by
EVGENIY V. AFANASIEV
[DIRECTOR-GENERAL 1-ST ASIAN DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION]
posted April 7, 2003
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 Preface : * Based on a lecture at the Graduate School of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University on March 22, 2003. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Russian government.
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Article : |
INTRODUCTION
The so-called North Korean nuclear crisis is currently one of the most crucial international problems and greatly influences the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The stability of the Northeast Asian region depends greatly on it being resolved. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan can all be part of the solution to this problem as countries near or on the Korean Peninsula or that have significant interests in the region. Concerns over this problem are also the topic of discussions within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and more recently the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The policy of the Russian Federation is aimed first at seeing to the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula, second, at solving the problem exclusively through peaceful negotiations, and third at preserving and developing the positive trends over the past years in the region, including the development of dialogue and cooperation between North and South Korea; the realization of large scale multilateral economic projects with Russian participation, the improvement of relations up to normalization between the DPRK and the United States and the DPRK and Japan, and the establishment of a system guaranteeing peace, security, and development in the region.
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THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
The nuclear activity of the DPRK that started in the late 1950s with the support of the Soviet Union was tied to the construction of a nuclear power plant in the DPRK (the corresponding agreement was signed between the DPRK and the USSR in 1985). However, with the break-up of the USSR, cooperation in this sphere stopped. The DPRK joined the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985, but signed the control agreement with IAEA only in January 1992 after South Korean President Kim Young Sam announced that there were no nuclear weapons in the ROK. At the same time Pyongyang and Seoul signed a declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
In June 1992, the IAEA started inspections in the DPRK. In reaction to the persistent demands to allow the inspections of two facilities that were not declared by Pyongyang as nuclear but as Pyongyang claimed, were military, the DPRK stated on March 12, 1993, its withdrawal from the NPT. The UNSC resolution calling for Pyongyang to honor the NPT and for continuing cooperation with the IAEA were regarded by North Korea as interference in its internal affairs and as an infringement on the sovereignty of the state. In order to understand this perspective of Pyongyang’s it is necessary to note that according to paragraph 1 of article X of the NPT, “Each member in exercise of its state sovereignty has a right to withdraw from the Treaty, should it decide that the exceptional circumstances, connected with the content of the present Treaty, endanger the highest interests of the state. The state has to notify all the members of the Treaty and the UNSC about such withdrawal three months in advance. Such notification must contain the explanations of the exceptional circumstances that have endangered the highest interests of the state.”
The DPRK forwarded such a withdrawal statement to the Chairman of the UNSC. Before that, the DPRK had not fulfilled its obligations under the NPT relating to cooperation with the IAEA. That same month the IAEA Director General claimed that the DPRK continued to violate the obligations under the NPT. In May 1993, the UNSC adopted resolution 825, obliging the DPRK to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty, as well as to reconsider its decision of withdrawal. The UNSC members even raised the possibility of imposing sanctions on the DPRK but the decision was not adopted. Military actions and threats by the United States against the DPRK were cited as the exceptional circumstances that forced it to withdraw from the Treaty. Under such circumstances, Russia suspended its cooperation with the DPRK in the nuclear sphere, including the construction of the light-water reactor nuclear power plant, and put forward the initiative to convene an international conference on the security and nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula in order to find mutually acceptable solutions to the problem.
In early June 1993, the DPRK and the United States held talks, followed by the issuing of a joint declaration in which the DPRK declared the “unilateral suspension” of its withdrawal from the NPT for the period of time it deems necessary. In return, the United States was obligated not interfere in DPRK internal affairs and not to threaten to use force. Pyongyang conditioned its final decision to continue its participation in the Treaty on the settling of military-political problems on the Korean Peninsula and on the normalization of relations with the United States. During the negotiations with the Americans, Pyongyang suggested replacing, with the assistance of the United States, its graphite reactors with light-water reactors, which do not produce plutonium.
The 1994 “Agreed Framework” Between the United States and the DPRK
On October 21, 1994 in Geneva, the United States and the DPRK signed an Agreed Framework on the nuclear problem. It outlines the following major points:
· Obligation, taken by the United States, to arrange for the construction of light- water reactors in North Korea by the year 2003.
· The United States will take steps to compensate for the energy losses of the DPRK by supplying heavy fuel oil (500 thousand tons annually) until the period of completion of the first light-water reactor.
· On receiving guaranties concerning the light-water reactors and heavy fuel oil, the DPRK will freeze its graphite reactors with the ultimate goal of dismantling them. The dismantling process must be finished after the completion of construction of the light-water reactors.
· Both parties will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations, and will establish liaison offices in each other’s capitals.
· The United States will officially guarantee that it will not use force or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK. The DPRK will take steps toward the realization of the North-South bilateral declaration on the demilitarization of the Korean peninsula and will start dialogue with South Korea.
· The DPRK is obligated to maintain its participation in the NPT and will fulfill the IAEA guarantee agreement.
· Upon completion of the light-water reactors, routine and specialized IAEA inspections will continue on the facilities, which are not frozen.
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
The agreement on the creation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a consortium to carry out the construction of the light-water reactors, was signed in March 1995 by representatives of the United States, Republic of Korea and Japan according to the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework signed in October 1994. In December 1995, the agreement between the DPRK and the United States concerning the supply of light-water reactors of South Korean origin to North Korea was concluded in New York. In August 1997, it was officially declared that the construction of the nuclear power plant begin not far from the Sinpo port on the boarder of the Sea of Japan/East Sea. The cost would be 4.6 billion U.S. dollars (North Korea promised to compensate for the expenditure of KEDO in equal parts for 20 years, 3 years after the end of the construction and its initial utilization). South Korea allotted 3.2 billion dollars, Japan would provide 1 billion dollars, the European Council would supply 130 million dollars, the United States was to give 115 million dollars and was to bear the cost of supplying annually 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK.
In December1999, a contract was made between KEDO and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) on the complete construction of two light-water reactors of South Korean standard with the necessary infrastructure. The period of the construction was established at nine years. Pyongyang reacted in a hard line manner to the declared postponement of the deadline set for the delivery and utilization of the nuclear power plant from the year 2003 to the years 2007-2008, and to the resolution of the General Conference of the IAEA. According to the resolution, the completion of the project could be disrupted because of the refusal of DPRK authorities to grant international inspectors access to its nuclear facilities. Threatening to withdraw from the obligations set in the Agreed Framework with the United States, the North Koreans demanded compensation for the damage caused by delays in the construction of the nuclear power plant. It is common knowledge that the concrete was poured for the foundation only in August 2002. The DPRK authorities also rejected the idea expressed by the representatives of the new U.S. administration to replace the nuclear power plant with a thermo power station.
The chief members of KEDO supported the idea of drawing Russia into the enterprise. Eventually, Russia emphasized that it was ready to join KEDO under the conditions that its place in the international consortium would correspond with the level of development achieved in the nuclear energy field in Russia, to the interests of the Russian nuclear industry and to our work experience with the North Koreans in this area in the past. With regard for these factors, Russia did not mount a campaign for a speedy decision concerning the question of membership in the consortium. At the same time, the idea of Russian industry experts joining the construction of the atomic power station in the DPRK was not excluded. The conditions for this were seen as advantageous for us, for example it could take shape as a delivery of nuclear fuel, components, and equipment. Some reporters expressed an alternative approach—the construction of the nuclear power plant at KEDO expense on North Korean territory or on the territory of Russia near the Russian-Korean border. It could have been built as a Russian project consisting of two blocks of one thousand megawatts each. However, the chief members of KEDO did not support such an idea.
Recently, the fulfilment of the KEDO program was jeopardised after Washington accused Pyongyang of resuming its nuclear program and after shipments of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK were stopped in November 2002. Unlike the Bill Clinton administration, which managed to achieve considerable progress in talks on normalization of relations with the DPRK, the George W. Bush administration stated that continuation of contact with Pyongyang would not be possible unless nuclear, missile and other problems, including conventional arms issues and human rights were deemed settled. The general line of the talks on the part of the United States was to demand that North Korea, “open all nuclear facilities for special inspection by International Atomic Energy Agency experts.” The condition was that the deadline for the construction of the light-water reactors by KEDO depended on fulfilment of this demand.
J. Kelly’s Mission and Its Consequences
James Kelly, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, was sent to Pyongyang in early October 2002 after a long pause in contacts between the United States and the DPRK, which resulted from the “re-evaluation” of Washington’s policy on the Korean Peninsula. The initial information on the results of his negotiations with the North Korean representatives was quite neutral and could be summed up in the idea of their “usefulness” in terms of “finding out each other’s points of view.” Nevertheless, within approximately two weeks it was declared in Washington that the negotiations in fact had collapsed after the United States blamed North Korea of having secretly purchased components and equipment used for the rotary method of uranium enrichment (mass media mentioned Pakistan as the source, but Pakistan later on vehemently denied these allegations). According to the Washington version, during negotiations, the North Korean first deputy foreign minister Kang Sok Ju, after consulting with his superiors, allegedly stated that the DPRK not only continued the mentioned program but could create even “more powerful weapons.” The United States interpreted this as “acknowledgement” by the DPRK that it was developing its nuclear program and thus mounted a wide-scale campaign of international pressure on Pyongyang.
According to the North Korean version of the same statement, being subjected to direct threats and pressure from the United States, the DPRK stated that it “could produce weapons even more powerful than those derivable by enrichment of uranium.” The emphasis in this case was made on the words “could produce” and not on acknowledgement of the fact that North Korea actually was in possession of nuclear weapons. Later on the North Koreans said that “the unity of the whole nation around the great chief comrade Kim Jong Il” was implied in the words of “more powerful weapons.” The representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK on the 25th of October, put forward the idea of an actual “interchange”—the suggestion to hold direct negotiations with the United States within which the concerns of the United States about the North Korean nuclear program would be settled provided that the DPRK receives guarantees from the United States regarding safety and non-interference in its internal affairs in the form of a non-aggression pact.
During the summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Organisation in Los Cabos (Mexico) in October 2002, the leaders of the United States, Japan and the ROK adopted a statement appealing to North Korea to shut down its nuclear program “as soon as possible in a way that could be verified.” In the middle of November, the chief members of KEDO decided to suspend deliveries of compensatory heavy fuel oil to North Korea, which provoked an extremely negative reaction from Pyongyang since the decision coincided with the eve of the winter season. At the end of November, the Board of Directors of the IAEA adopted a resolution that requested the DPRK to clear up the situation and agree to international inspections. In response, Pyongyang declared that it was lifting the ban on “the unfreezing” of it’s nuclear program (i.e. the launching of the research reactor in Yongbyon and continuation of construction of the larger reactor). The next step which fuelled the aggravation of the situation was the statement by the DPRK that it was withdrawing from the NPT. At the same time the statement mentioned that at the moment North Korea was not developing its nuclear weapons program and was even ready to agree to inspections of its nuclear facilities under certain conditions. However, these pleas were ignored by the United States.
In February 2003, the Board of Directors of the IAEA adopted a resolution in which the issue was forwarded to the UNSC. The Russian Federation refrained from voting, stating that the timing for taking such a step was not appropriate. The situation was further aggravated by reports of a regular test of a “surface to sea" missile conducted by Pyongyang, of the launching of the reactor in Yongbyon as well as by the incident involving the U.S. Army reconnaissance plane RC-135S, which was intercepted by North-Korean MIG fighters on March 2nd. Bush warned of the possibility of using military force as an extreme measure against North Korea.
Russian Policy Concerning the DPRK Nuclear Problem
From the very beginning of this latest crisis concerning the North Korean nuclear problem, Russia has taken a definite position in favor of a peaceful resolution through negotiations between the United States and the DPRK as the countries directly involved in the problem and which signed the Agreed Framework in 1994. Russia takes into account the fact that in the very beginning of the crisis Pyongyang claimed to be ready to eliminate the concerns of the United States about its nuclear program and other weapons of mass destruction by suggesting to sign a mutual non-invasion treaty. The DPRK repeatedly confirmed its readiness to return to the "freeze" on its nuclear facilities if the United States started to fulfill its obligations under the Agreed Framework. Russia considers the currently emerging problem primarily as a political issue that reflects a lack of confidence in the relations between the United States and North Korea. It is possible to resolve and it must be settled by means of negotiations between the main parties involved, namely the United States and North Korea. It is desirable for both sides to start complying with the 1994 Agreed Framework, possibly with some alterations, and as an ideal result we would like to see the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations achieved during the talks.
We should admit that the failure to comply with the deadline of the construction of two light-water reactors in North Korea that had been determined by the 1994 Agreed Framework, and the decision of the United States to discontinue heavy fuel oil shipments, seriously complicated the energy situation in the DPRK. In addition, Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the NPT added seriously to the instability on the peninsula. We still firmly advocate maintaining the non-nuclear status of the Korean Peninsula and the retaining of a nuclear non-proliferation regime there, while we also regard Pyongyang's demand concerning the construction of the nuclear power station to provide for the energy needs of the DPRK as appropriate. It would be promising if the DPRK were provided with multilateral security and non-intervention guarantees in return for putting its nuclear program under IAEA control. Russia is ready to join the countries that are willing to set up such guarantees.
On November 18, 2002, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that, “Moscow is seriously concerned about inconsistent messages from Pyongyang about the ‘right’ of the DPRK to possess nuclear weapons.” Russia expects the DPRK to comply strictly with all obligations of the NPT, which is the main guarantee for global strategic stability as well as for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Russia believes that all other countries involved, including those who signed the 1994 Agreed Framework, should continue fulfilling their international duties. Russia was one of the first states to warn of the negative consequences of the U.S. and KEDO decision to stop oil shipments to the DPRK. We directly stated that such a decision might not result in settling the current concerns over the DPRK’s compliance with the NPT and could even complicate pursuit of the common goal of denuclearising the region. Our key position has always been that all rising problems should be solved by means of peaceful negotiations between interested parties, mainly the DPRK and the United States, which can both remove mutual concerns.
However, Russia clearly responded to the DPRK's actions of removing IAEA monitoring systems from its facilities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its official statement expressed strong regret regarding these unilateral actions of the DPRK, confirming our support for further cooperation between the IAEA and the DPRK, and support for the IAEA's stance on preserving its leverage for guaranteeing the DPRK's activities. On December 30., 2002, Minister Igor Ivanov emphasized Russia's firm stance on upholding the non-nuclear status of the Peninsula and continuing inter-Korean dialogue. To this end we cannot but regret Pyongyang's actions of expelling IAEA inspectors and resuming preparations for a non-supervised use of nuclear facilities, the minister said. The DPRK should definitely fulfill all its international obligations. The Minister confirmed that Russia also believed that the fulfilling of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework was crucial, and supported all other international treaties that aim at denuclearising the Peninsula. This goal may be reached only by means of constructive dialogue between all interested nations. Aggressive claims and threats, as well as attempts to isolate the DPRK, may only lead to further escalation of the conflict, which would not benefit regional and global security interests.
At this time, Russia proactively carried out consultations with the DPRK, the People's Republic of China, Japan, the United States, the Republic of Korea and other interested parties in order to find ways to help resume dialogue toward a settlement of the crisis in a diplomatic way. The situation moved to another level after January 10th as the DPRK issued a statement on its withdrawal from the NPT. This caused a clear negative reaction in Moscow. The statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry emphasised that such action may only aggravate an intense situation on the peninsula and could greatly damage the existing law instruments of international and regional security. Russia expressed hope that Pyongyang would listen to the opinion of the international community, its neighbours and partners, and make the right decision toward complying with international non-proliferation obligations and also resume multilateral dialogue with all parties concerned. We are convinced that preconditions for effective dialogue exist and it is necessary to use them in the interests of international peace and stability, and in the interests of the North Korean people.
At the same time Russia has made vigorous diplomatic moves in order to solve the crisis in a peaceful way. We proposed a package deal, which provided for the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula and strict compliance with all obligations by all sides, including full implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. It also emphasized constructive bilateral and multilateral dialogue between all interested parties, which should result in security guarantees for the DPRK, and stressed the need to resume humanitarian and economic programs previously maintained on the Peninsula. Accordingly, our proposals were explained both to the DPRK and to the other parties involved.
Based on the decision of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Special Envoy Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov visited Pyongyang from January 17th - 21st, 2003, and had a six-hour meeting with Chairman of the National Defence Committee of the DPRK, Kim Jong Il. He also held consultations with other high-ranking officials in Pyongyang, including the first Deputy Minister of the Foreign Minister of the DPRK, Kang Sok Ju. During the visit of the special envoy, the North Korean counterparts expressed their concern over the U.S. stance toward the DPRK and possibilities of U.S. aggression against the DPRK. They emphasised that the United States is solely responsible for the deterioration of the economic situation in North Korea by cutting the oil supply. The DPRK withdrawal from the NPT should be regarded as a responsive action and a security guarantee in case of U.S. aggression. The DPRK leaders emphasized that Pyongyang was ready to reassume NPT obligations and permit access to IAEA inspectors to its nuclear facilities, but only in the case where the United States agreed to start bilateral talks and provide security guarantees. The visit showed that solving the crisis on the Peninsula by political means would be possible provided that we could see a political will from both the DPRK and the United States and that we had the support of other states involved. After the visit, Russian officials briefed the leaders of the United States, the Republic of Korea, PRC and Japan about the conclusions of the meetings and suggestions for conducting our specific proposals concerning the ways out of the deadlock. In addition, a special envoy from the ROK visited Moscow and conducted a fruitful meeting both with state and parliament officials. Certainly the situation on the Korean peninsula was one of the main topics of discussion.
Taking into account all the above-mentioned circumstances, Russia has taken a cautious stance on the issue of sending the North Korean nuclear program question to the UN Security Council. We clearly stated that bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue must be the main element for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The Russian delegation refrained from voting for the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA Director General on the issue of continuing with the NPT—dependent obligations between the IAEA and the DPRK. The main reasons for this were the results of the ongoing diplomatic process, in particular the President's special envoy’s visit to Pyongyang, which allowed us to believe that a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem was possible on the basis of the package deal suggested by Russia. As Foreign Minister I. Ivanov said in his letter of January 20th to the IAEA Director General El-Baradei, “In these conditions we think it is undesirable to forward this issue to the UN Security Council, as it might disturb the delicate process of pursuing the resolution of mutual concerns.” We have never doubted the necessity to observe all the stipulations of the Chapter of the Agency, but we disagree with sending the issue to the Security Council at this time. We were ready to support the draft resolution if direct dialogue between the United States and the DPRK started in New York.
We believe that there is no alternative to the peaceful resolution of the crisis. We are deeply convinced that direct dialogue between the United States and the DPRK should become the main element of a diplomatic settlement. Russia is going to make every effort to help establish dialogue, and will call on other members of the Board of Governors to join those efforts. We also support both multilateral and bilateral talks if they satisfy all sides. We proposed setting up a guarantee system for the United States and the DPRK that might include Russia, China and other nations as well, and we also introduced a package deal as well. It is very important to use all possible diplomatic means to solve the problem with respect to every country's interests and thus avoid pressure and further escalation. The absence of peaceful negotiations on the North Korean nuclear program has a negative effect on the Korean Peninsula as a whole, leads to escalation of mutual threats and increases the possibility for conflict. Tactics of political pressure do not lead to the expected results but on the contrary lead to further escalation of the crisis.
Examining the problem just from the point of a non-proliferation issue on the Korean Peninsula, today’s situation is much worse compared with early October 2002 when the US-DPRK negotiations began. At that time the DPRK was a NPT member, the IAEA inspectors and monitoring equipment were functioning inside the country, and the situation was quite clear to the international community. Moreover, as the deadline for the KEDO project was coming to an end, inspections of previous activities of the DPRK were to take place. Now everything has come to a standstill and the situation is more uncertain than before. This is a result of the so-called international pressure and the abandoning of negotiations with the DPRK.
The escalation of claims makes the situation even worse. The DPRK’s hints at a possible abandoning of the Armistice Agreement with the United States, which followed the U.S. claims of a sea blockade and the imposing of sanctions, made the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasize that the Armistice Agreement between UN forces command representatives headed by the United States and representatives of the Peoples’ Army of Korea and Chinese national volunteers is the main and only pillar of peace and stability on the peninsula. The Agreement defines the nominal regime boarder (DMZ) between the North and the South. The fact that the Agreement has not yet been replaced with a more thorough peace agreement shows that the situation in Korea is still unstable and relations between the two major sides of the conflict, the DPRK and the United States, are not settled.
The Russian side has noticed aggressive claims by some U.S. politicians and officials about an opportunity for the “two front war.” They claim that North Korea is a “terrorist state” and a part of the “axis of evil.” The United States has not ruled out the possible use of military force to solve the so-called North Korean nuclear problem. Russia urges both Washington and Pyongyang to be wise and restrained, refrain from claims and actions that can complicate the situation further and take real steps to reduce tension for the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the entire Asia-Pacific region. Such actions will help meet the interests of South and North Korea and all the countries concerned as the danger of conflict on the Korean Peninsula can thus be avoided.
Russia also notes the fact that its position on the settling of the “North Korean nuclear problem” apparently coincides with the approach of such an important power as China. In a joint communiqué issued on February 27th, 2003 by the Ministers of foreign affairs of Russia and China, both sides expressed a deep concern in connection with the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The two countries declared that the securing of nuclear-free status for the Korean peninsula, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the sustaining of peace, security, and stability meet the expectations of the international community. In addition, they noticed that constructive dialogue between the United States and the DPRK plays an important role in the settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem and in the improvement of North Korean-U.S. relations. Russia and China have agreed on continuing proactive dialogue and developing cooperation between North and South Korea. This process serves as a considerable contribution to normalizing the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia as a whole. Both ministers took into consideration the statement expressed by the DPRK, that it was not going to produce nuclear weapons and intentions expressed by both the United States and the DPRK to solve the problems peacefully. In this regard, Russia and China are ready to make effort to assist the U.S.-North Korean dialogue. Russia and China are also ready to contribute to a political solution of the Korean nuclear problem and to the establishment of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region in bilateral or multilateral formats. Both sides confirmed that they intend to develop good friendly relations and cooperate with the DPRK and ROK.
Russia and Inter-Korean Relations
Russia supports the position of the ROK that proactively advocates a peaceful solution to the “North Korean nuclear problem” with the participation of all parties concerned. We strongly encourage the continuation and development of dialogue and cooperation between North and South Korea and a continued policy of developing inter-Korean relations and exchanges. We proceed from the fact that the situation on the Korean Peninsula largely depends on the progress of inter-Korean relations, which during the last half century can be characterized as highly tense with periodical flashes of hostility. Beginning in the early 70s, both sides tried to settle their differences. Nevertheless, the North and South Korean joint statement of 1972 that stipulated principles for the unification of the country; the reconciliation, non-aggression, cooperation and exchanges Treaty of 1991 and the Declaration of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula have to this day remained unfulfilled. In addition, the 1996-1999 multilateral (DPRK, ROK, U.S., China) negotiations on a new system of peacekeeping processes in Korea have proven futile.
However, South and North Korea managed to better bring together their views in June 2000 during the first meeting of the heads of state of the DPRK and the ROK, which proved to be a remarkable step in relations` improvement and cooperation. In the Joint Declaration signed on June 15th after the summit, both sides agreed to independently settle the problem of unification and noted similarities in the North’s proposition to form a federation and the South’s proposal of a confederation. Both parties confirmed their commitment to mutual non-aggression, reached a consensus on meetings for divided families, came to an agreement on developing cultural exchanges and humanitarian cooperation, and expressed their readiness to keep permanent contacts.
In accordance with the signed agreement, a few rounds of inter-governmental negotiations at the minister’s and defense minister’s levels were held and the Panmunjom communication liaison offices resumed their activities. All this resulted in arranging a few divided families reunions, a single limited letter exchange, and delivering consignments of corn and fertilizer to the North as humanitarian aid. However, in 2001 and the first half of 2002—as a result of a number of negative factors e.g. a lack of U.S.-North Korea interaction—Korea’s mutual contacts were reduced to a minimum and Kim Jong Il did not pay a return visit to Seoul. On June 29, 2002, there was a military clash of North-South navy ships in the Yellow Sea, in the area of the maritime demarcation line that had never been recognized by North Korea. Later Pyongyang expressed regret in connection with the incident (the North Korean navy ships were the first to open fire) and suggested resuming inter-Korean dialogue. The position of the Russian leadership in convincing Pyongyang to pursue a sound approach to solve the Korean problem highly contributed to this move by the DPRK.
The objectives and position of Russia concerning Korean peninsula issues are quite definite and consistent, with little connection to current political trends. Russia intends to actively develop relations of mutually beneficial cooperation with both Korean states, and to contribute to peace, stability, and the reunification of Korea in a form acceptable to both Koreas. President of the Russian Federation V. Putin warmly congratulated the new President of the Republic of Korea, Roh Moo-hyun, and expressed his conviction that the policy of pursuing further enhancement of productive cooperation between Russia and the ROK and improvement of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the North East Asia region as a whole would be continued. The delegation of high level officials headed by the Speaker of the upper house of the Russian parliament, S. Smirnov, attended the inauguration ceremony of the President of the ROK and held very useful talks there. Russia will continue to serve as an important factor of peace and stability for the Korean Peninsula in the foreseeable future.
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