by
Pascal BONIFACE
[(Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques)]
posted January 4, 2008
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Inter-Korean Joint Declaration Signed
Since the beginning of this new century, good news is really infrequent on the international stage. Every time we are watching TV, listening to the radio, reading newspapers, we have awful news of terrorism, civil war, ethnic cleansing, slaughter of civilians, military strikes and potential or current wars. Every new year, we think that the past one has been terrible and the only ray of hope is that the next one could probably be better.
Therefore, we can only be grateful to Korean governments for their declaration on the advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity, signed by South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defense Commission. For sure, this has been the best news regarding strategic issues for the last six years.
Even if we must stay cautious and do not confuse declaration and implementation, this is still very good news. It gives the perspective of the end of a conflict that is one of the oldest conflicts – if not the oldest –, which was the bloodiest clash during the Cold War, and which is potentially the most dangerous on earth. We just have to imagine what would be the consequences of another war between the two Koreas: South Korea would be the winner. There is no question about that. But mass destruction would affect the 10th largest economy in the world. Seoul is only a few miles from the inter-Korean frontier and Tokyo could be easily reached by North Korean missiles.
North Korea pledged to dismantle its main nuclear facility and to make public its whole nuclear program before the end of the year. The goal of peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, that was out of reach yesterday, is now at sight. This is a major success for South Korea diplomacy, rewarding the sunshine policy launched in 1998.
Consequences Avoided
Had North Korea kept its nuclear program, the non-proliferation regime would have been in great danger. Japan and South Korea could have decided to refer to Article X of the NPT, arguing that extraordinary events relating to the subject of the Treaty had occurred and had created a new situation regarding their national security. But what would have been then the Chinese reaction? Beijing would have probably not accepted the "only Pyongyang targeted" reason for Japanese and South Korean programs. Not to mention the Asian countries or Russian reactions regarding a would-be Japanese accession to nuclear military capabilities. In June 2003, the U.S. Strategic Command – which is in charge of American nuclear forces – had a secret meeting in order to prepare plans for a new generation of nuclear weapons. The goal of this new strategy is to diversify nuclear options and to acquire high precision and low intensity weapons in order to reach deep shelters and bunkers. According to the nuclear posture review of 2002, the U.S. must diversify its arsenal and set a list of 7 countries against which tactical nuclear weapons could be used: Russia, China, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Obviously, behind this policy, the Bush administration’s idea is that nuclear non-proliferation does not rely on a treaty but on pre-emptive attack. So we can only conclude that we avoided the worst. The strategic status quo was impossible because if nothing had changed, we would have been confronted to the worst-case scenario.
Reversal of Proliferation
Several lessons could be drawn on a strategic point of view from the inter-Korean agreement of October 2007. First and foremost, nuclear proliferation can be reversed. This was far from being obvious and this is not without difficulty, but the spread of nuclear weapons is not irresistible. The general assumption is that the world community could only slow but not halt proliferation. The Korean example shows exactly the contrary. We have some other examples like this, but they are very few, and under very exceptional circumstances.
The first one is the South African “nuclear” coming out and dismantling of hidden military nuclear capabilities, just after the demise of apartheid. The second one is the giving up by Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan of their nuclear strategic capabilities inherited from the Soviet Union. Along with the North Korean case, these are the only examples of a voluntary renunciation of existing – and not potential or would-be – nuclear capabilities. The Korean example is even more exceptional because it is has occurred not as a result of the end of a crisis but as the condition to put an end to a very volatile and dangerous situation. This is much more difficult to find a solution to the nuclear proliferation issue in a period of would-be confrontation than during a period conflict ending.
Lessons Learned
For a long time, North Korean leadership has thought that possessing nuclear capabilities was a must for sanctuarizing their regime. It has been a difficult task to change their mind. South Africa, after the dismantling of Apartheid, was in a reconciliation period with its African neighbourhood and the world community. Possessing a nuclear arsenal was, from a current perspective, useless and even counterproductive for Pretoria. For the former Soviet Republics, the framework was the end of the Cold War. The international community was speaking of “new world order” and the “end of history”. It would have been hard to understand that this meant duplicating the number of nuclear states in Europe. On top of that, a nuclear arsenal was diplomatically, economically and strategically a cumbersome legacy inherited from the presence of nuclear weapons that was not the result of any national willingness.
The Korean agreement is even more valuable since it was reached despite a very tense situation between North Korea and the world community. It is both a disarmament and confidence basic measures agreement. This occurred in the most dangerous interstate strategic situation: if no positive steps had been taken, the possibility of an all-out war destroying a large part of Asia – with a likely extension beyond the Korean peninsula to Japan and China, and of course involving the United States.
The greater risk of interstate war with the most damaging effect lies at the inter-Korean border. Therefore it is in the world’s own interests to have the situation under control. But in the meantime, the main responsibility lies in Koreans hands. South Korea had the bigger expertise and was on the forefront. In this case, South Korea acted both for its national interests, and the international community’s interests.
Bush’s Axis of Evil
North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, has been included in the well-known category of "axis of evil" in President Bush’s State of the Union Speech in January 2002. A war has been launched against Iraq to topple the Saddam regime, to fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to participate in the global war on terror. Whatever the appreciations were in 2002-2003, it is now widely acknowledged, including in the United States, that this war was a mistake and a failure. The global situation in the Middle East is worse than 5 years ago.
As far as the two other "suspects" are concerned, we are in very different situations. As for Iran, the world is attending to a tug-o-war between the Iranian regime and the rest of the world. There is a general agreement within the world community to state that Iran’s accession to nuclear weapons would be unacceptable. For some political leaders or experts, the only choice is between a nuclear Iran and a war to avoid it. But many others think that this is not the only choice, and that the two terms of the equation would be foolish and could only lead to a strategic disaster, probably of unknown extent. A nuclear Iran would be the beginning of a large proliferation in the area (Turkey, Saudi Arabia and so on) and would mean the end of the non-proliferation regime and could trigger pre-emptive Israeli or American strikes. Military operations, even if they are limited, are not a better option. This would only fuel terrorism, worsen the Iraqi situation, widen the gap between Muslim and Western worlds and lead closer to a clash of civilisations.
The Korean deal should be introduced as a counter-example. The North Korean regime is in no way less dangerous or less repressive than the Iranian one. It is less integrated with the world community, less used to international negotiations. It relies more than Teheran on security and military power for its survival. We are in a region in which war has not been officially ended. Still, an agreement was reached.
Dinner With the Devil
It is not worthy to stick to a so-called "moral approach". Good feelings do not always lead to good policy. Refusing to deal with a regime because we judge it as immoral is just a dead end. The world is largely imperfect, but we are living in the real world, not in “wonderland”. And we must start from reality, not from our hopes or desires. If we want to change the current situation, we must first accept it, as nasty is it. Changes, and positives changes, could not occur from a wrong assessment.
Dealing with a regime we do not appreciate is not a moral failure: quite the contrary, this is a strategic necessity. Peace could only be reached if we face an enemy. A dialogue with friendly states is certainly nicer but less useful than a dialogue with states with which we have opposition or antagonism. Discussing with a regime we do not share views would not mean accepting its views but dealing with it in order to avoid turning that opposition into confrontation. Setting morality as a guide for diplomacy could lead to very immoral situations.
Could we have dinner with the devil? Yes of course, with a long spoon! Thus, we could first challenge the very idea of axis of evil. This is strategic nonsense, confusion between politics and religion, a misuse of moral arguments so as to prevent political analysis. We are living on earth, not in heaven, and implementing a religious drawing line on strategic issues could only lead to a dead end.
Evil could not be on earth. We could be confronted by an enemy, by challengers, by dictators to repressive regimes but not by evil. And, on top of that, no one is an angel, able to fight the devil. Forbidding or excluding any contacts or any negotiations with a regime on the basis of its immorality, of its absolute immorality, does not resolve anything. What are the alternatives? Fighting it? Who could think that an inter-Korean war (supposing that it could be limited to those two countries once launched) would have a positive outcome? Winners and losers will be reunified in destruction, despair, and death. Threatening it in order to obtain substantial concessions? History proves that we could have only the opposite. Under threat, compulsory concession is perceived as a confession of weakness, which could only lead to additional concessions. How could give-and-take occur without negotiations, without any perspective of reward for flexibility? Sticks without carrots are usually not good incentives. The third solution is to wait until the devil willfully turns itself into an angel. But time would be running out, and we do not have much time to solve this problem.
Sunshine Policy
I am well informed that the Sunshine policy was also a matter of debate in South Korea. For some people, it was unwise to trust North Korea. In reality, this was not a matter of trust but of realism. Two pitfalls had to be avoided. Trusting Kim Jong Il blindly, giving him a free hand, and being unconfident, believing that any negotiation was impossible. Let me just quote myself.
“A more conciliatory and flexible approach would allow the DPRK to move toward the freeze or even to the reduction or the dismantling of its nuclear program. A scared DPRK would become more dangerous. Feeling more comfortable lead it to some openness. We need to help the DPRK to diminish its paranoia. Growing links between the two Koreas in areas such as sports, culture, tourism, family reunification, and then the economy could play a positive role in reducing misunderstanding and distrust. The outside world must support this policy and must also primarily recognize the Republic of Korea’s expertise on this matter. The task of the international community is to make sure that the DPRK would not be pushed into a corner, thinking that war is the only solution. We must hope for a soft landing on this matter, otherwise it would certainly create a strategic nightmare.”
Misuse of Morality
We must not be trapped by inaccurate moral arguments. First, morality is sometimes a smoke screen for policy power. Secondly, it is wrong to oppose moral policy to realpolitik. What should be avoided is unreal and unrealistic policy. These would be highly immoral, even if they are pursued with moral arguments. If moral arguments are made for preventing any step forward or any progress until things are perfect, this is counterproductive. The real politic does not mean accepting the worst, refusing any change: it means wisely improving a situation, with an accurate appreciation of the balance of power, the room of maneuver and the balance between negative and positive repercussions.
What could be Kim Jong Il’s motivations? We could suppose that happiness of his people and future peace in the world may not be his main concerns. He is probably seeking to protect his regime first. But ironically, the best way to have him moving toward this positive direction is to rule out any regime change scenario. A famous Italian novel, the Count of Lampedusa, speaking about the Italian revolution in the 19th century, said "we must accept change in order that nothing would change" we could reverse the motto: " with North Korea we must accept an initial status quo in order to have some change".
The mutual agreement paves the way for South Korean investments inside North Korea. Everyone has his own interests to see an improvement in the North Korean economic situation. The humanitarian situation of the people would be more satisfactory and it could allow to the regime to be more open.
Role of the European Union
The European Union was not deeply involved in the inter-Korean dialogue. It has offered humanitarian help to North Korea in exchange for better international behavior. But Europe has no military presence in the region. By necessity more than by virtue, Europe is playing more on soft power than on hard power. Hard power could sometimes lead to catastrophic situations. When you have a big hammer, you tend to see nails everywhere. But hard power could be useful if coupled with soft power. The European position was to support the Sunshine policy and to be reluctant of a “regime change approach”. There is a historical legacy. German division was overcome thanks to Ostpolitik, and not to Hallstein doctrine. The so-called Hallstein doctrine (named for the West German minister of Foreign Affairs under Chancellor Adenauer) aimed to refuse any contact with East Germany, fearing indirect and unwelcome recognition of this country and this regime. In those times, West Germany broke diplomatic ties with countries that had an ambassador in East Berlin. When Willy Brandt came to power, he launched the famous Ostpolitik. As a result, contacts would become possible between the two Germanys, East Germans had access to information on what was going on in West Germany and concluded that the fate of their Western cousins was not the capitalist hell they had heard about. The East German regime became less paranoiac. Cultural, sporting, human and economic exchanges and contacts soared. And finally, reunification - and most important, peaceful reunification - occurred. More quickly than expected.
Conclusion
Comparison is not reason. If we could find some similarities between the German and the Korean examples, there are also strong differences. The end of the Cold War was both the condition and the result of German reunification. The Korean division is the product of the Cold War but has survived it. Relationships between the Soviet Union and East Germany and relationships between China and North Korea are really different. The price of a would-be reunification is not the same. We had 4 West German inhabitants for one East German inhabitant (i.e. 4 rich individuals for 1 poor individual). There are two South Korean inhabitants for one North Korean inhabitant. And the economic and social gaps between the two Koreas are much wider than between the two Germanys.
However, the trend is quite similar. The development of exchanges of all kinds is not a defeat for democracies but victory. Little-steps policy could be successful in enhancing mutual understanding, trust, and self-confidence. To conclude, I would say that the inter-Korean agreement is very welcome news. It decreases worldwide tensions, and gives a perspective of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. It is a good way to fight against nuclear proliferation. Giving a true alternative to regime change policy proves that use of military force is not the only option to solve strategic problems and could even be used as a useful model for other crises, including Iran.
*This paper was presented at the International Conference Commemorating the 2007 South-North Korean Summit, “New Era of Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia,” on November 19, 2007.
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