by
B. C. Koh
[Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago]
posted September 21, 2005
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 Preface : |
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Article : |
The fourth round of Six-Party Talks, held in Beijing from July 26
to August 7 and from September 13 to 19, produced a joint
statement for the first time since the multilateral negotiations
began twenty-three months ago. In the statement North Korea
agreed to scrap its nuclear weapons development programs in
exchange for security assurances, economic and energy assistance,
and normalization of relations with the United States. Whether this
development can be termed a breakthrough, however, remains to be
seen. For major differences between the two principal adversaries,
the U.S. and the DPRK, were not really ironed out but merely
sidestepped with ambiguous wording. In view of the rapidity with
which a dispute over the meaning of a key provision erupted, one
may even be justified to label the joint statement an agreement to
disagree. What is nonetheless clear is that the six-party talks
have now entered a new phase. Depending on how implementation
proceeds, then, the fourth round can be construed as having marked
a turning point of sorts.
Noteworthy Aspects of the Fourth Round
The fourth round of Six-Party Talks has a number of distinct
features. First, it was the longest round ever. Whereas the
first three rounds lasted three days on average, the fourth
consisted of an astounding 20 days of negotiations. What is more,
it occurred in two phases, separated by a 37-day recess. Second,
unlike in the previous rounds where "bilateral" contacts on the
sidelines of the main sessions fell short of being negotiating
sessions, the fourth round witnessed longer and more frequent
bilateral talks that almost eclipsed general sessions. Most
striking was the frequency of bilateral talks between the U.S. and
the DPRK. During the first phase of the fourth round, the DPRK
delegation even hosted a dinner for its U.S. counterpart. What is
more, there was an unprecedented trilateral meeting among the U.S.
and the two Koreas.
Third, China played a pivotal role in preventing the round from
collapsing altogether and in keeping the hope alive for a peaceful
resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. After consulting
with all the five parties, China produced a draft document, which
it kept revising until the very last moment. Had it not been for
China's prodding, the joint statement might not have been adopted
in the final session on September 19. Fourth, one should not
overlook the contribution of the Republic of Korea. Its offer of
2 million kilowatts (or 2,000 megawatts) of electricity to the
North, unveiled during an inter-Korean cabinet-level meeting in
Pyongyang on July 12, helped to pave the way for the North's
return to Six-Party Talks. ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, who
was visiting Washington during the final days of the fourth round,
reportedly played a part in inducing his U.S. counterpart,
Condoleezza Rice, to accept China's final draft of the joint
statement.(1) The final decision by the U.S. government to
endorse the draft, however, was made "at the highest level,"
meaning President George W. Bush. Key considerations that may
have entered into his calculations included the Iraq war, which
severely limits his options vis-a-vis North Korea, the plummeting
approval ratings in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and China's
prodding. The latter reportedly included a veiled threat that the
U.S. would be blamed for a breakdown of the round should
Washington persist in opposing the draft joint statement.(2)
The Joint Statement
Let us now turn to the key provisions of the joint statement,
briefly commenting on their implications.(3) The unanimously
reaffirmed goal of the Six-Party Talks, it proclaims, "is the
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful
manner." Since the DPRK "committed to abandoning all nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programs," two of the three goals the
U.S. has enunciated found their way into the joint statement; what
is missing is the goal of an "irreversible" dismantlement of the
North's nuclear programs.
The DPRK also pledged to return "at an early date" to the NPT and
IAEA safeguards. Lacking specificity, however, the phrase, "at an
early date," is subject to North Korea's own definition. It is
also worth noting that the preceding phrase does not cover the
North's commitment to "abandon all nuclear weapons and existing
nuclear programs." Nor does the expression, "all…existing nuclear
programs," necessarily include what the U.S. claims is a covert
program to develop nuclear weapons utilizing highly enriched
uranium (HEU). According to Washington, the North indirectly
admitted its existence in a Pyongyang meeting with a U.S.
government delegation headed by the then Assistant Secretary of
State James Kelly in October 2002. The North, however, denies
that such a program exists and that its alleged admission is a U.S.
fabrication. On August 24, however, General Pervez Musharraf,
Pakistan's president, told Kyodo News Agency that "the former head
of his country's nuclear program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, had sent
'centrifuges -- parts and complete' -- to North Korea."(4) Given
this and other information its intelligence agencies have
collected, the U.S. is unlikely to allow the North to get away
with its denial.
Departing from its long-standing policy of NCND (neither confirm
nor deny) with respect to deployment of nuclear weapons, the U.S.
"affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula."
It then reaffirmed its repeated disavowal of any intention to
attack or invade the DPRK." For the first time, however, the U.S.
indicated that this covers both nuclear and conventional weapons.
The ROK joined its ally in reaffirming the absence of any nuclear
weapons on its soil, adding that in accordance with the 1992 Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it
would neither receive nor deploy nuclear weapons. Since both
Koreas are bound by the denuclearization declaration, a fact
confirmed in the Beijing joint declaration under review here,
North Korea is legally prohibited from enriching uranium,
something that is not explicitly mentioned in the 1994 Agreed
Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK.
The provision that is potentially the most contentious is as
follows: "The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses
of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and
agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the
provision of light water reactor to the DPRK." Since, like many
other ambiguous phrases in the joint statement, the phrase, "at an
appropriate time," is not defined, it is subject to varying, even
conflicting, interpretations. The North's demand for a light-
water reactor, in fact, was the main sticking point during the
fourth round, with the U.S. categorically refusing to endorse such
an idea on grounds that the North has a track record of deceit --
that is, of turning an experimental reactor ostensibly designed
for electricity generation into a source of weapons-grade
plutonium. When the U.S. finally agreed to the inclusion of the
preceding provision in the joint statement, it did so with the
understanding that "an appropriate time" means "after" the North
has implemented its pledge to dismantle all of its nuclear
programs, not before. Aware that its own understanding is not
shared by all the other parties, Secretary of State Rice
reportedly "came up with a compromise during meetings on
[September 17] with her South Korean and Japanese counterparts.
Each country, she suggested, would issue separate understanding of
the deal, with a specificity that is not in the agreement
itself."(5)
Against this background, North Korea issued a statement on
September 20 that the provision of a light-water reactor must
precede, not follow, the implementation of its commitment to
abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs." The
statement by an unnamed spokesman of the DPRK Foreign Ministry
actually reiterated what a spokesman for the North Korean
delegation to the fourth round said in a press conference held in
Beijing on September 16 after China had circulated what proved to
be its penultimate draft.(6) Since, according to the North Korean
statement, its "nuclear deterrent" is aimed at protecting itself
against the "nuclear threat posed by the U.S.," it will never give
up its deterrent before the U.S. threat is removed. Arguing that
the provision of a light-water reactor will serve as a "material
foundation on which to build mutual trust," the North asserted
that such a measure will also remove the obstacle that "forced us
to withdraw from NPT." The U.S. should not "even dream about
inducing us to abandon the nuclear deterrent we currently possess"
without providing us with a light-water reactor first," the North
stated, warning that not heeding its demand will entail
"consequences that are both serious and complex."
Returning to the joint statement, it includes a reaffirmation by
the ROK of its "proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the
provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK."
This implies that the North is keen on receiving South Korean
assistance pending or in addition to the provision of a light-
water reactor. The North may have chosen to ignore the fact that
the South's proposal was aimed at replacing the LWR project that
had been under way in accordance with the 1994 Geneva accord but
suspended since 2003.
It is also noteworthy that the joint statement mentions the
willingness of the U.S., along with China, Japan, the ROK, and
Russia, to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. Previously, the
U.S. had pointedly declined to join in any program of energy
assistance to the North.
The joint statement also says that both the U.S. and Japan will
take steps to normalize their relations with the DPRK. In this
connection, the North and Japan have already agreed to resume
their long-stalled normalization talks.
Another notable provision pertains to the manner in which the
agreements embodied in the joint statement will be implemented:
"The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the
afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the
principle of 'commitment for commitment, action for action.'"
This may bolster the North's position that it will not do anything
in advance of corresponding or compensating action by the other
parties. In other words, the Bush administration's long-standing
insistence that the North must act first before it can expect any
benefits may have been compromised at least on paper.
Finally, the "Six Parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of the
Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be
determined through consultation." Should this agreement be
observed without a hitch, one can expect a difficult round in
which the wide gap between the positions of North Korea on one
side and the U.S. and its allies on the other must be bridged. In
sum, the fourth round may have given us an illusion of success,
merely postponing the hard work that lies ahead.
NOTES
(1) "Pukhaek p'ogi habui, ch'usok saebyok 'Hanmi oemu chopch'ogi
chonhwanjom" [Agreement on Abandoning North' Nuclear Program: Dawn
Meeting Between ROK and U.S. Foreign Ministers on Ch'usok Was
Turning Point], Joongang Ilbo (Seoul), September 20, 2005.
(2) Joseph Kahn and David Sanger, "U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves
Key Points Open," New York Times, September 20, 2005, p. A1 and
A6; Glenn Kessler and Edward Cody, "N. Korea, U.S. Gave Ground to
Make Deal," Washington Post, September 20, 2005, p. A1.
(3) For the full text of the joint statement, see Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, "Joint Statement of
the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 19 September
2005," online at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm.
(4) Salman Masood and David Rohde, "Pakistan Now Says Scientist
Did Send Koreans Nuclear Gear," New York Times, August 25, 2005, p.
A3.
(5) Kahn and Sanger, "U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms …," p. A6.
(6) "Choson oemuson taebyonin kyongsuro chegong chuksi NPT pokkwi"
[DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman: We Will Return to NPT
Immediately After Light-Water Reactor Is Provided], Choson
Chungang T'ongsin [Korean Central News Agency], September 20, 2005,
Pyongyang, online at http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2005/09/09-
20/2005-0920-005.html. See also "6-ja hoedam Choson-ch'uk
taebyonin choltaero 'son haek p'ogi' pada turiltu opta" [Spokesman
for the DPRK Delegation to Six-Party Talks: We Will Never Accept
'Abandon Nuclear Program First'], ibid, September 16, 2005,
Beijing, online at http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2005/09/09-17/2005-
0917-007.html.
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