by
Taik-young Hamm
[Professor of Political Science & Director of International Affairs, IFES]
posted November 20, 2002
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 Preface : |
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Article : |
Next month’s presidential election in South Korea gives the public a choice among four major candidates: Lee Hoi-chang of the Grand National Party, Roh Moo-hyun of the Millennium Democratic Party, Chung Mong-joon of the National Alliance Party, and Kwon Young-ghil of the Democratic Labor Party. Each candidate’s differences of ideology and worldview are largely manifested in the areas of foreign and security policy. Here, each candidate’s policy proposals in four key areas are analyzed: policy towards North Korea, Korea-U.S. relations, national defense, and North Korea’s nuclear weapons program which has recently become the most important security issue.
Firstly, in the area of North Korea policy, perspectives towards North Korea and proposals for establishing peace of the four candidates are compared. Secondly, in the area of Korea-U.S. relations, perspectives towards the alliance, the future of the U.S. forces in Korea, views on potential U.S.-Korean conflict caused by the U.S. troop presence, and overall foreign policy program are compared. Thirdly, in the area of national defense policy, the four candidates’ assessment of the military balance between the South and North, desirable level of military expenditure, and terms of compulsory military service are compared. Fourthly, policies concerning North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are compared by analyzing each candidate’s view of the responsible party, proposals for resolution and alternative policy measures. Each candidate’s policy proposals are evaluated based on how deeply they understand the nature of the problems at hand and how seriously they try to find solutions with initiative, originality, consistency and a sense of reality. Finally, overall evaluations of the four candidates including their ideological inclinations arranged in terms of the conservative-liberal spectrum are provided.
North Korea Policy
All four candidates agree that inter-Korean issues should be resolved by peaceful means, but differences can be seen in their perspective on North Korea and their policy proposals. Lee Hoi-chang believes the key to peace lies with North Korea and he stresses the need for “reciprocity” and “simultaneous efforts toward tension reduction and cooperative exchange.” Roh Moo-hyun has openly declared the continuation and development of the “Sunshine policy” by backing it with public support. He emphasizes the concept of “comprehensive security” that includes both economic as well as military security and insists on confidence building as opposed to Lee’s notion of reciprocity. Chung Mong-joon, while recognizing changes in North Korea and the regime’s willingness to open its economy and emphasizing the need for inter-Korean dialogue and cooperative exchange, suddenly changed his position to the extent that it is difficult to trust North Korea after its recent admission of a nuclear program. Kwon Young-ghil, who is the most progressive in approaches toward peace, suggests inter-Korean arms reduction and the reduction of United States forces in Korea, with South Korea taking the lead. In short, it can be observed that Lee is a conservative who puts priority on national security, Roh and Chung are functionalists, and Kwon is a pacifist.
Korea-U.S. Relations
With regard to Korea-U.S. relations, one can find a contrast between the moderate or conservative lines of Lee, Roh, and Chung and the revisionist line of Kwon. Lee insists on a close relationship between Korea and the United States stressing that, “when there is disagreement between South Korea and the United States people feel insecure.” He strongly warns against anti-American sentiment that may interfere with the resolution of pending issues surrounding the Nogun-ri incident during the Korean War, Maehyang-ri bombing range, etc. between Korea and the United States. Considering the fact that even the Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army admitted that anti-American sentiment in Korea is a “natural consequence” from the success of the Korea-U.S. alliance, Mr. Lee’s position may be criticized as too conservative and pro-American. Roh emphasizes that because there are a variety of different views in the United States, it is possible to form cooperative policies between Korea and the United States through persuasion. In addition, from the standpoint of the comprehensive security concept, he is enthusiastic about Korea taking the leading role in establishing a system of economic cooperation and peace in Northeast Asia. This implies furthering reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas to the level of peace and prosperity and expanding it to Northeast Asian regional cooperation. His support for keeping U.S. troops in Korea after unification and lack of attention to the improvement of the alliance relationship or the resolution of pending issues concerning the U.S. forces in Korea, however, gives one the impression that he is not quite liberal in these areas. It is likely that he is tying hard to avoid the conservatives’ charge that he may be an anti-American. While acknowledging that North Korea-U.S. relations are at the core of Korean foreign policy, Chung insists on revising part of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to create a more equal partnership between Korea and the United States. The more progressive Kwon insists on amending the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and the SOFA, returning the wartime operational control over the ROK armed forces to Korea, and the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. He advocates self-reliance, equality and an orientation toward peace in Korea’s diplomacy. His future oriented vision of an international alliance against U.S. hegemony may be criticized as radical with respect to the reality in Korea.
National Defense Policies and Disarmament
In the area of national defense policy and arms control and disarmament, Lee, Roh, and Chung are supporters of the military, insisting on an increase in the defense budget and maintaining the current level of armed forces. On the other hand, Kwon insists on reduction in the force level and, consequently, defense spending. With regard to the State Security Law, Lee wants to maintain it, Roh wants substitute legislation, and Chung wants it amended, especially with regard to the North Korean sympathizers/supporters clause. Lee would like to spend more than 3 percent of the GDP for national defense, while he proposes to reduce the term of compulsory military service by two months (to a 24-month service) for the benefit of college students. Roh also calls for more than 3 percent of the GDP for defense as indicated in his recent speech at a Veteran’s Association meeting, although he sees, unlike Lee and Chung, South Korea as economically and militarily superior to the North. The Millennium Democratic Party asserted that it is inevitable to maintain the current term of military service for the time being in order to sustain the force level. Chung proposes to increase defense spending to 4.1% of the GDP, the world average, and is also against force reduction. He still has not made any concrete proposal regarding the term of military service.
While other candidates pay only lip service to arms control and disarmament, Kwon displays a more positive approach toward disarmament and peace. He suggests that South Korea, who is superior to the North in conventional capabilities, reduce its armed forces by 200,000, so that North Korea follow suit and the United States gradually withdraw its troops from Korea. He assures that the North, which is suffering from the heavy burden of the arms race, will respond positively to the idea of South Korea taking the first step to reduce its force level. He suggests reducing the terms of military service to 18 months through manpower reduction. He also suggests an alternative system for those who conscientiously object to being involved in military actions and the voluntary service system in the long run. He claims that by reducing the manpower cost and spending on investment, defense budget can be cut by 4 trillion won, or roughly $ 3 billion, a year. He also insists on abolishing the National Security Law and supplanting such national security apparatus as the National Intelligence Agency (NIA, formerly KCIA/NSA), which oppressed human rights in the past, with new democratic intelligence organizations.
With the exception of the reduced term of compulsory military service, Lee’s proposals give the impression that he is quoting directly from the publicity materials of the Department of National Defense. The Grand National Party, which has many specialists in these areas, should be criticized for its neglect of a more active policy program toward the elite, “high tech” armed forces in the age of the information revolution. Roh has not mentioned much about defense spending and force level before, but recently conveys a similar conservative perspective. He states that there is no harm in using the term “main adversary (enemy)” with regard to North Korea in the military circles. He seems to mobilize support from the military and the conservatives. Chung’s proposed plan to increase the military expenditure to 4.1 percent of the GDP through the reduction of spending in other areas is too optimistic. Kwon is even naive in his defense budget cut proposals, considering the present security situation and conservative public opinion on security issues in Korea. However, Kwon emphatically opposes the current Korean arms buildup against the so-called potential adversaries in the region and believes that there should be an alternative security regime for a unified Korea, since a hypothetical arms race against China or Japan is beyond (unified) Korea’s ability and self-defeating.
The North Korea Nuclear Issue
While all the candidates agree to resolve the current nuclear issue peacefully, the diagnosis and prescriptions vary. Lee and Chung see North Korea as entirely responsible for the crisis. Roh thinks that the United States is partly responsible for providing the North with some rationale. On the other hand, Kwon thinks that both North Korea and United States are responsible. Especially, he cites the hard line policy of the United States toward North Korea as the main reason.
Regarding approaches to conflict resolution, Lee strictly maintains the position that the North Korean nuclear problem must not be the object of negotiations. He insists that the “North must relinquish its weapons program first and then negotiations can begin,” while other candidates oppose a unilateral resolution and suggest a package settlement. He insists on measures for linking the nuclear issue with North Korean economic cooperation. Such a “by the book” hard line approach lacks flexibility in the resolution of security problems. There is concern that the range of Korean policy options on the issue would be narrowed on its own and would worsen the situation. Chung emphasizes an uncompromising and more concrete discontinuation of economic aid to North Korea, in contrast to his original position. Roh insists on the continuation of exchanges and the resumption of talks between Japan and North Korea in order to ensure open channels of dialogue and to prevent a catastrophe. He believes that South Korea has to take the lead in resolving the problems, but shows a rather passive attitude toward the participation of Seoul in North Korea-U.S. negotiations. Kwon suggests reducing U.S. pressure on North Korea and the signing of a nonaggression treaty/pact between North and South Korea and between North Korea and the United States. His proposal may be a long-term solution to the Korean problem, but it is not a feasible approach toward resolving the current North Korean nuclear weapons crisis.
Overall Evaluation
The policy proposals of the four candidates all focus on security on the Korean peninsula in the narrow sense of the term, emphasizing Korea-U.S. relations and North Korea policy. There needs to be a more active, long-term vision for South Korea’s position and role in the international community. Foreign policy program packages toward Japan, China, Russia, and developing nations and trade policies are also missing. We can identify the ideological variations of the four candidates, even though they differ according to the areas covered above: roughly, Lee is a conservative, Chung is a moderate conservative, Roh is a moderate liberal (or moderate conservative depending on certain issues), and Kwon is a social democrat.
Lee, whose constituencies are mainly the conservatives, suggests a comparatively simple and clear policy package that centers on national security. While there is strength in suggesting a manageable number of proposals, there is also the impression of a lack of initiative and originality. It is still unknown whether his hard line proposals will produce a viable security environment and peace.
Chung shows a realistic and sharp pragmatic awareness on several important issues and sustains an objective perspective independent from the conflict between the Grand National Party and the Millennium Democratic Party. However, when observing the radical changes of his viewpoints on a number of key issues and some conflicting points in his statements, it appears his party program and policy package are not yet fully prepared.
In contrast to Lee and Chung, Roh suggests a more concrete vision of Northeast Asian cooperation. He actively insists on a comprehensive security perspective and enthusiastically suggests an integration plan that sees North-South cooperation contributing to the expansion of Northeast Asian regional cooperation. However, his enthusiasm in trying to harmonize the conservatives and the liberals becomes a “bread and butter” approach that simultaneously seeks security and economic cooperation. The fiscal burdens of his program would likely be a critical problem.
Mr. Kwon suggests the most systematic perspective on the means by which Korea can become more active on the international stage. He also suggests a set of concrete proposals for economic diplomacy of Korea. Overall, the Democratic Labor Party proposes the most complete foreign-security policy package. However, Kwon’s policy proposals are too good to be true, as they are the most idealistic and many difficulties can be expected to arise in the actualization of his policy measures. While the program of the Democratic Labor Party is too early to be realized in Korea, it nevertheless urges other political parties to make more efforts for initiative and creativity.
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