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Preface : Distinguished scholars and guests,
I am honored to speak before you today. Next month will mark two years since the historic summit between South and North Korea that renewed hopes for reconciliation, peace, and unification. As we come to this two year mark it is important to reflect on and assess the results of the summit. We realize that, unlike past agreements, the June 15 Joint Declaration carried a unique distinction in that it was signed by the top leaders of South and North Korea. Certainly, this strengthens the promises made and will ensure that points of the declaration are carried out. |
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The success of the summit and resulting Joint Declaration cannot be ignored. In a spirit of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence, a variety of exchanges between the South and the North followed the June summit, including inter-Korean ministerial-level talks, defense ministers¡¯ talks, working level-economic meetings, reunions of separated families and related Red Cross talks. The summit can be seen as the culmination of President Kim Dae Jung¡¯s engagement policy with the North. We have international support for the engagement policy as well.
The Joint Declaration also serves as our foundation to determine future prospects for inter-Korean relations, as there are still many issues to consider and tasks to accomplish. It is noteworthy that President Kim Dae Jung proposed, in his National Address in January 2002, five primary tasks: 1) linking of the Seoul-Shinuiju railroad and highway, 2) development of the Kaesong industrial complex, 3) reinvigoration of the Mt. Kumkang tourism project, 4) a permanent settlement for the reunion of separated families, and 5) relaxation of military tension and improvement of confidence-building measures.
After a period of stagnation, the recent visit to North Korea in April by special envoy Lim Dong Won from Seoul brought attention back to these issues and promise back to inter-Korean relations. South and North Korea reconfirmed their commitment to act in accordance with the spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration, agreeing on the need for increased dialogue, cooperative enterprises and the meetings of separated families.
The importance and wisdom of engaging North Korea is obvious. To do nothing would only lead to instability and increased tension and hostility on the Korean peninsula. In addition, tension on the Korean peninsula can easily lead to instability in the entire Northeast Asian region as the problems of the Korean peninsula are international in scope. Peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in North East Asia depend on close policy coordination in collaboration with the United States, Japan, China and Russia. Furthermore, these four powers have much to contribute in economic support and all have an important role in bringing about reform and the opening of North Korea.
The need for positive relations between South Korea, North Korea and the United States cannot be overstated. The most important issue in future security cooperation between Seoul and Washington will be how closely these two allies can coordinate their policies towards North Korea. While the United States indicates its support for President Kim¡¯s engagement policy and is seeking dialogue with North Korea, there are still issues pending with regard to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conventional weapons and the exporting of missile technology. North Korea¡¯s transparency and cessation of these activities is a priority for Washington as it seeks to reduce regional security threats and concerns about international terrorism.
It is evident that North Korea wants dialogue with Washington and vice-versa, both with hopes of improving relations. The planned visit to Pyongyang by special envoy Jack Pritchard is a welcome and positive sign. Firstly, negotiations between North Korea and the United States to resolve issues concerning nuclear weapons and other WMD should begin and based on the results of such negotiations, discussions concerning North Korea¡¯s conventional weapons can follow. Additionally, 2003 is crucial as it marks the end of Pyongyang¡¯s self-imposed moratorium on missile tests and deadlines for completion of light-water reactors as stipulated in the Agreed Framework of 1994. Both the United States and North Korea claim that they have complied fully with the agreement. But the construction of the nuclear power plant is being delayed by several years and North Korea continues to engage in obfuscation regarding its weapons program. The United States, as a leading member of KEDO, will have to rework some aspects of the agreement with North Korea. Washington will demand more access for IAEA inspectors and openness regarding nuclear weapons development. However, North Korea will likely demand additional compensation beyond the promised yearly delivery of 500,000 tons of heavy oil to make up for the delays in construction. Whether and how the two sides work out these issues have immediate consequences for inter-Korean relations and peace and security in North East Asia.
North Korea also needs the support and cooperation of the US if it is to join international economic organizations and financial institutions such as the World Bank and Asia Development Bank, which can help North Korea become a more active member of the international community. The U.S. is calling for dialogue but at the same time has upset Pyongyang by including it in the ¡°axis of evil¡±, the most recent nuclear posture review, and on its list of terrorism sponsoring states. Such labels are seen as unprovoked aggression from the United States and are taken quite seriously by North Korea. Yet, despite this disagreeable mood, we are hopeful that the process of dialogue will move forward as improved relations between North Korea and the US are essential to inter-Korean relations.
China and Russia have also expressed their support for permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. Historically, China and Russia were strong allies of North Korea. Together, they can play a leading role in assisting North Korea down the path of reform and openness. Particularly through economic cooperation, China and Russia can help North Korea improve its industrial structure and expand its social infrastructure. With his visits to Beijing and Shanghai, it is apparent that Chairman Kim Jong Il is looking to China for advice on economic reform. Chairman Kim showed particular interest in various areas of Information Technology, which can become a central focus for economic cooperation between China and North Korea.
In the post-cold war era Russia has maintained both a neutral and friendly relationship with the two Koreas. Kim Jong Il¡¯s visit to Moscow last year and the agreement on the connection of the trans-Siberian railway is significant. Concerted efforts to establish the railway and other modern industrial projects also provide Moscow with a leading role in North Korea¡¯s economic and industrial development. While Russia¡¯s current amicable and neutral position is appreciated, we welcome Moscow¡¯s more active involvement in North Korea¡¯s opening up and in the promotion of inter-Korean relations.
Normalization of relations between North Korea and Japan and will take time as Japan has its own unresolved issues including the alleged kidnappings of Japanese nationals. Recent Red Cross talks between the two countries offer hope that such issues can be worked out. The establishment of diplomatic relations would open the way for technological support and investment in the North. Japan has the resources to provide economic support to North Korea and has made significant contributions in humanitarian aid. In addition, as a member of KEDO, Japan¡¯s financial support in the implementation of the Agreed Framework is important. Both South Korea and the international community understand Japan¡¯s crucial role in the promotion of inter-Korean relations. Normalization of North Korea¡¯s diplomatic relations with Japan and the US would complete the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four major powers that would bring stability to inter-Korean relations. It would encourage North Korea to become a more responsible member of the international community.
Yet, challenges lie ahead. Momentary stalls and occasional reticence from Pyongyang will most likely continue and should be interpreted as periods of adjustment. We must also remember that the Sunshine Policy was formulated on the idea that patience is needed and that quick results are unrealistic. We may expect that the post-Kim Dae Jung administration in Seoul will continue with a similar policy. However, the most serious concern is, of course, the 2003 deadline for delivery of the light water reactors and the end of North Korea¡¯s self-imposed moratorium on missile tests. The US will take a dominant role in addressing the complicated issues surrounding the deadline and terms of the Agreed Framework. Flexibility from both sides will be needed to work out the problems that lie ahead. Furthermore, North Korea is also less likely to show any real outward commitments to change in the near future. In their Rodong Shinmun joint editorial commemorating the New Year, North Korea once again proclaimed their commitment to the four primary principles of leader-first, ideology-first, army-first, and institution-first. This is a strong indication of Pyongyang's belief in their regime, and clearly demonstrates their zeal to maintain it in the years ahead.
To conclude, the June 2000 inter-Korean summit laid the historic groundwork for a new era of peace on the Korean peninsula. But the summit was merely a first step in the long journey towards security and peace. The more challenging task of institutionalizing the Korean peace process lies ahead. The obstacles are a result of 50 years of division and confrontation. It is unrealistic to expect South-North relations to be altered within a short period of time and on the strength of one summit alone. Nonetheless, these past two year have given Koreans hope and the realization that time, hard work and perseverance is still needed. We also realize the need and welcome the active support and cooperation of the United States, Japan, China, and Russia. The establishment of permanent peace on the Korean peninsula will come about through coordinated efforts with these four powers. Therefore I am pleased to be jointly hosting this conference with the IFES, Georgetown University, and the Korea Press Foundation. It is a unique opportunity for us to begin working towards future collaboration and cooperative efforts that will ensure the continued improvement of inter-Korean relations and peace and security in the North East Asian region.
Thank you for being here and for your kind attention.
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