by
Chung Tae-Ik
[Former South Korean Ambassador to Russia]
posted September 1, 2006
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 Preface : |
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Article : |
The transfer of wartime military operational control in South
Korea has become a pressing security issue that remains to be
resolved. The issue has evolved and shifted according to the
security situation on the Korean peninsula and changes in South
Korean society's perception of the United States.
At the outbreak of the Korean War, President and Commander in
Chief Syngman Rhee relinquished operational command to General
Douglas MacArthur, head of the United Nations forces. This
measure was accepted as an unavoidable action undertaken by the
president to preserve the nation in a time of crisis. After the
armistice, in a 1954 agreement supplementing the Mutual Defense
Treaty between South Korea (ROK) and the United States, it was
agreed that the United Nations Command would retain operational
control as long as it remained responsible for South Korea's
defense. After the height of the cold war, in the process of
debating President Jimmy Carter's plans in 1977 to withdraw
American ground combat forces, operational control of Korean
military forces was transferred from the UN Command to the ROK-
U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) in 1978.
The issue of transferring operational control arose after South
Korean troops attached to the CFC were mobilized for the
December 12, 1979 coup d'etat without informing American
officials, thereby severely damaging the chain of command.
Furthermore, anti-American sentiment was spurred by controversy
over the American military's responsibility in the Kwangju
uprising on May 18, 1980. Domestic public opinion induced
presidential candidate Roh Tae-Woo to make the transfer of
military operational control a campaign promise in August 1987.
This, coupled with the passage of the Nunn-Warner Amendment in
1989 and the directional change in American defense policy in
1990, became the backdrop for the transfer of peacetime
operational control.
A subject of debate throughout the 1990s, the transfer of
wartime operational control has been a policy goal of the
current administration from the beginning of its term. During a
ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 2005, the two
sides agreed to accelerate the process, and it is anticipated
that a roadmap for the transfer will be presented at the 38th
meeting of the SCM in October.
The issue of transferring wartime operational control should not
be superficially handled from a polarized point of view, but
rather a balanced approach should be sought through discussion.
The issue is a matter of guaranteeing sovereignty as well as the
security of a new generation. As such it is necessary to
emphasize the opportunity and reduce the sense of crisis
presented by the transfer.
First, operational control was relinquished at a time of
national emergency, outside the bounds of the constitution, and
thus it is only natural that this issue should be normalized
through a transfer of operational control. Historically, Korea
ceded military command to Ming Dynasty forces during the Imjin
waeran (Japanese invasion in the 16th century) and to American
troops during the Korean War in order to survive. Entrusting
the nation's fate to a foreign country's military due to lack of
defense capability is a part of Korean history that should not
be repeated.
Second, as history teaches us, the fate of any nation that
cannot react to a changing international order caused by the
emergence of a dominant state is uncertain at best and doomed at
worst. Therefore it is necessary to examine the position of the
United States, a leader of the current Northeast Asian order,
regarding its wartime operational control. In the aftermath of
9.11, America has had to call upon its troops stationed overseas
in order to combat security threats posed by terrorism and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In accordance
with its reformulated policy to confront the new security
threats of the 21st century, America has taken a positive stance
on the issue of transferring wartime operational control.
Furthermore, the progress in inter-Korean relations, the rise of
South Korea's economic strength as the world's eleventh largest
economy, and American reliance on the South's improved military
capabilities form the background for receptiveness to the
transfer of control. It will be difficult to reverse the trend
towards transfer, in light of the ROK and U.S. governments'
respective policies.
Third, North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and missiles in
order to resolve its unstable security situation, brought about
by its self-incurred isolation and the drastic drop and
weakening of its power. A response must be formulated to
thoroughly address the perception of crisis that has arisen
because the transfer issue is being pursued in the face of a
nuclear threat. The roadmap for transferring wartime control,
which is to be agreed upon through the SCM, must be formed
through a rational and delicate process of linking South Korea's
Defense Reform 2020 and the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance.
The Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia face a variety of
security challenges: the constant and asymmetric threat posed by
North Korea, emergence of a dominant state, terrorism and
internet security, assurance of secure sea routes, etc. A
comprehensive ROK-U.S. joint defense policy, with a complex
command structure to combat these and other types of threats,
must be studied in depth. In particular, a NATO-like
organization that would prevent against the appearance of a
dominant power, as well as a joint defense system that provided
a fixed security structure, would contribute to a sense of
security for South Korea.
Fourth, since the transfer of wartime operational command is
essentially a restoration of supreme command of the military, a
measure transferring control back to the president would be
sufficient. However, such a measure would have important
implications for South Korea's security, such as the additional
expenditure needed for defense and the resulting burden placed
on citizens. The National Assembly should examine the
suitability of the transfer policy and the appropriateness of
the financial burden by conducting a budget review and an
inspection of the administration. As such a national referendum
on this issue is not necessary.
Fifth, several issues must be practically addressed: the lack of
South Korea's in-house operational command ability; maintenance
of "hardware," such as a deterrent military force and cutting-
edge information facilities; and acquisition of "software," such
as deterrent strategy, wartime planning, and intelligence
gathering and analysis. Maintaining a rational and dependable
defense force will strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance. The two
sides should consider opening a new forum for negotiations where
the foreign affairs and defense ministers from both countries
can discuss outstanding security issues related to the alliance.
Sixth, the transfer of control will not only reinforce the
principle of resolving issues affecting the Korean peninsula
without outside interference, but also serve as an opportunity
to reopen talks between the two Koreas and further the
construction of a peaceful system on the peninsula. The
transfer would decrease the likelihood of military conflict
between North Korea and the United States. Although a solution
has been sought through the multilateral structure of the Six-
Party Talks, the nuclear issue remains at an impasse, and the
United States should use this as a chance to directly approach
North Korea and resolve the issue through negotiations.
Furthermore, South Korea should concentrate its efforts on
translating improved inter-Korean relations into caps on defense
expenditure and armament reductions, thereby easing the immense
financial burden on both sides. More importantly, the transfer
of operational control offers the advantage that South Korean
troops will be able to be rapidly deployed in order to prevent
chaos in the event of sudden change in North Korea. More
emphasis must be placed on creating a diplomatic strategy that
will take advantage of the opportunities for peace offered by
the transfer.
In conclusion, the transfer of wartime operational control,
which has been made possible by the end of the Cold War, the
South-North Summit Meeting in 2000, and changes in both domestic
and foreign trends, has become an inevitable process. The
Korean peninsula faces many challenges above and beyond security
concerns, including the rise of China, Japan's shift to the
right, North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, and
America's change in strategy. Both a diplomatic strategy that
manages relations with these four countries and a military
capable of combating any security threat must be cultivated in
order to prevent a repetition of the tragedy that befell the
nation one hundred years ago. Rather than adhere to a division
that has existed for over half a century, now is the time to
accept the trend of global changes and craft an integrated
policy for a peaceful Korean peninsula. The future of the
peninsula hangs on today's strategic vision and its resolute
execution.
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