by
Kevin Shepard
[Research Fellow, ICNK]
posted April 1, 2005
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 Preface : |
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Article : |
The White House has recently warned that diplomatic efforts to defuse the crisis over North Korea's nuclear programs cannot "drag on forever"(1) and urged Pyongyang to return to negotiations. Although the United States and its partners are working for a diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice indicated that they've also started to discuss what to do if North Korea doesn't return to negotiations . North Korea daily reprises the United States for what it considers to be hostile policies and insincerity toward Pyongyang, and has now suggested that Japan not be allowed to participate in talks due to its hardcore stance. Seoul criticizes U.S. neo-cons while Congress calls for strength in character from the Roh administration. The U.S. prods China to step up while a show of strength from Beijing would be a threat to the ROK and Tokyo. Russia withholds information regarding the DPRK nuclear program while Washington skews it. Both China and Japan are embroiled in a number of land-rights disputes with everyone involved in the coalition.(2)
All of this is extremely simplified and not an attempt to lessen the importance of these concerns. Rather, it is an honest approach to what plays an important role in the lack of progress in the six-party talks. With Rice’s tour through Asia -- her first as Secretary of State -- this is a timely opportunity to see if there aren’t some chinks in the armor of our mighty five-country phalanx. As Rice crossed east to west from Tokyo to Seoul to Beijing, it began to be clear that the coalition was in fact much less than a combined force and much more of a tag-team string of negotiators. While the trip was an attempt to bring allies closer, the discussions Rice had in each country were markedly different, and showed how widely each’s concerns vary.
GOALS
The concerns, both over the DPRK nuclear program and in other areas, are real and need to be dealt with. The question is, can such varied agendas be collaborated and jointly presented to Pyongyang? Firstly, an agenda for diplomatic negotiations with North Korea needs to be agreed upon by all five parties involved. Secondly, parties need to agree to at least hold off on bilateral disputes that not only detract from the 6 party talks, but by stoking the fires of divisive nationalistic sentiment -- in ALL of the countries involved -- make the politicians’ jobs that much more difficult.
Firstly, unless someone knows otherwise, we must take the word of Kim Jong Il and proceed on the assumption that North Korea is nuclear capable. While everyone is against nuclear proliferation and the threat of a major destabilizing regional arms race, the United States, Russia, and China are already equipped with the overwhelming majority of the world’s nuclear warheads.(3) Japan and South Korea boast fully developed nuclear energy programs, and reprocessing facilities in Japan give them the capability to produce nuclear weapons in very short order. Clandestine South Korean experiments into reprocessing materials were recently deemed to have been unsuccessful, but a trust was broken. None of these countries are in a moral position of authority when it comes to asking Pyongyang to give up its nuclear aspirations.
GAMEPLAN
So how does a group of powerful nations convince a crumbling outpost of socialism to move away from the gun? The obvious answer is economics. North Korea has repeatedly changed its story, redrawn baselines, and changed the rules to its foreign policy game, but it has not acted irrationally. It has not acted as we in the developed, nuclear world would have liked, but to dismiss the actions of Kim Jong Il’s diplomatic team as irrational is to fail to see the method behind the madness. Pyongyang has continued to push for only two items -- security agreements from the United States, and economic assistance and cooperation from the international community. The United States has stated its position that it will consider security guarantees when an agreement is reached concerning the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, and as the main obstacle in the DPRK goal of economic assistance, the current nuclear issue is doing more harm to the North’s economy than good to its defense -- a defense that is being built up specifically because of the absence of the U.S. security assurances that it could acquire by dismantling the program. I would seem that all parties are in agreement as to the negative aspects of a nuclear North Korea, and on the need for economic assistance. Why is it, then, that six countries that all want the regional security and North Korean economic assistance that can be brought about by resolution of this problem continue to drop the ball? Because no one has spelled out exactly what is being offered. North Korea wants as much as it can get for as little as possible. This is not illogical. Through brinkmanship diplomacy it has time and time again managed to extract more than the others wanted to give, and managed to successfully continue to receive aid without sacrificing anything. This is not irrational. It is a tried-and-true method that Pyongyang has employed for decades and here we are, still asking them to talk to us, still pouring on the carrots without employing the stick.
WHERE DO WE STAND?
Why doesn’t North Korea rejoin talks on the nuclear issue? Because it doesn’t have to. China, fearing the economic impact of mass defection, knowing the implications of a united Korea that places U.S. troops on a Chinese border, and sharing a historic partnership with the socialist North, continues to send goods, fuel, money across the border. Japan, while becoming increasingly more demanding due to its current state of public opinion regarding kidnapped Japanese citizens, still carries on considerable trade with Pyongyang, and a sympathetic Korean community in Japan continues to send funds to the North. South Korea not only continues to trade with the North, nationalistic sentiment and a desire to reunite the peninsula has led to increasing cooperative ventures and calls for aid. Some experts that originally saw the alliance as U.S.-ROK-Japan vs. Russia-China-DPRK have now redrawn the lines with South Korea and China as the most sympathetic to the North. Russia has largely avoided the conflict, and has continued to have limited economic exchange with the North, but the personal friendship between Putin and Kim Jong Il is stronger than many realize, and Moscow is expected to continue to support the regime. The U.S. hard-line stance prevents international financial institutions from aiding the North, and U.S. imposed sanctions prevent the North from exploring U.S. markets, but the United States is also the largest provider of aid to Pyongyang -- aid that might not be necessary if policy in Washington wasn’t so crippling to the DPRK economy.
WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?
The issue here is not whose policy is more appropriate, but rather that the necessity for a common approach to North Korea must be recognized. Before serious negotiations can succeed, each country needs to reevaluate its goals and tools in order to evaluate options. Washington's imposition of economic sanctions to be followed by U.S. humanitarian aid is only one example of contradictory policy. South Korea and Japan have drawn proverbial lines in the sand, over which Kim Jong Il strolled over without slowing cooperative projects. Without having one solid and comprehensive policy toward North Korea, none of the countries involved have the means to restrain the DPRK nuclear program.
Secondly, through five-way negotiations -- not the current method of a network of bilateral discussions -- the U.S., ROK, PRC, Japan, and Russia need to construct one common strategy, and recognize the various means through which that strategy can be implemented. The current situation is one of mixed signals, opposing actions, internal and inter-ally disagreement, and a patchwork of policy that is showing no promise. The holes in the fabric of current joint policy allow North Korea to continue to advance both militarily and economically -- perhaps the most dangerous situation of all.
NOTES:
1) AFP News, Mon Mar 21
2) The sovereignty dispute over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan, and the Habomai group, known in Japan as the "Northern Territories" and in Russia as the "Southern Kuril Islands", occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945, now administered by Russia and claimed by Japan, remains the primary sticking point to signing a peace treaty formally ending World War II hostilities; intensified media coverage and protests highlight dispute over the fishing-rich Liancourt Rocks (Tok-do/Take-shima) also claimed by South Korea; China and Taiwan have intensified their claims to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Tai) administered by Japan, native Okinawans are asserting land-rights claims in areas occupied by US military installations; Certain islands in Yalu and Tumen rivers are in an uncontested dispute with North and South Korea and a section of boundary around Mount Paektu is indefinite; China and Russia have not yet worked out details on the demarcation in the dispute over islands in the Amur and Argun Rivers; The Russian Duma has not yet ratified 1990 Maritime Boundary Agreement with the US in the Bering Sea; Rising tensions between China and a US backed Taiwan are increasingly provocative and the US is committed to Taiwan’s defense.- CIA World Factbook
(3)Russia is thought to have 18000 nuclear warheads, the US 10,729, and China stands at around 400, although this estimate is weak due to the secrecy of the Chinese government- National Resources Defense Council (www.nrdc.org)
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