by
Keun-sik Kim*
[Kyungnam University, Institute for Far Eastern Studies]
posted January 25, 2007
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* Keun-sik Kim is an assistant professor in the department of political science and diplomacy at Kyungnam University and director of industry-academic cooperation at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES). Prior to joining IFES, Kim was a research fellow at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation for the Asia-Pacific Region. He has written extensively on North Korea's political economy and the current nuclear crisis.
New Year Editorial
On January 1st of this year, North Korea as usual made public its annual New Year joint editorial. During the Kim Il Sung regime, the head of state himself delivered a New Year address, but during Kim Jong Il’s tenure an editorial has been presented in print in three different newspapers. In general, the New Year editorial evaluates the policy results of the past year and is an important yardstick by which to anticipate North Korea’s policy direction in the present year. That is, it simultaneously serves the function of officially reviewing the previous year’s policies and of forecasting their course in the year to come. In recent years, the policy direction presented in the New Year editorial has varied little, indicating that the North’s surrounding environment has not changed and that its policy goals have not developed in any significant sense.
Possession of Nuclear Weapons and the Push for Economic Progress
The most striking feature of the review of the previous year in the latest New Year joint editorial is that 2006 is described as a year “in which the dawn of a great, prosperous and powerful socialist nation was ushered in.” It is well known that building a powerful nation has been continuously emphasized as a national goal ever since Kim Jong Il acceded to power. According to North Korea, the three strategic goals of becoming a powerful nation are ideological, military, and economic strength. The North takes pride in having become a nuclear state and thus achieving the first two goals, and is now pushing for economic progress in order to build a truly “great and prosperous nation.” Its core policy goal of becoming a socialist economic power in 2007 is in the same vein. Just as North Korea, through the possession of nuclear weapons, was able to prevent a preemptive attack by so-called American imperialism, hostile policies, and the plans of hardliners in the Republican Party, it is now seeking to devote its energies to ensuring a steady food supply, revitalizing light industry, and raising the standard of living.
The focus of this year’s policy direction on economic development has two levels of meaning. In one sense, as per its own explanation, North Korea has expressed its intent to adopt an active policy of concentrating its efforts on the economy, now that the nuclear test has guaranteed a means of self-defense that can overcome American sanctions and pressure. On the other hand, the emphasis on the economy’s importance may signify a passive and defensive stance, meant to manage the economic crisis brought about by the nuclear test and the ensuing sanctions imposed by the international community. This is shown by the editorial’s emphasis on the principle of self-reliance and the stated intent to “frustrate the maneuvers of the imperialists.”
However, considering the reality in North Korea, its pronouncement that the nuclear test ushered in the dawn of a powerful nation and its plans to push for economic progress based on possession of a nuclear deterrent are putting the cart before the horse. The nuclear test has not brightened the North’s future; rather it has brought about serious sanctions imposed by the international community and thus served to deepen the crisis of its system. Furthermore, being recognized as a nuclear state is not a basis for economic progress -- North Korea must bear in mind that its insistence on possessing nuclear arms will make such economic development more difficult. Although focusing on the economy as elucidated in the New Year editorial may appear to be favorable, national pride and the possession of nuclear weapons, which are mentioned as a premise for the new policy direction, will not bring about the desired results. This point shows the contradiction inherent in the latest joint editorial.
The Importance of Ethnic Ties and the Outlook for Inter-Korean Relations
The gist of North Korea’s policy towards the South, as set forth in this year’s editorial, does not differ significantly from that in previous years. The underlying tone is an emphasis on inter-Korean cooperation, based on the sense of a shared ethnic identity. The three points of cooperation and “patriotic movement” presented in 2005 and 2006, respectively, have changed in name only: in 2007, the three points were “attaching importance to the nation, maintaining peace, and achieving unity.”[1]
“Attaching importance to the nation” is of the same nature as the emphasis on Korean autonomy and the principle of independent unification. North Korea’s intent to utilize inter-Korean relations in its confrontation with America, in effect drawing the line of conflict between the two Koreas and the U.S., remains unchanged. In particular, the slogan of Korean solidarity has been useful in easing American pressure to some extent and in preventing the South from taking America’s side when sanctions were adopted and the Six-Party Talks were at a stalemate.
The phrase “maintaining peace” is identical in meaning to the previous “peace against war.” The slogan has been used to justify North Korean demands that the U.S. and South Korea discontinue their military training exercises and that U.S. troops be removed from the Korean peninsula, as well as to prevent any American preemptive attack or military measure related to the nuclear issue. Similarly, “achieving unity” is of primary significance in the inter-Korean cooperation that is continually emphasized by the North, in that it believes the two Koreas should combine their strength, as endorsed in the June 15th Joint Declaration, against America’s hostile policy.
Ultimately, North Korea’s policy towards the South in 2007 stresses the importance of Korean ties and maintaining peace in order to utilize inter-Korean relations as a buffer and favorably affect its position vis-à-vis the U.S. At the same time, the purpose of emphasizing unity is to gain political support, solidarity, and economic assistance from South Korea. To the North, inter-Korean relations have a certain strategic usefulness, and therefore it has a need to maintain these relations, regardless of how its confrontation with the U.S. plays out in 2007.
As the opposition between North Korea and America has deepened, relations on the peninsula have been pushed to the back burner; indeed 2006 was characterized by inter-Korean relations being overwhelmed by the U.S.-DPRK conflict. North Korea responded to American financial sanctions with the missile and nuclear tests, to which the U.S. reacted by leading the imposition of UN sanctions. Inter-Korean relations were suspended as the confrontation climbed to its peak throughout 2006. South Korea attempted to maintain its relations with the North in spite of the nuclear issue, but it could not overcome the limitations posed by the nuclear test, leading to the discontinuation of dialogue between the two countries. Inter-Korean relations were in effect captive to DPRK-U.S. relations.
In light of this, if the nuclear issue continues to worsen this year, progress in inter-Korean relations will undoubtedly be made difficult by certain limitations. However, it will be possible to sustain the dynamic of relations, separate from the nuclear issue, due to North Korea’s perception of the significance and utility of maintaining relations. In particular, judging by the emphasis on Korean ties in the New Year editorial, it seems that inter-Korean relations can be continued on the civilian level, regardless of the suspension of official dialogue. However, the restoration and advance of official contacts between the two Koreas are dependent on the DPRK-U.S. standoff, trends on the Korean peninsula, and how the South Korean government will deal with the issue. In its forecast of inter-Korean relations for 2007, the Chosun Sinbo, official newspaper of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, stated that, “North Korea will intrepidly develop its policy towards the South,” and pointed out the importance of the “Roh Moo-hyun government’s response and the direction of public opinion on inter-Korean cooperation.” These statements illuminate North Korea’s perspective, which allows for the possibility not only of maintaining but even actively advancing relations.
Given the premise that inter-Korean relations may be sustained and developed in spite of the nuclear issue, it is necessary to consider two issues: One is North Korea’s plainly visible stance against the Grand National Party (GNP), and the other is the continuously mentioned possibility of an inter-Korean summit.
A prominent point of the New Year editorial is North Korea’s position on interfering in South Korean politics in order to prevent pro-American, conservative forces from coming to power. The North has made clear its intent to interfere both directly and indirectly in lobbying against the GNP, but in reality this is neither possible nor favorable. Interfering in South Korea’s domestic politics is not only impossible, it may have the opposite effect intended by the North, considering the culture and structure of politics in the South. North Korean interference can only serve to deteriorate inter-Korean relations, which are difficult enough as it is.
South Korean criticism of holding another summit meeting, even though doing so is fitting and proper, is related to the North Korean attitude. The North’s official advocacy of an anti-GNP stance in this year’s presidential election is intended to improve the situation on the Korean peninsula and create a breakthrough in the nuclear issue, but instead it is making the inter-Korean summit a subject of criticism in domestic politics. In spite of all this, a second summit meeting is still a possibility. The summit is indeed a sensitive issue in South Korean politics, considering this year’s presidential election and the North’s anti-GNP feelings. However, the value of an inter-Korean summit as a historical stepping stone to improving relations on the peninsula and resolving the nuclear issue is undeniable, and far greater than any temporary sensitivity. Given the abatement of North Korean interference in domestic politics, a summit should be discussed and pursued, with due consideration given to South Korean public opinion and progress on the nuclear issue.
It is important to consider the leading role that inter-Korean relations can play in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in 2007. Of course, peninsular relations are prescribed by unavoidable external conditions presented by the nuclear issue, but South Korea must ensure the continuity and dynamic of relations in spite of this. The need to endeavor to improve the nuclear situation and hope for such improvement cannot be overemphasized. However, if inter-Korean relations in the new year are left to depend solely on making progress on the nuclear issue, then 2006 will merely repeat itself. Last year, in which inter-Korean relations were made futile by the deepening DPRK-U.S. rift and the worsening nuclear issue, was enough. The nuclear issue structurally limits relations, but this does not mean that South Korea should abandon seeking a more active role for inter-Korean relations from the beginning. Rather, the South should keep in mind the need to find a breakthrough in the Six-Party Talks and the nuclear issue by restoring and further developing relations, as well as the possibility of doing so. It was South Korea that convinced the North to return to the multilateral talks when they were stuck in a long-term stalemate in the first half of 2005. The meeting between the two countries on June 17th that brought about North Korea’s return to the talks, which in turn led to an opening for progress and the signing of the September 19th Joint Statement, owes much to the dynamic of inter-Korean relations. It is hoped that relations on the Korean peninsula will not just be restored or maintained but serve in resolving the nuclear crisis in 2007.
NOTES
1. The 2005 New Year editorial emphasized three points of inter-Korean cooperation --“national independence, peace against war, and patriotism for reunification” -- while the 2006 editorial set forth the “patriotic movement for independent reunification, peace against war, and great national unity.”
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