by
Su-hoon Lee, Dean J. Ouellette
[Chairman, Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, PhD. Candidate, University of North Korean Studies]
posted February 22, 2008
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* The following is an abridged version of the paper, “The Six-Party Talks and Dismantlement of North Korea’s Nuclear Programs,” presented at the International Conference on “Reducing the Threat of WMD through the Global Partnership,” February 1, 2008 in Seoul, Korea. For the complete paper with references, please contact the authors.
NUCLEAR CRISIS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: OVERVIEW
Allegations in October 2002 over North Korea’s possession of a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons led to controversy and the North’s withdrawal from the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), leading to turbulence in the North East Asian regional security environment and a second nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Some fault the North for the unraveling of the Agreed Framework (AF) reached between the United States and North Korea in 1994, citing the North’s provocative behavior, non-compliance, and apparent deceit, while many others point the finger at the U.S. miscalculation and insincerity from the beginning of the first nuclear crisis, and the subsequent lack of serious political will in Washington to carry out its end of the bargain struck in Geneva back in 1994. Hindsight tells us that, in 1993~1994, Washington and Pyongyang were negotiating over different objectives: the United States was focused on the issue of nuclear weapons, and did not address U.S.-DPRK relations nor the U.S. role in the region; North Korea was focused on obtaining security guarantees and energy assistance, and normalizing relations with the United States. Regardless, despite calls to revamp the Agreed Framework to deal with the new dilemma, it was obvious that it was no longer seen as a suitable or effective framework to manage North Korean nuclear issues.
EMERGENCE OF MULTILATERALISM IN NORTHEAST ASIA
In short, what emerged in its place in August 2003 was a broader multilateral negotiation framework: the Six-Party Talks. Unlike the Agreed Framework—which effectively was a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the DPRK that also excluded two major actors in the region, China and Russia—this new six-party arrangement included the two Koreas and the four surrounding powers of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States.
PROGRESS IN THE SIX-PARTY TALKS
September 19th Joint Statement
The first few found of talks were sluggish and achievements modest at best. In the beginning, there was a lack of substance, concrete agreements, and convergence of common interests among the participants. Nonetheless, a significant achievement was made at the end of the second phase of the 4th round of talks in September 2005, that being the signing of a six-article joint statement. In brief, the Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner. In the statement, “the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards”; “the United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons” and its willingness to offer security guarantees to this effect; and “[t]he ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The parties also expressed their intention to observe the ‘words for words’, ‘actions for actions’ principle and mutually coordinate measures, among commitments to provide energy assistance to North Korea, to discuss at an appropriate time the provision of light-water reactors (LWRs) to the North, to promote economic cooperation, to work toward U.S.-DPRK and Japan-DPRK normalization of relations, and so forth.
Was this a landmark step in the six-party multilateral process? Perhaps, but the talks and its first major agreement were not immune to external events. In particular, the U.S. Treasury Department’s allegations of DPRK counterfeiting of U.S. currency and usage of criminal profits laundered through a Macau-based bank, Banco Delta Asia (BDA), to fund development of nuclear weapons subsequently led to U.S. actions to freeze North Korean financial assets (approx. US$25 million) in said financial institution.
This later led to yet another lengthy hiatus in talks and triggered much more serious escalation of tensions in the region, beginning with North Korea’s test-firing of several ballistic missiles in July 2006, and eventually an underground nuclear test in October that same year. The unanimous international condemnation of the North’s nuclear test, including China’s uncharacteristically strong response, resulted in limited military and economic sanctions placed on the DPRK in the form of UN Security Council Resolution 1718.
However, with pressure on all sides, at the end of the month, North Korea expressed its desire to return to the Six-Party Talks, and the U.S. as well uncharacteristically seemed more willing to return to the negotiation table. The strategic decision made by the six parties to commit to diplomacy to resolve the nuclear impasse generated enough positive momentum to resume six-party talks in December 2006 (the 2nd phase of the 5th round).
February 13th Action Plan
This return to negotiations later led to the 3rd phase of the 5th round in February 2007 and the breakthrough signing of a detailed “action plan” in which all parties reaffirmed their common goal to move the peninsular denuclearization efforts forward in a peaceful manner, reiterated their intention to fulfill their commitments in the September 2005 Joint Statement in coordinated steps in a phased manner in line with the principle of “action for action.” The concrete measures are as follows:
- The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.
- The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.
- The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.
- The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.
- Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.
To carry out these initial actions and for the implementation of the September 2005 joint statement, five issue-specific Working Groups were created, one each for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations, normalization of DPRK-Japan relations, economic and energy cooperation, and Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism.
October 3rd Action Plan Agreement
Progress was maintained throughout the next several months, with working groups meeting and, for the most part, making tangible progress. This eventually led to a return to the six-party negotiation table with the holding of the 2nd phase of the 6th round of talks in late September 2007, where working groups reported their achievements, and implementation of actions outlined in the February 2007 agreement were confirmed. The culminating achievement of this phase, however, was the agreement on the “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” (hereinafter the “action plan agreement”), which was not officially announced until October 3, 2007. (The official announcement came a few days following the session’s end, as parties needed time to review and confirm the agreements with their respective capitols.)
Under the terms of the action plan agreement, North Korea agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs—including clarification regarding the uranium issue—by the end of 2007; disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to the September 2005 Joint Statement and February 13 Agreement, starting with the core nuclear facilities at Yongbyon (a 5-MW(e) nuclear reactor, reprocessing plant, and nuclear fuel rod fabrication facility; and not transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how.
For its part, the United States reaffirmed its intent to fulfill its commitments regarding the removal of the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and the termination of the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) with respect to the North. This is to be done in accordance with U.S. law and provided the DPRK submits a declaration and disables its said facilities.
In addition, North Korea and Japan agreed to make “sincere efforts” to normalize their relations, while the other parties reaffirmed their commitment to providing the North with economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), inclusive of the 100,000 metric tons that has already been delivered, and all remain committed to holding a ministerial level meeting in the near future.
It appeared as though North Korea was sticking to its denuclearization commitments. Even Washington hailed early on that the North was “entering a ground-breaking phase” as it started to disable its core nuclear facilities. Despite missing its 2007 year-end deadline to disable and disclose its nuclear facilities, U.S. top envoy Christopher Hill remained optimistic that Pyongyang is committed to the six-party deal, preaching patience and the need to be flexible.
DISMANTLEMENT OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
Disablement
For now, the three Six-Party Talks agreements mentioned above essentially provide a workable plan under which North Korea’s nuclear programs and activities can be declared and facilities and weapons gradually and verifiably dismantled. At this point, the specifics of the disablement are based on the findings of the U.S.-China-Russia experts who visited North Korea in mid September 2007 to survey the facilities at Yongbyon. It was stated that the “goal of these actions is to ensure that the DPRK would have to expend significant time and effort to reconstitute its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.” As well, at the request of the parties to the talks, the United States agreed to lead disablement activities and provide the initial funding for those activities. The first step was taken, which saw a delegation of U.S. experts visit Yongbyon in October and November 2007 to prepare to for the disablement.
However, significant hurdles have appeared, and these will challenge the six-party process.
The issue of removing the North from the State Department’s list of terror sponsoring states and the lifting of sanctions is one.
Another hurdle is the disablement itself. North Korea has taken steps to disable its dilapidated graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon beginning last November. But technical difficulties (safety issues) have prevented the North from meeting its year-end deadline. The process of safely disabling the sophisticated yet rundown complex at Yongbyon will no doubt be fraught with delays, and this may pose challenges to political deadlines imposed on the process.
Now while the U.S. appears to show patience with this problem, the issue of the declaration poses a much bigger hurdle. The North has yet to submit a “complete” declaration of its nuclear programs and weapons. One point of contention is the alleged highly enriched uranium program—the issue that led to the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis in the first place. And since the discovery of North Korea’s shopping for centrifuges at the underground nuclear black market in Pakistan, the U.S. has demanded the North declare its nuclear activities to the full extent. Reportedly, North Korea did give samples of some of its imported (possibly from Russia) aluminum centrifuges to the U.S. disablement delegation upon its second visit to Yongbyon in November 2007, and U.S. experts apparently found traces of highly enriched uranium in them. In its own defense, the DPRK foreign ministry has claimed to have submitted a declaration last November, but the U.S. has denied this claim and says it is still waiting for one which will address the above concerns, and the additional concerns over how much plutonium the North has weaponized. Of course, North Korea will have to address all these concerns adequately in its disclosure.
The issue of proliferation is another major political obstacle. Since the North did commit in the October 2007 action plan “not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, and know-how,” the North will have to clarify its proliferation activities. These once again arose last summer over alleged North Korean assistance to Syria’s nuclear program. Without concrete evidence, the Syrian linkage issue is being turned into a huge obstacle to completion of the disabling stage.
The domestic circumstances in South Korea are also holding up progress. With only weeks until it finally exits the Blue House, the incumbent Roh Moo-hyun administration seems to have little driving force in its final days. The transition to a new and most likely more conservative government in the South is making Pyongyang nervous. So while the North has expressed disappointment with the lack of progress on the part of the six-parties—in particular the U.S. for neither removing the DPRK from the list of terror sponsoring states nor lifting sanctions against the North, as well as with the delays in aid (heavy fuel oil) deliveries—the North Korean leadership maybe hesitating to move forward with disablement until it sees what Seoul will ultimately do.
The other parties as well are affected by the transition in South Korean government. Despite the expressed desire among the participants to return to the talks soon, and to get a deal done before the next administration is inaugurated in South Korea, Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo are not making any substantial moves. While Russia itself has made some constructive efforts to prevent North Korea from stalling, the parties all will wait until the new team in Seoul designs its policies more fully. In the time it takes to do so, the six-party process will effectively be stalled.
No actor seems to be making any substantial moves—save for Russia’s affirmation that it will provide oil to the North; but Russia’s hand at the table is rather weak. Tokyo as well has little clout, and is unlikely to try anything anyway, as it still feels snubbed by its allies for not making the issue of the 1970s abductions of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents a bigger priority in the talks.
But mostly, President Bush does not have the extra energy to move things forward—as Washington’s focus seems to be on Iran, Pakistan, and the upcoming presidential elections. Fading out neocons within the Bush administration also seem to be trying to derail the progress, while U.S. envoy to the six-way talks, Christopher Hill, and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice try to pursue this new, prudent and pragmatic approach.
Dismantlement
Full dismantlement, including its nuclear weapons, will be the true test of North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization—for as the skeptics assert, Pyongyang is unlikely to work toward diminishing or eliminating “the bedrock of its national defense” unless leaders in the North are confident that those weapons are no longer needed.
That said, dismantlement will only come about if North Korea sticks to the six-way dialogue designed to deal with the denuclearization issue, if Washington keeps up the momentum gained, and if both keep their ends of the bargain. Avoiding the multilateral dialogue or reneging on commitments can only lead us to another lengthy hiatus.
We should also not be deceived. Dismantlement will be a lengthier, more technical and much more costly process than disablement. It will require our patience, and the expertise and financial burden-sharing that only a multilateral arrangement can handle. To secure the financial commitments, build political support, and engage the relevant experts and tools needed to tackle the difficult and hazardous work to dismantle the DPRK’s nuclear programs, international participation in a cooperative threat reduction (CTR) program will be needed. As governments will change and as disputes will arise, an international approach will also help sustain the various CTR programs over the long term. Multilateral decision making and implementation of projects may be cumbersome at times, and may also present the DPRK an opportunity to revert to playing participants off against each other; but these risks can be mitigated through careful organization, planning, coordination, and implementation of projects.
Actors may be willing to conceive of such CTR programs, and commit to them. It has been suggested by experts that potential CTR partners would be the participants to the Six-Party Talks, the EU, and states of the former Soviet bloc that could bring applicable CTR experience and knowledge to bear on potential projects in the DPRK. Other potential candidates may be countries like Australia, Canada, and perhaps even India based on a variety of factors (i.e., their CTR experience, likely acceptance by the North based on their rather neutral positions, past non-governmental experience working with and inside the DPRK, relevant nuclear and non-nuclear expertise, respectable international standing, financial resources, etc.).
CONCLUSION
Ending the North’s nuclear ambitions will come down to the bilateral decisions in Pyongyang and Washington. However, multilateral talks have their advantages. Having multiple players involved in the process allows for each one to make an important contribution along the way to keep the process going. Nevertheless, full disclosure and dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs, removal of financial sanctions and trade normalization, along with the other bones of contention will continue to challenge the six-party process. At this juncture, let us hope that all parties can rediscover the energy and creativity to keep the progress going.
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