contactless global economy. Then, it 3) delivers a brief overview of targeted sanctions by the UN and the U.S. Treasury on the illicit activities by North Korea that continue in the form of sanctions evasion, which has evolved significantly in the realms of money laundering and cyber hacking. It asks 4) whether to bring about cooperation in areas where there is policy space, if any, and addresses the challenges in sanctions relief at a time of stalemate in inter-Korean relations exacerbated by the sudden death of a maritime public official, as the U.S. and South Korea in turn enter the period of political leadership. In relation to such circumstances, it 5) brings to attention the domestic politics in South Korea and the U.S.: the role of South Korean public opinion to which the presidency is beholden to, and the power struggles for authority within key players of U.S. sanctions on North Korea. Finally, the presentation concludes with a cautionary warning on the art of evasion that may be taken to a new level with client state support from China, as China is poised to launch the world's first and only digital sovereign currency issued by its central bank, which may relatively weaken the U.S. Treasury's might in its financial sanctions endeavor.

20201007 IFES-FNF International Conference
North Korea International: (Re)Evaluating, (Re)Viewing, and (Re)Connecting in a COVID World

Adapting Sanctions: Blocking Bad Behavior, Facilitating Cooperation

Dr. June Park
East Asia Voices Initiative (EAVI) Fellow, East Asia National Resource Center,
Elliott School of International Affairs, **The George Washington University**
Next Generation Researcher, **National Research Foundation of Korea**

OVERVIEW

1. **Background:** Sanctions and Provocation Timeline
2. **Research Question:** *How to Deal with the Art of Evasion?*
3. **Targeted Sanctions:** *Money Laundering* and *Cyber-Hacking*
4. **Challenges in Sanctions Relief:** *Lost Causes*
5. **The Bottom Lines:** SK *Public Opinion, U.S. Treasury*
6. **Cautionary Warning:** *Digital Sovereign Currencies*

U.S. Sanctions, UNSC Resolutions & NK Provocation (2006-2016)



UNSC Resolutions & NK Provocation (2016-Present)

Sanctions Committee UNSC/RES 1718



Source: CRS 3/30/2020, Photos and graphics added by June Park

Research Question

How to Deal with the Art of Evasion?

- NK Individuals - Travel Ban - UNSC Sanctions / U.S. Treasury SDN List
- NK Assets - Assets Freeze - UNSC Sanctions / U.S. Treasury Sanctions
- Export Restrictions - UNSC Sanctions
- NK Cyber Hacking - The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)
- NK Money Laundering - U.S. Treasury **Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)**

Targeted Sanctions

UN Sanctions Committee established pursuant to UNSC/RES 1718 (2006)

- Arms Embargo
- Travel Ban
- Assets Freeze
- Correspondent Account Approvals
- Refined Petroleum Products
- Humanitarian Exemption Requests

'North Korea Fault Lines Exposed at UN Security Council Meeting,' Bloomberg, September 28, 2018.

Targeted Sanctions - U.S. Unilateral Sanctions

The main players and the process



Source: Atlantic Council (2019)
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/feature/sanctions-explained-how-a-foreign-policy-problem-becomes-a-sanctions-program/
Additional photos and graphics added by June Park

Targeted Sanctions - U.S. Unilateral Sanctions (continued)

The main players and the process

U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control

Trump often at odds with Treasury

How Money Laundering has worked for North Korea

The FinCEN Files (Reported by NBC News, BuzzFeed, ICIJ)

Thank you.
Vielen Dank.
감사합니다.

Comments, Questions:

jpark12@gwu.edu

junepark@bu.edu

June Park IR/IPE Research Web:
blogs.bu.edu/junepark

Twitter: @junepark

코로나19 사태 이후 남북관계: 정책 및 전망 재평가

Inter-Korean Relations in a COVID World: Re-evaluating Policy and Prospects

—

리프-에릭 이즐리 이화여대 부교수

Leif-Eric Easley Associate Professor, Ewha Womans University

< Abstract >

한미동맹은 동아시아 및 기타 지역에서의 북한에 의한 안보위협에 대응하는데 있어 가장 중요한 제도이다. 그러나 미국과 한국의 군사협력은 남북간 평화추구 전략들과 마찰을 일으키고 있다. 즉 북한의 핵과 미사일 프로그램을 겨냥하는 경제재제는 남북 공동 번영을 위한 사업들을 금지하고 있으며, 북한의 인권침해에 대한 우려는 남북화해를 위한 노력을 한층 더 복잡하게 하고있다. 대북 압박전략(accountability) 과 포용전략간의 (engagement strategies)의 모순을 어떻게 완화시킬 수 있을 것인가? 이 글에서는 한미동맹 조율과 관련해서 발표된 정책 및 인터뷰 데이타, 유엔안보리 제재이행에 관한 기본자료 및 정치양극화와 국가정체성에 관한 한국내 자료를 분석함으로써, 포스트 코로나 시대에 맞게, 위 질문에 답하고자 한다.

김정은 정권이 외교적 방안을 거부한채 핵, 미사일과 사이버 능력을 앞세움에 따라 한미동맹에 긴장감이 계속 증대되고 있다. 한미동맹간 협력과 제도는 그대로 있지만, 양국은 코로나 상황 및 논쟁이 많은 선거에 정신이 분산되어 있다. 축소된 군사훈련은 대비태세와 양국군의 상호운용성에 대한 우려를 낳고 있다. 전시작전통수권의 이전과 첨단기술 방위시스템의 조달이 국내 정치에 의해 영향을 받고 있다. 한미동맹 비용분담에 관한 협상은 트럼프 정부가 동맹국측의 비용부담을 확 증폭시킨 이후 난항에 부딪혀 있다. 심지어 유엔사령부와 동맹 대화메카니즘도 서울의 대북접근에 간섭한다는 주장으로 정치이슈화 되었다.

한국경제는 글로벌 팬데믹, 미중 기술-무역 경쟁, 그리고 전시근로배상문제로 인한 일본의 보복조취등에 직면해있다. 이같은 배경하에서, 한국정부는 "한국평화경제"를 기반으로 새로운 기회 창출을 모색하고자 하고있다. 인프라 연계, 개인단위 관광 재개, 개성에 공동 공공의료공단 건설 및 DMZ를 가로지르는 평화지역 제안, 남북교류와 협력에 관한 법률 개정과 공동 올림픽 신청등의 계획이 이에 포함된다. 그러나, 김정은-트럼프간 하노이 정상회담 이후 제재가 제대로 완화되지 않았기에, 한국은 북한이 협상테이블로 복귀하도록 유도하지 못하고 있다. 가장 최근에 한국정부가 제안한 남북물물교환은 현금이전에 대한 필요성을 제거함으로써 제재를 피하려는 의도를 갖고 있다. 하지만, 한국의 법적책임과 북한측 상호주의 결여문제가 걸림돌로 남아있다.

한국의 국내 정치는 역사, 정책, 북한 관련한 정체성 논쟁에 시달려왔다. 국회 다수파인 진보진영은 국정원같이 전통적으로 보수적인 기관들의 법적 권력을 이양시키려고 하는 반면, 판문점선언같은 남북합의서는 국내법화 시키고자 한다. 보수야당은 현정부가 북한의 남북합의 위반과 보편적인권 침해에 대해서는 문제를 제기하지 않고, 김정은 정권에 대해 비판적인 종교단체와 탈북자단체를 억압하고 있다고 주장한다. 이같은 양극화된 상황은 지속가능한 대북정책에 관한 공적합의 달성을 어렵게 하고 있다. 게다가 한국이 이산가족재상봉을 재개하고 코로나 및 자연재해를 해결하기 위한 인도적 지원을 제공할 의사를 표명하고 있으나 북한은 협력에 주저하고 있다.

대북포용정책은 갈등으로 격화될 수 있는 오판과 오해의 소지를 줄이고, 정치경제적 개혁과 한반도상의 호혜적 교류를 촉진하며, 또 북한 주민의 생명과 삶의 질을 개선하는 등 막대한 혜택을 약속한다.그러나, 이같은 포용정책이 효과적이고, 가장 중요한 대북 정책용 도구인 한미동맹이 유지되기 위해서는 이같은 포용정책의 원칙이 지켜져야 한다. 이는 평양과의 대화와 그 모멘텀을 유지하기 위한 명목하에 국가 안보, 경제상호성 또는 인권문제등에 대해 타협하는 "지름길"을 피해야 한다는 것이다. 이 연구는 당근과 채찍간의 이론적 상호작용, 한미간 조율 및 협력국들과 국제기관들간의 정책 조율에 대한 함의를 제공한다.

◆ ◆ ◆

The U.S.-ROK alliance is the most important institution for addressing North Korea's security threat to East Asia and beyond. But Washington and Seoul's military cooperation comes into friction with inter-Korean peace initiatives; economic sanctions targeting North Korea's nuclear and missile programs inhibit projects for inter-Korean shared prosperity; and concerns over Pyongyang's human rights abuses complicate inter-Korean efforts at reconciliation. How can contradictions between accountability and engagement strategies be mitigated? This paper attempts to answer the question for a post-COVID environment by examining declared policy and interview data on U.S.-ROK alliance coordination, primary documents on UN Security Council sanctions enforcement, and Korean sources on political polarization and national identity.

The U.S.-ROK alliance is coming under increasing stress as the Kim regime rejects diplomacy and advances its nuclear, missile and cyber capabilities. Alliance cooperation and institutions remain intact, but Seoul and Washington are distracted by the pandemic and contentious elections. Scaled down military exercises raise concerns about readiness and interoperability. The transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the procurement of high-tech defense systems are influenced by nationalist politics. Alliance cost-sharing negotiations have stalled after the Trump administration dramatically increased financial demands on allies. Even the roles of the United Nations Command (UNC) and alliance dialogue mechanisms have become politicized over alleged interference with Seoul's outreach to Pyongyang.

South Korea's economy is faced with the global pandemic, U.S.-China technological and trade rivalry, and Tokyo's retaliation against wartime labor compensation claims. In this context, Seoul seeks new opportunities based on a "Korean peace economy." This includes plans for infrastructure links, restarting tourism on an individual basis, proposals for a joint public health complex in Kaesong and peace zone across the DMZ, revision of the South-North Exchange and Cooperation Law, and a joint Olympics bid. However, given the lack of sanctions relief after the Trump-Kim Hanoi summit, South Korea has been unable to entice North Korea back to talks. Seoul's most recent proposal of inter-Korean bartering aims to get around sanctions by eliminating the need for cash transfers. But Seoul's legal liabilities and Pyongyang's lack of reciprocity remain obstacles.

South Korean domestic politics struggle with identity contestation over history, policy, and North Korea. A progressive majority in the National Assembly intends to shift legal powers away from traditionally conservative institutions like the NIS, while enshrining inter-Korean agreements like the Panmunjom Declaration into domestic law. Conservative opposition alleges that the current government fails to call out Pyongyang's violations of inter-Korean agreements and universal human rights while suppressing religious and defector groups critical of the Kim regime. Such polarization makes public consensus on a sustainable North Korea policy elusive. Furthermore, while Seoul shows willingness to restart separated family reunions and deliver humanitarian assistance to cope with COVID-19 and natural disasters, Pyongyang is reluctant to cooperate.

Engaging North Korea promises enormous benefits, from lowering the probability of miscalculation and miscommunication that could precipitate conflict, to incentivizing political economic reform and beneficial exchange on the Peninsula, to improving the lives and livelihoods of the North Korean people. But for engagement to be effective, and for the most important tool for dealing with North Korea — the U.S.-ROK alliance — to be maintained, engagement must be principled. This means avoiding shortcuts that compromise national security, economic reciprocity or human rights for the sake of maintaining "momentum" and dialogue with Pyongyang. This research offers implications for the theoretical interaction of carrot and stick approaches as well as for policy coordination among the United States, South Korea, partner countries and relevant international and non-governmental organizations.

북한과 세계: 유럽의 역할 재정의

North Korea and the World: Redefining the Role for Europe

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테레자 노보트나 EUROPEUM/베를린자유대 선임 연구원

Tereza Novotna Senior Associate Research Fellow, EUROPEUM/Free University Berlin

< Abstract >

현 코로나 위기와 이전부터의 장기적 추세의 결과물인 미–중 갈등 양상에 있어, 유럽연합과 한국은 "전략적 파트너쉽" 을 강화해야 할 것이다. 올 10월로 10주년을 기념하는 전략적 파트너쉽은 의료, 통상, 다자주의, 신기술, 기후 변화와 같은 공동 관심사를 다루고 있다. 유럽연합과 한국이 미중 사이에 끼게 된다는 비슷한 문제에 직면할 수 있기에, 유럽연합과 한국은 상호 공조할 수 있는 영역을 파악해서, 미국과 중국 양측이 모두 수용할 수 있는 제안을 공동으로 마련함으로써, 미중간 경쟁 악화에 선제적으로 대응해야 할 것이다. 이번 발표에서는 북한은 이같은 영역 중 하나임을 주장하고자 한다. 북한이 미국과 중국간의 또다른 불일치 영역이 되어 양측 정책중 하나를 선택해야하는 불편한 입장에 처할 수 있기에, 유럽연합은 대북 정책을 개편해야만 한다.

본 발표에서 유럽연합의 대북정책과 관련해서 재평가되고 검토되어야 하는 세가지 신화에 대해 개괄적으로 서술하고자 한다. 즉, 첫째, 유럽연합은 한반도에서 너무 멀리 떨어져 있기에 유럽과 더 근접한 다른 이슈들을 우선시 해야한다. 둘째, 북한은 유럽연합이 마지막까지 미국 트럼프대통령과 동의할 수 없는 주제이다. 셋째, 북한은 어쨌건 미국인들과의 직접 협상을 원한다는 것이다(반면 한국은 유럽이 끼어들어서 운전석을 차지하는 것을 원하지 않는다). 이같은 신화들과 관련해서, 특히 코로나 시대에 유럽이 할 수 있고, 또 해야만 하는 일들을 몇가지 제안함으로써 이 발표를 마무리 짓고자 한다. 즉, 다른 지역 주체들과 공조하여 향후 협상을 다자화시키고 동시에, 유럽연합의 새로운 한반도 전략을 짜고, 유럽 고유의 "보렐 평화 플랜"을 제시함으로써 어젠다를 주도해 나가야 한다는 것이다.

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In the light of the contest between the US and China both as the result of the current Covid19 crisis and of previous underlying long-term trends, the EU and South Korea should strengthen their Strategic Partnership, which celebrates ten years this October 2020, in the areas of common interest such as health, trade, multilateralism, modern technologies, climate change, etc. Since both the EU and South Korea could face a similar challenge of "being caught between the US and China", the EU and ROK should identify areas for collaboration where they can pre-empt the Sino-American rivalry from escalating by coming up with joint proposals that would be acceptable both to the US and China. The presentation argues that North Korea is one of such areas. The EU should therefore revamp its policy towards the DPRK as the DPRK might become another area of disagreement between China and the US where the EU will be forced to make an uneasy choice which of the two policies to pursue.

The presentation will first outline three myths related to the EU's foreign policy towards North Korea that should be re-evaluated and re-viewed: first, the EU is too far away from the Korean peninsula and should prioritize other issues closer to home; second, North Korea is the last topic where the EU is on the same page with US President Trump and, third, the North Koreans want to negotiate with the Americans directly anyway (while the South Koreans don't want the EU to meddle in and stay in the driver's seat). The presentation will conclude by re-connecting these points with a few proposals on what the EU can, and should, offer to do, especially in a COVID world: drafting a new EU strategy on the Korean Peninsula, setting the agenda by proposing its own "Borrell Peace Plan" while working with other regional actors and multilateralizing any future negotiations.

North Korea and the World: Redefining the Role for Europe

Dr Tereza Novotná
Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow
Free University Berlin

IFES International Online Conference, Seoul, South Korea
7 October 2020

Freie Universität Berlin

"EUSKOR"

Europe, the **U**nited **S**tates and the Crisis on the **KOR**ean Peninsula: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Marie Sklodowska-Curie Project

https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/polwiss/forschung/international/europa/euskor/index.html

Friends of Europe/Europe's World
6 March 2020
https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/whats-wrong-with-the-eu-policy-towards-north-korea-and-how-to-fix-it/

38 North
6 February 2020
https://www.38north.org/2020/02/tnovotna020620/



9DashLine
11 July 2020
https://www.9dashline.com/article/health-trade-and-pyongyang-the-eu-south-korea-summit

"At the virtual EU-ROK summit, EU leaders Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel wanted to talk about health and trade, while North Korea – and the EU's support with it – was on President Moon's mind."

It's all about Geopolitics

North Korea International: (Re)Evaluating, (Re)Viewing, and (Re)Connecting in a Covid World ?

- US & China competition as a result of the current Covid crisis, but also underlying long-term trends
- EU & ROK face a similar challenge of "being caught between the US and China"

↓

- i) EU & ROK – to deepen their Strategic Partnership (health, multilateralism, climate..)
- ii) EU & ROK – to create a *network of like-minded partners*
- iii) EU & ROK – to look for areas where they can pre-empt Sino-Amer. rivalry from escalating & come-up with joint proposals acceptable for both sides

↓

North Korea

What's Wrong with the EU's Foreign Policy towards North Korea?

- 1) DPRK is too far away and the EU needs to prioritize other issues closer to home
- 2) DPRK is the last area where the EU is on the same page with US President Trump
- 3) The North Koreans want to negotiate with the Americans directly anyway
  - (+ the ROK administration doesn't want the EU to meddle in)

↓

3 Myths

1) DPRK is too far away and the EU needs to prioritize other issues closer to home



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"DPRK might be geographically distant from Europe, but geopolitical implications of neglecting it are not."

2) DPRK is the last area where the EU is on the same page with US President Trump



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"Europeans, as much as US Democrats, should not be dissuaded from a dialogue with North Korea just because President Trump has done it.. 'Talking to dictators' is not an inherently bad thing—as long as… you know what you want and how to achieve it."

3) The North Koreans want to negotiate with the Americans directly anyway
(+ Moon administration doesn't want the EU to meddle in)

Press Statement Issued by Vice-Minister for European Affairs of DPRK Foreign Ministry

Korean / English / Chinese / Russian / Spanish / Japanese

Pyongyang, June 17 (KCNA) – Kim Son Gyong, vice-minister for European Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued the following statement on Wednesday:

On June 16, the spokesperson for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy led by the High Representative of the European Union picked a quarrel with the DPRK's measure of completely destroying the north-south joint liaison office and overrode her commission in making absurd remarks that the DPRK should avoid any action that could raise tension and that it is imperative for the DPRK to open the lines of communication to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation. She also said that the EU encourages dialogue for denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and the restart of a sustained diplomatic process aimed at building trust and establishing lasting peace and security on the Korean peninsula, free of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time.

Press Statement Issued by Vice-Minister for European Affairs of DPRK Foreign Ministry

Korean / English / Chinese / Russian / Spanish / Japanese

I do not hide the fact we had even expected that a new EU leadership, which was formed at the end of the last year, would conform to the impartiality and objectivity, to some extent, in international affairs unlike its predecessors who had been too ready to take sides with the U.S. in its policy of putting pressure against the DPRK.

But this expectation is gradually fading away with the passage of time.

To correctly judge and deal with the issues of international relations on the basis of the universal principle of impartiality and objectivity, I think, this stands as a precondition for the EU to realize its idea to become an independent pole in the international arena.

The EU is well advised to lend an ear to the voices of European DPRK experts who demand an immediate reformulation of its policy towards the DPRK, rather than getting overheated in picking on us simply without any reflection.

DPRK and EU parliamentary group hold talks

↓

"[Pyongyang] may prefer speaking directly with Washington, but if the Americans do not listen, there is no point for them to come to a negotiating table. If this table moves to Brussels, the North Korean diplomats would surely be willing to fly over."

What Can (and Should) the EU Do?
Big Picture

- *Plan*: Draft a new "EU Korean Peninsula Strategy"
- *Set the Agenda*: Propose a "Borrell Peace Plan"
- *Multilateralize*: A Set of Confidence-Building Measure & Network of Like-Minded Partners

↓

Individual Concrete Policy Options

Policy Options for the EU on DPRK

1. *Resume dialogue*
   - start with "easier" human rights (e.g. labor, of the disabled)
   - nominate a "Special Envoy for Peace on the Korean Peninsula"
2. *Offer (and offer to pay for) verification expertise*
3. *Open a Pyongyang EU Mission*
   - and let the DPRK move their mission from Berlin to Brussels
4. *Resume humanitarian aid (+ create an NK Instex 2.0)*
5. *Promote EU as a convening point*
   - including a Brussels high-level conference on DPRK
6. *Drop (some of) the EU's autonomous sanctions*
   - an example of a reverse step-by-step approach
1. *Promote educational (& cultural) exchanges*

Session 2

향후 관계 초석을 다지기 위한 북한 '다시'보기

(Re)Viewing North Korea to Build the Foundation for Future Exchanges

북한과의 인도주의적 관계 재설정?: 역사로부터의 교훈

Resetting Humanitarian Engagement with North Korea?: Lessons from History

—

나자닌 자데-커밍스 호주 디킨대 인도주의 리더십 센터 연구 부소장

Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings Associate Director, Centre for Humanitarian Leadership at Deakin University

< Abstract >

올해로 북한에 국제인도주의적 원조를 제공한지 25년째 된다. 어떤 면에서는 2020년은 여느때와 다르지 않다. 즉, 인도주의적 지원이 필요한 상황이 정치경제적 의사결정을 그 배경으로 하는 지리적 위험에 의해 때때로 더 악화되기도 하고, 원조의 접근성, 펀딩과 원조에 미치는 지정학적 영향 등에 관한 논의도 여전하다. 다른 한편으로는, 2020은 그 어떤 해와도 판이하다. 북한의 코로나 대응으로 국가가 봉쇄되었고, 기후적 재난과 맞물린 전염병의 세계적 대유행으로 인해서 안그래도 지연되어 있던 인도주의적 필요성이 여지껏 경험한 바 없는 인도주의적 위기로 악화될 가능성이 있었다.

대북인도적지원의 미래를 내다볼때, 지난 사반세기 동안의 활동에서 어떤 교훈을 도출할 수 있는가? 이 글에서는 세가지 교훈을 제시한다: 첫째 인도주의자들과 북한측 상대방과의 관계가 핵심이다. 신뢰와 건설적인 관계를 수립하는데는 시간, 인내심 그리고 이해를 위한 공동의 자리를 찾고자 하는 의지가 필요하다. 일상적 교류를 가로막는 코로나 상황에서 인도주의자와 원조 공여자들은 잠재적인 걸림돌을 현재를 다시 이을 수 있는 기회로서 대응해야 한다. 두번째로, 원조의 접근성은 수년간 우려스러운 문제이긴 하나, 반면 변동성이 있다. 원조의 접근성 문제는 눈에띄게 개선되었는데, 이는 일정부분 펀딩이 적절하게 이루어져서 그렇다고 볼 수 있다. 제재와 낮은 펀딩 수준은 접근성을 확대할 수 있는 잠재적 기회를 약화시켰는데, 이는 여러 행위자들이 북한의 인도적 지원환경을 구성하고 있음을 상기시킨다. 세번째로, 인도주의적 지원은 인도주의적 필요성에 대한 해결책은 될 수 없다. 즉 영양실조, 식량조달의 불확실성, 부적절한 의료체제와 같은 문제점들의 근본적 원인은 정치적인데서 비롯되며, 고로 정치적 해법을 필요로 한다. 이는 원조가 무용하다는 뜻은 아니다. 원조를 제공해야하는 도덕적, 윤리적 이유 외에도, 원조의 효과성에 관한 사례 및 성공 지표들을 인도적지원기관들에서 찾아볼 수 있다. 그러나, 북한 정권이 진정으로 주민의 복지를 최우선하지 않는 한, 원조가 필요한 근본적 원인은 해결되지 않을 것이고, 인도주의자들은 앞으로도 계속 북한에 원조를 제공하게 될 것이다.

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This year marks twenty-five of international humanitarian aid to North Korea. In some ways, 2020 is business as usual – a situation of humanitarian need sometimes exacerbated by geographic hazards but underpinned by political and economic decision-making. Discussions of access, funding, and geopolitical impacts on aid persist. In other ways, 2020 is unlike any other year – North Korea's COVID-19 response has sealed off the country, and a global pandemic coupled with climatic hazards have brought the potential for protracted humanitarian need to tip over into an acute humanitarian crisis ever nearer.

As we look to the future of humanitarian aid in North Korea, what can we learn from the past quarter century of engagement? This paper presents three lessons: first, relationships between humanitarians and their North Korean counterparts are key. Building trust and constructive relationships takes time, patience, and a willingness to find shared spaces for understanding. With COVID-19 hampering usual interactions, humanitarians – and their donors - should be prepared for potential stumbling blocks as opportunities to re-engage present. Second, access remains a perennial topic of concern but is dynamic, has seen notable improvements, and depends partly on adequate funding for improvement. Sanctions and low funding levels have eroded potential opportunities to expand access, serving as a reminder of the multiple actors that construct the humanitarian environment in North Korea. Third, humanitarian aid cannot provide the solutions to humanitarian need – the root causes of malnutrition, food insecurity, and inadequate healthcare are political and thus require political solutions. This does not mean aid is fruitless – beyond the moral and ethical grounds for providing aid, there are indicators of success and stories of impact across humanitarian organisations. However, unless the North Korean regime decides to truly prioritise the wellbeing of its people, the root causes of need will not be addressed and humanitarians may find themselves continuing to work in North Korea for decades to come.

Resetting Humanitarian Engagement with North Korea? Lessons from History
Dr. Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings
Associate director of research
Centre for Humanitarian Leadership
Nazanin@cfhl.org.au
North Korea International: (Re)evaluating, (Re)viewing, and (Re)connecting in a COVID World
CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN LEADERSHIP


DPRK
United Nations Seeks $43.6 million for humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
News and Press Release • Source: UN DHA • Posted: 6 Jun 1996 • Originally published: 6 Jun 1996
NEW YORK, 6 June (Department of Humanitarian Affairs)-- The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Yasushi Akashi, today announced the launching of the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for flood-related emergency humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The appeal covers the period from 1 July 1996 to 31 March 1997, and requests a total of $43,632,935 to address the most urgent needs stemming from the severe and unprecedented floods that caused wide spread devastation in the the country in 1995.
Primary country:
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Source:
UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
Image source: ReliefWeb

DPRK

Provisional 2020 DPR Korea Needs and Priorities Overview

Appeal • **Source:** UN RC DPRK • **Posted:** 10 Feb 2020 • **Originally published:** 10 Feb 2020

For 2020, UN agencies and humanitarian partners are requesting approximately $107 million to target an estimated 5.5 million people with humanitarian assistance. The people in need (PiN) number decreased from 10.9 million in 2019 to 10.4 million in 2020 mostly due to the different methodology as per the Humanitarian Programme Cycle approach applied to calculating sector-level and the overarching PiN. There is a 45 per cent increase in the number of people targeted with assistance rising from 3.8 million in 2019 to 5.5 million in 2020, thanks to the WHO coverage expansion to children under 15. Notably in 2019, WHO targeted only children under five.

CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN LEADERSHIP

Image source: ReliefWeb

Enduring and new challenges to aid in 2020



As we look to the future of humanitarian aid in North Korea, what can we learn from the past quarter century of engagement?


Three lessons
Relationships are important, and take time
Humanitarian aid cannot provide solutions to political problems
Access is dynamic and requires more than North Korean approval to expand

Lesson 1: Relationships are important, and they take time

- Five levels of interaction between humanitarians and North Koreans:
  - Primary interlocutors and local staff (e.g. North Koreans working with resident NGOs)
  - Line ministries
  - Provincial level organs
  - Individual institutions
  - Aid recipients
- 'Experience has shown time and again that Koreans operate very firmly on the principle of relationships' (Weingartner 2001, 25)
- Personal relationships as one component influencing aid agency ability to remain in North Korea (Reed 2004)
- 'For a foreigner to obtain realistic information and develop an accurate understanding of the country and its people, long-term engagement, patience, and the development of mutual trust are necessary' (Zellweger 2014, 2)

Lesson 2: Access is dynamic and requires more than North Korean approval to expand

Lesson 2: Access is dynamic and requires more than North Korean approval to expand

Image source: Zadeh-Cummings and Harris 2020

Lesson 3: Humanitarian aid cannot provide solutions to political problems

'Although there is clear and urgent need to provide both emergency and programme food assistance now, it is fully recognised that these measures would only help solve immediate problems and not inherent long term ones. In the medium to longer term, over the next few years, the country is in considerable danger of recurrent food supply difficulties, given its limited potential to expand domestic food production either extensively or intensively, declining soil fertility that cannot sustain high doses of fertiliser even if they were available and a shrinking economy that effectively rules out sufficient imports of food to meet the deficit. It is clear that in the past food supply depended heavily on the general state of the economy and its capacity to finance imports. As this is no longer the case, it is evident that the country urgently needs to address these issues and implement some radical solutions, if it is to avert serious problems in the future.' – FAO/GIEWS Special Alert No. 267, May 1996



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CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN LEADERSHIP

온라인 북한: ICT를 활용한 북한과의 '재'연결

North Korea Online: (Re)connecting through ICT with North Korea?

—

강하연 정보통신정책연구원 다자협력연구본부 본부장

Hayun Kang Executive Director, Division of International Cooperation Research, Korean Information Society Development Institute

< Abstract >

대부분의 학계와 미디어에서 다루고 있는 북한의 정보기술은 북핵 능력, 해킹과 같은 사이버안보 우려등에 집중되어 있다. 북한의 ICT 능력은 아시아태평양 지역과 향후 평화에 대한 위협으로 간주되고 있다.

저자는 이 글에서 북한 개발에 있어서 ICT 역할을 분석하는 대안적 설명을 제시하고자 한다. 북한을 개발의 관점에서 바라보고, 북한 개발에 있어 ICT 가 어떤 역할을 담당하고 있는지를 평가함으로써 향후 남북 경제 협력 가능성을 모색해 보고자 한다. 역사적으로 볼때, 북한은 국가발전상 과학기술의 역할을 크게 강조해 왔다. 시기에 따라 강조점이 달라지기는 했지만, 이같은 전통을 계속 지켜왔다. 김정은 집권 이후에는 경제 발전과 주민복지 향상에 있어 정보통신 기술을 포함한 과학과 기술의 역할이 더욱 강조되었다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 북한 정보통신기술 능력의 한계가 뚜렷하고, 북한이 중국의 ICT 플랫폼과 경제블록에 협력할 가능성이 (이는 남북 경제협력 전망에는 좋지 않은 소식이 될 수 있음) 존재한다.
본 발표에서는 1) 북한 과학기술 정책의 역사에 대한 개괄, 2) ICT (핸드폰과 장마당/ 전자상거래)를 통한 정치경제의 변화을 살피고, 3) 북한의 기술능력을 개발의 관점에서 평가한 후 잠정적인 결론은 도출하려 한다.

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Most academic and journalistic treatment of information technology in NK are related its nuclear capability, cybersecurity concerns such as hacking etc. North Korea's ICT capability is considered a threat to the Asia-pacific region and peace prospects.

In this presentation, I provide an alternate explanation of the role of ICT in NK development. I look at North Korea from a development perspective and assess how ICT played a role in its development with a view to exploring possibilities of economic cooperation between the two Koreas in the future. Historically NK has placed great emphasis on the role of science and technology in national development. The legacy has continued, with different emphases over time. Since Kim Jeong-un's rule, there is greater emphasis on the role of science and technology (including ICT) on economic development and improving the welfare of the people. Nevertheless, there are clear limits to ICT capabilities in NK and the possibility of NK cooptation to China's ICT platform/economic bloc exists, which may be bad news from the perspective of Inter-Korean economic cooperation.

The presentation provides 1) overview of the history of science and technology (ICT) policy in NK, 2) changing political economy through ICT- mobile phones and the "Jangmadang"/ E-commerce 3) evaluation of NK tech capabilities from a development perspective and tentative conclusions

Understanding Information Technology in North Korea: Possibilities from a Development Perspective

(1) History of ICT Policy in NK

□ Beginnings (~1980)

- Emphasis on building socialist economy via science and technology
  (Ist generation computer "전진5500" etc)
- During Sixth National Economic Plan (1971-76) nation-wide efforts to mechanize and automation of production
- Kim Il Sung commands the continuation of the economy's self-reliance, modernization and through science and technology (주체화, 현대화 과학화) In the second phase of Seventh National Economic Plan (1978-84)
- With emphasis on automization and mechanization, electronic parts production and related development given priority, institutional basis for ICT policy established

□ Promotion of ICT Industry (1980s~1998)

- Great Leap through ICT Policy & CNC Policy under Kim Jeong Il
  -> Global ICT boom in the early 90s; attempt to leapfrog the technological ladder
- Chosun Computer Center (KCC), Pyongyang Information Center (평양정보센터): to develop OS and applied software programing capability
- However efforts to acquire indigenous ICT capability stalled with the demise of the socialist bloc and the onset of the Arduous March ('고난의 행군') period
- Dual purpose of ICT: pursue autonomous military capability & jump the economic development ladder via ICT technology
  → Indigenous development of ICT industry & basis for ICT capabilities established during this period
  → selective promotion of software industry rather hardware industry

□ Promotion of ICT Education and Research Capability (1998~2012)

- Kim Jeongun commands the nation's development via science and technology, with emphasis on promoting ICT education and research capability
- heavy emphasis on computer education since 2001: ICT dedicated official bodies newly created in this period- 전자공업성, 21국, etc.

□ Attempt to Merge ICT Technology with National Economic Development (2013~)

- Realization of Strong Economy through the development of cutting- edge technology industries
- emphasis on electronic, electric, information technology, applied engineering
- emphasis on ICT infrastructure: nation-wide 3G capability but closed network vis-à-vis the external

world

(2) Changing Political Economy- the rise of Jangmadang economy

□ Economic Hard Times and Financial Crisis

- Arduous March in the aftermath of death of Kim Il Sung (1994~2000) and the experience of severe economic downturn
- Currency reform (2009.11.30) resulted in popular resistance to the official exchange rate (100:1) and dollarization of the economy
- breakdown of the socialist distribution system, and the rise of local markets
  → 500 Jangmadang throughout NK
  → Rise of NK market economy heavily dependent on mobile telephony

□ Local Markets, Mobile Phones, and the New Rich

- 3G service announced Dec 15. 2008
- Subscription to service began from March 2009.

〈북한의 손전화 가입자 추이(2009~2018)〉



자료: ITU, DailyNK　　자료: SKTelecom

- 3G is different from 2G.
- Rise of State sponsored E-Commerce; ICT as a tool of social control
- Mobile phones an integral part of the Jangmadang economy. Rise of nouveau rich. Trigger of social change?
- ICT as means of social control. Maybe following China's footsteps. Mobile phone has built in monitoring system- creates history of log-in. Users therefore prefer not to search on the phone.

(3) NK ICT Capabilities viewed from development perspective

- Possibilities of inter-Korean cooperation in the ICT area?
- Demand for ICT knowledge, want to know current tech trend
- Highly skilled software workforce.
- Networking with scholars
- But UN Sanctions and Political Environment

북한의 국립공원, 보호구역과 생물다양성 담화: 국제적 협력을 위한 기회

National Parks, Protected Areas and Biodiversity Conservation in North Korea: Opportunities for International Collaboration

—

크리스토퍼 맥카시 경남대 극동문제연구소 초빙연구위원
Christopher McCarthy Visiting Research Fellow, IFES

< Abstract >

국립공원과 (자연)보호구역은 자연을 지키고 생물다양성, 특히 고유종과 멸종위기에 처한 동식물을 보존하는 최선의 방안 중 하나이다. 현재 110개국 이상에서 다양한 형태로 자국내 보호구역을 지정해 놓고 있다. 북한의 포괄적인 국립공원과 보호 구역 네트워크는 풍부한 생물다양성과 높은 생태학적 가치를 지니고 있다. 그러나, 북한 전역에 걸친 보호구역에 관한 현재의 연구는 아직 미완성에 머물러 있다. 저자는 이같은 연구 프로젝트를 위해, 유네스코-MAB 생물권 보전지역과 지정된 황야지역을 포함하는 북한의 보호구역 체계의 현 구조를 탐색하고, 생물다양성 보존 현황을 조사하고자 한다. 이를 통해, 생물다양성 훼손 방지를 위한 국립공원 거버넌스와 운영상의 효율성을 평가하고, 에코 투어리즘의 발전 가능성을 논의한다. 유엔 생물다양성 협약 아이치 타겟 2020과 유엔의 지속가능한 개발목표에 서명한 국가들은 북한이 이같은 다자주의 환경보호 협약들이 요구하는 의무를 이행하기 위해 밟아야 할 단계들을 논의하고, 보존 노력을 제고하기위한 국제협력이 나아갈 길에 대해 권고하고 있다.

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National parks and protected areas represent one of the best ways to safeguard nature and preserve biodiversity, especially endemic and endangered species. Currently, more than 110 countries have some form of protected areas within their borders. North Korea's comprehensive network of national parks and protected areas are rich in biodiversity and ecological value, however, contemporary research on the integrity of North's Korea's protected lands is incomplete. For this research project I explore the current structure of North Korea's protected area system, which include UNESCO-MAB biosphere reserves and dedicated wilderness areas, and investigate the current state of biodiversity conservation. It evaluates the effectiveness of national park governance and management toward guarding against biodiversity loss and discusses the potential for ecotourism development. Signatories to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity Aichi Targets 2020 and Sustainable Development Goals I discuss the steps North Korea can take to fulfil its obligations to these multilateral environmental agreements and recommend pathways for international cooperation aimed at enhancing conservation efforts.

1. Introduction

Protected areas represent the cornerstone of global efforts to safeguard nature and curb biodiversity loss. As of 2020, there are more than 210,000 protected areas in 111 countries, representing 14.7 percent of land globally, which is nearly double the amount of land protected in 2000. The 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), signed by 168 participating countries, mandated 17 percent of the world's terrestrial area to be protected by 2020. Some scientists argue that current levels of biodiversity can only be sustained if 50 percent of terrestrial ecosystems are designated as protected lands. While governments have committed to increase their network of protected areas to meet the CBD's benchmark, national parks and protected areas are increasingly threatened by human pressure and many are at risk of having their protected area status downgraded. Recent studies have documented more than 3,000 cases of protected area downgrading, downsizing or degazettement in more than 70 countries, totaling an area of 130 million hectares. With more than 1 million species at risk of extinction, countries must establish effective governance of their protected areas to ensure long term protection of their unique ecosystems and prevent the dangerous loss of biodiversity. Effectively managed protected areas not only ensure the protection of biodiversity, but preservation of nature provides important economic value in the form of tourism and jobs, health care savings, water quality protection and natural disaster mitigation.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea, has been endowed with vast natural resources including forested mountains, rivers, long coastlines, and rich biodiversity and wildlife. Since 1959, the country has maintained a balanced and ecologically representative protected area network, that includes 34 types or nature reserves that span a total area of more than 314,000 hectares (2.4% total land area); and comprises more than nine national parks, four national monuments, 2 nature reserves, 3 protected areas, and 1 scenery reserve. North Korea's national parks are officially recognized by the IUCN and UN and have met the criteria for IUCN Categories II, III, IV. Comparatively, South Korea currently has no national parks meeting IUCN criteria. Many of North Korea's national parks support rare endemic and endangered animal and plant species, and several sites, such as Ch'ilposan, Geumgang-san, and Guwol-san have been identified as important bird areas, with Myohyang-san receiving the designation of World Biosphere by UNESCO in 2009.

In recent years, human activity and climate change have exerted increasing pressure on the environment and natural resources of DRPK. Studies of satellite imagery have revealed that more than 40 percent of the country's forest cover has been lost since 1985, largely due to cultivation, logging, and natural disasters. During the 1990s, a period characterized by severe economic stress, deforestation accelerated, as many people turned to the forests to provide food and firewood, which had cascading ecological effects including soil erosion, soil depletion, increased flood risk, and threats to biodiversity. A study in 2003 reported an increasing number of animal and plant species to be critically endangered, endangered or rare. A survey of national parks in 2013 by an international delegation of scientists reported barren landscapes, absent of wildlife. To address this problem, the Government of North Korea, adopted a "Ten Year Plan for Afforestation/Reforestation" to rehabilitate two million hectares of degraded forests, and in 2016 had stated they produced 90 million saplings to be distributed around the country. Reforestation and environmental programmes have emerged

as an area for international cooperation, with North and South Korea agreeing to joint action on forest restoration. In addressing biodiversity conservation, North Korea has participated in various international environmental projects, and has hosted national workshops on the conservation of wetlands and migratory birds. Several important bird species migrate through North Korea along the East-Asian-Australian Flyway, one of the 8 global flyways of migratory birds, including the critically endangered bar-tailed godwit, Eastern curlew, and Eurasian curlew. North Korea has also taken steps on global warming, cooperating with international efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change by investing in the development of solar and other renewable energy technology.

As North Korea confronts the challenges of environmental degradation and biodiversity loss effective management of its protected areas is crucial for ensuring the long-term health and integrity of its environment and ecological systems. Many of North Korea's protected areas include distinct landscapes that can serve as a valuable tourism resource; however, adequate monitoring and management is required for sustainable development of its natural resources. In this paper, we evaluate the current status of North Korea's national park and protected area system. We discuss the potential for ecotourism and development and recommend opportunities for international cooperation for enhancing conservation outcomes and the sustainable management of the country's national parks and protected areas.

2. The Environment and Biodiversity

The environment of North Korea consists of diverse alpine, forest, farmland, freshwater, and marine ecosystems that provide a range of ecosystem services. The country experiences the effects of oceanic and continental climates, and has 4 distinct seasons, with warm summers and cold winters. Vegetation regions include subtropical, temperate and frigid zones. More than 80 percent of North Korea is mountainous. Forest coverage accounts for 70 percent of terrestrial area, although most forest coverage occurs on steep slopes. As a result of deforestation, stemming from a need for firewood, energy, and food, forest coverage has declined to 50 percent total area. Forests are also often ravaged by fires, landslides, and insect pests. Water areas, which include rivers, lakes and wetlands cover 6% of the country. The country has two Ramsar Sites (Wetland of International Importance), with a surface area of 7,241 hectares.

North Korea's physiographical conditions have resulted in diverse habitats for a variety of flora and fauna, and the country has a high rate of plant endemism. Comparatively North Korea exhibits a rich diversity and high density of species among northeast Asian countries. As of 2006, the number of plant and animal species recorded in the country was 10,012 and 9,795, respectively. Twenty-one percent of vertebrate species are endangered including large mammals such as the otter (Lutura lutura). The main threats to biodiversity include habitat fragmentation resulting from the destruction of forest ecosystems and the overuse of natural resources stemming to population increase. North Korea has a population density even higher than China.
Several plant and animal species are considered to have high economic value including high timber value tree species, medicinal plants, wild edible fruits, greens, mushrooms, oil plants and aromatic plants.

3. Environmental Laws

Environmental regulation in North Korea was developed in the mid-1980s to institutionalize environmental and land management following years of policy directives that fell short in addressing worsening environmental conditions. While the main environmental laws, the Land Law 1977 and the Environmental Protection Law 1986, have improved environmental governance to a degree, environmental regulation for safeguarding biodiversity in North Korea still has a long way to go to address 21st century problems. Currently, North Korea has no laws on the conservation of wild plants and threatened species, or on comprehensive biodiversity conservation efforts. In addition, the efficacy of environmental protection policy in North Korea is difficult to ascertain due to a lack of available data on the subject, and efforts to enforce environmental laws are unknown.

4. Current Structure of North Korea's Protected Area System

North Korea's protected area network consists of 34 different types of international and national designated protected areas officially recognized by IUCN and UN, including UNESCO-MAB biosphere reserves (3), national parks (9), natural monuments (12), natural reserves (2), protected areas (7), and scenery reserves (1) and covers more than 3,780 square kilometers in total area (2.4% total land area). In terms of IUCN categories, North Korea has three types of protected areas, Category II, III, IV. Table 1 shows the protected areas of North Korea as recorded in the United Nations List of Protected Areas 2018.

While the variety of IUCN categories represented by North Korea's protected area network reflect a balanced and ecologically representative system, questions persist on the preservation of biodiversity. The total area of protected lands in North Korea is less than half of the global average and far less than neighboring countries, Table 2. In addition, protected area connectivity, integral for effective conservation and management of biodiversity is severely lacking; with the country having less than a 4% connectivity rate. Studies find that connectivity is essential to facilitate large-scale ecological and evolutionary processes such as gene flow, migration and species range shifts. Buffer zones, a critical component to the sustainability of protected lands that offer efficient means of reducing biotic stress to a core area, are also lacking.

Table 1. Protected areas of North Korea

Name of Protected Area	Year Established	IUCN Category	Area (km2)
UNESCO-MAB Biosphere Reserve (3)			
Mount Kuwol	2004	n/a	527.15
Mount Myohyang	2009	n/a	96.82
Mount Paekdu Biosphere Reserve	1989	n/a	1320
National Park (9)			
Kuwol	1959	II	180
Lake Jangjin	1981	II	96
Lake Sohung	1981	II	53
Monggum Port	1981	II	50
Mount Chilbo	1976	II	300
Mount Jangsu	1981	II	30
Mount Kumgang	1959	II	600
Mount Myohyang	1959	II	160.53
Pakyon	1981	II	31.9
Natural Monument (12)			
Kangryong Crane Habitat	0	III	0.16
Kungangguks	1986	III	15
Monggumpho Sand Hill	1985	III	0.1
Ongjin Crane Habitat	1985	III	0.5
Outer Kumgang Geoclemys veevesii (Gray) Habitat	1986	III	0.2
Paechon Crane Habitat	1985	III	0.04
Paektu-san Korean Tiger	1980	III	50
Phanmun Crane Habitat	1985	III	10
Ryongyon Crus vipio (Phallas) Habitat	1986	III	1
Samjiyon Deer	1980	III	30
Solbong-ri Pine Tree Community	1986	III	0.1
Unmu Island Sea-Bird Breeding Site	1976	III	0.85
Natural Reserve (2)			
Mount Oga	1959	IV	60
Mount Paekdu	1959	IV	1320
Protected Area (7)			
Chail Peak	1976	IV	24.59
Chongchon River	1976	IV	8
Jangsan Cape	1976	IV	25.8
Kosong Bay	1976	IV	20
Kumya Seaside (Botanic)	1976	IV	1.2
Sonchon-rap Island (Breeding Seabird)	1976	IV	0.2
Taegam Island (Breeding Seabird)	1976	IV	0.25
Scenery Reserve (1)			
Musudan	1976	IV	90

Source: United Nations List of Protected Areas (2018).

Table 2. Summary of protected areas in East Asia

UNEP-WCMC "East Asia"																		
Country	Area (km2)	Ia / Ib		II		III		IV		V		VI		Not		TOTAL		
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	Area (km2)	%
China	9,361,609	7	5.74	0	0	0	0	2	1.64	0	0	18	14.75	95	77.86	122	1,461,913	15.62
China - Hong Kong	1,102	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	18.27	19	18.27	0	0	66	63.46	104	462	41.88
Japan	374,093	45	0.91	22	0.45	0	0	3758	76.46	932	18.96	100	2.03	58	1.18	4,915	109,937	29.39
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)	122,186	0	0	9	26.47	12	35.29	10	29.41	0	0	0	0	3	8.82	34	2.976	7
Republic of Korea (South Korea)	99,713	31	0.89	16	0.46	2	0.06	2883	83.2	190	5.48	301	8.69	58	1.67	3,465	16,692	12
Mongolia	1,565,864	14	12.84	31	28.44	13	11.93	32	29.36	0	0	0	0	19	17.43	109	310,015	17
Taiwan	36,245	21	22.83	8	8.7	2	2.17	60	65.22	0	0	0	0	1	1.09	92	7,146	19.72

Source: World Database of Protected Areas (WDPA). UNEP-WCMC (2019).

A critical problem in assessing the efficacy of North Korea's protected area network is the lack of information on the management and monitoring of its protected lands. Primary datasets commonly used by researchers to assess the current global conservation situation are often lacking for North Korea and scholarly articles on important biodiversity indicators, which are critical for a timely assessment of biodiversity state and change, are scarce. Achieving the sustainable management of its protected areas will depend both on the ability to obtain data from a variety of biodiversity observation sources, including in situ and ex situ data, and the development of monitoring programs to address critical data gaps. If collected data are publicly available, the international research community can be better mobilized to identify hotspots and collaborate with North Korean stakeholders to enhance conservation outcomes.

5. Tourism Potential and Development

Protected areas are increasingly recognized as playing an important role in the development of nature-based tourism that promote the effective management of natural resources and support socioeconomic development. As North Korea attempts to attract more foreign tourists, a declaration made recently by Kim Jong Un, development of naturebased tourism centered around its protected area network may help the country achieve their goals for both nature conservation and the country's need for material development. While inbound tourism to North Korea reached 200,000 visitors in 2018, institutional and infrastructural capacities still pose obstacles for tourism development around the country's national parks.

6. Opportunities for International Collaboration

North Korea's commitment to taking actions towards multilateral environmental agreements such as the

United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity's Aichi Targets for 2020 and Sustainable Development Goals presents an important opportunity for the international community to collaborate on capacity development initiatives aimed at enhancing conservation outcomes. Critical to the success of the Aichi targets is the ability to monitor and measure natural systems and human impacts and produce long-term holistic data sets that make it possible to monitor biodiversity change across time and space. Currently such data from North Korea is either unavailable, missing or not readily accessible, as reflected by the lack of quantitative data in existing databases, such as the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (www.iucnredlist.org), Protected Planet (www.protectedplanet.net), and the Living Planet Index (www.livingplanetindex.org). Capacity development geared toward the development of long-term monitoring schemes that increase the volume of data provides an opportunity for the international community to collaborate with North Korea to address these critical data gaps.

Recent advancements in technology have made it possible for automation of data collection and processing. For example, satellite based remote sensing can deliver longterm data series with a high sampling frequency and extensive geographic coverage on ecosystem function and contribute substantially to biodiversity monitoring by enabling more accurate assessments of wildlife populations, rapid detection of deforestation, illegal mining, and other changes in the landscape. To complement satellite imagery with on the ground monitoring, camera trap technology and bioacoustic recording devices, combined with machine learning, have made it possible for automation of in situ data collection and processing, which can then be used alongside direct field observations, to identify and monitor biodiversity. By deploying emerging technological tools like remote sensing and deep learning, North Korea can obtain information from varied biodiversity observation sources and that can then be harnessed for the sustainable management of the country's natural resources. Furthermore, making data transparent and publicly available to the international community will enhance its use for analysis, conservation planning, and environmental decision making.

7. Conclusion

Protected areas are at the center of national and international efforts towards safeguarding nature and the services it provides us. While North Korea has made considerable progress in developing a balanced and ecologically representative protected area network, urgent challenges remain to ensure the long-term protection of the country's natural resources. Developing a long-term monitoring programme for critical environmental indicators and public sharing of datasets is an important step for establishing a sustainable management framework of the country's protected area network. North Korea's commitment to global environmental agreements presents an important opportunity for collaboration with international partners. Properly managed, the country's natural parks and protected areas can provide important economic value in the form of tourism and jobs, while also making an important contribution to safeguarding important biodiversity.

북한에서의 근무 경험: 상황적 경험 공유

Lessons for Working in North Korea: Sharing Situational Experience

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제임스 반필 경남대 극동문제연구소 초빙연구위원

James Banfill Visiting Research Fellow, IFES

< Abstract >

조선인민민주주의 공화국에서 일한다는 것은 힘든 경험이다. 학습곡선은 가파르다. 북한에서 일하는 외지인들은 정보가 부족한 환경속에서, 대체로 낯설은, 정치적 고려, 경제적 조건, 사회적 규범, 그리고/또는 문화적 가치 등의 조합에 직면하게 된다. 게다가 북한측 상대방과의 대인관계는 종종 어떤 사업이든 그 효과성을 담보하는 데 핵심적 역할을 한다. 이같은 대인관계는 보통 수년간에 걸쳐 시간과 노력을 들이고, 신뢰를 쌓아야만 형성될 수 있으며, 고도의 압박 혹은 리스크가 큰 상황들에 의해 지속적으로 시험당하곤 한다. 현장 종사자들이 은퇴하고, 지쳐 떨어지지거나 혹은 이직하기에, 북한에서 활동하는 외부 단체들은 종종 상황적 지식을 – 북한 체재를 실질적으로 잘 다루고 북한 이들과 함께 일을 하기 위해 요구되는 – (재)습득해야만 한다. 이 글은 두가지 목적이 있다. (1) 저자의 북한 주변에서 십여년간 활동했던 경험에 기반한 상황적 지식을 공유하고, (2) 외교관, 기자, 인도주의적 활동가, 사업가, 그리고 학생들 간에 북한에서의 경험과 상황적 지식을 더 많이 공유할 것을 주장하고자 한다.

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Working in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a challenging experience. The learning curve is steep. Outsiders working in the North Korea encounter a largely unfamiliar set of political considerations, economic conditions, societal norms, and/or cultural values within an information-poor environment(s). Additionally, interpersonal relationships with North Korean counterparts are often key to the efficacy of any undertaking. Such relationships take time, effort, and trust to develop, usually on the scale of years, and are continually tested by high-stress or high-stakes situations. As practitioners retire, burnout, and/or turnover, outside organizations working in the DPRK must often (re)learn the situational knowledge required to practically navigate the North Korean system and work with North Koreans. The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to share the situational knowledge of the author based on a decade of working in and around North Korea, and (2) to make the argument for further sharing of situational knowledge among diplomats, journalist, humanitarian workers, businesspeople, and students with experience in North Korea.

Lessons from North Korea: Sharing Situational Experience

James Banfill
Visiting Research Fellow
Kyungnam University Institute of Far Eastern Studies
2020 October 07

"The British army always fights uphill, in the rain, at the junction of two maps."

-Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks

Imagine…

North Korea is a difficult place to work.

- Fatigue
- Burnout
- Turnover
- Silos
- Rivalries
- Competition
- Unknowns
- Opacity…



Today's talk

- 6 of 30 lessons focused on common challenges
  - (Remainder are lessons for dealing with those challenges)
- A note on methods:
  - Experience
  - Informal discussions
  - Relevant literature (suggested reading)

(1) "There are many eyes…"

- Formal reports
- Informal reports (gossip)
- The blind eye

(2) The importance of memory

- Questions: How would you act if everyone is watching? How would you act if everyone remembers what you do?

*You also need to pay attention.

*Wider impressions matter.

(3) Suspicion and competition

- "There are no real friends anymore." (Abrahamian, 2020)
- "Money is the most important thing." (Anonymous, 2018-2020)

(3) Suspicion and competition (theory)

(4) There is little clarity

- Not monolithic: different rules across time, space, circumstance.
  - Pyongyang vs. other places
  - Urban vs. rural
  - Regional differences
    - Sensitivity
    - Linguistic
    - Cultural

*Is clarity always a good thing?

(5) There are always problems

- Legal (largely external)
- Health
- Political
- Logistical problems

(6) People and relationships are key

- How can we better prepare?

Towards a primer?

- Distill situational knowledge
  - Flatten the learning curve?
  - Akin to a language?
  - Discussion of differing perspectives & humility

*Tangible project for "down time"?

*Increase cooperation

Area-guides?

- Diplomats
- Humanitarian-Development
  - Agriculture
  - Forestry
  - Public Health
- Businesspeople
- Teachers
- Students

Scenario-based training?

- Example:

Suggested Reading

Questions?