by
B. C. Koh
[Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago]
posted October 9, 2007
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 Preface : |
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ROK President Roh Moo-hyun’s visit to Pyongyang from October 2 to 4 and his meeting with Chairman Kim Jong Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission marked a new milestone in the annals of inter-Korean relations. It was only the second time in nearly six decades that the leaders of the two Koreas had met face-to-face. The first such meeting, which occurred in June 2000, had ushered in a new era of reconciliation and ever-expanding exchanges and cooperation in the cultural and economic fields.
What, then, did the second inter-Korean summit accomplish? How did it differ from its predecessor? What are the prospects for the implementation of the agreement signed by the two leaders on October 4?
Notable Aspects of the Second Summit
The 2007 summit differed from its predecessor in a number of aspects—(1) mode of travel, (2) timing, (3) mode of welcome, and (4) outcome. First, whereas in June 2000 Kim Dae Jung traveled by air, which marked the first time that a South Korean civilian airplane made a voluntary landing at Pyongyang’s Sun’an Airport, in October 2007 Roh Moo Hyun traveled by car, which took him and his entourage four hours. A symbolically important feature of the land journey was that Roh crossed the Military Demarcation Line by foot.
Second, the timing of the summit lent itself to the charge that it might be a well-calculated political gambit, for Roh has only four and a half months left in his term of office. What is more, the Presidential election is only two months away. This contrasted with the situation in June 2000, when Kim Dae Jung was at the midpoint of his five-year term. Under these circumstances Roh could not escape the suspicion that his ulterior aims might include not only creating a legacy for his otherwise unpopular stint in the Blue House but also helping the “pro-Roh” candidate to win the election.
Third, the manner in which Kim Jong Il greeted and treated Roh was markedly different from how he behaved during Kim Dae Jung’s visit seven years ago. In June 2000 the North Korean leader, who had been waiting for the plane carrying the South Korean president at the airport tarmac, walked toward Kim Dae Jung with a big smile and embraced him. He then rode in the same car with the president to the Baikhwawon state guesthouse. To this day, no one but the two Kims—and the driver of the car—knows what transpired during the 50-minute ride.
The first North Korean leader to greet Roh in October 2007 was not Kim Jong Il but Kim Yong Nam, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the North’s nominal legislature. Under the North Korean constitution, that post is equivalent to the head of state, and in terms of the actual pecking order of Pyongyang’s governing elite, Kim Yong Nam is second only to Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il did greet Roh at the official welcoming ceremony in front of the April 25 Hall of Culture. He, however, displayed no emotion, let alone warmth of welcome, waiting until Roh approached him to shake hands. The two leaders then inspected the elite honor guard of the Korean People’s Army. All in all, the two leaders spent a total of 12 minutes together. Kim Jong Il was conspicuously absent from the welcoming banquet Kim Yong Nam hosted later that day. The two would meet again on the following day during two sessions of summit meeting. On the third and final day, Kim Jong Il hosted a farewell luncheon. In sum, the two leaders spent a total of six hours together in four encounters. This contrasted with the ten hours in six encounters the two Kims shared in June 2000.
Finally, the outcome of the Roh-Kim summit was notably different from that of the 2000 summit. The joint declaration signed by the two leaders on October 4 contained many specific agreements and hence was much longer than the June 15, 2000 joint declaration. The latter is a five-article document consisting predominantly of commitments of general nature—such as “The North and the South shall tackle the problem of national unification independently, pooling our respective strengths as the masters and members of the same nation [uri minjokkkiri]” The only specific commitment in that declaration pertains to an exchange of delegations comprising separated family members and relatives and an “expeditious resolution of such humanitarian issues as the repatriation of long-term prisoners [in the South who have refused to renounce communism].”
Key Provisions of the October 4, 2007 Agreement
The Roh Moo Hyun government’s decision to shun the label, the “Second Inter-Korean Summit,” officially designating the Roh-Kim summit as the “2007 South-North Summit,” bespoke its desire to distance itself from the Kim Dae Jung government’s legacy. The text of the 2007 joint declaration, however, belies such intent. For it enunciates at the outset that the new declaration is intended to “expand and advance South-North relations based on the June 15 Joint Declaration.” The first of the eight articles in the new declaration makes this intention crystal clear:
“The South and the North shall uphold and endeavor actively to realize the June 15 Declaration. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of “by the Korean people themselves [uri minjok kkiri].” The South and the North will work out ways to commemorate the June 15 anniversary of the announcement of the South-North Joint Declaration to reflect the common will to faithfully carry it out.”
Apart from the above, however, the October 4 declaration contains a number of potentially significant agreements that are specific in nature. One that Roh rated as most important in his report to the nation upon returning to South Korean soil pertains to the creation of a “special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea [Yellow Sea].” With Haeju as the main harbor in the zone, this project will also entail the creation of a “joint fishing zone” as well as a “special economic zone. Vessels from both sides will be accorded the right of passage “via direct routes in Haeju.” They will also be allowed to use the Han River estuary jointly. Should this plan be implemented, the Northern Limit Line may cease to be a barrier for North Korean vessels, and the danger of armed clashes between the navies of both sides will abate measurably. In order to discuss this plan, together with other issues related to military confidence building, the defense ministers of both sides will hold talks in Pyongyang in November.
The two sides have also agreed to “complete the first-phase construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex at an early date and embark on the second-stage development project.” Other agreements related to Kaesong include the opening of “freight rail service between Munsan and Bondong” as well as the prompt completion of “various institutional measures, including those related to passage, communication and customs clearance procedures.” North Korea’s refusal to permit the use of cellphones and computers (Internet) in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, for example, has been a source of complaint, not to mention inconvenience, among South Korean companies and personnel operating there.
Additionally, the two sides have agreed to “discuss repairs of the Kaesong-Sinuiju railroad and the Kaesong-Pyongyang expressway for their joint use.” Regarding the latter I can testify from personal experience that it is in bad shape owing to poor maintenance caused by the lack of funds and material. An agreement that may appear frivolous but symbolically important nonetheless concerns the dispatch of “a joint cheering squad…to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games” using the Gyeongui Railway—the railway linking Seoul and Sinuiju.
Other agreements in the area of economic cooperation include the establishment of “cooperative complexes for shipbuilding in Anbyeon and Nampo,” upgrading “the status of the existing Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee to a Joint Committee for Inter-Korean Cooperation to be headed by deputy prime minister-level officials,” and opening “nonstop flight services between Seoul and Mt. Baekdu” in order to allow tours to the mountain from the South.
The two sides have also agreed to “expand reunion of separated family members and their relatives and promote exchanges of video messages.” When the construction of a reunion center at Mt. Kumgang, currently under way, is completed, both sides will “station resident representatives” there.
The minister-level talks that have been held at regular intervals since 2000 will effectively be upgraded to the prime minister level. Significantly, the term used is “prime minister,” not “prime minister-level.” The first round of inter-Korean prime ministers talks will be held in Seoul in November.
As for summit meetings, the two sides have agreed that “their highest authorities will meet frequently for the advancement of relations between the two sides.” Roh disclosed that Kim Jong Il had turned down his request to visit the South, as stipulated in the 2000 joint statement. Instead, Kim offered to send Kim Yong Nam to the South. This suggests the possibility that the North may not necessarily construe the “highest authority” [chongsang] in the same way as the South does. That is to say, Kim Yong Nam or his successor as the chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly may well step into the role of the DPRK’s dialogue partner of the ROK president as was the case to some extent during the 2007 summit.
The October 4 joint declaration also reiterates the commitments the two Koreas have already made on previous occasions—notably in the July 4, 1972 joint statement and the 1992 basic agreement—pertaining to the need to foster mutual trust, for non-interference in the internal affairs of the other, and to resolve inter-Korean issues in the “spirit of reconciliation, cooperation and reunification.”
The two sides have also stated that they “recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime.” Specifically, they have “agreed to work together to [realize the goal of] having the leaders of three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war.”
On what both the United States and many people in the South consider as the pivotal issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the leaders of the two Koreas have merely “agreed to work together to implement smoothly the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 Agreement achieved at the Six-Party Talks.” Although Roh stated in his report to the nation upon returning to the South that he had confirmed Kim Jong Il’s firm resolve to carry out his country’s commitment to denuclearization, the absence of an unequivocal reaffirmation of such commitment in the October 4 Joint Declaration is widely viewed as a serious flaw.
Another flaw, which Roh frankly admitted, has to do with humanitarian issues—notably South Korean citizens abducted by the North since the Korean War and prisoners of war from that conflict who have not been accounted for, some of whom are believed to be alive in the North. In Roh’s words, due to a wide gap in the perceptions and positions of both sides, the issue remained elusive during his talks with Kim Jong Il.
Prospects
Notwithstanding important omissions, the October 4 joint declaration does contain many ideas and plans that, should they be implemented, have the potential to advance the goal of ensuring peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Some of the projects are relatively inexpensive in economic and political terms alike—notably, the expansion of reunion of separated family members and their relatives, promoting exchanges of video messages, and holding prime ministers’ and defense ministers’ talks.
Most of the projects adumbrated in the declaration, however, carry huge, even astronomical, costs, particularly for the South. Estimates range from a billion to tens of billion dollars. There is, moreover, the matter of time constraint. Within two months, when the presidential election is held in the South, Roh Moo Hyun will be a lame duck president. With a high probability of political turnover—that is, a victory by a candidate who is the polar opposite of Roh in policy orientation, ideological proclivity, and perhaps in attitudes toward the North—the chances are slim that the incoming government in Seoul will embrace wholeheartedly the grandiose projects outlined above. Unless some of the funding emanates from the private sector—an exceedingly remote possibility—, the ROK National Assembly will need to approve and appropriate the necessary funds. That will be a huge hurdle to clear.
Nor is this all. Take the matter of convening the summit meeting of “three or four parties directly concerned” to issue a declaration ending the Korean War. First of all, it will not happen until and unless the nuclear threat from the North is completely removed, a position President Bush has enunciated a number of times. Secondly, what is meant by the phrase, “three or four parties directly concerned”? If by “three parties” is meant, the two Koreas and the United States, will China go along with its exclusion? As a signatory to the Korean Armistice, China has as much right to participate in a forum to discuss ending the Korean War as the United States and the two Koreas. It should be recalled that North Korea has insisted for a long time that South Korea, a non-signatory to the Armistice Agreement, is not one of the “parties directly concerned.” If, as some observers have suggested, the inclusion of the preceding clause in the October 4 joint declaration signals a change in the North’s position—that is to say, its tacit acceptance of the right of the South to participate fully in any discussion of transforming the armistice regime into a permanent peace regime, Roh may merit credit for having successfully induced such change.
In sum, the second inter-Korean summit did mark a new milestone in inter-Korean relations. The face-to-face meeting between Roh and Kim may well have enhanced mutual understanding; it may also help open the way for an expansion of multifaceted exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas. Whether it will ultimately lead to a signal breakthrough on the Peninsula, triggering what Roh’s aides and supporters argue will be a “virtuous circle” of peace, prosperity, and mutual trust, however, remains to be seen.
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