by
Kim Yeon Chul
[Research Professor, Asiatic Research Center, Korea University]
posted Auguest 16, 2007
|
|
|
|
|
 Preface : |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Article : |
I. Why now?
II. What is on the table?
III. Undesirable political criticism
The second inter-Korean summit meeting opens. It is late, but fortunate just the same. Much can be easily accomplished, as well. The agreement to hold the summit was reached between a private, yet official, channel between the North’s unification minister Kim Yang-keun and the South’s National Intelligence Service Chief Kim Man-bok. Private, official lines of communication have been important to inter-Korean relations ever since the July 4, 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué.
It is true that there has been sympathy for the need to hold a summit meeting since 1972, but the likelihood was unclear. Luckily, the two Koreas did not miss the opportunity for the emergence of ROK-DPRK-U.S. trilateral relations. Through the six-party talks, the finishing touches were put on the first stage of transitional measures for resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. In addition, the current set of circumstances, which are expected to foster inter-Korean relations as well, despite being late, cannot be written off as insignificant. The inter-Korean summit held in 2000, along with the activation of the “Perry process” in 1999, brought about those circumstances, and this second summit meeting also reflects circumstances favorable to the development of U.S.-DPRK relations. The inter-Korean summit reconfirms the possibility of this formula within the structure of ROK-DPRK-U.S. trilateral relations.
I. Why now?
It is not advisable to analyze this summit politically. The timing of events surrounding the Korean Peninsula does not revolve solely around South Korea’s presidential election. What can South Korea do during the sudden change of the political situation on the Korean Peninsula? The argument not to take any action due to routine domestic politics carries no weight. It is important to first understand why the decision was made to hold an inter-Korean summit at this juncture.
Why did North Korea agree to hold an inter-Korean summit? In talks held on June 17, 2005, Kim Jong Il agreed to push for a summit meeting. However, due to timing issues, he later took a stance calling for further discussions. At the same time, North Korea appeared to hold doubts about the effectiveness of an inter-Korean summit due to unclear DPRK-U.S. relations. The Banco Delta Asia issue became a problematic issue since September 2005, and in 2006, the situation further deteriorated due to actions such as the North’s testing of a nuclear device. A situation arose in which it was difficult for either North or South Korea to promote a summit meeting.
As 2007 rolled around, the United States began holding bilateral talks with North Korea, the February 13 Beijing Agreement was reached and its implementation was set into motion, and through this, an environment fostering a summit was created for the first time. From the North’s perspective, it could have been perceived that at the point when improved U.S.-DPRK relations were anticipated, general management of the stalemated inter-Korean relations and overall political environment, not to mention economic interests, would not be best served. While U.S.-DPRK relations needed to be improved, there are many issues that must be resolved, and mistrust runs deep. There was also the perception that development of inter-Korean relations would favorably influence the improvement of U.S.-DPRK relations.
There is also criticism regarding the location of the summit. However, the government already publicly revealed its flexibility on this issue during the June 17, 2005 talks. It adopted the viewpoint that developments in resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations are more important than the location of talks. Prime Minister Koizumi traveled to Pyongyang on two occasions in attempts to resolve the Japanese kidnapping issue, following similar reasoning. It would be meaningful if the summit were held in Kaesong, however the city is not yet at a point where it is capable of handling issues such as the ceremony, security, and communications.
While evaluating this summit, there is still a tendency to view the current situation through the perspective of the past. The first summit meeting came about at a time when there was no trust between North and South Korea. There was also practically no contact between government officials. Therefore, Hyundai’s role as intermediary was necessary, and economic compensation was also required. However, seven years have passed. During this time, twenty-one ministerial-level talks have been held. Kaesong Industrial Complex and many other economic projects are being carried out. Stances regarding the summit meeting are also being shared through private, official channels.
The same is true for economic costs. The current situation is not the same as it was seven years ago. The economic benefits wanted by North Korea can be acquired naturally once there is development in the nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations. Our government had already revealed that it would actively promote the improvement of North Korean infrastructure through projects such as modernization of the railways if the North Korean nuclear issue were resolved. Overly biased perspectives will hinder one’s ability to grasp the current situation.
II. What is on the table?
It is possible to predict the agenda for the summit. The seven years of meetings between the two Koreas following the first summit in 2000 reveal the issues now up for discussion. Concrete directions for areas in which agreements were reached yet no action has been taken will be discussed, and basic agreements on areas in which there is a difference of perspective will be pursued.
The most important agenda item is peace. This summit will serve as an opportunity to begin discussions on a peninsular peace framework. Such a framework was agreed upon in the September 19 Joint Statement of Principles, and there is a recognition of the need for discussions with the United States and other interested governments. However, the Bush administration is focusing on denuclearization, and North Korea is also prioritizing improvement of the U.S.-DPRK relationship. In this situation, proclamation of the opening of discussion on a framework for peninsular peace during the summit meeting carries an extremely important meaning. If it is possible, it would be even better to present a basic agreement and goals for such a framework.
The building of trust between North and South Korean militaries is also a central agenda item. The two Koreas are already holding discussions regarding military issues through ministerial-level talks. However, there is a clear difference of perspective. North Korea is prioritizing the resolution of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea, while South Korea is pushing for a more gradual approach. This issue is a stumbling block for the improvement of inter-Korean relations. Regular train service, joint development at the mouth of the Han River, and other agreements on economic cooperation that have been reached but not been implemented require military support from both sides. The North Korean military is tying support for these projects to the issue of the NLL, so if this issue is not resolved, peace and economic cooperation cannot proceed to the next level.
It is necessary to create an overall package to overcome military trust issues. If our government can also build overall trust agreed upon in an inter-Korean non-aggression pact, then the NLL issue could be discussed. This issue could determine the success or failure of the summit meeting.
Obviously, there are more agenda items on which agreements have been reached but not implemented. The issues of prisoners of war and South Koreans kidnapped by the North, as well as historical issues such as wartime and cold-war estate claims, still exist. The issue of separated families needs to be resolved more quickly, and inter-Korean economic cooperative projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex need to be jumpstarted.
III. Undesirable political criticism
What can be expected from this summit meeting? Judging by the particular characteristics of North Korea’s policy-making structure, meeting with Kim Jong Il guarantees some degree of success. Following the first summit, Lim Dong-won, Park Jae-kyu, Chung Dong-young and other special envoys reached many agreements when opportunities for meetings cropped up. This is because in North Korean politics, one summit meeting is more important than 100 working-level talks.
Of course, a summit meeting is part of a process. Not all issues can be resolved at one time. The second summit is an opportunity to institutionalize inter-Korean summit meetings. Through ministerial talks, working-level discussions on implementation processes can take place, and through a summit meeting, the next level of talks can be carried out. As was the case between East and West Germany, hopefully this summit can serve as a framework for effective discourse on issues central to inter-Korean relations. Of course, overly optimistic expectations are not advisable.
One concern is the political criticism surrounding the summit meeting. The summit was decided upon at a time not long before the presidential election. The impact on the political area cannot help but be acute. However, the summit should not be buried under only domestic political issues. An issue that could impact a framework for peninsular peace and decide the fate of the two Koreas should not be taken out of our hands, nor decided by others. Deciding South Korea’s role in denuclearization and a framework for peninsular peace in this changing political environment should be top priority. This process needs to reflect the wisdom of our politicians.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
