by
Sergey Radchenko
[Tutorial Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science]
posted October 2, 2007
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*Sergey Radchenko, Tutorial Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, was a visiting professor and Korea Foundation research fellow at IFES in June-September 2007. He is the author of various publications on Soviet foreign policy in Asia during the Cold War, and is currently working on a book, Gorbachev Looks East: Soviet Policy toward China, Korea and Japan, 1986-1991.
Introduction
Nearly 20 years after the Cold War ended, many of its oozing sores of bitter regional conflicts endure all over the world. Here, in Seoul, the Cold War is not history, it is very much a reality, a danger lurking unseen yet keenly felt some short distance beyond the Bukhansan. But the division of Korea is not the only legacy of the Cold War in Northeast Asia; just a little ways to the Northeast of Korea there is yet another roaring Cold War dinosaur: also rooted in the events of 1945, still unsolved with no solution in sight, still poisoning regional relations as a major obstacle to Russian-Japanese partnership – the problem of the “northern territories.”
In 1945, following its entry into the war against Japan, the Soviet Union captured Southern Sakhalin Island and the Kurile chain from the faltering Japanese Empire. Stalin had far-reaching goals: he intended to land the Soviet forces on Hokkaido, and only Washington’s resistance to the idea saved Japan from a Korean scenario. Following the Soviet occupation of the “northern territories” Tokyo repeatedly and unsuccessfully bargained to have some of the islands returned – namely, Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and a desolate collection of rocks scattered in the ocean, the Habomai.
The Soviet Union and Japan nearly came to an agreement in 1955 – Nikita Khrushchev promised to return two of the four islands in order to sign a peace treaty with Japan. But the agreement failed to materialize partly because Washington pressed the Japanese to insist on all four islands. Several years later, after the conclusion of a renewed US-Japanese Treaty (1960), Moscow took back Khrushchev’s earlier promise to give up Shikotan and Habomai.
Despite serious tensions over the islands, the Kremlin repeatedly tried, in the 1960s and 1970s to mend fences with the Japanese, especially after Moscow’s confrontation with China seriously complicated Soviet strategic outlook in East Asia. Moreover, the Soviet Union wanted Japanese investments in Siberia and the Far East, to help overcome this region’s chronic development problems. The golden shower of Japanese capital came down somewhere else, because in the end Tokyo was unwilling to make large long-term investments in the Soviet Union, partly for economic but primarily for political reasons.
It is not uncommon, especially among contemporary political commentators, to dismiss the Soviet-Japanese dialogue during the Cold War as a pointless recitation of zero-sum positions without any willingness or ability to achieve compromise on either side. Declassified historical record (unfortunately, mainly the Russian record, since Japan’s declassification procedures are entirely inadequate) shows a different picture – the Soviet Union’s repeated efforts to achieve a breakthrough in relations with Japan, including through a territorial compromise. This brief article, which is partly based on documents for my forthcoming book, Gorbachev Looks East: Soviet Foreign Policy Towards China, Korea and Japan, 1986-1991, aims to give the reader an idea of what kind of offers were on the table, why no agreement was ever achieved, and what can be done to overcome the long-standing problem of the “northern territories” in Soviet-Japanese relations.
Historical analysis(1)
By 1971, after the border clashes with China prompted strategic rethinking in Moscow, rapprochement with Japan became a matter of considerable importance. The Soviet leaders hoped that the prospect of sharing in the mineral riches in Soviet Siberia would entice Japan to rely less on the Americans and avoid any kind of a behind-the-back anti-Soviet deal with China. In turn, Japan would supply the Soviets with strategically important technologies to develop the Far East. As Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev explained this complicated strategy in November 1971,
Japan is closely connected to the United States of America, has a military treaty with them, American military bases are situated on its territory. At the same time, there are forces in Japan, which would like to make a deal with China on a nationalist, great power basis; Beijing leaders, on their part, clearly would not mind to find a way of some king of a collusion with Japan. Considering all of this, the Politburo is keeping an eye on the questions of Soviet-Japanese relations. We are trying to find ways to influence policies of this country. (2)
Opportunity soon presented itself. In January 1972 Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko traveled to Japan (it was his second visit). In the talks with his Japanese counterpart Fukuda Takeo (father of the current Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo) on 24 January 1972 Gromyko called for closer political relations between Tokyo and Moscow but he complained about US and Chinese plans “to make combinations at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Union.” Fukuda claimed that no such combinations were in the making. Discussions of serious economic cooperation in Siberia and the Far East appeared to be proportional to the Soviet willingness to give up the four disputed islands. Gromyko had been extremely unsympathetic of Japanese territorial claims but this time he was prepared to go fairly far to put Soviet-Japanese relations on an entirely new footing. On 27 January when he met with Prime Minister Sato Eisaku Gromyko suggested that in order to remove any obstacles to the successful development of Soviet-Japanese relations the Soviet leadership was willing to return to the compromise solution Khrushchev had once proposed – that the Soviet Union return two islands instead of four. (3)
Given the conservative views of the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev, Gromyko’s offer was remarkable: it showed the strength of Soviet commitment to mending fences with Tokyo now that the stakes in East Asian geopolitical game were high. Two islands, in spite of pronounced territoriality of Soviet leadership, meant less to them than a stable relationship with an Asian neighbor, an opportunity to counterbalance China, or at least prevent a Sino-Japanese rapprochement with its unpredictable security consequences. In May 1972 Brezhnev commented on the Soviet position: “… there are certain obstacles in the way of a peace treaty with Japan, connected, in particular, with the so-called territorial question. Probably, we need to show both the necessary firmness and certain flexibility [in this question].”(4) The two-island compromise was precisely the kind of give-and-take Brezhnev was now willing to consider to bring about the desired result in the Soviet-Japanese relations. In the meantime, Brezhnev was hopeful that the talks with the Japanese would lead to agreements on the long-term cooperation projects in Siberia, where their capital was as needed as ever.
What the Soviets feared the most came to pass in 1972 when Japan and China normalized their relations and, in a joint communiqué, promised to jointly oppose “hegemony” in Asia. Soviet reaction to this development was relatively muted. This was in part because Moscow had reconciled itself to the new realities of the “triangular” world after the Sino-US rapprochement took shape. Improvement of Sino-Japanese relations now appeared inevitable. On the other hand, Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi visited Moscow to reassure the Soviets than the Japanese move did not have an anti-Soviet connotation. Gromyko quizzed Ohira at length about the content of Sino-Japanese rapprochement but then appeared satisfied with the latter’s explanation that Japan had not become a party to an anti-Soviet combination.(5)
In the mid-1970’s the aim of Soviet foreign policy with regard to Japan was in expanding trade and attracting Japanese credits in the absence of a peace treaty or any agreement to resolve the territorial problem. The Japanese side appeared interested; in October 1973 visiting Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei promised to “intensify the development of economic ties.”(6) In a Politburo meeting on 10 January 1974 Soviet leadership discussed the prospects of attracting Japanese funding for the construction of a massive railroad across Siberia and the Far East, the BAM. Brezhnev thought that “we need the railroad like air” primarily for strategic reasons, since the existing railroad to the Soviet Far East was too close to the Chinese border and could be easily lost to the enemy if hostilities broke out. But aside from these strategic concerns it was Japan and the possibilities for Soviet-Japanese trade that made for a good part of the discussions around the BAM. Arguments were made in favor of selling Siberian coal and oil to the Japanese, and asking Japan for credits to help pay for the already excessively expensive railroad. With the exception of Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov who asked suspiciously “why would one pull the Japanese into this?” Politburo members appeared upbeat about Japanese participation in the BAM project.(7)
In the end, the grand plan for Soviet-Japanese cooperation fell through, though in the mid- to late-1970’s trade with Japan grew substantially, as the Japanese government agreed to buy coal, oil and timber from the Soviets. In the five years since 1976 to 1980 trade between the Soviet Union and Japan doubled in comparison with the previous 5-year period, reaching 12 billion rubles.(8) But these economic gains were not matched by comparable improvement of the political climate. The thorny territorial problem continued to plague Soviet-Japanese relations. For example, a 1974 Soviet border force report detailed increasing instances of demonstrative Japanese activities in the vicinity of the Kuriles, such as attempts by Japanese fishermen to land on the islands “with the aim of putting up there the Japanese national flag.” The report cited an alarming number of border violations – 204 people were detained by the Soviet border guards in 1974 alone. Commenting on these developments the report concluded that “in the recent years certain revanchist circles of Japan are expanding an anti-Soviet campaign around the so called ‘northern territories.’” According to the border authorities, however, “progressive public circles” in Japan sympathized with the Soviet side of the problem.(9)
The reliability of these “progressive circles” was almost certainly overstated. In fact, Moscow consistently failed to win friends among the Japanese political forces, especially after the beginning of the “second cold war” in the early 1980’s. The LDP government sided with the US in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and endorsed US economic sanctions, resulting in a sharp reversal of Soviet-Japanese trade dynamics. And the “progressive circles” – e.g. in the Soviet understanding in particular the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) – put on a very disappointing performance. A Soviet delegation that visited Japan in accordance with a Kremlin-mandated program of exchanges with the JSP, reported to the Central Committee in September 1979:
At the meetings and receptions the socialists did not talk about the struggle against the arms race, unemployment and price increases, they did not censure the Japanese-American security treaty, and the treaty of peace and friendship with China, which has an anti-Soviet direction.
Moreover, the JSP made an impression of not having clear goals with regard to achieving socialism in Japan and did not appear to oppose the ruling LDP hard enough.(10)
The hopelessness of Soviet tactical approaches to the JSP became manifest when in the early 1980’s the socialists began to improve their electoral performance, evident, for example, in the election of socialist Yokomichi Takahiro as the governor of Hokkaido in 1983. The Soviets were disappointed that, in his position as the governor, Yokomichi did not do anything to oppose the Japanese territorial claims. In fact, in a meeting with the Soviet General Consul in Hokkaido on 17 January 1984 Yokomichi allegedly “tried to touch upon the so called ‘territorial question’ having made clear that, as a governor, he cannot help but raise it, taking into consideration the position of the Japanese government.” The head of the JSP office in Hokkaido Tsushima Takakatsu did not do much better when he claimed, in a meeting with a Soviet representative in August 1983, that the local JSP is limited in what it could do to limit the campaign for the return of the “northern territories” since “some measures are carried out on the instructions of the central organs and they [the JSP] is forced to implement them.”(11) On another occasion Tsushima tried to explain that the “participation of the JSP in the forthcoming activities connected to the movement for the return of the ‘northern territories’ is subject to a reservation that all of these activities do not have an anti-Soviet character and are not limited merely to the expression of the hopes and wishes of the Japanese people.”(12) The Soviets were of course not persuaded by this interpretation.
One positive development in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) relations with the JSP during that time was that, as the Soviets concluded, the socialists did not approve of the Japanese support for US-imposed economic sanctions on the USSR. Such was the conclusion of a Soviet delegation that visited Japan in 1982: the JSP “censures the US demands to stop export to the USSR of the equipment produced with the American licenses and Washington’s other ‘economic sanctions.’”(13) Indeed, Kawamura Seichi who ran the JSP office in Hokkaido in 1982 signaled his disagreement with the Japanese government’s refusal to supply drilling equipment for the Sakhalin oil and gas industry and even promised to make a direct approach to the Minister of Trade Abe Shintaro to demand that the LDP fulfill their contractual obligations to the USSR.(14)
In another positive development, the Japanese communists appeared more open to a dialogue with the USSR than before; in 1979 JCP General Secretary Miyamoto Kenji visited Moscow for talks with the Soviet leadership. To much Soviet relief Miyamoto agreed with the Soviet position with regard to Vietnam and Cambodia, and, as Brezhnev reported with satisfaction to a Politburo meeting on 3 January 1980, “they are conducting a struggle against the resurgence of Japanese militarism, for the cancellation of the military alliance of Japan and the USA.”(15) But all of that was a small consolation for the otherwise sorry state of Soviet relations with Japan.
On September 9, 1982 ailing Brezhnev discussed the question of Soviet-Japanese relations at a Politburo meeting. The initiative to do so came from Gromyko and a number of other senior officials who submitted a memorandum on improving relations with Japan. The memorandum proposed several practical steps, including Gromyko’s visit to Tokyo, bilateral consultations with the Japanese Foreign Ministry, parliamentary exchanges, increased contacts with the ruling party (LDP) and “some small concessions to the Japanese in the day-to-day affairs.” In the economic sphere Gromyko and others wanted to see Japan’s investments into the development of natural resources in Russia, specifically, Sakhalin oil and gas resources. At the same time, the memorandum called for continuation of Soviet efforts to bring about a peace treaty with Japan without a mention of the territorial problem. This is in fact what the Soviet leaders hoped to do since at least Tanaka’s visit to Moscow almost a decade before.(16) Brezhnev’s reaction to this memorandum was very curious:
I want to say only one thing. The memorandum proposes to continue to push forward our draft treaty on good neighborly relations and cooperation, rejecting any mention of the so called ‘territorial’ (or ‘unsolved’) question, to which the Japanese stubbornly hold. Probably in the current situation it is not easy to come up with something different. However, honestly speaking, I don’t believe that a simple repetition of the position, which we have been offering for five years already, will result in any kind of a movement in our relations with Japan. Perhaps, both the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Defense, and the KGB should continue thinking about this problem, look for ways out of a political cul-de-sac, in which our relations with this country, important to the interests of the Soviet Union, find themselves.
This was a remarkable thing to say for the elderly General Secretary, the symbol of Soviet political and economic stagnation, at the time when he had only two months left to live. Evidently, Brezhnev, despite his progressing health difficulties, at least grasped as much as to say that Soviet policy toward Japan had to become more creative, if it were to succeed at all. Indeed, Soviet interest in improving relations with Tokyo was consistent throughout Brezhnev’s rule (1964-82), and yet options for dealing with the territorial problem remained rather limited at the best of times. Was there something else to be done? Brezhnev was too old and sick to offer solutions; he merely encouraged his colleagues to see to it that the Soviet coverage of Japan in the media emphasizes positive aspects of Japanese life and the dynamic of Soviet-Japanese cooperation.(17)
When Brezhnev died and Iurii Andropov became the General Secretary, the Politburo once again returned to the unsolved territorial problem on 31 May 1983. Andropov was disappointed that Tokyo appeared to side Ronald Reagan’s rather hard-line policy towards the Soviet Union and offered to make concessions to the Japanese to induce them to tone down the anti-Soviet rhetoric. Explaining his idea, Andropov said:
For example, one could think of joint use of some small islands, which do not have strategic importance. Perhaps other proposals will arise. In particular, it seems to me that Japan could opt for more active cooperation with the Soviet Union in the economic sphere […].
There followed a candid exchange between Andropov and (by all accounts orthodox) Foreign Minister Gromyko:
GROMYKO. Regarding Japan. I have the following proposal: should we not opt for a proposal regarding Habomai and Kunashir islands, and other small islands, which are in reality small dots and draw the border, that is – make a correction to the border. This would simply be a prestigious [sic] proposal.
ANDROPOV. When I spoke about Japan, I did not have in mind this proposal. I was talking of joint use of some small islands.
GROMYKO. One could combine both things. These islands are anyhow small dots in the ocean and do not have such great strategic importance. […]
Of course, it is possible that Gromyko meant Habomai and Shikotan in his impromptu comments, and the mention of Kunashir (a much larger island) was merely a slip of tongue. If so, Gromyko was merely peddling the two island solution of the 1956 Declaration. On the other hand, he may have actually meant Kunashir, in which case it is hard to see Gromyko’s comments as anything short of a major new initiative regarding the new territories, which was incidentally torpedoed by Andropov, as well as by the Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov who readily rebuffed Gromyko’s proposal in his comments on the account that Kunashir was important for Soviet defense.
Another interesting point in this dialogue is Andropov’s out-of-the-blue proposal about “joint use” of the disputed islands. It is unclear what exactly he had in mind, though his idea probably entailed allowing Japan access to Soviet fishing areas, for there is little else to do jointly around the islands except for fishing. Andropov, former head of the KGB, demonstrated ability to think about the territorial dispute with Japan in unorthodox terms – something that Brezhnev encouraged just a few months before. Unlike Brezhnev who realized the problem but had no mental capacity to find a solution, Andropov was willing to explore alternative solutions. Andropov’s thoughts did not result in any concrete proposals, perhaps because Tokyo was in no position to mend fences, especially after the downing of KAL flight 007 in September 1983.
Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” translated into significant changes for Soviet foreign policy; from confrontation with the West the Soviet Union moved indecisively and with frequent reversals toward accommodation and the end of the Cold War. Changes were also in the making in the relationship between Moscow and Tokyo, but no breakthroughs were achieved despite repeated discussions of Japan in the Politburo, despite Gorbachev’s famous speeches in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk, and despite frequent exchanges of top officials from both countries, including the first ever visit of the Soviet head of state to Japan in April 1991. All of these difficulties are easily understandable if we admit that “new thinking” with regard to Japan was actually much older than Gorbachev claimed, and dated back to the 1960s and the 1970s. It was then that the Soviet leadership made efforts to mend fences with Japan as if the ideological constraints did not exist, and it was then that the Soviet policy toward Japan, though ostensibly free from ideological baggage, failed to bring about the much desired rapprochement between the two countries. In reality, then, Gorbachev’s policy toward Japan was nothing new; the key elements in play were by then well familiar to both Moscow and Tokyo.
There was, however, a difference of emphasis. Gorbachev was probably the first Soviet leader to understand the political implications of Asian economic “miracles.” As he explained at a Politburo meeting on 3 April 1986, “the development of civilization is shifting in the direction of the Pacific. Our economy is also shifting to Siberia, to the Far East. Therefore, there is an objective interest in raising the question of Asia-Pacific cooperation. … We have to raise this question on a large scale. We have great problems in that part of the world, and great work to be done.”(18) A few months later he once again defined the goals of Soviet policy; “Soviet Union is a European, but also an Asian country; therefore, it understands Asian problems. Let’s focus on Asia.” And then, “we must improve upon our assessment of China, India and Japan. This is serious. This is politics. This will stimulate our relations with them.” Ahead of his speech in Vladivostok Gorbachev decided that “one will have to present the Far East in the perspective. And show that there is movement already.”(19)
On 28 July 1986 Gorbachev made a speech in Vladivostok, promising to build “new and equitable relations with Asia and the Pacific.”(20) He was primarily interested in improving relations with China; indeed in the subsequent months Soviet long stagnant relationship with Beijing began to improve markedly. Another target of Gorbachev’s new outlook for Asia was South Korea; it would take several more years and a number of reversals but Moscow and Seoul would mend fences at the expense of North Korea. As ice began to melt for the Soviet Union in the Far East, one would expect some kind of “movement” to show in the way of a rapprochement between Moscow and Tokyo. But no immediate consequences followed for Soviet-Japanese relations.
In January 1986 new Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Tokyo. In the course of his conversations with the Japanese leadership, Shevardnadze explained Gorbachev’s initiatives in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. He also tried to push forward questions of Soviet-Japanese cooperation, but encountered the familiar unwillingness on the part of the LDP to conclude a peace treaty in the absence of an agreement on the disputed islands.(21) When Shevardnadze returned, however, he sounded very positive about the prospects of a breakthrough with Japan. In a Polituro meeting on 30 January 1986 he argued that there was a good chance for improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations because Japan behaved more and more as an independent nation on the world stage, without necessarily following the lead of the United States:
Now the Japanese show interest in the development of relations with the USSR. There are reasons for this. The Japanese are no longer satisfied with the role of a ‘younger partner’ of the USA. They are striving, and not without success, to positions of leadership in international affairs, and above all in Asia.
Building bridges to Tokyo was therefore essential (and for very familiar reasons):
We must take steps today to develop relations with Japan. Tomorrow Japan may become different. We also need normal Soviet-Japanese relations for a balance with China.(22)
But there was little substance to Shevardnadze’s proposals. He did not obtain any concessions but felt simply that the Japanese leadership was favorably disposed toward the USSR, and that in itself provided a good enough reason to push through a rapprochement. The Foreign Minister also referred to his meetings with the leaders of the JCP and the JSP; both parties expressed support for Gorbachev’s disarmament proposals. As for the territorial problem, Shevardnadze had the following to say:
Territorial claims to the Soviet Union can also constrain the development of relations. And here it is important, as I see it, to maintain consistency and to show certain flexibility.
Thus, Shevardnadze unwittingly repeated Brezhnev’s formulation of the Soviet foreign policy with regard to the territorial dispute, made almost 15 years earlier.
Needless to say – summed up Shevardnadze – there is no talk of revising our position.(23)
Gorbachev himself confirmed this position when Abe Shintaro (father of the recent Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo) visited Moscow as the Foreign Minister in May 1986: the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations was welcome, but not at the cost of revising the results of the Second World War.(24)
In 1987 the question of Japan came up in the Politburo discussion several times.(25) Not all records are yet available; those that are indicate Gorbachev’s growing frustration with the lack of progress in Soviet-Japanese relations, but also his uncertainty over what was to be done to move things forward. On 8 August Gorbachev noted persistent invitations for him to visit Japan (Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro extended such an invitation as early as 1985). Gorbachev was not sure what to talk about in Japan, should he go: “But any Japanese government will raise the territorial question. … We must move. Let’s return to this question in light of the development of the situation. Something must be done.”(26) Gorbachev’s uneasiness – like that of Brezhnev – stemmed from a realization that unless Moscow recognized the Japanese claims to the islands, it would be very hard to achieve any real progress in Soviet-Japanese relations. Unlike Brezhnev, however, Gorbachev perceived the endgame in sight, and feared that he was running out of time for making the decisive moves.
There were several opinions to consider. On the one hand, Gorbachev had to weigh the proposals of his liberal advisors, people like Anatolii Cherniaev and Georgii Shakhnazarov who were willing to consider fairly radical steps in foreign policy, including giving up the four islands to Japan. An interesting example of this thinking may be discerned from the following memorandum from Shakhnazarov to Gorbachev dated 13 October 1989:
I fought for this land, and it is as dear to me as to any Russian man. But it seems to me that we have to cast aside the syndrome of ‘territorial space.’ This is a legacy of ages past. France, after a long war, tortuously understood that she would not go under without Magrib and Indochina. And now it flourishes. Great Britain also parted with its colonies without delight… Of course, we have a different situation. The Soviet Union is one unified space. And yet Russia will not go under if some peripheral territories separate from it. On the contrary, it will flourish… I am deeply convinced that we will only win if we “exchange”… four islands near the Japanese coast for a peace treaty with that country, for her participation in the development of the Far East and for the expulsion of American bases.”(27)
Opinions like these were sometimes shared by Gorbachev’s colleagues in the Politburo, for example, liberally-inclined Aleksandr Yakovlev and Vadim Medvedev (though there is no evidence of their support for Shakhnazarov’s aforementioned recommendations with regard to Japan). Whatever the case, Gorbachev had to contend with other forces within the Politburo, i.e. with relatively conservative Gromyko, at least until his retirement. In 1986 Gromyko reportedly criticized Shevardnadze for making concessions to the Japanese along the lines of a two-island solution that Gromyko had himself proposed on previous occasions.(28) As we have seen, Shevardnadze himself was by no means willing to give up all four islands, a politically precarious position to take even in Gorbachev’s Politburo.
And then there were of course regional and institutional pressures on Gorbachev, which in the end made any decisive moves on the territorial problem improbable, if not impossible. An example of such pressures was a letter by the Sakhalin Party Committee to the Central Committee dated 10 March 1989. In the letter, Sakhalin party officials complained about the wretched state of development of the Southern Kuriles and accused the Japanese for unwillingness to invest in joint ventures in the islands.
In our opinion – the letter went to say – one should change the situation in the Southern Kurile islands, first and foremost through their active development… It is expedient to attract foreign capital to develop the region. And though Japanese businessmen under the pressure of the leadership of the country categorically refuse in joint economic projects in the Kuriles, there is a growing interest of American, Western European, Chinese and New Zealand’s business circles. Indirectly, though their Western European partners, South Korean industrialists are offering their services.
The Sakhalin Party Committee’s plan was to use this alleged explosion of interest in the Kuriles to facilitate their economic development and by so doing undermine Japanese claims to the islands. The letter was discussed by the Politburo in May in referred for consideration to an ad-hoc committee comprising senior officials from the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of External Trade. The relevant ministers considered the letter and drew up recommendations. They agreed that it was important to take measures to develop Southern Kuriles economically, but disagreed with the Sakhalin party officials about the ways for doing this, suggesting mainly reliance “on our own forces, mobilizing internal resources.”
The problem with asking for foreign assistance in developing the Kuriles was that Japan would likely sabotage any such measures, and “possessing fairly effective levers of influence on the business circles of the West, South Korea and other countries, it, in all probability, will try not to allow or try to limit their participation in joint entrepreneurship in the Southern Kuriles, inasmuch as such form of cooperation between third countries and ourselves would mean indirect recognition on their part of our sovereignty over this territory, and would weaken the position of Japan.” In other words, Sakhalin authorities did not keep in mind the bigger picture, and were consequently rebuked by the policy makers higher up for having neglected matters of high politics. Nevertheless, the ministers agreed with the recommendations of the Sakhalin Party Committee to better protect the border against incursions by Japanese fishermen, and also open up the Southern Kuriles for visits by foreign citizens with an eye to furthering the islands’ development. The Politburo approved these recommendations on 2 October 1989.(29)
Generally speaking, in particular the KGB was far from convinced that Japanese sabotage of the economic development of Southern Kuriles could not be countered in one way or another. To this end, 1988-89 it probed the reaction of South Korean and US businessmen and officials to the idea of investing in the region in spite of the Japanese sanctions or pressures, and on the whole met with a positive response.(30) Far from taking a liberally detached attitude like Shakhnazarov (and in fact a growing number of Soviet Japan specialists and journalists) the KGB sought out ways to preserve Soviet control over the Kuriles despite increasingly difficult political and economic circumstances. It is curious that whereas in the 1970s the Sino-Soviet tensions prompted Soviet attempts at mending fences with Japan (in order to obtain her funding for development of Siberia and the Far East), now Moscow was turning to the West and to South Korea to balance the Japanese threat to the Soviet frontiers in the Far East. Strategic calculations remained the same; the variables were somewhat different.
Faced with these various opinions and choices Gorbachev tended to err on the side of caution against the advice of the liberals. When Prime Minister Nakasone visited Moscow in July 1988 the General Secretary gave a cold shoulder to the territorial issue: “we approach the post-war realities differently, and assess them differently. But they are what they are. They are based on the outcome of war, and have been consolidated in documents.”(31) Nakasone left empty-handed. Efforts by other Japanese politicians, including LDP General Secretary Ozawa Ichiro, who visited Moscow in March 1991, to move the resolution of the problem forward, fell on Gorbachev’s deaf ears: the Soviet leader remained opposed to Japanese demands. He did, however, indicate some flexibility to Ozawa: “I always say: let’s get away from the old position. Let’s meet each other halfway. I don’t see any other way.”(32) But getting away from the old position merely meant a return to another old position, a move from complete adamancy to a two-island compromise. These kinds of moves recurred in Soviet policy toward Japan since Moscow first proposed the two-island formula in 1955.
Even the increasingly desperate economic situation inside the crumbling USSR did not force Gorbachev to trade away the Southern Kuriles for a substantial aid package from the Japanese. Financial assistance, as I have argued elsewhere, was the key reason why Gorbachev, after much procrastination and uncertainty, opted for recognition of South Korea.(33) But circumstances were different with Japan, and no matter how bad the Soviet finances were Gorbachev could not afford to sell the Kuriles either politically or as a matter of personal pride. Aware of the subtle hints to this effect from Japanese visitors, Gorbachev stressed self-righteously: “I have been informed that the Japanese are concluding: the Soviet Union needs new technology. It will have to come hat in hands to Japan. This is a big mistake. If such an approach lies at the basis of Japanese policy, we will not be able to get anywhere.”(34) Sure enough, even after Gorbachev’s visit to Tokyo in April 1991 Soviet-Japanese relations were hardly much further advanced than they had been for about 20 years. When on 17 July 1991 Gorbachev told Kaifu Toshiki in London that “ice has cracked” in Soviet-Japanese relations, he must have been fooling himself.(35)
Conclusions and prospects
Historical overview of Soviet-Japanese relations in the 1970s and the 1980s, presented above, allows us to put the problem of “northern territories” in a wider context. This is important for proper understanding of current trends and prospects for resolving the thorny territorial problem. One of the lessons learned is to take media speculation about new thinking in the Kremlin with a pinch of salt. For example, in November 2004 newspapers in Russia and overseas were abuzz with speculations that Putin would undertake “a new push to reach a compromise over the islands” following his sudden announcement that Russia would accept the 1956 Declaration (two islands compromise) as a basis for settlement with Japan.(36) Three years later, peace treaty is still nowhere in sight, but now we know why: Putin’s offer repeats similar offers made on numerous occasions by successive Soviet leaders since Khrushchev. There is no trace of new thinking in a two island scenario as even ailing Brezhnev seemed to realize.
I have also read in several editorials that now Russia under Putin is more interested than ever in a compromise with Japan in order, allegedly, to attract Japanese investments in the Far East, especially in connection with the oil and gas projects in Sakhalin. Once again, though, historical precedents suggest that such speculations are without basis. Indeed, if anything, the Soviet Union in the 1970s and the 1980s was more interested in Japan’s capital than Putin’s Russia. Then, Japan was not only seen as a viable partner for economic cooperation in the development of Siberia and the Far East, but also as an important fellow-traveler in the strategic competition with China. From the mid-1980s the Soviet situation was even further complicated by the falling oil prices and the resultant budget deficits.
Russia today is under no such pressure. Oil prices are as high as ever. China is no longer a strategic foe, but a major partner, in political and economic terms. There is even now South Korean capital to tap into – an option only imagined by the Soviet government in the 1980s. In other words, Russia is now under much less pressure than before to do something about the territorial problem, which is why Putin’s return to the 1956 Declaration signifies absolutely nothing short of his abstract willingness to see the deadlock with Japan resolved. Certainly, neither Putin nor his successors will bend over backwards to achieve a solution in the absence of a dramatic Japanese counter-proposal.
On the other hand, the aforementioned historical facts indicate that there was considerably more discussion to the Soviet thinking with regard to the territorial problem than what met the eye. Interesting episodes, like Shakhnazarov’s proposal to give up all four islands, Gromyko’s mention of Kunashir in the trade-off, and Andropov’s idea about “joint use” of the Kuriles – all suggest that at various points there was at least some discussion in the Soviet ruling elites (not to mention affiliated structures, like research institutes) about a possible compromise with Japan on terms quite different than the familiar formulations of the 1956 Declaration.
Why didn’t any of these proposals bear fruit? There are two main reasons. Firstly, there was some resistance to fresh ideas within the Soviet bureaucracy, especially in the Defense Ministry and other strongholds of conservative opinion. Secondly, (and probably most importantly), Tokyo was not willing to negotiate a compromise solution, insisting on a zero-sum arrangement: either everything or nothing. Were there dissenting voices in the Japanese policy establishment? This is impossible to say, since unlike the Russian archives, the Japanese archives remain tightly closed to researchers – a situation, which certainly hampers the ability of the reading public to judge the merits of the dispute, and the effectiveness of proposed solutions, for themselves.
In light of the aforesaid, the prospects for a speedy resolution of the territorial problem between Japan and Russia remain very dim. It seems that only by giving green light to some of the dissenting voices in the policy making apparatus can the two sides ever come to terms. The Russian record indicates that there was no lack of such voices even in the context of Soviet policy making, and probably there are such voices now, in Russia and in Japan. In the longer term, the most suitable solution lies precisely in the murky and unexplored area of joint use, perhaps even joint administration. Why, at the time when social scientists proclaim the inevitable withering of international borders do policy makers float zero-sum territorial solutions, which had long outlived their usefulness? The future of Russian-Japanese cooperation is intrinsically connected to the degree to which old ideas can be replaced with new ideas – politically, economically and, most importantly, educationally – so that the unlikely prospect of Russia’s participation in the integrated Northeast Asian political and economic space can be realized in due course.
NOTES:
(1)The following historical analysis is based on an unpublished paper I presented at a conference “Russia as a Regional Power: Its International Status and the Elections in 2007-2008 (February 22-23, 2007)” at the Slavic Research Centre, University of Hokkaido, Japan.
(2)“Doklad Generalnogo Sekretaria TsK KPSS L.I. Brezhneva na noiabrskom (1971) Plenume TsK KPSS” (November 22, 1971), Lamont Library, Harvard University, Russian Archives Collection: a 1059, reel 154, fond 2, opis 3, delo 248, list 25.
(3)Mikhail Kapitsa, Na raznykh paralleliakh: zapiski diplomata (Moscow: Kniga i biznes, 1996), pp. 150-155.
(4)“Doklad Generalnogo Sekretaria TsK KPSS L.I. Brezhneva na maiskom (1972) Plenume TsK KPSS” (May 19, 1972), Lamont Library, Harvard University, Russian Archives Collection: a 1059, reel 156, fond 2, opis 3, delo 270, list 18.
(5)Kapitsa, p. 161
(6)Ibid., p. 162
(7) “Zasedanie Politbiuro TsK KPSS” (January 10, 1974), Dmitrii Volkogonov papers, The Library of Congress, Containers 23-24.
(8)Kapitsa, p. 165.
(9)“Spravka ob obstanovke na granitse s Iaponiei,” Dmitrii Volkogonov papers, The Library of Congress, Containers 23-24.
(10)“Otchet o poezdke delegatsii Sakhalinskogo obkoma KPSS v Iaponiiu” (September 18, 1979), Sakhalinskii Tsentr Khraneniia Dokumentatsii po Noveishei Istorii (STKhDNI): fond 4, opis 124, delo 101, list 33.
(11)“Zapis besedy s novym predsedatelem ispolkoma khokkaidskogo otdeleniia sotspartii Iaponii Takakatsu Tsushima” (August 8, 1983), STKhDNI: fond 4, opis 136, delo 172, list 75.
(12)“Zapis besedy s predsedatelem ispolkoma khokkaidskogo otdeleniia sotspartii Iaponii Takakatsu Tsushima” (August 22, 1983), STKhDNI: fond 4, opis 136, delo 172, list 10.
(13)“O vypolnenii postanovleniia TsK KPSS” (October 22, 1982), STKhDNI: fond 4, opis 133, delo 163, list 46.
(14)“Zapis besedy s predsedatelem ispolkoma khokkaidskoi federatsii sotspartii Iaponii S. Kawamura” (October 12, 1982), STKhDNI: fond 4, opis 133, delo 191, list 105.
(15)“Zasedanie Politbiuro TsK KPSS” (January 3, 1980), Dmitrii Volkogonov papers, The Library of Congress, Containers 23-24.
(16)“Zasedanie Politbiuro TsK KPSS” (September 9, 1982), Dmitrii Volkogonov papers, The Library of Congress, Containers 23-24.
(17)Ibid.
(18)Cited in Anatolii Cherniaev et al. (eds.), V Politbiuro TsK KPSS (Moscow: Alpina Biznes Buks, 2006), p. 37.
(19)V Politbiuro TsK KPSS, 71-72.
(20)The New York Times (July 29, 1986), p. A6
(21)Kapitsa, p. 174.
(22)“Zasedanie Politbiuro TsK KPSS” (January 30, 1986), Dmitrii Volkogonov papers, The Library of Congress, Containers 24(continued)-26.
(23)Ibid.
(24)Kapitsa, p. 175.
(25)For example, Japan was a subject of discussion on May 8 and August 6, 1987. See Kak “Delalas” Politika Perestroiki, 1985-1991 (Moscow: Gorbachev Fond, 2004), pp. 30, 34.
(26)V Politbiuro TsK KPSS, p. 217.
(27)Georgii Shakhnazarov to Mikhail Gorbachev (October 13, 1989), Gorbachev Fond’s Archive: fond 5, opis 1, dokument 18066.
(28)Kapitsa, p. 175
(29)“O voprosakh, postavlennykh Sakhalinskim obkomom KPSS po Iuzhnym Kurilskim Ostrovam” (May 15, 1989), STKhDNI: fond 4, opis 159, delo 115, list 1.
(30)“O merakh po sodeistviiu realizatsii programmy po razvitiiu Dalnevostochnogo ekonomicheskogo raiona” (September 7, 1989), STKhDNI: fond 4, opis 152, delo 67, list 1.
(31)Cited in Anatolii Cherniaev, “The Last Official Foreign Visit by M.S. Gorbachev as President of the USSR: The Road to Tokyo,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 10 (March 1998), p. 199.
(32)Ibid., p. 201.
(33)See Sergey Radchenko, “Building Bridges, Building Bridges: Soviet Moves in Korea, 1988-1991”, Report on the International Workshop on Foreign Relations of the Two Koreas during the Cold War Era (Seoul: The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 2006).
(34)Cited in Anatolii Cherniaev, “The Last Official Foreign Visit by M.S. Gorbachev as President of the USSR: The Road to Tokyo,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 10 (March 1998), p. 199.
(35)Kak “Delalas” Politika Perestroiki, 1985-1991 (Moscow: Gorbachev Fond, 2004), p. 94.
(36)Anatoly Medetsky, “Putin says Japan Can Take Back 2 Islands”, Moscow Times, November 14, 2004, p. 1.
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