by
Kab Woo Koo
[The Graduate School of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University]
posted Auguest 2, 2003
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 Preface : |
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Article : |
Korean Endgame, written by American journalist Selig Harrison and translated by four Korean journalists from South Korea’s Hankyoreh newspaper, paints a picture of bitter conflict between the political “right” and “left.” According to Harrison, the Korean peninsula is still in the midst of a civil war. Although in its final stage, its outcome remains difficult to predict. Along the same vein, another American journalist, Don Oberdorfer, author of The Two Koreas, has said that the confrontation between the United States and North Korea over the nuclear issue is leading the Korean peninsula into a “perfect storm.” Are tensions reaching a boiling point?
The puzzling question is, “Who would want a war?” As Harrison tries to untangle the approaching crisis he simultaneously hopes to undertake the task of writing history. In 1972, as an American journalist, Harrison reported on North Korea for the first time after the Korean War. After not only visiting North Korea regularly he directly participated in the process to resolve the 1994 nuclear crisis, leading the exchanges involving North Korea’s freezing of its nuclear program and an end to U.S. diplomatic and economic sanctions. He has tried to solve the equation of peace on the Korean peninsula, believing that unless the United States is willing to sign a peace pact with North Korea, and unless South Korea agrees to this pact, little hope for ending the two Koreas’ mutual hostilities will remain. In order for this hostile relationship to end, it is first necessary for North Korea and the United States to reconcile their differences. In Harrison’s mind, for any proposed peace process on the Korean peninsula, U.S.-DPRK reconciliation is the essential point of departure.
Through the lens of a state-centered approach to international politics, such a solution could be interpreted as Harrison perceiving the main actors of the peace process as abstract states. One may easily get this impression from reading the book’s introduction. For the sake of convenience, the limits of language, or reified perceptions, there is a tendency to use expressions such as “America,” “South Korea,” or “North Korea” does this or that. However, we realize that sometimes the “subjects” we use in such statements may be inappropriate. We find that Harrison does not follow the modern trend of viewing states as transcendent actors, whereby they have become the primary unit of analysis in international politics. As Harrison points out, the international politics of the Korean peninsula, which appears to be a game of conflict and cooperation between nations, is actually composed of conflict and cooperation amongst various social and political forces. According to his analysis and explanation, the transnational and shared perception of the problem of the Korean peninsula by Washington and Seoul’s military and industrial forces and the conservative powers in North Korea has unknowingly created a tacit alliance among the three that maintains the status quo. In order to solve the Korean peninsula problem this unspoken alliance, which could be the most dangerous source of a crisis, must be dissolved.
Considering the impending crisis that is now approaching the Korean peninsula, such a solution could easily be regarded as unrealistic. It seems as if North Korea has admitted to possession of nuclear weapons or the existence of a nuclear program and the United States has clearly expressed harsh disapproval. As Harrison points out, according to the U.S. Operations Plan 5027, if there is any indication that North Korea plans to attack South Korea, the United States will undertake a preemptive strike that could include the use of nuclear weapons. This is one reason North Korea is investing money in a relatively inexpensive nuclear program for defense purposes. Since the Korean War, North Korea has been gripped by a “permanent siege mentality” stemming from its fear of attack by U.S. forces. Japanese North Korea expert, Wada Haruki, points out in his book, North Korea, that if the DPRK maintains itself as both a garrison and conventional military state because of this siege mentality, the possibility of a U.S.-DPRK reconciliation will remain remote. At the moment, this game of chicken between the United States and North Korea appears to be reaching a climax; unless one of the parties changes its direction, the two are likely to crash head on. In the aftermath of such a collision, the United States—as the driver responsible for the collision—will walk away bruised but not broken; its passenger South Korea, and the other driver, North Korea, are likely to become fatalities together. This is why it is vitally important to have reconciliation between North Korea and the United States as a starting point.
Conservatives in Washington believe it is possible to pressure the North Korean regime into collapse. However, Harrison insists that the collapse theory underestimates the “will to survive” of North Korean elites who are trying to preserve their privileged lives and vested interests. In addition, this is not a desirable alternative for the future of the Korean peninsula. Achieving peace in a peaceful way can only begin when there is a simultaneous exchange of North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons for regime security guarantees by the United States. Harrison’s approach is pragmatic. He knows the historical reality of North Korea. What he offers in Endgame is a real alternative that emphasizes the need for an agreement rather than just an “economic, political, and inducement policy” that does not seek to provide any kind of final resolution to the predicament.
Harrison’s method of resolution may mistakenly be read as a “pro-North Korean/left-wing” alternative when in fact his approach leans more toward American interests. One of the most interesting points in Harrison’s book is his insistence that coexistence between the two Koreas in a federation system with denuclearization and neutralization coincides with fundamental U.S. interests. A change from America’s role as a regional mediator or stabilizer to pursuit of a policy of disengagement should be based on the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States, arms reduction on the Korean peninsula, and gradual withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). This process will actually maximize U.S. economic and military interests. Harrison’s assertion that America should accept a system of coexistence under a loose federation in which it can still offer a security umbrella when needed and play a role to deter an attack initiated by either of the two Koreas is worth noting as it indicates his fundamental concern for American interests in the disengagement process. In this way, not only are the interests of the Korean peninsula served, but America’s interests in the East Asian region can also be fulfilled. From Harrison’s perspective, North Korea has made a “new system” that defies conventional classifications by political scientists and its pragmatists are pursuing “reform by stealth” in order to survive. For North Korea to sustain this reform process it is necessary for Washington to change its policy. In addition, the final solution involves not only American influence but also the influence of neighboring countries that are redefining their own national interests in the flow of economic globalization. Harrison believes that when a consensus is reached not to have U.S., Chinese, Japanese, or Russian conventional forces intervening on the Korean peninsula and a six party agreement (that includes the two Koreas) that forbids the production, use, and possession of nuclear weapons on the peninsula, it will then be possible to have progress toward lasting peace and move in a direction toward unification.
If this is the case, could it be that the United States is the real obstacle to finding a peaceful solution? According to Harrison, the heart of the problem is Washington’s unsuitable policy of engagement. More accurately, the biggest obstacles to achieving peace are the powers in the United States and the social and political forces in East Asia—including those in North and South Korea—that desire to maintain the cold-war structure on the Korean peninsula in order to maximize national interests. This reality informs us that the peace process will not be easy. The United States thinks of itself as the only superpower and makes policy based on this assumption. We can see this expressed in the tendency of the United States to expand and impose its values as a great power on so-called “rogue states” such as North Korea—an approach that will only obstruct efforts for peace. U.S. policy makers would like to see the very idea of North Korea disappear in order to complete the Fukuyamian version of the “end of history.” While I believe that hope for a peace process on the peninsula lies somewhere between utopia and reality, the project for an endgame as proposed by Harrison could end up on the scrap heap because of U.S. arrogance. Our hands may continue to be tied.
Yet, the answer does not lie in waiting for America to change on its own accord. Despite their willingness, the South Korean government and civil society are in a situation where they cannot even play the role of mediators. In order to overcome America’s toying with North Korea, South Korea must exercise its historical international political muscle and demonstrate its role as a wise and active player in seeking to change the current political structure. Although it may seem impossible, the task that has to be carried out is to find the power to change the structure. Is not this power to be found in the South Korean civil society, which has been critical of the United States and one of the most powerful agents propagating real change in the international political structure of the Korean peninsula? Harrison’s conservative bias to view the reality of Korean civil society as a kind of nationalism is one limitation of his analysis. In the midst of the global civil society movement to counter America’s unilateral policies formed after 9/11, South Korean civil society has transformed its perception of international politics. Can we not say that the Korean peace process is beyond the “balance of power” concept that characterizes the traditional perspective of western-centered views of international politics? The source of power for changing the international political structure on the Korean peninsula is the universal practice of the South Korean civil society and its pursuit of international solidarity with other civil societies around the globe.
Most people see what they want to see and read what they want to read, which only results in bias. Harrison, refreshingly, is quite open-minded. His book tries to look beneath the surface of the issues and open the way to an alternative to the realist dominated international political world by reminding us of the power of social forces to initiate peaceful means to achieving peace. This book also makes us aware of the reason for the existence of social science in changing society. Peaceful means for peace is a common starting point from which can branch many different approaches to solving the Korean predicament. Harrison’s solution as presented in Endgame is one. Various forms of communication allow for the sharing of a variety of views. Monopolization of the solution process or imposition of a singular view can only work as a detriment to the peace process. Multiple views from the public sphere need to be expressed and encouraged. Only then can a consensus on how to resolve the problem of the Korean peninsula be reached.
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