by
Park Jae Kyu
[President, Kyungnam University]
posted January 6, 2006
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 Preface : |
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Article : |
* This article is based on Dr. Park's interview with The Korea
Times. "Prospects for Nuke Issue Could Be Much Darker," Korea
Times, January 1, 2006.
U.S. DPRK Relations
The prospects for North Korea's nuclear issue in 2006 could be
much darker than past years unless Washington and Pyongyang find
a way out of the ongoing confrontation over the sanctions. The
U.S. and North Korea will be unable to find any common ground
unless facts about Pyongyang's alleged processing and delivering
of counterfeit U.S. dollars can be ascertained. The United
States holds the key to the problem in some ways as it imposed
the sanctions, and Pyongyang should listen to Washington's
explanation of the evidence it holds regarding North Korea's
financial illegalities. While Washington holds the key to a
resumption of the six-party talks, North Korea should make a
compromise.
Pyongyang's human rights, drug trafficking, counterfeiting and
money laundering have been on Washington's radar since September,
when North Korea and the United States disagreed as to the
interpretation of the joint statement of the six-party talks and
North Korea argued that it should be first given the light-water
reactors before dismantling its nuclear programs. That might
have led Washington's conservatives to strengthen their belief
that the North is a state it cannot trust, causing quite
difficult problems for Christopher Hill, U.S. top delegate to
the talks, in conversing with the neocons in Washington.
It is not important whether the explanation on the North's
financial illegalities is given to Pyongyang through a
"briefing," which Washington prefers, or a "high-level
bilateral meeting," which North Korea wants to hold. It would
not be just a casual briefing, it could be a briefing for North
Korea's top delegate to the six-party talks, in which the United
States can explain the reasons for its sanctions and the ways of
lifting them through more consultations down the road. With that
being said, North Korea also needs to make a positive overture
to the United States by declaring its return to the disarmament
talks and its willingness to come back to the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. Such attitudes of the North could help
Hill to persuade Washington's conservatives, but for now it
looks impossible for the United States to make an appeasement
gesture unless the North returns to the talks.
Assessment of 2005
If inter-Korean relations during the first five years following
the 2000 summit could be summed up in two words, reconciliation
and cooperation, then relations today, in the sixth year since
the summit, could be encapsulated as peace and prosperity. In
2005, South and North Korea consolidated the foundation for
joint prosperity. The adoption of a joint statement by the six
parties on September 19 helped the nuclear issue enter a new
phase. The establishment of a hotline between the navies of both
sides marked a step forward in the prevention of accidental
clashes in the West Sea. Both of these developments served to
lay the groundwork for perpetuating peace on the peninsula.
The number of people traveling between the South and the North
surpassed 80,000; the annual inter-Korean trade volume reached
the $1 billion mark; major economic cooperation projects,
including the Kaesong Industrial Complex, made notable headway;
and new cooperative projects in agriculture, fisheries, light
industry, and mining got under way. All this signaled the
strengthening of the foundation for inter-Korean co-prosperity.
At the 17th round of inter-Korean cabinet-level talks, held from
December 13 to 16 in Cheju, the South and the North agreed that
they had opened "the second June 15 era" in 2005. The joint
assessment, in my view, is well grounded, for the year witnessed
significant progress in all fields -- political, military,
economic, social and cultural.
The positive developments of 2005 in inter-Korean relations
bespeak the commendable performance of Unification Minister
Chung Dong-young. First, he helped to embed inter-Korean
relations with mutual trust. Minister Chung's meeting with
Chairman Kim Jong-il on June 17 helped to jump-start the stalled
inter-Korean relations and enhance mutual trust. Such trust made
possible the visit by the North's delegation to our National
Assembly to participate in the joint celebration of the Korean
liberation in mid-August. Minister Chung merits praise for
helping to raise Seoul's visibility as the pivotal party in
dealing with the issues on the Korean Peninsula. At a time when
the North Korean nuclear issue became volatile on the heels of
the North's declaration on February 10 that it possessed nuclear
weapons and would indefinitely postpone participation in the
six-party talks, he made an "important proposal" to Chairman
Kim, thereby paving the way for the resumption of the talks. He
also worked hard to persuade North Korea and the United States
to settle the disputes in the six-party talks. I also commend
Minister Chung for going beyond the solution of pending issues
by presenting a vision for the establishment of a South-North
economic community by 2020 and by striving to forge a national
consensus.
Issues for 2006
The New Year promises to be more important than any other time
in the recent past. The future of inter-Korean relations will
hinge on the evolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, the
manner in which negotiations for a peace structure on the Korean
Peninsula proceed, and the equilibrium and pace of military and
economic cooperation between the South and the North. This means
that in 2006 inter-Korean relations must proceed in the
direction of measurably strengthening the foundation for peace
and joint prosperity. We must adopt a plan to implement the
September 19 joint statement as soon as possible, thus embarking
on the dismantling of North Korean nuclear programs and on
negotiations for a peace structure on the peninsula.
In conjunction with negotiations by the parties directly
concerned with the creation of a peace structure, the South and
the North must make serious efforts to adopt measures that build
confidence and reduce tensions. Both sides need to step up
efforts to strengthen existing economic cooperation projects,
including the Kaesong Industrial Complex. They should also
expedite the initiation of new projects they agreed on in 2005,
notably in agriculture and fisheries.
The Korean Peninsula, moreover, needs to rid itself of the
stigma of being the last outpost of the cold war. The cold war
persists not only between the North and the South but between
the North and the United States as well. The tenuous, often
conflictual, relationship between the North and Japan may be
regarded as another variant of the cold war. Finally, the
remnants of cold-war thinking in the South have yet to be
banished. If I were to sum up the most important task facing our
government in the realm of inter-Korean relations in 2006, I
would venture to suggest the dismantling of the cold war
structure on the Korean Peninsula.
Kim Dae-jung: A Second Visit to Pyongyang?
Former South Korean president Kim Dae-jung has made a landmark contribution
to the development of inter-Korean relations with his bold
initiative to seek a summit with Chairman Kim Jong-il, which
produced the historic June 15 joint declaration in 2000. Not
only is he well versed in inter-Korean relations, he is also
trusted by the North. Because of this, a second visit to the
North, should it materialize in 2006, will be beneficial to
inter-Korean relations. A precondition for success, however, is
the full support of his visit by the government and people alike.
If the visit does materialize, it could jump-start the stalled
dialogue, aiming to realize the nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
Should it come, former president Kim would first talk about how
to facilitate the implementation of the joint declaration, which
was reached in 2000. But knowing his style, he will also have
candid talks with Chairman Kim Jong-il, urging strategic
decisions to be taken for the recovery of the North's economy,
and for peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.
A Second Summit
Former President Kim's visit and a possible visit to the South
by Chairman Kim Jong-il are not necessarily linked. However,
should it occur, it would signal a new phase in inter-Korean
reconciliation and cooperation. Although the 2000 summit has
helped to transform inter-Korean relations, the mistrust and
discord between the two sides have not dissipated. Kim Jong-il's
visit could mark a major step toward improving this situation. A
second inter-Korean summit must serve as a forum for designing a
comprehensive framework for peace on the peninsula and joint
prosperity, as well as serve as a catalyst for deepening a
genuinely national -- encompassing both South and North --
consensus for eventual unification.
Chairman Kim Jong-il's visit to the South in return for former
President Kim Dae-jung's visit to Pyongyang in 2000 is enshrined
in the joint declaration as a mutually agreed commitment. What
is more, the North has repeatedly reaffirmed the commitment and
indicated a willingness to implement it. Although the North will
not postpone it indefinitely, its timing will be affected by a
multitude of factors: the North's internal situation; the status
of its relations with Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington; and other
circumstances surrounding the Korean Peninsula.
The current impasse in the six-party talks, coupled with a
chilling of U.S.-North Korea relations, cautions us against
expecting an early visit. On the other hand, if and when he
believes that the North can secure a credible security guarantee,
a reaffirmation of its right to a civilian nuclear program, and
assurances of economic assistance -- which will signify that the
September 19 joint statement has finally entered the early stage
of implementation -- Chairman Kim Jong-il may decide to make the
visit a reality.
The political calendar in the South makes it desirable for Kim
to visit in 2006 rather than in 2007. More important than the
timing of the visit, however, are its substantive results. Just
as the 2000 summit marked a turning point in inter-Korean
relations, so too the second North-South summit must produce an
epochal agreement for peace on the peninsula and for moving
inter-Korean relations to the next level. The emergence of
favorable internal and external environments, however, will be a
prerequisite for such a breakthrough.
Where the next inter-Korean summit will be held will have
symbolic value. Although Seoul has many advantages -- such as an
agreement in 2000 that Seoul would be the site of the next
summit and Seoul's international reputation -- it presents a
formidable challenge as far as protecting the visitor is
concerned. In view of the high priority the North places on the
protection of its supreme leader, therefore, Seoul may lose its
appeal. However, Cheju Island has distinct assets. Chairman Kim
is known to have a favorable impression of the island. It has
previously hosted numerous international summits. It is
conducive to security. The residents on Cheju, moreover, have
established good relations with their North Korean brethren. One
drawback, however, is that Chairman Kim is known to avoid flying
as much as possible; his only recorded experience of flying
occurred when he visited Indonesia. Whether this is due to his
antipathy toward flying is not known. If not, Cheju is a good
candidate for the summit venue.
The venue per se is less important than whether the summit will
be held at all and what will be discussed; hence it should not
serve as an obstacle. If necessary, the summit could be held
even at Dorasan station in the DMZ, Pyongyang, or in a third
country. What counts most, in the final analysis, is that a
second inter-Korean summit materializes.
Future of the Kim Regime
Although speculations abound in the press about planning for
political succession in the North, there do not seem to be any
notable signs pointing to the grooming of any of Kim Jong-il's
sons or any other related developments. Chairman Kim has
reportedly issued a gag order on the succession issue. The only
certainty is that the issue remains hidden from the public view.
Kim Jong-il's grip on power vis-a-vis the party, the government,
and the armed forces at the moment is unshakable, and his
leadership will probably continue for at least another decade.
This, of course, is not to rule out unexpected developments, for
there are many variables in the equation. Notable are the
North's economic situation, its strategic environment in
Northeast Asia and Kim's assessment of his sons. What is
reasonably certain, however, is that Kim Jong-il will be the
decisive factor. Even if someone outside of his family were to
be appointed as his successor, there is little or no possibility
that Kim's power will be challenged. Only when someone gains his
full confidence that the regime's security and survival will be
safeguarded can a successful succession take place.
Chairman Kim is amply aware of both domestic and international
public opinion regarding the succession issue. He knows that the
international community frowns upon dynastic succession to a
third generation. He has his own agenda, policy goals, and a
roadmap pertaining to regime survival, economic recovery, and
normalization of relations with the United States and Japan
through the resolution of the nuclear issue. Under these
circumstances, it is premature to unveil any succession plan,
and Chairman Kim is most likely to choose a prudent course of
action.
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