by
Seoul-Washington Forum
[Seoul-Washington Forum]
posted June 1, 2007
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IFES Forum is pleased to bring you a special collection of
papers recently presented at the Seoul-Washington Forum in Seoul
on May 14-15, 2007.
The annual Seoul-Washington Forum, jointly organized by the
Sejong Institute (Seoul, Korea) and the Brookings Institution
(Washington, D.C., USA), and sponsored by the Korea Foundation,
brings together scholars and former officials from the United
States and the Republic of Korea to address the pressing issues
facing the Korean peninsula and the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Below is a summary of the presentations. Full-length papers are
also available for downloaded (see attachment below).
SEOUL-WASHINGTON FORUM
May 14-15, 2007 - Seoul, Korea
SUMMARIES
James A. KELLY (CNA Corporation)
ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION: STRENGTHENING POLITICAL TRUST AND
ADAPTABILITY
In the writer's view, and though some Americans believe the
alliance has served its purpose and should be left behind, the
U.S. -Korea alliance has benefited both sides greatly. It is
becoming more equal. It provides little downside risk for either
and significant chance for improved benefits of cooperation. The
alliance is more than a defense pact now and has gone far beyond
the written language of 1954. It should be continued and
broadened as it is practiced. The direct and ongoing North-South
dialogue is an essential step in solving the North Korea
"problem." These issues with the DPRK, despite the seriousness
of North Korean missile and nuclear developments, can be even
more amenable to mutual cooperation despite important
differences in how the DPRK is perceived. The restructure of US
forces and modification of wartime command lines should continue,
with an ongoing appraisal of U.S. troop levels. The KORUS-FTA
offers a superb opportunity to broaden a mutually beneficial
trade relationship and can lead to other elements of cooperation.
YANG Sung Chul (Former ROK Ambassador to the US)
BUSH'S NORTH KOREA POLICY: FROM DISENGAGEMENT TO ENTANGLEMENTS
The paper focuses on North Korea's Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
question, raised by the U.S. State Department during Bush's
first term, and the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) question, initiated
by the U.S. Treasury Department during Bush's second term.
Bush's national security and foreign policy or strategy toward
North Korea is a two-track approach, which has become more
transparent and concrete after the launching of his second term.
The U.S. State Department-led Six-Party Talks (SPT) is the first
track, an "above-the-surface" open forum; the U.S. Treasury
Department-initiated "below-the-surface" investigation of North
Korea's illicit financial activities overseas is the second
track, with the BDA probing the case in point. Specifically, as
of this writing, the BDA issue has once again stalled the
implementation of the February 13 Beijing Agreement, as it did
the SPT Joint Statement of September 19, 2005. Instead of an
eyeball to eyeball confrontation, however, a more reasonable
solution seems to be that either U.S. Treasury Department
provides the irreproachable conclusive evidence, facts, and
figures of North Korea-related illicit BDA financial
transactions to the public or does not allow its final rule to
become a booby trap for the implementation of the SPT Beijing
Agreement. In addition to this, the paper comments that the
recently concluded ROK-U.S. FTA is a welcome progress for
solidifying both nations' military alliance and closer economic
and trade integration, with a proviso that this new pact impedes
neither the pace of inter-Korean integration process nor that of
closer constructive cooperation among ROK, Japan, China and
Russia.
PAIK Haksoon (The Sejong Institute)
HOW TO DENUCLEARIZE NORTH KOREA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
The paper identifies the several remaining salient problems and
issues in denuclearizing North Korea: the structural dilemma or
frustration of allowing North Korea to increase its plutonium
stock for weapons, since the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions
Agreement has not yet been implemented; an asymmetry of demands
and objectives between the United States and North Korea, for
which North Korea tends to be more defensive, less flexible, and
more passive; incompletion of the first step of the February 13,
2007 Initial Actions Agreement, causing serious doubts about
North Korea's intention to accept denuclearization and about the
ability of the participant states in the six-party forum to
implement the Initial Actions Agreement; how North Korea and the
United States "strategically" linked the BDA issue to the
denuclearization issue for different reasons and interests, a
strategy that proved to be self-binding and self-destructive in
that the denuclearization issue fell victim to the slow progress
made in the BDA issue; and the concern about the United States'
potential toleration of North Korea's possession of nuclear
weapons. Considering these problems and issues, this paper
offers several policy recommendations regarding the
denuclearization of North Korea.
Robert EINHORN (Center for Strategic and International Studies)
SIX-PARTY TALKS: SEEKING A NUCLEAR-FREE KOREA
Until recently, the Six Party Talks produced very little. But
with China now deeply disturbed by the DPRK's behavior, North
Korea now facing the prospect of real penalties if it continues
its nuclear program, and the United States now prepared to
negotiate a deal involving normalization with the Kim Jong-il's
regime, prospects for resolving the North Korea nuclear issue
are better than they have been for several years. The key
question remains whether North Korea is genuinely prepared to
give up nuclear weapons. But if the five countries that
participate with the DPRK in the Six Party Talks can stay united
in offering the North Koreans strong incentives if they disarm
and threatening serious penalties if they don't, then
Pyongyang's willingness to give up its nuclear capability will
finally be put to a true test.
Joel S. WIT (Weatherhead East Asia Institute, Columbia
University)
A PEACE PROCESS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA
The challenge of negotiating a permanent peace regime on the
Korean Peninsula has been with us since the Korean War ended in
1953. As David Straub, a former State Department official has
observed, the difficulty of that negotiation "is exceeded only
by the importance of doing so." 1 During that 50-year period,
there have been numerous proposals made by the parties concerned
for such a regime but few real attempts at reaching an agreement.
As a result, the Korean Peninsula is the sole remaining outpost
of the Cold War. Its history is characterized by continuing
hostility, the confrontation of large conventional military
forces, the risk of devastating military conflict, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the
long-range missiles necessary to deliver them. Today, with
progress in the Beijing Six Party Talks and the glimmer of
renewed engagement between Washington and Pyongyang, greater
attention is being paid to the possibility of constructing a
permanent peace regime. But a number of significant challenges
still remain: participation, structure of a permanent peace, and
relationship to denuclearization.
PARK Kun Young (Catholic University of Korea)
PREPARING FOR A PEACE PROCESS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Since the Korean War there have been several attempts to bring
about permanent peace in the Korean peninsula. The 9.19 and 2.13
accords have made another attempt possible. This attempt is
particularly important not only for the peninsula but also for
regional and global peace and stability given that the DPRK has
conducted a nuclear experiment and that the roll-back of the
DPRK's nuclear program is closely intertwined with the peace
process in the peninsula and resuscitation of the NPT. This
paper discusses factors affecting the peace process including
the U.S.-DPRK Normalization, the North-South economic
Cooperation, arms control on the peninsula, and multilateral
security cooperation in Northeast Asia.
Jack PRITCHARD (Korea Economic Institute, Washington, D.C.)
BEYOND KORUS FTA: TOWARDS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Any discussion of future beneficial economic relations between
the United States and the Republic of Korea must center on the
recently negotiated Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).
The purpose of any FTA is to provide additional benefits to each
party that otherwise would not be available absent an agreement.
Seoul saw in an FTA with the United States an opportunity to
increase trade, revitalize and reform sectors that otherwise
would not readily accept change, and enhance its overall
relationship with the United States. The U.S. looked at the FTA
as an opportunity to remove barriers to trade and allow new
sectors to penetrate the Korean market where they had been
prohibited before. Creating a new economic pillar for the
alliance at a time when the traditional security pillar was
undergoing considerable strain was also appealing. For the
United States, two issues [automobiles and beef] clouded the
negotiations and continue to raise questions about eventual
approval of the FTA by the U.S. Congress. . . The Roh Moo-hyun
administration was inconsistent in its approach to the FTA.
Negotiations were authorized and initiated with the strong
political backing of the president, yet months elapsed before a
government team was organized to promote the benefits of the FTA
while the Agriculture Minister appeared to be conducting an
independent campaign designed to kill any prospects of success
in the negotiations. As a result, public opinion in Korea was
divided and protesters received a disproportionate amount of
attention. We can look theoretically beyond the FTA and see
that successful passage and implementation of the FTA will bring
the projected increases in economic benefits to both the U.S.
and Korean economies. It also will fulfill the early
justifications for entering into a free trade agreement. The
agreement, as President Bush emphasized in February 2006, would
provide important economic, political, and strategic benefits to
both countries and build on America's engagement in Asia. It
also elevates the role economics plays in the U.S.-Korea
relationship to a level more on par with that of the security
relationship.
KIM Sung-hoon (Former ROK Minister of Agriculture and Forestry)
BEYOND KORUS FTA: TOWARD MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
There have been found many witnesses and cases leading to a
common belief that the recently concluded FTA deal would not
only have detrimental effects on the economic stability of
farmers, small size businessmen and their employees in both
countries, but also would deepen the dependence of the Korean
economy on the U.S. by restricting the Korean government's
ability to pursue autonomous macroeconomic policies and
benevolent microeconomic programs. News from over the Pacific,
however, heralds that KORUS FTA might need to be overhauled in
order to appease the voracious demands made by Congressmen who
represent the interest of the constituents as well as MNCs/TNCs
who financially support them. Beef, autos, environmental and
labor conditions all can be tuned to be explosive if one or all
are brought to the renegotiation table by the U.S. It may then
be a high time for Korea to renew the needs and feasibilities of
the FTA deal from the standpoint of the weak all over again. On
that occasion, unfair provisions and detrimental factors could
be renovated to restore the balance of interest between the two
countries.
(For the full-length papers, please see the attached file.)
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