by
B. C. Koh
[Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago]
posted November 30, 2005
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The first session of Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing from
November 9 to 11. What, if anything, did it accomplish? What were
its most salient aspects? What did it suggest about the current
status and future prospects of the talks? Can one, in short, make
an interim assessment of the multilateral negotiations aimed at
resolving the standoff between North Korea on the one hand and
the United States and its allies in Seoul and Tokyo on the other
based on what has happened thus far?
The Significance of the First Session of the Fifth Round
The least one can say about the value of the first session is
that it showed that the six-party process is still alive and well.
The interval between it and the last round, moreover, was only
six weeks, a record thus far. The third round, one should recall,
materialized 11 months after the preceding round had ended.
Neither the participants nor outside observers expected any
tangible outcome from the three-day session. On the other hand,
its failure to agree on procedural issues, notably the creation
of working groups and the date, either exact or approximate (such
as the early part of December or January), on which the next
session would be convened, must have been disappointing to some
of them.
Highlights of the Session
What, then, were the most salient aspects of the session? To make
a broad comparison with the preceding round first, bilateral
contacts, which emerged as a hallmark of the fourth round, were
also a notable feature of this session. There were not only
bilateral talks but dinner parties as well between North Korea on
the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other. The
dinner between the heads of the North Korean and Japanese
delegations, actually, was a novelty, and it showed how much had
changed from the last round, when the North had refused to hold
any bilateral talks with Japan until the final week of the
unprecedented three-week-long talks (which was divided into two
sessions separated by a 37-day recess). What is more, the dinner
took place at the Japanese ambassador's residence in Beijing.
Unlike the last round, however, the first session of the fifth
round did not appear to witness any signs of flexibility on the
part of the two main protagonists, the United States and North
Korea. Neither budged from their positions on what needs to
happen first, with the United States insisting that the North
must jettison its nuclear programs before it can expect to
receive any benefits, while the North reiterated its demand for
light-water reactors for civilian use as a precondition for
dismantling its nuclear program.
The North, moreover, raised a new issue when it demanded the
United States lift "economic and financial sanctions" directed
against it. The North was referring to the U.S. Treasury
Department's blacklisting of "eight North Korean entities as
proliferators of weapons of mass destruction" and freezing of
"whatever they have under US jurisdiction."(1) More serious to
the North was the U.S. action pertaining to a Macao bank, which
the United States charged had "worked surreptitiously with North
Korea for 20 years and helped it traffic in drugs." The U.S.
Treasury Department had "imposed a ban on American financial
institutions doing business with Banco Delta Asia in the former
Portuguese colony of Macao, which is now Chinese controlled."
This "led to a run on the bank," which in turn "prompted the
authorities in Macao to freeze the bank's assets."(2)
In addition to the above, the North was irked by the reported
reference by U.S. President Bush to Kim Jong Il as a "tyrant"
during his visit to Brazil in early November. A spokesman for the
DPRK Foreign Ministry described it as "hurling mud at the supreme
headquarters of the DPRK," which Pyongyang viewed as "a blatant
violation of the spirit of the joint statement of the six-party
talks, which calls for 'respect for sovereignty' and 'peaceful
co-existence'."(3)
Japan played a more active role in the first session of the fifth
round than it did in the previous rounds; it proposed the
creation of two working groups, dealing respectively with the
verifiable dismantlement of North Korean nuclear programs and
economic and energy assistance to the North. Security guarantees
and such bilateral issues as normalization of relations, under
the Japanese plan, would be separated from the two areas.(4) As
noted, the session recessed without adopting the Japanese
proposal, even though it pertained to procedural rather than
substantive issues. Interestingly, while the proposal reportedly
"had received the approval of host China as the basis for future
discussions," the United States and North Korea "were vague on
the matter." U.S. delegation head Christopher Hill was quoted as
saying that "while the Japanese idea was a good one, the current
round of talks was not meant to agree on a future road map for
achieving agreement on the September joint statement."(5)
If the actions taken by the U.S. government in the weeks
preceding the fifth round could not be described as conducive to
the creation of a favorable atmosphere, those taken by China were
unquestionably helpful. For PRC president Hu Jintao visited
Pyongyang from October 28 to 30, which marked the first visit to
North Korea by a top Chinese leader since 2001. Since such visits
almost invariably involve "gifts" of significant proportions, the
Hu visit insured that the North would not boycott the fifth round
regardless of how hostile U.S. actions might appear to Pyongyang.
A Hong Kong daily reported, citing a Kyodo news agency dispatch,
that Hu had pledged long-term economic aid worth $2 billion to
Kim Jong Il.(6)
Consistent with past practice, the chairman's statement issued by
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, the chief Chinese delegate, at
the end of the first session gave an upbeat assessment. To quote
a few passages:
"The Parties conducted serious, pragmatic and constructive
discussions and put forward proposals on how to implement the
Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks.
"The Parties reaffirmed that they would fully implement the Joint
Statement in line with the principle of 'commitment for
commitment, action for action', so as to realize the verifiable
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at an early date and
contribute to lasting peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula
and Northeast Asia.
"The Parties emphasized that they are willing to comprehensively
implement the Joint Statement through confidence building, carry
out all commitments in different areas, commence and conclude the
process in a timely and coordinated manner and achieve balanced
interests and win-win results through cooperation."(7)
Prospects
As noted at the outset, the only real agreement coming out of the
first session was to "hold the second session of the Fifth Round
of Six-Party Talks at the earliest possible date." While the
probability that the second session will be held is reasonably
high, when that will happen is hard to predict. Will the
"earliest possible date" turn out to be sometime in December? Or
will it be sometime next year?
More important, will common ground ever be found between the two
principal protagonists? Or will one party make a pragmatic
adjustment and change its position to accommodate the concerns of
the other party? For clues to these puzzles, let us examine the
positions of the United States and North Korea more closely.
A major bone of contention revolves around the interpretation of
a key provision in the joint statement adopted by the fourth
round, which states:
"The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and
agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the
provision of light water reactor to the DPRK."(8)
The U.S. government has made it clear that the phrase, "at an
appropriate time," refers to the period following North Korea's
verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and programs.
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, who heads the U.S.
delegation to the talks, called on the North immediately to "stop
reprocessing [spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium]" and
then to declare "what it has in the way of nuclear programs."
Hill told reporters in Beijing that he "rejected the North's
proposal to be compensated with aid for the interim step of
shutting down the [five-megawatt Yongbyon] reactor." "We are not
prepared to launch a separate negotiation to have a freeze
because freezing programs does not solve this problem," he
said.(9)
After the first session recessed, Hill appeared to raise the
stakes higher, when he said that he was "extremely concerned
about North Korea's human rights record." "North Korea's human
rights record is something that should make every person in the
world feel a certain personal sense of moral revulsion," he was
quoted as saying. "You can't have a normal relationship with a
country that keeps a gulag."(10) On a different occasion, Hill
reportedly went even further. He was quoted by a Korean reporter
as saying that "North Korea doesn't seem to have a raison d'etre
other than regime maintenance," adding that "such a country
doesn't have a future."(11) If Hill has not been misquoted, he is
sure to upset the North, thus hindering his effectiveness in
future negotiations in the six-party process.
Turning to North Korea's interpretation of the clause regarding a
light-water reactor, let us first note the statement its foreign
ministry spokesman issued on September 20, a day after the joint
statement was published. Since the North's "nuclear deterrent" is
aimed at protecting itself against the "nuclear threat posed by
the U.S.," it will never give up the deterrent unless and until
after the U.S. threat is removed. He argued that the provision of
a light-water reactor will serve as a "material foundation on
which to build mutual trust," adding that such a measure will
also remove the obstacle that had "forced us to withdraw from the
NPT." (12)
The North has not budged one inch from this position. In a
postmortem following the first session, a commentary in Choson
sinbo, a pro-North Korean daily in Tokyo that reflects
Pyongyang's official position, cited the light-water reactor
issue as the biggest bone of contention between North Korea and
the United States. The North's position, according to the
commentary, is not negotiable, for it is tied to the core of the
North's energy policy. Recalling that the provision of light-
water reactors was the pivotal component of the Geneva Accords of
1994, the commentary pointed out that the refusal by the United
States to honor its commitment had inflicted colossal damage on
the North. The depth of mutual distrust between Pyongyang and
Washington, moreover, compels the North to insist that its
nuclear deterrent must be exchanged with a material proof of
America's abandonment of its policy of isolating and stifling the
North, the commentary said.(13)
Another potential obstacle pertains to what the United States
suspects is a North Korean program to build nuclear weapons
utilizing highly-enriched uranium (HEU). Although the joint
declaration adopted by the fourth round contains North Korea's
commitment to "abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs," the North has refused to acknowledge the existence of
an HEU program. This issue, however, is bound to be raised, and
whether the North will change its position remains to be seen.
In sum, bridging the gaping chasm between the positions of the
United States and North Korea is highly problematic. Ultimately,
both sides will need to bend a little if common ground is to be
found. The road ahead, then, promises to be long and arduous.
NOTES
(1) "US Blacklists Eight North Korea Entities Over WMD
Proliferation," Yahoo! News, October 21, 2005, online at
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20051021/wl_asia_afp/usnkoreaweapons_
o.
(2) Joseph Kahn, "North Korea and U.S. Spar, Causing Talks to
Stall," New York Times, November 12, 2005, p. A5.
(3) "Spokesman for DPRK FM Refutes U.S. Chief Executive's Anti-
DPRK Vituperation," Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) (Pyongyang),
November 8, 2005, online at
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200511/news11/09.htm.
(4) "6-sha kyogi, Nich-bei ga Kita Chosen teian o hihan, gicho
seimei o chotei," [Six-Party Talks, Japan and the U.S. Criticize
North Korean Proposal, Adjusts Chairman's Statement], Asahi.com
(Tokyo), November 11, 2005, online at
http://www.asahi.com/international/update/1110/015.html.
(5) "No Concrete Progress At 6-Party Talks," ibid, November 12,
2005, online at http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-
asahi/TKY200511120136.html.
(6) "Hong Kong ji 'Chung, Puk e 20-ok talo wonjo yaksok'" [Hong
Kong Paper: China Promises North Korea Two-billion-dollar Aid],
Donga.com (Seoul), October 31, 2005, online at
http://www.donga.com/fbin/news?f=print&n=200510310111.
(7) "Full Text of Chairman's Statement of First Phase of Fifth-
round Six-Party Talks," People's Daily Online (Beijing), November
11, 2005, online at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200511/11/print20051111_220630.
html.
(8) For analysis the Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks, see B. C.
Koh, "Six-Party Talks: A Breakthrough?" IFES Forum, No. 05-9-21-1,
online at http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr. The italics in the
quotation are not in the original but have been added by the
author.
(9) Joe McDonald, "U.S., North Korea Each Urge Concessions,"
Yahoo! News, November 11, 2005, online at
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051111/ap_on_re_as/koreas_nuclear_28
&...
(10) Elaine Lies, "US Wants China to Clean Up N. Korea's Nuclear
'Mess'," ibid., November 19, 2005, online at
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20051119/wl_nm/korea_north_china_dc_1&
...
(11) Kim Jong An, "Hill ch'agwanbo 'Puk chonjae mokjok opko
yongwon haji anulggot" [Assistant Secretary Hill: "North Lacks
Raison d'etre, Won't Last Forever"], Donga.com, November 21,
2005, online at
http://www.donga.com/fbin/news?f=print&n=200511210091.
(12) Koh, "Six-Party Talks: A Breakthrough?" cited in Note 8.
(13) "Siron, 'kongdong songmyong' rihaeng tangye e turoson 6-ja
hoedam" [Commentary: Six-Party Talks Has Entered the Stage of
Implementing the Joint Statement], Choson sinbo [Korean News]
(Tokyo), November 12, 2005, online at http://www.korea-
np.co.jp/news/ArticlePrint.aspx?ArticleID=19514.
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