by
Jae Kyu Park
[President, Kyungnam University, Former Minister of Unification, Republic of Korea]
posted February 3, 2006
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*The following is a transcript of the speech delivered by Dr. Jae Kyu
Park at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars,
Washington, D.C., on January 17, 2006. A video recording of the presentation
can be viewed online at www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=161541.
Good morning. I am delighted to have this opportunity to give a talk
at this world-renowned institution. My topic today is "North Korea
Since 2000 and Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations."
The reason why I have chosen 2000 as a point of departure is that in
June of that year a historic inter-Korean summit occurred. I had the
privilege of serving as the cabinet member in charge of its
preparation on Seoul's side. That summit, I believe, not only helped
to open a new era in inter-Korean relations but also accelerated the
pace of change in North Korea itself.
Change in North Korea can be discerned not in the structure of power,
but in policy outputs. Structurally, the leader-dominated system has
proved to be strikingly resilient. Even though Kim Jong Il's official
titles do not include state president, a position the North reserves
exclusively for his late father, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il's grip on
power is beyond challenge.
What is new is the conspicuous ascendancy of the military in the post-
Kim Il Sung North. One indicator of this is Kim Jong Il's choice of
titles for himself: two of the three positions he occupies are
military: the chairman of the National Defense Commission and the
supreme commander of the Korean People's Army. Also noteworthy is
Kim's adoption of the military-first policy as the guiding policy of
his regime. That policy officially elevates the military to the
supreme repository of power, gives it the highest priority in resource
allocation, and upholds it as the model to be emulated by all North
Korean citizens.
All this, however, predated the 2000 summit. Of the policies that
materialized in the post-summit period, the most noteworthy may be the
economic reform measures the North adopted on July 1, 2002.
The measures promulgated on July 1focused on price reform and the
reform of enterprise management. In the ensuing months the North has
adopted additional measures dealing with reforms in commerce,
agriculture, and external economic relations.
Although stopping short of price liberalization, the North has
endeavored to deal with the problem of price distortion by abolishing
subsidies and making prices approximate those set by the market.
In market reform, the North has (1) introduced multipurpose markets
for consumers for the first time, thereby legalizing black markets,
(2) tried to enhance the role of the market in its planned economy,
and (3) begun to see the market as beneficial, rather than detrimental,
to the maintenance of its political system.
The North has also decided to establish special districts in Shinuiju,
Kumgang Mountain, and Kaesong with the aim of inducing South Korean
and foreign investment. Concurrently, the North has liberalized or
amended laws and regulations pertaining to external economic relations.
Of the special districts, Kumgang Mountain and Kaesong continue to
grow, while the Shinuiju project remains in limbo. Tourism also
continues to grow and diversify since the establishment in November
1998 of the scenic Kumgang Mountain tourist resort. The number of
South Korean tourists reached the one million mark in June 2005.
Kaesong is also growing. A model complex has been completed and a
dozen South Korean firms have completed the construction of their
facilities. Five are already selling wares made by North Korean hands.
The North's gradual transition to what it calls "pragmatic socialism"
has nonetheless entailed the spread not only of capitalist ideas, but
of foreign culture as well.
Although productivity has improved in some industries, the paucity of
resources has emerged as a severe constraint. Agriculture, light
industry, and other labor-intensive industries have seen some
improvement in productivity. In agricultural policy, the North appears
to be replicating the early Chinese experiment in allowing de facto
private ownership on a limited basis. The effects of the economic
reform measures, however, have been severely limited by the exhaustion
of investment capital and crippling shortages of energy and raw
materials.
Inflation is rampant and the gap between rich and poor is widening in
the North, both of which have the potential to precipitate conflict.
Hyper inflation has spawned a new class of urban poor in the North and
aggravated the sufferings of ordinary citizens. When this is combined
with pervasive corruption and increasing crime rates, social
instability is unavoidable. The recent reinstatement of grain
rationing can be viewed as a response to the problems that have arisen
from a combination of inflation and the rising discontent of those who
have not benefited from the economic changes noted above.
Despite, or perhaps because of, all this, the regime has not loosened
control over its people nor diminished political indoctrination.
There are, however, unmistakable signs of a generational shift among
the North's elite. Those in their 40s and 50s are more conspicuous in
the ranks of top-level leaders in the government, the armed forces,
and state enterprises.
The North Korean leaders appear to be well informed about the outside
world. Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defense Commission
listens to or watches South Korean and even foreign broadcasts. CNN,
BBC, and virtually all major foreign channels are available to him and
to other top leaders. Kim told me that he reads South Korean
newspapers and has read my own essays and columns in them. One
difference I noticed during my latest visit in June 2005 was that the
aura of supreme self-confidence I witnessed in 2000 seemed to be
either absent or markedly muted.
Chairman Kim Jong Il seemed to be well informed about a wide range of
subjects, and his understanding of international affairs struck me as
excellent. Insofar as decision-making on important issues is
concerned, his authority appears to be beyond challenge. The
speculation that there is a conflict between hard-liners and moderates
in the North or that the military has an excessive amount of power
should not distract us from an overriding reality -- that is, Kim Jong
Il is the absolute ruler of the North. Nothing important gets
accomplished without his instructions. The probability of military
coup is exceedingly low. All key decisions, in other words, are made
at the top with Kim Jong Il at its core.
However, the stability or persistence of the regime may have
contributed to the economic crisis. The shortage of resources, the
isolation from the international community, the inertia of the
political system?these may be the underlying causes of the North's
predicament.
In foreign policy, one sees both continuity and change, with the
former eclipsing the latter. The foremost strategic goals in
Pyongyang's foreign policy continue to be legitimacy, security, and
development. Legitimacy and security are intertwined, for they are
both geared to the preservation of the Kim Jong Il regime in what it
perceives as a hostile environment. With economic woes still
bedeviling the country, moreover, the goal of development has
realistically been scaled down to survival. Officially, however, the
North has set its sights on building a "powerful and prosperous
country (Kangsong taeguk)."
Change in Pyongyang's foreign policy can be detected primarily on the
tactical level. A prominent example is Kim Jong Il's admission to
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in September 2002 that North Korean
agents had kidnapped Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s; even
more surprising was his apology to Koizumi for what had happened.
DPRK-U.S. relations reached a high point in the immediate aftermath of
the inter-Korean summit. In October 2000 Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok
became the first North Korean official ever to visit the White House
for a meeting with a U.S. president. A joint communique issued at the
end of his visit proclaimed that the two countries would put an end to
their hostile relations. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
visited Pyongyang a month later and held talks with Kim Jong Il.
Washington and Pyongyang almost agreed on a summit meeting in 2000,
and informal remarks of North Korean leaders indicate that they still
regret the missed opportunity. They want "peaceful coexistence" and
normalization of relations with the United States in order to fortify
their national security and to accelerate the revitalization of their
economy.
The advent of the George W. Bush administration in January 2001,
however, ushered in a period of discord and confrontation, leading to
a standoff over the nuclear issue beginning in October 2002. Bush's
hard-line stance, coupled with official name calling and personal
attacks aimed at Kim Jong Il, led to North Korea's refusal to
cooperate, repeated boycott or postponement of meetings, and stepped
up rhetoric aimed at driving a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea.
After three rounds of unsuccessful six-party talks, and over a year's
passing before a fourth round could be convened, a joint statement has
emerged that has the potential to break new ground.
Inter-Korean relations, by contrast, have proved to be immune from
change of governments in Seoul. The Roh Moo Hyun government has
embraced the sunshine (or engagement) policy of his predecessor and
actually expanded it. As a result, multi-faceted exchanges have
steadily grown. The total number of people visiting North and South
tripled between 2000 and 2004; most of this traffic, however, is one-
way. In 2005, for example, South Korean visitors to the North
exceeded 78,000, but North Korean visitors to the South totaled a mere
1,071. This does not include South Korean tourists to Kumgang
Mountain, who vastly outnumber other visitors.
At the governmental level, Cabinet-level meetings have been held 17
times since the June 2000 summit. In recent years the two sides have
been holding inter-governmental or quasi-governmental (such as Red
Cross) meetings two or three times a month on average.
Inter-Korean trade has steadily grown to the level of about $700
million a year. In 2001 South Korea replaced Japan as North Korea's
largest trading partner, accounting for 22.3 percent of the latter's
total external trade. Last year inter-Korean trade surpassed $1
billion for the first time.
The North's economic dependence on the South is greater in non-trade
terms, notably humanitarian assistance. In 2005 the South's
humanitarian and other assistance to the North totaled $385 million,
including 500,000 tons of rice on a deferred payment basis, which was
worth $150 million. The South, in fact, has provided 300,000 tons of
fertilizer and 400,000 tons of food to the North every year since the
summit.
The successful conclusion of a fourth round of six-party talks in
Beijing in September 2005, in which Seoul has played an active role,
suggests that economic and other exchanges between the two Koreas can
help enhance the security of the Korean peninsula.
However, the North continues to pursue the strategy of trying to
persuade the South to place North-South cooperation ahead of the ROK-
U.S. alliance, arguing that minjok (nation or ethnic identity) should
take precedence over relations with foreigners. While the Roh Moo
Hyun government has thus far refused to heed the passionate appeal
emanating from the North, some segments of the South Korean population
-- notably the youth, organized labor, and radical elements -- find
the North Korean rhetoric appealing.
One cannot over-emphasize the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance for
the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the peace of Northeast Asia.
The problems on the Korean Peninsula have direct implications for the
lives of the Korean people, which may help explain why Seoul and
Washington do not always see eye to eye on important issues.
During the Cold War era, the ROK and the U.S. were united in their
support of "pressure and containment" vis-a-vis the North, Eastern
Europe, and other countries in the socialist camp.
As already mentioned, the Pyongyang summit opened a new page in the
annals of inter-Korean relations. Five years after the summit, the
current South Korean government is pursuing a policy of
"reconciliation and cooperation for peaceful unification," which the
majority of the South Korean people support.
Seoul's attempts to pursue both ROK-U.S. collaboration and inter-
Korean reconciliation and cooperation inevitably gave rise to a
discord in the former. Following summit meetings in 2005, however,
the ROK and the U.S. have put their relations back on track. Mutual
understanding and collaboration have increased measurably.
No matter what some of the opinion polls conducted in the South may
show, an overwhelming majority of the South Korean people appreciate
the value of the ROK-U.S. alliance. A recent poll conducted by Dong-a
Ilbo, a leading daily in Seoul, in fact, found that a half of the
respondents in their 20s had chosen the U.S. as the most important
country in Seoul's diplomacy, while only 10 percent of them had chosen
North Korea. Overall, the poll strongly suggested that the majority
of today's youth in South Korea tended to be pragmatic and not
ideologically hostile to the U.S. To most South Koreans, in other
words, the threat from the North has not dissipated but remains intact
as long as it clings to its nuclear weapons development program.
To attain the goal of a nuclear-weapons free Korean peninsula, Seoul
must work closely with the United States, within the framework of six-
party talks. Close collaboration between Seoul on the one hand and
Tokyo, Beijing, and Moscow on the other is indispensable. Seoul needs
to further strengthen its cooperative relations with Beijing. Having
invested considerable energy and reputation in the six-party talks,
China has a high stake in ensuring that they continue and eventually
succeed.
The momentum of steadily increasing inter-Korean exchanges and
cooperation cannot be sustained unless the North Korean nuclear issue
is peacefully resolved. The adoption of a joint statement at the
fourth round of six-party talks marks a turning point in the quest for
a resolution of the issue.
In this joint statement, the six parties reaffirmed the goal of a non-
nuclear Korean Peninsula, and the North agreed to abandon all nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programs, return to the NPT, and allow
IAEA inspections at an early date. The U.S. reaffirmed its
recognition of North Korean sovereignty and agreed to take steps
toward normalizing relations, reiterating that there was no U.S.
intent to attack the North with nuclear or conventional weapons. The
DPRK and Japan made a similar statement regarding normalization, and
all parties agreed to continue discussions on the provision of energy,
trade, and investment in order to promote security and peace in the
region.
Since details need to be worked out and since many pitfalls remain in
trying to implement the broad principles enumerated in the joint
statement, however, much work remains to be done.
The joint statement also recognizes North Korea's right to peaceful
nuclear energy. The North lost no time in declaring that it would not
abandon its nuclear weapons program nor take any steps toward that
goal until the U.S. provided a light-water nuclear reactor (LWR) to
North Korea first. Although the U.S. has been staunchly opposed to
this, the ambiguous wording of the agreement has left the door open to
divergent interpretations.
Another potentially contentious issue pertains to the North's
agreement to "abandon all…existing nuclear programs." Since the U.S.
still insists that the North has a covert uranium enrichment program,
an accusation denied by Pyongyang, controversy over this discrepancy
is inevitable.
The resumption of the six-party talks in Beijing on November 9,
however, may have aggravated the situation. The talks recessed after
three days without setting a firm date for their resumption. Not only
do the basic positions of the two main protagonists, the U.S. and
North Korea, remain poles apart, but the latter accused the former of
"poisoning the atmosphere" of negotiations by imposing economic
sanctions on the North, including those on a bank in the former
Portuguese colony of Macao with which Pyongyang has close links. The
North also cited President Bush's reference to Kim Jong Il as a
"tyrant" a few days before the first session of the fifth round opened,
calling it a violation of the joint statement adopted by the fourth
round of the talks. The U.S. allegation of counterfeiting by the
North of $100 bills has emerged as a new bone of contention,
threatening to derail the six-party process.
However, North Korea does have more to gain than lose from a peaceful
resolution of the current standoff. Its dire economic situation means
that it is in no condition to risk a war. Economic cooperation with
the South, Japan, and China will hinge on the absence of a major
disturbance. Many believe that the North recognizes the benefits of
engagement with Washington, and is sincere in its overtures toward the
latter. Coercive measures such as large-scale sanctions and
interdiction of DPRK ships as part of the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) have the potential to trigger a major conflict.
A key question is this: Is the North prepared to give up its nuclear
weapons program completely and in a verifiable manner? Or is it
merely interested in extracting maximum concessions from the U.S., the
South, and Japan, while buying more time to fortify its "nuclear
deterrent"? The North is most likely serious about wanting to
exchange its nuclear card for security guarantees and economic
benefits -- that is, the formula outlined in the joint statement noted
above, in my view, does meet the North's true needs and desires.
If Seoul's offer of two million kilowatts of electricity to the North
did indeed make a difference in inducing the North to return to the
long-stalled six-party talks, it means that Seoul is now in a position
to play an important role in the resolution of the nuclear issue.
What is most important for Seoul, however, is to avoid publicly taking
sides with Pyongyang in opposition to Washington. Seoul must always
take pains to iron out its differences with Washington behind closed
doors.
Seoul's engagement with North Korea is essential to easing tensions in
the region and alleviating the DPRK's dire economic conditions. It is,
however, far from sufficient. Aid from Japan is expected to eclipse
that of all other players once relations are normalized between Tokyo
and Pyongyang. More important, both North and South Korea need strong
support from Washington, as the U.S. approval for international
development funding is essential.
The North's heavy dependence on the South gives the latter leverage in
negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral. Seoul's leverage over
Pyongyang may be second only to that of Beijing. If South Korea plays
its hand well as a leading provider of humanitarian and other
assistance to North Korea, while at the same time encouraging the
cooperation and constructive involvement of all other players, the
prospects for peace on the Korean peninsula will improve measurably.
Thank you very much.
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