by
Heajeong Lee
[Chung-Ang University]
posted February 15, 2007
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"[P]eace in itself is a meaningless aim."
E. H. Carr
"It is one thing to be imprisoned in a fantasy of your own. It is much worse to be imprisoned in the fantasy of someone else. The latter is South Korea's situation today."
William Pfaff (October 2003)
South Korea lies in Northeast Asia, a region in which boundaries and order are contested and in flux. South Koreans themselves are deeply divided over who they are, how to live with America and what kind of Northeast Asia to dream of. This paper is a survey of the challenges, contestations, and confusions in which South Korea finds itself caught.
A Fractured Region
What makes up a region? A quick answer would be geography, but geography is not simply about fixed locality. Rather, a region is a complex social construction that is the work of many agencies, such as state and capital, and has many dimensions -- security, economy, politics and culture. Northeast Asia is a fractured region of social construction, with variegated spatial boundaries, historical zones, and models of social life.
Northeast Asia is conventionally considered to include the two Koreas, China, Taiwan, Japan, and Russia. The divided Korean Peninsula lies within the region, but the territories of China and Russia are not confined to Northeast Asia. China, the Middle Kingdom at the center of the world, once ruled all of Asia. The traditional Chinese order fell to Japanese imperialism, which was in turn defeated by the United States, located far from Northeast Asia.
Japan has been the lynchpin of American hegemony in East Asia. Not inviting even South Korea (not to mention China and North Korea, with whom the U.S. was fighting on the Korean Peninsula) to the San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951, the United States resurrected Japan as a semi-sovereign state. Thus a historic chance for "reconciliation" between Japanese imperialism and its victims was lost; South Korea and Taiwan were ensconced as outposts of the "free world." As a result, during the cold
war, American hegemony in Northeast Asia worked as a wedge against traditional Chinese and Korean nationalism, which decried Japanese imperialism and sought a unified nation-state. On the Korean Peninsula, North Korea fortified traditional nationalism with the ideological fervor of communism and existed as a "partisan state" against Japan and the United States. On the other hand, under its authoritarian regimes South Korea formed a second nature of alliance with the United States, or what might be called an "ROK nationalism" that prized state-led industrial development at the expense of democracy while naturalizing its confrontation with North Korea and alliance with the United States.
The normalization of the cold war in Northeast Asia was attended by the unresolved histories of Japanese imperialism and nationalism of China and Korea; seen from this perspective, America's role in Northeast Asia was ambiguous, contrary to the Washington cliche that the United States worked as a benign offshore stabilizer. With the end of the cold war and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the historical terrain of Northeast Asia crumbled, and a new definition of American hegemony was proclaimed.
The post-cold war economic fortune propelled the Chinese economic rise, boosted the American economy, busted the Japanese bubble economy (and a Japan that can say no to America), disintegrated South Korea's developmental state, and plunged North Korea into a disaster. While North Korea was on its "arduous march," the market economy integrated and reconfigured Northeast Asia into various global and regional nexus (WTO, IMF, APEC, ASEAN, etc.). Increasing economic interdependence worked as a centripetal force in Northeast Asia but was accompanied by each state's efforts to secure its own relative advantages through bilateral free trade agreements. Also, China's economic rise, the driver of regional economic growth and integration, was not without backlashes; most of all, it spawned American concern over the China threat.
The security turnabout in the wake of 9/11 was more sweeping. Led by the "fantasy" of the Bush Doctrine, America began a global war on terror, which prompted a military transformation that overhauled the cold war normalcy of its bilateral alliance with Japan and Korea. America's new war integrated Northeast Asia into Greater Asia (of Islamic population in Middle, Central, Southwest, and Southeast Asia), encircled by the East Asian littoral. Through the East Asian littoral, the Japanese military sphere was extended into the Persian Gulf, while its "Peace Constitution," dictated by the "blue-
eyed Shogun" MacArthur, was once again under pressure for change to meet the needs of America's new war. The U.S. also accelerated the realignment of its alliance with South Korea in the direction of turning the American forces in Korea into a regional stabilizer; in the middle of the recurrent North Korean nuclear crisis and fierce domestic controversy, South Korea dispatched additional troops to Iraq. China, encircled by America's arc of instability and the East Asian littoral, continued its military modernization and charm-offensive toward Southeast Asia, and launched countermoves through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Central Asian countries.
Northeast Asia is embedded in economic globalization and the global war on terror. Its spatial boundaries are much extended, its social constructions fractured and complicated. In general, Northeast Asia's economic terrain is governed by multilateralism whereas its security terrain is governed by bilateralism; the former works as a centripetal force and the latter as a centrifugal force. However, if we follow Carr's counsel that we should face "the unpalatable fact" of conflicts of interests in the guise of peace and other abstract, ideological catchwords, we must reconsider the facile dichotomy of economic multilateralism and security bilateralism in Northeast Asia. Economic multilateralism is not without jockeying for power and security concerns, and security bilateralism is supplemented by multilateral groupings in order to include new members in one's own interest.
In short, Northeast Asia is rampant with power politics, of which the alignments are too disjointed and complex for us to ascertain the present status quo and its future direction. All the players in Northeast Asia except North Korea are on the side of the market economy; the Chinese economic rise is an accepted phenomenon, but its future is uncertain. In terms of democracy -- the new hegemonic dividing line in America's global war on terror -- South Korea is on the side of America and Japan but can neither sever its economic ties with China, on the other side of democratic peace, nor risk a preemptive strike against North Korea that its democratic allies hold as an option.
In terms of security, China is a key player in the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis and a security threat to America and Japan. How far North Korea would go in posing security threats and maintaining its regime is uncertain, and mutual hedging between China and America (and Japan) is underway. America's new security norm is military transformation for its global war on terror, and as such the U.S. is forging new alliances with South Korea and Japan. For ROK nationalism, the status quo is and should be the deterrence of North Korea. Neither traditional Korean nationalism nor ROK nationalism can endorse Japan's assertive armament and legitimization of its imperial past.
Most troubling is the lack of a model or primer for order in Northeast Asia. There is no historical precedent of peaceful coexistence between the current major players -- America, China and Japan -- as great powers. The traditional Chinese-centered world order is an anachronism in terms of the economy, or modernity in general, and an anathema to both Korea and Japan, not to mention America. Japanese imperialism was an embodiment of Asia's own search for modernity but led to war and criminal acts against Asia. The norms of the cold war are being broken down by their very molder, America, while the Bush Doctrine fails to provide a new vision for Northeast Asia and the world.
What Are Friends For?
The alliance with the United States has been the backbone of the South Korean state, and for ROK nationalism, the alliance has been naturalized not just as a means for security but also as an end itself -- a sanctified symbol of South Korean political identity and international stature. For traditional Korean nationalism, which stands against imperialism and for unification, American hegemony is to blame for the division of the Korean people.
In the South Korean political spectrum regarding the alliance with the United States, traditional Korean nationalism and ROK nationalism represent both ends of the spectrum. During the cold war, the balance of power between ROK nationalism, which espoused loyalty to the alliance, and traditional Korean nationalism, which favored exiting the alliance, was heavily skewed toward the former, while moderate voices were hollow. This dominance of loyalty stemmed primarily from the successive authoritarian regimes' monopoly of security and unification policy, but it was not without some grounds. The cold war norms in Northeast Asia allowed South Korea no alternative or
third way in the bloc system. Moreover, there were some material dividends of being an outpost of the "free world": besides cheap security protection from North Korean military threats, the United States provided South Korea with economic aid, models of export-led development, markets for Korean exports, and financing, all of which were indispensable for the development of the South Korean state.
The loyalty of ROK nationalism still prevails in South Korean politics, but the exit favored by traditional Korean nationalism is no longer the sporadic outcry of political prisoners, and the moderate voices of critics and skeptics are no longer hollow. Moreover, ROK nationalism's loyalty no longer completely corresponds with American interests. This shift has to do with domestic political changes in South Korea and the changing payoff matrix of its alliance with America. The democratization of South Korean politics has broken down the state's monopoly of security and unification policies and spawned a fierce politicization of foreign policy in general. In the wake of the end of the cold war and 9/11, South Korea's positive and direct gains from its alliance with the United States have decreased, while the alliance's opportunity costs or hegemonic rents that South Korea must pay have increased.
With the end of the cold war and South Korea's economic growth, South Korea has lost the dividends of being an outpost of the cold war. The Washington Consensus dismantled South Korea's developmental state in the so-called "IMF crisis" of 1997-8, and the United States has driven a hard bargain against the South in sharing the burden of the alliance's costs and responsibilities. American hegemony now provides no development vision suited for both countries' specific situations other than "market fundamentalism." While its economic playing ground with the United States has leveled and its economic interdependence with China increased, South Korea is not free from America's hegemonic rents such as the dollar's power and America's military control of oil transportation sea lanes.
From the South Korean perspective, the original rationale of its alliance with the United States was the latter's provision of security protection from North Korea's military threats -- South Korea's alliance dilemma was abandonment. From the perspective of American hegemony, the alliance was for the "double containment" of both North Korea and South Korea, which was critical to the protection of Japan -- America's alliance dilemma was entanglement. In the post-cold war period, North Korea, diplomatically isolated and economically devastated, has built an unconventional military capability of nuclear weapons and missiles on the rationale of self-defense. Now the primary security concerns of American hegemony are focused on WMD terrorism and China. For the United States, the nature of North Korea's threats is primarily global. The Bush Doctrine has proclaimed and executed a preventive war in Iraq against the threats of WMD terrorism on the rationale of self-defense.
Thus, the alliance's strategic space-time asymmetry has widened, and South Korea has been trapped in a new security dilemma between North Korea and the United States. The alliance should be, from the American perspective, realigned to meet the challenges of the global war on terror and China's military modernization. America's alliance dilemma is now the entrapment of its troops in South Korea for the single purpose of protecting the latter against a North Korean military invasion. The strategic flexibility of American troops in South Korea and the transfer of wartime operational command to South Korea are measures for the American military's freedom of action.
In contrast, South Korea, which holds peace on the Korean Peninsula as an absolute goal, cannot risk the consequences of a new (nuclear) security dilemma between the United States and North Korea. It thus faces both dilemmas of the alliance: entrapment and abandonment. On the one hand, South Korea fears being trapped in Sino-American conflicts or distant wars on terror. On the other hand, South Korea's traditional alliance dilemma, abandonment, has taken a new twist. Now South Korea fears that the U.S. would dispense with peace on the Korean Peninsula for the latter's self-defense. Some American hardliners would not hesitate to argue for "an amicable divorce" or military strikes against North Korea for the prevention of WMD terror against the United States.
South Korea has already been caught in such a double dilemma of abandonment and entrapment. The dispatch of South Korean combat troops to Iraq -- a Kurdish area away from the center of resistance forces -- was a balancing act to avoid abandonment and entrapment: the decision was legitimized as an effort to ensure America's peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The alliance payoff matrix here was not so positive for South Korea. Whereas the South did dispatch troops to Iraq, the United States only withheld military options against North Korea (probably due not to South
Korea's dispatch of troops but to its own independent calculations and the limits of its military power).
Such an unpalatable alliance matrix for South Korea will continue unless the security dilemma between the United States and North Korea is resolved. The alliance is being realigned along a new division of responsibility (South Korea for the Korean Peninsula, the United States for regional and global missions), but it is not prepared for the deterrence of North Korea's nuclear threats. In other words, the alliance itself is either useless or redundant with respect to North Korea's new threats. As the events in the wake of North Korea's recent nuclear test testify, the United States, faced with the
North's nuclear threats, would only confirm its nuclear umbrella commitment to South Korea and press the latter to join various measures for blocking proliferation and North Korean regime change -- what North Korea has declared to be a declaration of war against itself.
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