by
B. C. Koh
[Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago]
posted Auguest 21, 2006
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North Korea's test-firing of seven ballistic missiles of varying
range on July 5 (local time) generated unanticipated consequences
for the parties concerned, especially the North. It spawned an
unprecedented unanimous resolution by the United Nations Security
Council condemning the North and imposing de facto sanctions. In
what ways, if any, will the incident affect the prospects for the
resumption of the six-party talks?
Salient Features of the Incident
Let us begin by noting the salient aspects of the missile
incident. First, it was the first time that the North had
launched three different types of missiles consecutively -- four
Scud C missiles (range: 500 km), two Nodong missiles (range: 1300
km), and a Taepodong 2 missile (range: 6000 km or longer).[1]
Second, the launch of the last-named missile, which can
theoretically reach Alaska, was a "complete failure." After
examining all available evidence, Japan's Defense Agency
concluded that its first stage flew for approximately 40 seconds
but the second stage failed to separate, falling into the Sea of
Japan (the East Sea) about 640 km from the launch site.[2]
One should hasten to add, however, that "failure" does not
necessarily mean that it was a total loss for the North from a
technical standpoint. For "setbacks [are] a normal part of
rocket and warhead science." According to Jonathan McDowell, a
"Harvard astronomer who publishes the online Jonathan's Space
Report, which tracks global rocket launchings," "the fact that
something flies for 40 seconds before it blows up means that the
design is probably fundamentally sound." "Even if failures cut
short a vehicle's debut," he added, "the flight can give you an
incredible amount of information about such things as how well
your engines are working and what the aerodynamic stability of
the vehicle is."[3]
Third, the timing of the launch appears to have been carefully
calculated. It began in the wee hours of July 5, which coincided
with the late afternoon of July 4 in Washington, DC, which was
celebrating its Independence Day. This seems to bolster the view
that one of Pyongyang's objectives may have been to induce
Washington to change its policy toward the North and engage in
bilateral talks, which the North hopes would lead to the easing
of financial sanctions.
Fourth, the North ended up losing much more than it gained from
the missile launches. In the gains column, one may include the
North's demonstration of its capability to launch multiple
missiles. Since all of them except Taepodong 2 appeared to have
performed without a hitch, their test-firing may have served as
an advertisement to the North's customers in the global arms
market. The single most important loss for Pyongyang, on the
other hand, was the passage of the UN Security Council resolution
with the approval of China and Russia. The Chinese decision, in
particular, must have been a heavy blow to Pyongyang, something
the Kim Jong Il regime had failed to foresee. The sanctions
Japan imposed on the North in the immediate aftermath of the
missile launches -- notably, the banning of North Korean ships
from entering Japanese ports and the tightening of controls on
travels to and from the North -- hurt Pyongyang. The Roh Moo
Hyun government's decision not to accommodate the North's request
for additional assistance -- 500,000 tons of rice, and 100,000
tons of fertilizer -- must also be counted as a loss for
Pyongyang. This last-mentioned loss, however, would be offset to
some extent by Seoul's provision of emergency aid for flood
relief.
The UN Security Council Resolution
The resolution the UN Security Council adopted on July 15, 2006
was the product of a compromise. Japan and the U.S. had co-
sponsored a draft resolution invoking Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, which would have authorized the use of force in
enforcing sanctions on the North. After threatening to veto it,
China, in cooperation with Russia, proposed a rival draft that
neither invoked Chapter VII nor included the kind of sanctions
that were in the Japan-U.S. draft. Subsequent negotiations
produced a compromise draft: in exchange for the omission of any
reference to Chapter VII, China and Russia agreed to a tougher
text. To cite a few examples:
"Acting under its special responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security," the Security Council "condemns
the multiple launches by the DPRK of ballistic missiles on 5 July
2006 local time" and "demands that the DPRK suspend all
activities related to its ballistic missile program, and in this
context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium
on missile launching." The Security Council also "requires all
Member States…to exercise vigilance and prevent missile and
missile-related items, materials, goods and technology being
transferred to the DPRK's missile or WMD programs." The Security
Council further "requires" Member States not to purchase any
missile, missile-related materials and technology from the DPRK.
Finally, the Security Council "strongly urges the DPRK to return
immediately to the Six-Party Talks, without precondition, to work
towards the expeditious implementation of [the] 19 September 2005
Joint Statement."[4]
How may one account for China's unprecedented decision to approve
the preceding resolution? The main reason appears to have been
Beijing's profound disappointment at Pyongyang's refusal to heed
its advice not to launch missiles. In the days following the
launches, China sent Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei to Pyongyang
"to persuade North Korea to freeze its missile tests and return
to [the six-party talks]."[5] Wu was a member of a Chinese
delegation headed by Vice Premier Hui Liangyu. An article in
the August 2006 issue of the monthly magazine Zhengming,
published in Hong Kong, asserts that on July 11 the North sent
Yang Hyong Sop, a vice-chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
People's Assembly, to Beijing bearing Kim Jong Il's letter to Hu
Jintao requesting an increase of annual Chinese aid to the North
from 12 billion yuan (about $1.5 billion) to 30 billion yuan
(about $3.8 billion). Hu reportedly underscored to Yang the
importance of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, the need
for the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks, and Pyongyang's
need to play a proactive role in building mutual trust in inter-
Korean relations. Although Hu dispatched Vice Premier Hui
Liangyu and Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei to Pyongyang in order
to explain to Kim Jong Il that China would be willing to
accommodate the North's request for increased aid should China's
conditions be met, the North made Hui and Wu wait at a guesthouse
for six hours before informing them that Kim Jong Il was on an
inspection tour and unable to meet them. They returned to
Beijing empty-handed on July 15 (local time), which would be a
day before the crucial vote was taken at the UN Security
Council.[6]
Immediately following the adoption of the UN Security Council
resolution, according to the same magazine article, DPRK Vice
Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan summoned PRC ambassador Wu Donghe
to lodge a strong protest. Kim allegedly told Wu that both the
ruling party and the government of the North had been "shocked by
the action of the Chinese government that was tantamount to a
betrayal of trust." On the same day DPRK ambassador to China
Choe Jin Su requested a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing but was told that Li was tied up with an important
matter. Choe subsequently returned to the Chinese Foreign
Ministry with ten other North Korean diplomats and military
attaches but the Chinese refused to see them. After waiting for
two hours, the North Koreans reportedly returned to their
embassy.[7]
Other signs of new strains in Beijing-Pyongyang relations
included a reported freezing of North Korean accounts in the
Macau branch of the Bank of China; Beijing's decision to allow
"three North Korean refugees who had been holed up at a U.S.
Consulate [in Shenyang] to travel to the United States"; Chinese
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing's initiative to hold a multilateral
meeting (with foreign ministers from ten countries) on Korean
issues without North Korean participation at the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) in Kuala Lumpur on July 28; Li's commitment to
Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro, made at a bilateral meeting
on the sidelines of the ARF, not to object to Japan's raising the
abduction issue at the Six-Party Talks; and admissions by Chinese
officials that all was not well in China-North Korea
relations.[8]
During a three-day visit to Seoul in early August, the chief
spokesman for the PRC Foreign Ministry, Liu Jianchao,
acknowledged that disagreements emerged between Beijing and
Pyongyang over the missile launch issue. His government's
position, Liu said, was that the launches should not have
occurred under any circumstances and that they not only
aggravated the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula but
also had a negative effect on North Korea itself. While
insisting that "good neighborly relations" between China and
North Korea remained intact, Liu revealed that China didn't know
much about the conditions and developments within the Korean
People's Army and that the North listens neither to Chinese words
nor to their own words. The latter was construed by the South
Korean press as a reference to the North's failure to keep their
words. Liu's remarks were corroborated by General Guo Boxiong,
vice-chairman of China's Central Military Commission, who, during
a visit to Washington, DC, told his American hosts that China
actually obtained much information on the North's missile program
from the U.S.[9]
North Korean Response
North Korea lost no time in dismissing and denouncing the UN
Security Council resolution. Pyongyang's chief representative to
the UN, Pak Gil Yon, declared immediately following the
resolution's adoption that his country "resolutely condemns the
attempt of some countries to misuse the Security Council for the
despicable political aim to isolate and put pressure on the DPRK
and totally rejects the resolution." Pak's U.S. counterpart,
John Bolton, countered: "This has been a historic day. Not only
have we unanimously adopted resolution 1695, but North Korea has
set a world record in rejecting it 45 minutes after its
adoption."[10]
Pyongyang's unwavering position is that as a sovereign state, it
has a right to produce, possess, and test ballistic missiles.
Since North Korea is not a party to the Missile Technology
Control Regime, as it takes pains to point out, the only legal
impediment to its missile launches is the self-imposed moratorium
on them -- first unveiled in 1999 and reaffirmed in the Japan-
DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of September 2002. The North, however,
argues that neither of them is binding because the reciprocal
obligations underlying them have not been honored. With regard
to the argument that by failing to give advance notice to ships
and aircraft that would be traveling in the waters and airspace
affected by the missile launches, the North had posed serious
dangers to their safety, Pyongyang claims that careful planning
went into the launches so as to avoid any hazards, pointing to
the lack of any damages reported.[11]
When U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called North Korea
"a completely irresponsible state and dangerous" for the missile
tests, the North reacted angrily. To quote Rice further: "When
you look at them testing missiles, not telling anybody they're
firing them in all different directions, and they're saying that
they have a nuclear weapons capability…that they could make those
together is very dangerous." She stressed that the July 15 UNSC
resolution shows "that this is a problem that North Korea has
with the entire international community."[12]
A commentary distributed by Pyongyang's official news agency,
KCNA, characterized Rice's remarks as a reflection of
Washington's "bellicose policy of putting pressure on" North
Korea, labeling Rice a "political illiterate" (chongch'i
munmaengja). The English translation of this phrase by none
other than KCNA itself was an erroneous exaggeration -- a
"political imbecile." This translation was widely quoted in the
English-language press, with the result that it was North Korea's
image, not Rice's, that was tarnished.[13]
What is indisputable is that the net impact of the North's
missile launches has been deleterious. However, before the North
could fully absorb the shock of change in Chinese policy and the
other adverse repercussions, both symbolic and substantive, a
natural disaster of major proportions struck the country in the
form of torrential rains, which inundated 24,000 chongbo (approx.
2.4 million acres) of farmland, destroyed over 16,000 dwellings
and 202 bridges, and caused the drowning or missing of over 900
people as well as the injury of over 3,000 others.[14] The
prolonged absence of Kim Jong Il from public view, who remained
invisible for 40 days, most probably bespoke the gravity of the
predicament in which Pyongyang's governing elite found itself.
Prospects for the Six-Party Talks
The Six-Party Talks have not reconvened since November 2005, when
the first session of the fifth round was held for three days in
Beijing. The session ended without any agreement due to the
financial sanctions the U.S. imposed on Banco Delta Asia on the
grounds of its alleged involvement in money laundering (including
U.S. hundred-dollar bills allegedly counterfeited by the North)
and other illicit activities for its long-time client North Korea.
The action led to the freezing by the Macau-based bank of North
Korean accounts totaling $24 million.
This means that the Joint Declaration of September 19, 2005, the
first agreement ever produced by the Six-Party Talks, remains in
limbo. The commitments by the North to abandon "all nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programs" and to return "at an early
date" to the NPT and IAEA safeguards in exchange for security
guarantees and energy and other assistance are in danger of
evaporating into thin air.
Have the North's missile launches and subsequent developments
affected the prospects for the resumption of the six-party talks
in any way? Inasmuch as the main impediments remain unchanged --
namely, the North's insistence that the financial sanctions be
lifted and the U.S.'s flat refusal to do so -- the prospects are
neither dimmer nor brighter than they were before the missile
incident. Is there, then, any chance that the North will drop
its demand? In the long run, the North has much more to gain
from successful negotiations in the six-party talks than from the
removal of financial sanctions. This is a point the U.S. tried
valiantly to press upon China with the hope that China can
persuade the North to see the light. As the missile incident has
demonstrated, however, China's ability to change the North's
behavior is painfully limited. The possession of leverages in an
objective sense -- that is, the North's heavy dependence on
Chinese aid in energy and food -- is offset to a marked degree by
the reluctance on the part of the Chinese leadership to use them.
The costs of using them, as subjectively calculated in the inner
sanctums of power in Beijing, in other words, outweigh possible
benefits, also subjectively estimated.
Is there, then, any chance that the U.S. will change its policy?
If the North has really engaged in counterfeiting U.S. currency,
as Washington insists, then the U.S. patently has no choice but
to take a hard line. For no country can tolerate a threat to the
integrity of its currency. The U.S. Treasury Department's
investigation of money laundering by Banco Delta Asia needs to be
wrapped up as expeditiously as possible. When incontrovertible
evidence emerges, the U.S. should not hesitate to share it with
all the participants in the Six-Party Talks, including North
Korea.
Are there any other ways to break the stalemate? One consequence
of the North Korean missile launches has been to expose the gaps
in the perceptions and priorities of the putative allies -- the
U.S., South Korea, and Japan. Whereas Japan and the U.S. always
spoke with one voice -- albeit Japan sounded more alarmist and
hard-line than the U.S. on a few occasions -- South Korea
appeared to be closer to China than to its only military ally,
the U.S. The North tried very hard to exploit such differences
and to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington, with but a
marginal success. ROK President Roh Moo Hyun told editorial
writers for selected South Korean news organizations on August 13
that his government "is squeezed between 'stubborn North Korea'"
and the U.S. "with whom communication is difficult" on issues
relating to the North. He likened how the U.S. views the North
to how "civilization views the savages." More important than
trying to "force savages to follow the rules of civilization --
such as democracy and market economy," Roh suggested, "is
fairness. But the U.S. does not treat North Korea fairly."[15]
As Morton Abramowitz recommended during his testimony before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 20, Washington
"must try to bridge the gulf with Beijing and Seoul." He urged
the U.S. to "craft a new approach that might get real Chinese and
South Korean support to seriously test the proposition that there
may be some package of security assurances, political measures,
and economic bait that would cause North Korea to put aside its
nuclear ambitions and stop throwing missiles around." What is
needed to accomplish this interim goal, he believes, is to go
beyond a "Libyan like approach" that was embodied in the
September 19 joint declaration. Abramowitz also believes that
"any new negotiating approach should be accompanied by some
dramatic measure to show [Washington's] willingness to negotiate
-- not only to North Korea but to our partners as well -- such as
a visit by Secretary Rice to Pyongyang or an offer to immediately
begin negotiations to establish diplomatic relations."[16]
The probability that the Bush administration will heed
Abramowitz's recommendations, however, is quite low. This is
especially true against the backdrop of the Lebanon crisis and
the newly uncovered plot by terrorists to blow up passenger
planes. Not only will these developments keep Washington
preoccupied, but they will bolster its hard-line policy toward
the North as well.
A final question one needs to raise, although the answer remains
elusive, is this: Will the North ever give up its nuclear
programs? As long as its sense of insecurity persists and as
long as it clings to the conviction that nuclear weapons provide
the only real deterrents to external attacks, the North Korean
leadership will likely hang on to its nuclear and missile
programs. This, however, is conjecture. The only way to test
the North's true intentions is to resume the Six-Party Talks and
craft a package that all the parties deem reasonable, fair, and
workable. A worst-case scenario is for the North to conduct a
test of a nuclear device, a possibility that cannot be ruled out
in light of reports that it may be preparing for an underground
nuclear test.[17]
NOTES:
[1] Please note that "Nodong" and "Taepodong" refer to the names
of localities (missile bases) in the North and are code-names
used by the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. The estimates of the
ranges of these missiles vary. Whereas Japan's Defense Agency
estimates Taepodong 2's range as 3,500~6,000 km, the U.S.
National Security Council gives longer estimates: 10,000 km (if
two-stage) and 15,000 km (if 3-stage). See Mainichi shinbun
(Tokyo), July 27 and 30, 2006.
[2] Ibid., July 30, 2006; "N.K. Missile Broke Up Soon After
Launch," Korea Herald, July 31, 2006.
[3] William Broad, "Failure Can Be Successful," New York Times,
July 9, 2006, p. 1, section 4 (Week in Review).
[4] For the full text of UN Security Council Resolution 1695, see
the UN home page at www.un.org. Italics are not in the original
but provided by the author. For the background of the resolution,
see Warren Hoge, "U.N. Council, in Weakened Resolution, Demands
End to North Korean Missile Program," New York Times, July 16,
2006.
[5] "China's Diplomatic Efforts in N. Korea Face Difficulties,"
Mainichi Daily News, July 14, 2006.
[6] "Anbori kyorui hu kinbak haetton Puk-jung kwan'gye naemak"
[An Inside Story of Strained North Korea-China Relations
Following Security Council Resolution], Chosun ilbo, August 9,
2006.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Myoung-Gun Lee, "Nations to Hold Talks Without North," Donga
ilbo [English edition], July 26, 2006; "China Irked at N. Korea,
Analysts Say," Star-Telegram.com, August 4, 2006, online at
http://www.dfw.com/mid/dfw/news/world/15197586.htm; "Yojum Pukhan,
Chungguk maldo anduroyo" [Recently North Korea Doesn't Heed
Chinese Advice], Chosun ilbo, August 7, 2006.
[9] Ibid.; "Sr. Chinese General Discusses N. Korea With US,"
Yahoo! News, July 18, 2006, online at
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060718/ts_nm/china_usa_dc_1&printer=
1.
[10] Warren Hoge, "U.N. Council, in Weakened Resolution Demands
End to North Korean Missile Program," New York Times, July 16,
2006.
[11] "Oemusong taebyonin misail palsanun chongsang kunsa hullyon
ui irhwan" [Foreign Ministry Spokesman: Missile Launches were
Part of Normal Military Training], Choson chungang t'ongsin
[Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)], Pyongyang, July 6, 2006,
online at http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2006/07/07-07/2006-0706-
016.html. Although these arguments were made prior to the
adoption of the UNSC resolution, the North repeated them after
the resolution was approved.
[12] "North Korea 'Completely Irresponsible', 'Dangerous': Rice,"
Yahoo! News, July 22, 2006, online at
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060722/wl_asia_afp/usaseannkoreavie
tna.
[13] "Choson Chungang T'ongsinsa nonp'yong Mi kungmu changgwan
paron un tae Choson appak chongch'aek hamnihwaga soksim" [KCNA:
The True Aim of U.S. Secretary of State's Remarks is to Justify
Policy to Put Pressure on DPRK], Choson chungang t'ongsin [KCNA],
Pyongyang, July 24, 2006, online at
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200607/news07/25.htm. For the
error-ridden English translation, see "KCNA Blasts Rice's
Outcry," KCNA, Pyongyang, July 24, 2006, online at
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item'2006/200607/news07/25.htm.
[14] These are official statistics reported in a pro-North Korean
newspaper published in Tokyo. See "3,000 myong isang ui sasangja,
p'oguro inhayo kakji eso chokji anhun p'ihae" [Torrential Rains
Cause 3000 Deaths and Injuries and Considerable Damage in Many
Places], Choson sinbo (Tokyo), August 7, 2006, online at
http://www.korea-np.co.jp/news/ArticlePrint.aspex?ArticleID=22797.
[15] "Chakt'ongkwon, taebuk p'yonghwa taech'o edo p'iryo"
[Operational Control (Over the Military During Wartime) Necessary
To Deal With North and Peace Issues], Hangyoreh sinmun, August 19,
2006, online at
http://www.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=150287.
[16] "Testimony of Morton Abramowitze, Senior Fellow, The Century
Foundation, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, July 20,
2006, online at
http://lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=258964.
[17] "Seoul Beefs Up Watch on North," Korea Herald, August 21,
2006. Emblematic of the seriousness with which South Korea views
this development is its decision to "closely watch for any signs
24 hours a day."
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