by
Tong Kim
[Former Senior Korean Interpreter, U.S. State Department and Visiting Professor, School of North Korean Studies,]
posted January 25, 2006
|
|
|
|
|
 Preface : |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Article : |
* This article is based on a presentation delivered by Professor
Tong Kim at the 2006 Conference of Visiting Professors of the
Kyungnam University School of North Korean Studies, Seoul, Korea,
January 9, 2006.
Basic Positions of the U.S. and North Korea: An Endless Parallel
U.S. Position
When the George W. Bush administration was inaugurated, it
harbored strong disapproval of the DPRK leadership and its system.
It had wasted four-and-a-half years considering options, including
military ones, until it finally opted for a diplomatic approach to
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The Bush administration
is willing to provide economic aid once the DPRK has dismantled
its nuclear weapons and programs. The U.S. believes that any
normalization process should address the issue of human rights and
other illicit DPRK activities including proliferation of missiles,
counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and money laundering, etc. In
the event that the six-party talks fail to resolve the nuclear
issue, the United States is likely to consider tougher sanctions
and enforce a blockade around North Korea.
DPRK Position
North Korea basically wants to improve relations with the United
States. In exchange for U.S. respect for its sovereignty and its
system, the DPRK would recognize the U.S. role as a balancer in
the Northeast Asia region. The DPRK would be flexible on the
status of U.S. forces in South Korea, opposing unification by
system under the terms of either side of the peninsula. In the
event its conciliatory efforts fail, the DPRK is ready to commit
itself to a suicidal war to protect its system. On the other hand,
Kim Jong Il knows war is unthinkable for it would mean the end of
his system. No easy or quick resolution of the nuclear issue is
in sight without the application of simultaneous actions. It is
likely that the DPRK will prolong the negotiation process in order
to wait out the remainder of the second Bush administration.
Two Aspects of U.S.-DPRK Negotiations: Format and Substance
We have observed a positive shift in South Korea's role and an
interesting development of dynamics among the six parties.
However, there has been no change in policy substance on the part
of the United States, but only in format. We recognize the
importance of format, because if properly applied, it helps
achieve policy objectives.
The position of Assistant Secretary is regarded as a high level
position in the United States. But President Bush has referred to
that level as "tier four." Apparently he sees the summit level as
"tier one," the ministerial level as "tier two," and the under
secretarial as "tier three." The level of vice president is seen
to be somewhere between "tiers one and two," and Deputy Secretary
between "tiers two and three."
Meaning of the September 19 Joint Statement: Full of Mutual
Distrust
Considering the September 19 Joint Statement that was produced by
the fourth round of six-party talks, the principles agreed on in
the statement are merely a list of agenda for future negotiation.
I foresee a lot of problems with them down the road. I even
described the statement as a "linguistic minefield," as it
contains ambiguous language and raises the question of
appropriateness for inclusion of issues that are not directly
related to the nuclear issue.(1)
Prospects for Resolution: Washington's Perspective on North Korea
The fallacy of the collapse theory and the lack of a viable
military option raise the question of whether Bush is willing to
pay a moral and political price from a perspective of American
values to achieve a negotiated settlement with the DPRK. If Bush
makes up his mind, the nuclear issue can be resolved rather
quickly. Undertaking of confidence building measures will be the
first step toward resolution. South Korea's role along with the
U.S.-Korea relationship will have an important impact on the
process.
Bush's Abhorrence of North Korea
The Bush administration's negative perception of the Kim Jong Il
system persists. President Bush's disapproval of Kim Jong Il is
shared by his closest advisers, including Vice President Dick
Cheney and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Bush
believes that North Korea is a member of the "axis of evil," and
that Kim Jong Il is a tyrant who starves and oppresses his people
and violates their human rights while pursuing his own interest.
There are two views on the source of Bush's negative perception,
both coming from those who are close to the President. One view
is that Bush, by virtue of his religious faith and values, has
long harbored hatred against the North Korean regime even before
he came to Washington. The other view holds that his dislike of
the DPRK began after he was briefed on the North Korean situation
at the White House. The origin of his view is not important.
What is important is his overt abhorrence of Kim Jong Il. He
conveys his strong feelings to other heads of state. By publicly
calling Kim Jong Il a liar and a tyrant, he sometimes complicates
the situation.
Bush's advisers and other Neocons in Washington are consumed with
the wishful thinking that the North Korean regime will collapse.
They believe Kim Jong Il will not be an exception to the fall of
tyrants that we have seen throughout history. From an American
moral perspective, they are right.
At this point, it will be helpful to review some of the important
presidential pronouncements aimed at a target that clearly
included North Korea either in relation to weapons of mass
destruction or system of government.
During his first inauguration speech, President Bush said: "We
will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century
is spared new horrors…. And to all nations, we will speak for the
values that gave our nation birth."(2) In his first speech to a
joint session of Congress in February 2001, he said:
"[Threats]…range from terrorists who threaten with bombs to
tyrants in rogue nations intent upon developing weapons of mass
destruction…we must develop and we must deploy effective missile
defenses."(3) Remember this was before September 11. It is clear
that North Korea was included in the rogue nations and that the
missile defenses would be targeted against North Korea.
In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush said: "Our…goal is to
prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or
our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction…North
Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass
destruction, while starving its citizens…" and that "States like
these [Iran, Iraq and North Korea] constitute an axis of evil,
arming to threaten the peace of the world."(4)
In his 2003 State of the Union address, Bush emphasized the role
of the International Atomic Energy Agency "to track and control
nuclear materials around the world" and said he wanted to
"strengthen global treaties banning the production and shipment of
missile technologies and weapons of mass destruction."(5) "On the
Korean Peninsula, an oppressive regime rules a people living in
fear and starvation…We now know that that regime was deceiving the
world, and developing those weapons all along. Today the North
Korean regime is using its nuclear program to incite fear and seek
concessions. America and the world will not be blackmailed."(6)
Now, I note the timing of that statement that followed former
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's October 2002 visit to
Pyongyang.
In the 2004 State of the Union message, Bush stated that
"America is committed to keeping the world's most dangerous
weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous regimes."(7)
President Bush then spoke of one of the consistent themes in his
foreign policy. "America is a nation with a mission, and that
mission comes from our most basic beliefs…This great republic will
lead the cause of freedom."(8)
In his second inaugural speech, Bush, deeply entangled with the
Iraq war, spoke of even more idealistic goals of American foreign
policy, invoking God. In January 2005, he said: "The best hope
for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the
world…we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth
has rights, and dignity, and matchless value, because they bear
the image of the Maker of Heaven and Earth… So it is the policy of
the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."(9)
Then in a message of warning to the oppressors and agitation to
the oppressed, he said, "The United States will not ignore your
oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your
liberty, we will stand with you… The rulers of outlaw regimes can
know that we still believe... Those who deny freedom to others
deserve it not for themselves; and under the rule of a just God,
cannot long retain it."(10)
By the time of the 2005 State of the Union address, he had turned
to the Iranian people: "As you stand for your own liberty, America
stands with you"(11) -- a message by association to the North
Korean people. On the nuclear issue, Bush this time reported that
he was working with other members of the six-party talks to find a
peaceful solution by showing the "North Korean government that
nuclear weapons will bring only isolation, economic stagnation,
and continued hardship."(12)
Those of you who support President Bush and want to learn about
his religious conviction must read A Man of Faith (2004) by David
Akin, and The Faith of George W. Bush (2003) by Stephen Mansfield.
Plan of Attack (2004) and Bush at War (2002), both books by Bob
Woodward, will also give you some insights on the President's
faith and the style of his presidency. The Rise of Vulcans: the
History of Bush's War Cabinet (2004) by Jim Mann is also helpful
to understand the strategic thinking of the neocons.
For those who do not agree with Bush may find some psychological
comfort in Bush on the Couch: Inside the Mind of the President
(2004) by Justin Frank. The author is a psychoanalyst who
diagnoses Bush to be a sadistic, "untreated alcoholic with
paranoid and megalomaniac tendencies." He also questions the
truthfulness of Bush's religious faith.
Neoconservative Hardliners
Some of the hardliners in Washington believe that Kim Jong Il will
not abandon his nuclear weapons. They want to pursue a tougher
policy, accepting the reality that North Korea possesses nuclear
weapons as it announced. As far as the six-party talks are
concerned, they don't seem to have any great expectations. They
prefer to push for containment and isolation of North Korea by
intensifying the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
financial sanctions, and by raising the North Korean human rights
issue. These conservatives believe it will be increasingly
difficult for the DPRK to sustain itself if South Korea and China
cooperate with the United States. Some of them complain that
South Korean aid is extending the life of the North Korean regime.
The worst scenario for the Bush administration is that the North
Koreans transfer their nuclear bomb or fissile material to
terrorists. Obviously the administration is mobilizing all its
intelligence resources to watch North Korea in order to prevent
and interdict such transfer. The hardliners believe that Kim Jong
Il is on notice that it would bring an end to his regime, if he
either starts a war or uses his nuclear weapons. Hardliners argue
that the United States should not succumb to North Korean threats
or blackmail.
On the other hand, the Bush administration does not seem to have
any specific, coordinated plan to bring down the DPRK regime.
There are many people who simply wish for its collapse. It is not
true that Washington is staging the DPRK's non-nuclear issues --
such as human rights, counterfeits, drug trafficking, etc. -- as a
part of an overall plan to "stifle" the DPRK regime, as Pyongyang
accuses it of doing.
Based on this policy perspective, the Bush administration is
moving to complete its missile defense system and supports a
research project to develop a bunker buster bomb (called Robust
Nuclear Earth Penetrator),(13) a new weapons system that is most
feared by North Korea, which has numerous underground facilities.
The conservatives in Washington see the control of Kim's regime as
weakening given the country's bankrupt economy and pressure for
change. They believe that in time these will lead to the
undermining of Kim's authority to a level that will give rise to
either regime change or transformation.
The Bush Administration and the Six Party Talks
Bush maintains his official position to resolve the North Korean
nuclear issue through the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. objective is
to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear programs
while cooperating with South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia
(participants of the six-party process) on denuclearizing the
Korean peninsula. Washington clearly wants nuclear dismantlement
first before discussing the political issues of DPRK interest. It
is highly unlikely that the DPRK would go along with the U.S.
preferred sequencing. However, if and only if Kim Jong Il blinks
and gives in to the pressure of the United States, it would be one
of the greatest foreign policy victories for the conservatives in
Washington.
Iraq and U.S. Policy on North Korea
President Bush's unswerving stance on Iraq may potentially have
either a negative or positive impact on North Korea. If there
comes no positive turn around in Iraq, Bush may face domestic
pressure to at least make some progress in the North Korean
nuclear issue, thereby motivating the administration to stay the
course on the six-party process. On the other hand, North Korea's
unacceptable demand for the construction of a light water reactor
may enforce the Washington hardliners' argument that standing
tough is the only stance to take, and the only one that the
defiant North Koreans understand.
Ambassador Vershbow and Assistant Secretary Hill
U.S. Ambassador to the ROK Alexander Vershbow's recent
characterization of North Korea as "a criminal regime" reflects
well the bottom line of Bush's policy. Vershbow's comments
accurately manifests the atmosphere of the White House and the
attitude of the leadership in the administration. When his
predecessor Christopher Hill took the job of U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and became
chief U.S. negotiator to the six-party talks, the press and
pundits in both Washington and Seoul created a false expectation
of what he would be able to deliver on the nuclear issue.
Hill did not have new instruction to be flexible on substance but
only permission to be flexible on format, shifting to freer and
more flexible interactions with his North Korean counterpart.
Format is important but it alone cannot solve the problem. It is
also interesting to note that Hill has been talking tough -- in
line with the mood of the White House and the Neocons -- since the
release of the September 19 Joint Statement.
During a speech to the Korean Council of Reconciliation and
Cooperation on December 23, 2005, Ambassador Vershbow refused to
retract his earlier remark on North Korea, ratcheting up "illicit
activities" to "criminal activities." Henry Hyde, chairman of the
House Committee on International Relations, publicly praised
Vershbow for calling the DPRK "a criminal regime." This was
followed by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's remarks
that characterized North Korea as a "dangerous regime."(14)
The Problem of Rhetoric
Just like the North Korean state-run media including KCNA that put
out harsh rhetoric for the pleasure of Chairman Kim Jong Il and
his close confidents, foreign policy implementers have no choice
but to echo the strong feelings of the leaders of the Bush
administration. This is an inevitable phenomenon that takes place
under a presidential system or in an autocracy like North Korea.
Ratcheting up the tone of provocative rhetoric complicates the
problem. Usually, Washington provokes Pyongyang, and the latter's
reprisal is usually quite vulgar.
Pyongyang called President Bush -- who first named the DPRK an
axis of evil and its leader Kim Jong Il "a tyrant and a liar" --
an "origin of evil," "a politically immature infant," and "a
fool." Of Secretary Rice who called North Korea an outpost of
tyranny, the North Korean mouthpiece said, "Now even a woman
wearing a skirt around her body is running around uttering the
noise of kang, kang." (This expression in Korean is an analogy to
a female dog.) On Vershbow, "The bastard ambassador who made an
insane comment ought to be put on trial at the intersection of
Jongro (Seoul) to be judged for deportation."
The North Koreans quote a Korean saying, "When you speak nicely to
me, I speak the same way to you." It is close to an American
adage, "What comes around goes around." In their verbal attack,
the North Koreans are implementing their military slogan, "If
American imperialists attack us, we will reprise them one hundred-
fold."
The point is that such exchanges of callous rhetoric may please
the ears of the hardliners in their respective capitals, but it
would not be helpful to the resolution of the nuclear issue.
Pyongyang's Perspective on the United States: What Kim Jong Il
Wants
Improvement of Relations with Washington: A Matter of Survival
Based on the words of those who met with Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong
Il, my assessment is that North Korea has made relentless efforts
to improve relations with the United States since the days Kim Il
Sung officially ruled the North. In October 2000 I had an
opportunity to listen to Chairman Kim Jong Il in person, when I
interpreted for former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
during her visit to Pyongyang. I also reviewed the reports of
former President Kim Dae Jung and recently of former ROK
Unification Minister Jung Dong Young. The DPRK leadership
believes their survival hinges upon improved relations with the
United States. (On December 26, I reconfirmed with President Kim
Dae Jung what Chairman Kim Jong Il said to him.) In August 1997,
the DPRK leader Kim Jong Il declared, "The United States is no
longer a sworn enemy of 100 years." Kim Jong Il wants improved
relations with America.
Deeply Rooted Mutual Distrust: The Biggest Impediment
It was Kim Il Sung who first raised the necessity of building
mutual confidence when he met with former President Jimmy Carter
in the spring of 1994 when the clouds of war were lingering over
the Korean peninsula. North Korea's interest in improving
relations with the United States can be viewed in the context of
the North Korean fear of American military might, which stretches
back to the Korean War. North Korea still fears a U.S. military
attack. Kim Jong Il must be afraid that he could be eliminated,
and the United States could do so if it really wanted to.
Kim Jong Il is well aware that North Korea is seen as one leg of
the axis of evil by the Bush administration and he himself as an
oppressive tyrant by the American public. Naturally, Kim does not
trust Bush. There was a peak level of mutual trust during the
Clinton administration when Albright met with him. Considering
the absence of trust and confidence at the highest level, it is
difficult to expect a negotiated settlement to come out of tier-
four level talks. The level of the negotiator may have to be
raised to tier three for any final settlement to be formally
recognized by the Secretary of State and the President.
Two Missed Opportunities for North Korea
It seems to me that North Korea missed two opportunities to
improve relations with the United States. First, if the North had
sent Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok to Washington six to ten months
earlier in 2000, Clinton would have gone to Pyongyang to close a
deal on the missile issue and we might have seen a fast track to
normalization. Incidentally, when I saw President Kim Dae Jung
the other day, he told me that Clinton, while visiting President
Kim at his library last fall, said that he was sorry that he did
not work out a final settlement on the North Korean issue while he
was in office.
The second chance Chairman Kim Jong Il missed came right after the
September 11 attacks on New York and Washington. Yes, the DPRK
issued a general statement opposing terrorism, but being still on
the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, Kim Jong Il did not
take any proactive approach to address the global issue of
terrorism. If he had proposed that the DPRK wanted to put aside
the pending bilateral issues with the United States in order to
support the U.S. effort to fight terrorism, that might have given
a different twist to the history of U.S.-DPRK relations. If Kim
had called for a bilateral meeting and said his government was
willing to give all assistance it could, including "some insights
from its own experience," and fight the war on terror with and on
the side of the United States, I wonder what would have been the
nine-month-old Bush administration's response. Remember that Bush
was defining the countries either on our side or on the side of
terrorists. If Kim Jong Il had done this, the issue of uranium
enrichment might not have developed the way it did.
Unsuccessful DPRK Effort to Improve Relations
In 1991, Kim Jong Il sent a message to Washington through Kim Yong
Soon, a (North) Korean Workers' Party secretary, who met with U.S.
Under Secretary of State Arnold Kantor, that his country wanted to
improve relations with the United States and it would be flexible
on the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal. According to Kim Jong Il,
his father Kim Il Sung had even before that asked the old Soviet
Union, China, Italy and Egypt to convey a friendly message to the
United States, but these countries only took advantage of the
situation North Korea was in those days. Kim Jong Il has been
consistent in that he wants to improve relations with Washington
as proved during his meetings with Kim Dae Jung, Albright, Jung
Dong Young and others.
In my view, Kim Jong Il would prefer to be on Washington's side
rather than that of Beijing or Moscow. From a geopolitical and
historical perspective of the Korean peninsula, Kim Jong Il does
not want to be caught between China and Japan in their struggle
for hegemony of the region. He would prefer the United States --
as it has no territorial ambition in the region -- to play the
role of a balancer, and reign in the rivalry of the two
neighboring giants. If the United States politically accommodates
North Korea, The North's anti-American slogans could disappear
overnight. Kim Jong Il has said, "Don't link the demands for
American troop withdrawal of some South Koreans with us." "Our
anti-American propaganda is a habitual practice without
seriousness."
What Kim Jong Il Has to Do First
First he has to officially and publicly renounce the unrealistic
goal of unifying the Korean peninsula under Communism, something
that is still stipulated in the charter of the Korean Workers
Party. Kim Jong Il knows himself that it is impossible to achieve
unification under his terms.
Second, Kim must apologize, in some appropriate format, for North
Korea's starting of the Korean War. This would be difficult for
him to do in view of the influence of the late Kim Il Sung on the
legitimacy of the DPRK system and the collective power of the
revolutionary generation who supported Kim Il Sung in starting the
war. Other hardliners in Pyongyang, too, would not support such
an apology.
But in the political reality, the division between the hardliners
and the moderates exists only at the working level in Pyongyang.
Once the chairman makes a final decision, there can be no
opposition to that decision. Kim Jong Il has said his military
was divided half and half on the question of improving relations
with the United States. Inasmuch as his decision is
unchallengeable, he seems to want to be cautious and even prudent.
One example of Kim's attempt to play the "gutsy" leader came in
September 2002 when he confessed to Prime Minister Koizumi on his
visit to Pyongyang that Japanese citizens had been abducted by
North Korean agents. As we now know, Kim's confession benefited
Koizumi politically; on the other hand, the move backfired for Kim
Jong Il and that decision still haunts him today.
U.S.-DPRK Relations and South Korea
The Bush Administration's Concern for ROK Policy
Washington's conservatives are not really thrilled with South
Korea's policy of economic cooperation with North Korea. Of
course, Washington publicly says it supports Seoul's policy. The
United States stresses the need to cooperate on the nuclear issue.
This emphasis may imply that cooperation between the two is not
going well or that the two allies may have problems cooperating in
the future. For sometime now trilateral coordination among the
United States, South Korea, and Japan has been quietly
disappearing. There were even some cases of disagreement between
the traditional allies regarding the matters involving North Korea.
Today, no one can disregard South Korea's economic power. To the
extent to which North-South economic cooperation increases and a
political framework is developed toward unification, South Korea
will affect U.S. policy. Contrary to the view that economic
support for the North only contributes to North Korean
survivability, if you think of the cost of a possible war versus
the "cost of peace" that South Korea is paying now, and the
security aspects of the South Korean economy, Washington's
inflexibility does not seem to be warranted.
DPRK's Double Track Strategy
Pyongyang is working on two fronts: the United States and South
Korea, while it still wants to resolve the issue with the United
States. Confronting the intractable policy of the Bush
administration, Pyongyang is carrying out a nationalist strategy,
called "Between Us the Same Nation," trying to appeal to the
emotional side of South Koreans.
In a way this strategy is possible because politics comes first in
everything North Koreans do and there are so many political
workers in the North. Effective or not, they do it because they
have nothing to lose. A fundamental question is whether a unified
Korea can preserve its independence even if unification is
achieved independently through the campaign of "between us the
same nation." A unified, neutral Korea, as envisioned by some
people -- including Selig S. Harrison, author of Korean Endgame: A
Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (2002) -- is
merely a sentimental notion.
Frequent Change of Unification Ministers in the ROK
Our immediate interest should be on whether the six-party talks
resume this month. Recently in the Korea Times I wrote that North
Korea may well wait until after President Bush's coming State of
the Union address to decide when to return to the talks. Kim Jong
Il will probably drag out the denuclearization process beyond the
term of the second Bush administration. Outgoing ROK Minister of
Unification Jung Dong Young said it would take at least three
years to complete the process.
Also, the frequent replacement of the Unification minister in the
South may not be such a good thing. Learning the job is important
and it takes time, but more importantly, a Unification Minister
should build a personal relationship of trust with the North
Koreans whom he deals with. That takes time. It may be
worthwhile to look into the possibility of passing a law
stipulating the term of the Unification Minister's office, making
it the same as that of a President, for it is mind boggling to see
Minister Jung Dong Young, who met with Kim Jong Il last summer,
leave his job without finishing it because he wants to campaign
for the South Korean presidency.
Reconfiguration and Rebalancing the Power Relationships in East
Asia
Absent a visible restoration of good relations with the United
States at this point, there are other important variables that may
affect the long term interest of South Korea -- such as continuing
friction in the U.S.-Korea alliance, a strained relationship with
Japan, an increasingly stronger U.S.-Japan alliance, and a steady
expansion of Chinese influence. The strengthening of U.S.-Japan
relations as well as the worsening U.S.-DPRK relations seem to
push North Korea to depend more on China for its security and
economic support, clearly more so now than before. China's trade
volume with the North is now about $1.8 billion dollars. China is
not afraid of North Korean nuclear weapons but very concerned
about a nuclear Japan. China is also concerned about a unified
Korea that would fall into the American sphere of influence.
(I note that former Unification Minister Chung Sae Hyun wrote in
the April 2005 issue of The Shin-Dong-A last year, "North Korea
cannot collapse even if it wants to, because China would not let
it happen due to geopolitical reasons." I fully agree with him.)
President Roh Moo Hyun's advocacy for an independent defense, the
retaking of operational command and control, opposition to the U.S.
concept of strategic flexibility, and South Korea to play a
balancer's role may provide psychological comfort for his
political supporters and other progressive forces at home.
However, some see these policy statements as not being conducive
to the promotion of South Korea's long-term strategic interest.
With respect to the North Korean nuclear issue, time is not on the
side of South Korea or the United States as North Korea would keep
adding more bombs to its nuclear arsenal.
NOTES:
(1) Tong Kim, "You Say Okjeryok, I Say Deterrent: No Wonder We
Don't Agree," Washington Post, September 25, 2005, p. B01.
(2) President George W. Bush's Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C.,
January 20, 2001, online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html.
(3) "Address of the President to the Joint Session of Congress,"
Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, D.C., February 27, 2001,
online at
http://whitehouse.fed.us/news/releases/2001/02/20010228.html.
(4) "The President's State of the Union Address," Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, D.C, January 29, 2002, online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
(5) "President Delivers 'State of the Union'," Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2003, online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
(6) Ibid.
(7) President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address,
Washington, D.C., January 20, 2004, online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
(8) Ibid.
(9) "President Sworn-In to Second Term," Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, D.C., January 20, 2005, online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html.
(10) Ibid.
(11) "State of the Union Address," Office of the Press Secretary,
Washington, D.C., February 2, 2005, online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html.
(12) "President Delivers 'State of the Union'," Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2003, online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
(13) For a description see
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/rnep.htm.
(14) "Rice Calls on North Korea To End Its Self-Imposed
Isolation," U.S. Embassy, January 5, 2006, online at
http://www.usembassy.org.uk/acda462.html.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
