북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망

Capacity Building and Knowledge Sharing with North Korea: Past Successes and Future Prospects

2013년 6월 12일(수)
경남대 극동문제연구소 정산홀
Wednesday, June 12, 2013
IFES, Kyungnam University

주최
경남대 극동문제연구소
Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University (IFES)

FÜR DIE FREIHEIT
프리드리히 나우만 재단
Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Korea Office (FNF)

후원
북한대학원대학교
University of North Korean Studies
프로그램

9:00    등 록

9:30~10:00    개최식

개회사 이수훈 (경남대 국토문제연구소 소장)
환영사 라스 안드레 라히터 (프리드리히 나우만재단 한국사무소 대표)

10:00~10:10    휴식

10:10~12:00    제1회의 북한의 개발역량 강화를 위한 주요 사례

사회    김영희 (중앙일보 대기자)
발표

* 북한의 개발역량 강화: 유럽의 경험
  펠클리스 엡트 (평양 비즈니스 스쿨)
* 북한의 개발역량 강화: 미국의 경험
  로버트 스프링스 (클로벌 리소스 서비스)
* 북한의 개발역량 강화: 중국의 경험
  한현동 (중국정책대학)

토론    이수형 (국가과학기술연구소)
양문수 (북한대학원대학교)
염승심 (북한대학교)

12:00~13:30    오찬
Program

9:00  Registration

9:30–10:00  Opening Session

Opening Address
LEE Su-Hoon (Director, IFES, Kyungnam University)

Welcoming Address
Lars-André Richter (Resident Representative, FNF)

10:00–10:10  Photo Session

10:10–12:00  Session I  Development and Capacity Building Programs in North Korea

Moderator  KIM Young-Hie (Editor-at-Large, Joongang Ilbo)

Presenters
* Capacity Building and North Korea: The European Experience
  Felix Abt (Pyongyang Business School)

* Capacity Building and North Korea: The American Experience
  Robert E. Springs (Global Resource Services)

* Capacity Building and North Korea: The Chinese Experience
  Han Xian-Dong (China University of Political Science & Law)

Discussants  LEE Soo-Hyung (Institute for National Security Strategy)
  YANG Moon-Soo (University of North Korean Studies)
  LIAN Songxin (Beihua University)

12:00–13:30  Luncheon
## 프로그램

### 13:30~15:20  제2회의 개발역량 강화를 위한 북한의 교육 현황

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### 15:20~15:40  Coffee Break

### 15:40~17:30  제3회의 개발역량 강화를 통한 대북 포용: 평가와 전망

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# Program

**13:30–15:20 Session II North Koreans at Home and Abroad: Case Studies in Educational Exchanges**

**Moderator** Chang Dal-Joong (Professor, Seoul National University)

**Presenters**
- Capacity Building and North Korea: Pyongyang University of Science and Technology
  - Ko Dong-hoon (Pyongyang University of Science & Technology)
- Experiences in Capacity Development Programs in the DPRK: Opportunities, Challenges and Successes
  - Katharina Zellweger (Stanford University)
- Educational Exchanges with North Korea: A Russian Experience
  - Vladimir I. Kurilov (Far Eastern Federal University)

**Discussants**
- Zang Hyoungsoo (Hanyang University)
- Tsuchiyama Jitsuo (Aoyama Gakuin University)
- Kim Seok-Hwan (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

**15:20–15:40** Coffee break

**15:40–17:30 Session III Engaging North Korea through Capacity Building: Evaluation and Prospects**

**Moderator** Choi Wan-Kyu (President, University of North Korean Studies)

**Presenters**
- Singapore as an Aspirational Platform: The City State’s Role and Potential in DPRK Capacity Building
  - Andray Abrahamian (Choson Exchange)
- Capacity Building at the Kaesong Industrial Complex: Implications for North Korea’s Special Economic Zones
  - Lim Eul-chul (Kyungnam University)
- Possibilities and Prospects for South Korean Engagement with North Korea in Knowledge Sharing/Capacity Building Projects
  - Kim Taekyoon (Seoul National University)

**Discussants**
- Philo Kim (Seoul National University)
- Cho Bong-hyun (IBK Economic Research Institute)
- Kim Keun-sik (Kyungnam University)
Su-hoon LEE received his Ph.D. in Comparative International Development and sociology from Johns Hopkins University in 1986. In 1986, Dr. Lee joined the faculty of Sociology at Kyungnam University in Korea and simultaneously assumed the position of the Associate Director at the Institute for Far East Asian Studies in Seoul. From Feb 2009, he serves as the Director of IFES, Kyungnam University. His academic activities include serving as the President of the Korean Association of Comparative Sociology, Editor of International Sociological Association (2002-2006). His monographs include State-Building in the Contemporary Third World (Westview Press, 1989), World-System Analysis (in Korean, 1993), For a Humane World-System (in Korean 1999), Crisis and Capitalism of East Asia (in Korean, 2001), and World-System. Northeast Asia. Korean Peninsula (in Korean, 2004). He has also published numerous articles and book chapters on the world order, Northeast Asia, and Korean peninsula. He has served on various advisory committees of the ROK government. Since August 2005, he has assumed the Chair (Ministerial level position) of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Initiative, one of the key foreign policy advisory organs for the President Roh Moo-hyun. He accompanied President Roh Moo-hyun for the 2007 inter-Korean summit held in Pyongyang as one of the special delegation. After the summit, he served as a special envoy to the United States and Japan to explain the summit for opinion leaders in both countries.

Lars-Andre RICHTER is the Resident Representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Korea since June 2012. He studies amongst others German Literature, Philosophy and History in Tubingen, Leipzig, Paris (Paris III-Sorbonne Nouvelle) and Berlin. He earned his PhD from Humboldt University in Berlin in 2008 with doctoral dissertation on the Weimar Republic. He has been working for the FNF since 2008: he served as Press Officer and Deputy Spokesman at the Foundation’s headquarters in Potsdam before the current post. Prior to joining FNF, he also worked for the DAAD (Deutscher Akademische Austauschdienst/German Academic Exchange Service), amongst others in Mexico-City, and later for WELT ONLINE, the online edition of the German daily newspaper “Die Welt”. 
MODERATOR

Young-hie Kim joined Joongang Ilbo in 1965, was foreign editor until 1970; Washington correspondent (1971-78); chief editorial writer, executive managing editor (1983-86); founding editor and then publisher of Newsweek Korean edition; managing director for JoongAng Daily. He was journalist-in-residence at Samsung Economic Research Institute, Chairman of Shinyoung Journalism Fund (1996-2001), lecturer at Korea University, Sokang University and Ewha Womans University. He graduated from George Mason University (B.A. in Philosophy) and University of Missouri School of Journalism (M.A. in Journalism). He is author of “Koreans in Washington; Koreagate Scandal and Korea-American Relations” (1980), “Perestroika Journey in the Soviet Union” (1990), “Machiavelli’s Advice”(2003), and “Hamel”(2011, a novel).

Dal-joong Chang is Professor of Political Science at Seoul National University. He earned a Ph.D in Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley after having completed his BA and MA degrees at Seoul National University. Professor Chang joined the Department of Political Science at Seoul National University in 1990, where he continues to teach. The majority of his teaching and research has been focused on Northeast Asian issues, Inter-Korean Relations, and Japanese Politics. His most recent works are “The Rise of China and Sino-Japanese Power Game,” “US-DPRK Relationship 1990-2008.” Throughout the course of his career Professor Chang has been engaged in various advisory activities for national unification, security and foreign policy. He is currently a member of Korea-China Experts Committee which has been established to upgrade the “strategic-cooperative partnership” relations between Korea and China.

Wan-kyu Choi is the President of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. An expert in comparative and North Korean politics, Dr. Choi is currently a standing co-representative of the Korean Sharing Movement. He has served as the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of National Assembly on Policy Governance toward North Korea and as an Adviser to both the Korean Association of North Korean Studies and the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice.
**PRESENTERS**

**Felix Abt**, 58, Swiss entrepreneur, member of boards of directors of several SMEs in East Asia, lived and worked in 9 countries on 3 continents. He is currently resident with his family in Nha Trang, Vietnam where he founded www.topteam.co, leaders in team building and leadership training indoors and outdoors. Abt is currently holding some shares at JV companies in North Korea where he lived from 2002-2009. He was resident country director of ABB, a US$ 40 billion a year Swiss-Swedeh global leader in power and automation technologies. From 2004-2006 he run his own agency in Pyongyang representing multinational corporations (MNC) such as ABB, Sandvik (a global leader in mining equipment) and Dystar (the global leader in dyestuff). After the nuclear and missile tests when MNCs stopped their DPRK business activities Abt represented Asian and European SMEs, led the first pharmaceutical JV to global industry standard level and profitability, co-founded the first IT joint venture and co-founded and run the Pyongyang Business School. He was also a co-founder and the first president of the European Business Association, a de facto European Chamber of Commerce in Pyongyang. Abt is the author of “A Capitalist in North Korea: My Seven Years in the Hermit Kingdom”

**Robert Springs** is the Founding CEO & President of Global Resource Services, Inc. (GRS). He is a second generation licensed industrial, commercial, and residential construction contractor. Robert has also worked in the fields of fire fighting, emergency medicine, horse ranching, and education before concentrating his efforts in international development. From 1985 until 1995, working closely with government and local community leaders, he coordinated infrastructure development projects in underdeveloped island areas off the southwest coast of Korea. His vocational and academic focus since 1980 has been immersed in Asia as a student and practitioner. Robert became a founding member of the National Committee on North Korea (www.NCNK.org) in 2004. He has been serving on the Steering Committee since 2007 and as co-chair since 2010. Robert has been a member of Rotary International since 2001 and Interaction (www.interaction.org) since 2003. Robert holds a Bachelors of Science Degree in Secondary Education with an emphasis in Health and a minor in Speech Communications; a Masters in Intercultural Studies; and a Doctorate with an emphasis in International Development and Cultural Anthropology. Robert and his family lived in Korea for ten years and completed post-graduate Culture & Language Certificate Program at Mokwon University, Taejon, Korea (1985-87).

**Xian-dong Han** is professor of political science, and deputy director of the institute of international politics, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL). He obtained his PH.D. from Kyungnam University, Republic of Korea. His publications include the Security Structure of the Korean Peninsula (in Chinese, 2009), Can we see the future from the history? : China, South

Dong-hoon Ko is a professor of Agriculture & Life Sciences, Pyongyang University of Science & Technology. He also serves as a Dean of Academic Affairs Office of PUST since its opening in October, 2010. He obtained his B.S. and M.S. degree from Korea University and a Ph.D. degree from the Florida State University majoring in Organic Chemistry. Immediately before joining PUST, he was an associate professor of Department of Biological & Chemical Engineering, Yanbian University of Science & Technology.

Katharina Zellweger has been the Pantech Fellow in Korean Studies at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University since November 2011. She is a senior aid manager with over 30 years of field experience in Hong Kong, China and North Korea. Zellweger lived and worked in Pyongyang for five years (2006-2011) as the North Korea country director for the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). She focused on sustainable agricultural production to address food security issues, income generation to improve people’s livelihoods, and capacity development to contribute to individual and institutional learning. Before joining SDC, Zellweger worked for almost 30 years for the Catholic agency Caritas in Hong Kong where she developed pioneering Caritas involvement in China and in North Korea. Zellweger received the Bishop Tji Hak-soon Justice and Peace Award from a South Korean foundation established to promote social justice, and the Dame of St. Gregory the Great from the Vatican for her work in North Korea. Zellweger has a Master’s in International Administration, School for International Training in Brattleboro, Vermont.

Vladimir I. Kurilov is Vice President for International Relations, Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU), and the Director of the FEFU School of Law. In 2010-2012 he was the Provost of Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU) and in 1990-2010 - the 20th, the longest serving President of Far Eastern National University (FENU, now FEFU). Under his leadership, FENU became one of the few leading Russian research universities, and the 3rd university nominated by Russian Federal Government for the exceptional status of federal university. His achievements have been recognized by many exceptional national and international awards, including 3 honorary citizenships and honorary degrees of 7 foreign universities. Dr. Kurilov received his S.J.D. and LL.D. degrees from St. Petersburg State University, and his J.D. degree from FENU.

Andray Abrahamian from 2006-2013, Andray Abrahamian lectured in International Relations at Ulsan University, South Korea, where he is also in the final stage of finishing his PhD. Focusing
on Korean Peninsular political-economy, he has given special lectures at Harvard’s Kennedy School, University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies and DC-based research institutes as well as published in a variety of magazines, journals and newspapers. He is the Executive Director of Choson Exchange, a Singapore-based non-profit focused on training young North Koreans in economic policy, business and law. He is currently based in Beijing.

_Eul-chul Lim_ is currently a Research Professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES), Kyungnam University. He also works as a Director of the Center for International Cooperation for North Korean Development at the IFES. His research focuses on development-related Issues including capacity building and the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Dr. Lim is widely published in the above mentioned areas which include “The New Paradigm for Economic Reform: Theory and Practice of Development for North Korea” (in Korean, 2007), “Kaesong Industrial Complex: History, Pending Issues, and Outlook” (in English, 2007) among many others. Prior to joining IFES, Dr. Lim worked as a researcher in the Department of North Korea in the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) (1992-1996), and a reporter specializing in North Korea for _The Hankyoreh Daily_ (1996-2005). He was also a visiting scholar at Georgetown University (2000-2001).

_Taek-yoon Kim_ is assistant professor of international development at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. He received D.Phil. from the University of Oxford in 2007 and is now expected to receive his second Ph.D. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University in 2013. Prior to joining Seoul National University, he has taught at Waseda University in Japan, the University of Paris IV-Sorbonne in France, and Ewha Womans University in South Korea. His academic interests are international development cooperation, comparative social policy, international political sociology, and global governance.
DISCUSSANTS

**Soo-hyung LEE** is a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy(INSS) in Seoul. He graduated from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies(HUFS), Seoul Korea and received his Ph. D. from HUFS. He has served as the Assistant Secretary to the President for Security Strategy, CHEONG WA DAE(Office of the President), from 2005 to 2007. His major research interests include NATO and the European Security, The ROK-US Alliance Politics. His publications include North Atlantic Treaty Organization(in Korean, 2012) and European Union’s Strategy and Foreign Security Policy in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula(in Korean, 2013).


**Lian Songxin** Associate Professor, East Asian History and Culture Research Center, Beihua University Ph.D of Ethnology, Minzu University of China Master’s Degree of History, Northeast Normal University. Main Research Areas: History and culture of Korean nationality, History of cultural communication between China and Korea, Korean history of immigration

**Hyoung-soo Zang** is currently Professor of Economics and Finance at Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea. Prior to joining the Hanyang University faculty, he was affiliated with the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP, 1997-2000) and worked for developing countries in transition at the World Bank (Washington, DC, 1993-97). He has regularly provided policy advice to the Korean government on various issues on the Korean peninsula. Specifically, he had serviced as National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the DPRK affairs at the National Intelligence Service (NIS) of the Republic of Korea for two years during 2005 through 2007 on leave of absence from Hanyang University. He has published various academic papers and research reports on the DPRK economy, agenda for international cooperation on the Korean peninsula, interim development assistance for the DPRK in a multilateral perspective, and the role of the international community in the development process of DPRK, among others. He was born in 1960 in Korea and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Brown University in the USA (1993).
Jitsuo Tsuchiyama is a professor of international politics at the School of International Politics, Economics and Communication (SIPEC) of Aoyama Gakuin University, and Director of Joint Research Institute for International Peace and Culture of AGU which was founded in cooperation with the Japan Foundation in 2008. He was Dean of SIPEC, 2004-8, and Vice President of Aoyama Gakuin University, 2007-2011. He also served on the board of directors at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) where he has been a director of Security Studies Scholarship program since 1994. He has been Vice President of Japan Association for International Security since 2011. He received BL from Aoyama Gakuin University, MA from George Washington University, and PhD from the University of Maryland at College Park. He was a visiting scholar at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 1993-4. His latest publications include International Politics of Security: Hubris and Anxiety (written in Japanese) (Yuhikaku, 2004), Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policy of an Adaptive State (co-editor, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional Steps Towards Global Governance (co-editor, United Nations University Press, 2008), and U.S.-Japan Alliance Reconsidered (co-editor, Aki-Shobo, 2010).

Seok-hwan Kim is president of ‘Korea Institute for Eurasian Studies’, and visiting professor of Hankuk Univ. of Foreign Studies. Professor Kim had formerly served as a long time journalist at JoongAng Ilbo, Korea’s leading daily. He served two terms as a Moscow correspondent of JoongangIlbo, and has been active for many years as an editor of world affairs, and a editorial writer. He has also worked as a advisor to National Security Council, and a member of Presidential Committee of Policy Planning. Later he joined government as senior press secretary to Prime Minister. After that he worked as a research fellow at ‘Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade’(KIET), and vice-president of Jusung Univ. He is the author and co-author of many books. ‘Post-soviet 20years, The future of central Asia’(2011, KIEP), ‘Russian National Strategy and ROK-Russian Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century’(2010,KINU), ‘Resource Development in Emerging Strategic Markets and Strategies for Expanding Industrial Cooperation’(2008, KIET), ‘Understanding modern Russia’s Politics and Economy’(2005,KIEP) etc.

Philo Kim is associate professor at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS), Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea. He received his Ph.D in Sociology from Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA. Professor Kim had formerly served as a senior fellow and director of North Korean Studies Division at a government funded research institute KINU. He is currently serving as advisory committee members in National Intelligence Service, Ministry of Defense, Korea Broadcasting System, Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, etc. He is the author of Kim Jong Eun Succession System (2011), North Korean Diaspora (2011), Flexible and Complex Unification (2010), and Formation and Structure of Socioeconomic Network between North Korea and China (2008).
**Bong-hyun CHO** is currently a research Fellow at IBK Economic Research Institute, IBK. He is a standing committee member of the National Unification Advisory Council, a visiting professor at Chung-Ang University, an advisory at the Kaesong Industrial District Business and a former association advisory at the Ministry of Unification.

**Keun-sik Kim** is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Kyungnam University and Director for Research, the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES), Kyungnam University. He received his Ph. D. in Political Science from Seoul National University. Areas of research interest include North Korean politics and economy and Inter-Korean relations. He has written extensively on North Korea’s political economy and North Korean nuclear issues.
Opening Remarks

Lee Su-hoon
Director, IFES, Kyungnam University

Distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen.

It is a great pleasure for me to be here and to welcome all of you this morning.

I like to thank you for coming to our conference on Capacity Building and Knowledge Sharing with North Korea: Past Successes and Future Prospects. This conference is a joint project organized by IFES of Kyungnam University and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom. I’d like to take this opportunity to thank our excellent institutional partner, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, and in particular Resident Representative Lars-André Richter.

As many of you are aware, capacity building is the process through which developing societies obtain, strengthen, and maintain capabilities to set and achieve their own development goals. It involves improving institutional capabilities through human resource development, organizational development, and institutional and legal framework development. It seeks to outline and design the essential organizational and institutional prerequisites for a society’s economic and social progress.

One component of capacity building is knowledge sharing. This can be explicit, tacit, or embedded. If properly planned and implemented, it can be a powerful tool to promote economic growth and improve the quality of life for a society. It can create channels of communication that facilitate mutual understanding between persons and institutions and eventually lead to relationships of trust.

In the case of North Korea, capacity building and knowledge sharing efforts are being conducted by a number of international organizations, humanitarian NGOs, and academic institutions. Their projects cover areas such as agriculture management, technology promotion, environmental planning, and international business and finance, among others. These efforts can greatly enhance the benefits of humanitarian assistance to the country,
and provide a step toward building trust—where to date there is largely none. Such projects can also play a significant role in encouraging North Korea to be involved in regional and international cooperation.

Today’s conference seeks to illuminate some of these projects and experiences, explore their dimensions, assess their value and limitations, and provide us with a fuller understanding of one less recognized aspect of North Korea’s interactions with the international community.

To conclude, let me once again thank you all for coming, and I look forward to the presentations and productive discussions.

Thank you.
Welcoming Remarks

Lars-André Richter
Resident Representative, FNF

Annyeonghaseyo?

Dear Director Lee,
Distinguished Participants,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom I would like to welcome all of you to our seminar “Capacity Building and Knowledge Sharing with North Korea.”

Let me first express my gratitude to IFES, the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, and Director Lee for organising today’s event with us. I am very thankful that we have the opportunity to host our conference here in your institute at this beautiful spot. Our two institutions have been enjoying a very fruitful and successful cooperation since 2008. I’m very thankful for that as well.

You may already know, but allow me some remarks on what the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the FNF, stands for. The foundation is a German independent non-profit organisation established in 1958 by then Federal President Theodor Heuss. Its philosophy is to promote individual freedom and responsibility, market economy, the rule of law and human rights. The Foundation spreads these ideas through seminars, conferences, special lectures, workshops and publications in nearly sixty countries worldwide.

Our office in Korea was opened in 1987, more than a quarter century ago. By bringing in the very unique German experience of national unification, we promote dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas. Since 2002, our foundation has been providing both theoretical and practical training seminars for experts on the economy and finance in North Korea. Our programs include study tours abroad and are aimed at supporting economic modernization and development in North Korea.

That brings me back to today’s topic. We will hear from our speakers that North Koreans
are eager to learn more about the modernization of the economy, higher education, farming and many other subjects.

I am sure that today’s discussions will be very useful for us to exchange our experiences, learn from our successes as well as from our mistakes, and discuss future prospects for engagement. Because one thing is for sure: engagement with North Korea has to continue.

Last not least I would like to thank IFES’ and the foundation’s members of staff, who organised today’s event. I know the last weeks were extremely busy for all of them.

Kamsahamnida!
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Capacity Building and North Korea: The European Experience

Felix ABT
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북한의 개발역량 강화: 유럽의 경험

1990년대 중반 이후로 지속된 산업 분야의 비정상적 운영은 수 백 만 명의 실업자와 배급제 붕괴를 초래했으며, 대규모 식량 부족과 파도한 해외 원조 의존도를 가져왔다. 이 같은 문제의 원인은 일면 세밀한 계획이 부재했던 것에서 찾을 수 있다. 즉 철저한 계획의 부족은 상당한 양의 해외자본이 북한 내 고정자산의 활용을 새롭게 하고, 예비부 품과 원자재를 구입하는데 투입되는 것을 저해했다. 아울러 기업가들이 보다 빠르게 시장 중심의 환경에 적응하고, 새로운 기술과 안정적 수입을 얻도록 도울 수 있는 최신 관리 기술(know-how)이 부족했던 것도 다른 원인으로 지적할 수 있다.

평양비즈니스스쿨(Pyongyang Business School)은 보다 빠른 효과를 도모하기 위해 대학생이 아닌 북한 경영진들을 대상으로 이와 같은 경영기술을 제공하기 위해 만들 어졌다. 이 글은 이와 같은 '자본주의적 실험'이 가능하게 하기 위한 북한정부와의 신뢰 구축 과정, 학생 선발에 대한 관리자(organizer)의 영향, 북한 기업 문화와 실천에서의 변화, 그리고 현재 및 장래의 기업가들 줄 수 있는 이점 등을 다룬다.
Abstract

Capacity Building and North Korea: The European Experience

An idle industrial sector that left millions of workers unemployed and that was unable to help fund the Public Distribution Sector any longer from the mid-nineties led to massive food insecurity and a decade-long dependence on foreign food aid.

One part of the problem was the absence of thorough reforms, hampering the infusion of a significant amount of foreign capital to renew fixed assets and to buy spare parts and raw materials, another major part was the lack of modern management know-how to enable enterprises to adapt to an increasingly more market-driven environment and to seize new opportunities and generate income.

The Pyongyang Business School was meant to provide such business skills to North Korean executives, rather than to university students to achieve a faster effect. The paper discusses the trust building process with the government to allow this “capitalist” experiment to happen, the organizer’s influence on the selection of the students, the changes in business culture and practices and the benefits for North Korean enterprises and emerging new entrepreneurs.
1. Rationale for the Pyongyang Business School

This mindset, that education was key, was a potential panacea to the black hole in North Korea’s economic development. With no end in sight, North Korea had since the 1990s been dependent on a massive wave of foreign humanitarian aid. This problem motivated me to think up a cost-effective way to make food security more reliable and sustainable. I wanted to accomplish this by trying to reactivate the idle enterprises that were supposed to feed millions of employees and their families through the public distribution system. I found an ally in Ueli Mueller, the then director of the Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency office in Pyongyang. Together we tried to convince his agency to become the first sponsor of the project.

North Korean authorities, too, quickly became aware that a healthy economy would ease the chronic shortages. They, like us, did not want to drag along with what they called a culture of aid dependence.

Solving the problem was easier said than done. We could not help these enterprises purchase badly needed spare parts for their machines, or raw materials for that matter. No investor or sponsor would put up millions of dollars to pay for those operations, especially in what they considered to be a risky market like North Korea. We could, however, train their managers to make the best out of the resources they already had.

The dilemma was that executives were familiar with receiving and executing orders in this centrally planned economy. To get their operations up to speed, they’d have to abandon much of the old model, and become familiar with basic skills like accounting and controlling, marketing, supply chain management and strategy. With that in mind, I drew up a concept for a course geared at managers, and containing the elements of most MBA degrees in other countries. We sent the idea to some future sponsors: the Swiss government, a handful of multinational corporations and the North Korean government.

Having worked in lots of sectors in North Korea, I got a strong sense as to how local managers worked and the skills they possessed. With that in mind, I rid the seminar of topics that would have been more suitable for 23-year-old MBA students elsewhere, focusing instead on know-how tailored for senior executives in North Korea. Our goal
was never to foster an economic elite. We simply wanted to see North Korean managers optimize their practices, make hard currency earnings and raise their businesses to a level fitting for international competition.

The North Korean government, on the other hand, was indeed wary that we had a political agenda. We put together pilot seminars to show that we, the Swiss initiators, had no strategic interest in overthrowing the system. We wanted to demonstrate to the authorities that this was purely a business school, a provider of the hard skills that both private and state-run bodies needed in both capitalist and socialist societies.

Here is how we explained to the DPRK government and to sponsors (including the Swiss Cooperation and Development Agency) the necessity of a business school:

“The lack of revenue in foreign currency as well as access to foreign exchange is severely hampering energy supplies and overall production. DPRK enterprises (including farms) can therefore use only a fraction of their full potential. With a very limited base for agricultural production (17% arable land) a continuous underutilization of its much more important industrial potential would make food security a fragile if not unattainable goal.

Given the severely restricted financial resources a very cost-effective means of enhancing export capacities as well as sourcing (importing) skills can be made available without delay by appropriate training and exposure.

Attracting capital from foreign investors is another effective means of boosting the national economy as the so-called Asian tigers, including China and Vietnam, have shown. But it also requires training and insight for policy makers and officials concerned to develop a framework, legal and otherwise, aimed at making the DPRK attractive and competitive for investors.

In addition, a lack of qualified Korean management staff trained according to international state of the art practices is a prime concern for foreign investors as suitable expatriate managers are highly expensive and difficult to find and keep. Korean staff trained in accordance with the needs of foreign companies will therefore contribute to more foreign investment bound to become another important hard-currency earner for the national economy.”
2. Objectives for the Pyongyang Business School

After weeks of negotiations, these were the objectives agreed upon with the DPRK authorities and the sponsors:

“Providing professional skills to DPRK-enterprises to ‘set foot in foreign markets’ and to enhance the abilities to develop and export higher value goods that generate income, employment and foreign exchange is a prime objective. According to the needs of the stakeholders (Korean partners and foreign supporters), specific courses may be added to the business school program cycle such as accounting or marketing courses at a later stage. The (postgraduate) students are executives from a wide variety of companies and ministries. The medium-to long-term goal of the school is to reach international MBA-level (Master of Business Administration), the internationally highest professional business qualification.

The Business School is also meant as a cost-effective communication and meeting platform for DPRK-companies to gain access to (school sponsoring) foreign companies suitable for becoming potential customers, suppliers and/or investors. At a later stage courses on public management could be added on demand to capitalize on experiences with market reforms in other countries where capacity building at different levels helped create favorable framework conditions for domestic business and domestic and foreign investment triggering a significant boost to national economies.

Finally, the Pyongyang Business School is also meant as a contribution to the efforts of the DPRK-government to promote exports and to successfully implement necessary adjustments to the economy in line with requirements of the new century.”

3. Program, Contents and Implementation

Given the small budget (approx. US$ 200,000-300,000 p.a.) and the needs of the target group (busy business executives and officials), the following was agreed with the DPRK authorities:

“The program is more or less a complete business plan cycle (12 modular monthly
seminars at weekends or during a working week) and the core of a future MBA-program (see attachment 1) for at least 30 participants. For the time being the main focus will be on business strategies for export markets and on the capacity to set foot in foreign markets. Specific courses will be added on demand. The cycle will culminate in an exam with a diploma.

To safeguard a strong practice orientation and the link to potential business partners lecturers will be asked for, whenever possible, from companies with a successful international business track record.

The school director himself representing several international industrial groups in the DPRK is expected to make sure that the school will not become an ivory tower but that it follows the outlined philosophy and meets the set objectives. Moreover, with his experience working with DPRK companies his knowledge about their shortcomings and training needs he is expected to brief and guide lecturers in such a way as they provide only know-how and experience that meet the needs of the participants. For thematic, didactical and quality matters he is to develop a partnership with the University of Applied Sciences Northwest Switzerland, the Swiss market leader in adult executive and entrepreneurs’ training and the Hong Kong Management Association, Hong Kong’s market leader in management training. The Korean school co-managing partner is the Korea Europe Cooperation Agency (KECA) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the ministry of foreign affairs and, with regard to this project, reporting to the Council of Ministers ("cabinet"). KECA is expected to establish the necessary links to the light industries as well as other industries and ministries and the Korean business school participants.

KECA is expected to spread the contents of the business school seminars beyond the participants to ministries and enterprises in written or electronic form.

1 or 2 representatives of future Korean partner institutions (in particular universities where the school could be attached to, later) will also be invited to participate.”
4. Experiences

*Reach:*

There was a clear preference among KECA to choose students close to the MoFA; the same people have also regularly been invited to seminars organized by other foreign organizers. I presented my own list of enterprises from army, party and cabinet which should be allowed to send students. A part of my proposals were accepted. I personally handed seminar contents on memory sticks to enterprises that had not been invited. Some of the seminars were also published in booklets in both Korean and English, on CDs and on the Naenara intranet for a larger audience.

*Students’ Feedback:*

During the seminars the students got plenty of hands-on experience and insight into how businesses have come to operate successfully both in the lecturers’ home countries as well as on highly competitive international markets, passed on by outstanding senior managers or university lecturers with a successful business career. Our carefully selected and prepared lecturers were generally able to address all areas of interest by the audience and could offer plenty of concrete advice on solving practical problems in the students’ daily business practice. Students also showed great interest in developing a co-operation with the companies represented by the lecturers that would help develop and expand their own businesses. All seminars and lecturers were assessed by the students and were given very good marks.
Extract from a report by The Financial Times in 2005:

With its first graduates having just received their diplomas, the privately-run Pyongyang Business School is setting its sights on offering a Master of Business Administration… Kang Chun-il, one of the graduates, told a state publication the course had helped him set high aims for the high-technology service center he manages, which offers a digital imaging facility and electronic reading room.

“Our aim is to raise the country’s economy and technology to a world-leading level as soon as possible and, with this in mind, we welcome all partners who want true and practical co-operation with us,” Mr. Kang said.

Testimonies by two former PBS students given to the Swiss governmental Development and Cooperation Agency and published in its “Asia Brief,” in January 2011:

“Previously I hardly met people, but now I am able to interact and build networks. Thanks to this I got a partner in Hong Kong who invests into the construction of a factory here”.

“I did not know what a ‘break-even point’ is. Meanwhile I learned how to make profit and I analyzed the past 10 years of our business. This eventually helped me to manage a turn-around of our company.”

Business opportunities and other benefits:

There were a number of attempts to promote business beyond borders. Example: One of the lecturers started giving contracts to DPRK-software companies and the world’s leading chemical group’s head of its Asia headquarters whose human resources and marketing directors lectured at the PBS showed interest in holding a seminar himself and, while in Pyongyang, would study the investment potential for his company that invested billions of Euro in new plants in China and elsewhere in Asia including in the Republic of Korea. The nuclear and missile tests, however, have shattered all these intentions.

The business school also helped promote innovation: the bank whose director was a student was the first to introduce bank cash cards in North Korea. Another former student became the director of the first advertising company in the country.

Former students also reported that the Pyongyang Business School enabled them to increase productivity, reduce customer complaints, expand business and hire more
staff or raise profitability. They and their companies seemed to have been energized thanks to the PBS which was a good omen for the economy, as there were millions of jobless workers in the crisis years of the 1990s.

5. The (preliminary) end of the Pyongyang Business School

Although a development project with an excellent cost/benefit ratio, sponsors refused to support it any longer after the first nuclear and missile tests. A little later, Switzerland as the remaining sponsor also stopped funding it due to a decision by the Swiss parliament to limit Switzerland’s engagement to humanitarian assistance only. Thus the project started in 2004 ended in 2010. I will re-launch it if I can find new sponsors to fund it.
Capacity Building and North Korea: The American Experience

Robert E. Springs
(Global Resource Services)
북한의 개발역량 강화: 미국의 경험

Global Resource Services Inc (GRS)는 비영리기관으로 전체적인 지역사회 개발 모델을 통하여 북한을 국제사회에 참여시키기 위해 노력하고 있다. GRS 프로그램의 목표는 건강, 교육, 소득이라는 세 가지 중요한 자원을 이용한 북한과의 파트너십을 통하여 북한의 자급자족 능력을 발전시키는 것이 다. 1997년 시행 이후로, GRS는 북한과의 화합을 도모하는 3단계의 20년 마스터 플랜을 구상하였다. 플랜의 1, 2 단계는 역량강화, 식량안보, 글로벌보건, 교육의 4가지 프로그램을 통하여 북한과의 “50-50” 파트너십 모델을 구축하는 방안을 설명한다.

플랜의 마지막 단계는 혁신적인 경제 채널을 통한 북한의 국제사회를 도모하는 방안을 소개한다. 이 단계에서 상업적인 요소가 각각의 새로운 이니셔티브를 주도하게 된다. GRS 플랜이 3단계로 넘어가셔도 위에 언급한 2단계의 4가지 프로그램들은 여전히 GRS의 미션이 되는데 왜냐하면 위의 4가지 프로그램들은 플랜 3단계의 근간이 되기 때문이다. GRS의 북한 역량강화 프로그램이 미국의 경험이도 관련되므로 이번 프레젠테이션에서는 GRS 플랜 3단계에 관하여 설명하고자 한다.
Abstract

Capacity Building and North Korea: The American Experience

Global Resource Services, Inc. (GRS) is a non-governmental organization that spearheads primarily private efforts to engage the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) through a holistic community development model. Our programs aim to build self-sufficiency by developing partnerships that address three critical resources: health, education, and income. Since its inception in 1997, GRS launched a three phased 20-year master plan designed with an end vision of reconciliation. Phase I through II illustrate a clear progression towards a “50-50” partnership model with our DPRK counterparts through four programs: Capacity Building, Food Security, Global Health, and Education.

In the final phase, we venture to engage the DPRK through innovative, economic channels; the commercial component will mark each new initiative. Even as GRS transitions to Phase III, the four program sectors, which are characteristic of Phase II, are still within GRS’ mission because these Phase II initiatives are the foundation upon which Phase III is built. In this presentation I will explain the three phases as it relates to an American’s experience coordinating our capacity building efforts in North Korea.
Introduction & Background

Global Resource Services, Inc. (GRS) is a non-profit organization whose programs aim to build self-sufficiency by partnering with community leaders in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) to develop three critical resources: health, education, and income. GRS works closely with community and national leadership in a way that protects dignity and builds mutual respect. The core value of reconciliation is the desired end result of our efforts. GRS is devoted to working with partners and policy leaders in national and international areas to build bridges for understanding.

GRS is a registered and certified United States Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia and a support office and training facility in Arizona. In addition to our two primary U.S. locations, GRS has representative offices, operational centers, logistical staging centers, collaborative offices, and support units in Nepal, China, and North Korea. Ninety percent (90%) of all our resources are channeled through and focused on our programs in North Korea.

In 1997, with reports of starvation in North Korea reaching the United States, the Southern Baptist Convention decided to send 100,000 children’s coats as aid and asked me to coordinate this project. When the coats arrived at Pyongyang Airport on a freezing January day, the control tower asked the plane’s pilot to prepare our chartered gigantic Antonov 124 for unloading. The British pilot refused. “They want the plane, not the coats,” he said. That’s because he had to immobilize the Antonov to prepare it for unloading and he feared the North Koreans would then simply commandeer his plane.

To determine whether their interest in the cargo or the plane, the pilot asked the North Koreans to send out forklifts to unload the pallets of coats. Prepare the plane first, the North Koreans replied. Meanwhile, I jumped in to help the crew start throwing bundles of coats out a small door in the back. As we did, DPRK workers materialized to carry the coats away. More coats out the door, more workers emerged to carry them away. The control tower would radio the pilot to lower the plane’s nose. The pilot would repeat his request for forklifts. And so it went. Six hours later, with about 95,000 coats to go, the pilot decided maybe the Koreans wanted the coats after all. He put the plane’s nose down, the North Koreans sent out forklifts, and then hours later, the empty plane flew
off. I remained behind with the coats to arrange distribution. I asked why the workers hadn’t brought out forklifts at the pilot’s request. “You were warm in the plane. But it’s freezing outside and we’d be standing around in the cold. Why didn’t you just get the plane ready so we wouldn’t have to be out there so long?” This was my first lesson in negotiating with the North Koreans. The mistrust on that first encounter, each side suspecting the worst of the other, became the key for understanding a lot of the problems in the relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK. I left that trip and decided to start an NGO with staff and volunteers who understood the culture of North Korea and spoke Korean.

GRS has worked all over North Korea, in cities and villages, in nine of its ten provinces. GRS professional staff and volunteers—all Americans—have carried out roughly 200 development projects in agriculture, health, education, and cultural exchange. That adds up to almost 1,100 individual visits by Americans to North Korea since 1997. And North Koreans have made about 200 individual return visits to the U.S.

GRS is an NGO that spearheads primarily private efforts to engage the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) through a holistic community development model. Since its inception in 1997, GRS launched a three phased 20-year master plan designed with an end vision of reconciliation. Phase I through II illustrate a clear progression towards a “50-50” partnership model with our DPRK counterparts through four program sectors: Capacity Building, Food Security, Global Health, and Education.

Since 1997, our North Korea Program highlights:

• **Our Capacity Building** programs provide fresh water wells, cisterns, and distribution systems to over 300,000 people every year in four different provinces. Most recently we developed four new water systems in Koksan County which are providing water for over 100,000 beneficiaries. Since 1997 we have drilled and developed 9 water wells in four provinces and installed a water harvesting cistern system in DaeDong County for 35,000 beneficiaries. We have installed 5 emergency back-up generators for critical care units in four different hospitals as a part of the USAID/OFDA Emergency Generator Project.
• **Our Food Security** programs feed approximately 250,000 people daily in South Hwanghae, North Hwanghae, and North Hamgyung Provinces in the DPRK through Goat Dairy, Soy, and Corn Farms. We also worked with a team of four other American NGOs to distribute 100,000 Metric Tons of Food in North Pyongan and Chagang Provinces as a part of the Food for Peace Program of USAID feeding nearly 1 million beneficiaries. In connection with our Global Health Program, we are also providing and monitoring 64,000 thousand “At-Risk” mothers and their children in North Hwanghae Province through our Micronutrient Supplement program.

• **Our Global Health** programs currently provide training and support services for seven hospitals in five different provinces in the DPRK. GRS has trained 100 doctors in laparoscopic surgery, equipped two surgical units, and developed one training center. As a next phase, in the four hospitals where we installed 5 emergency back-up generators, we also installed critical medical equipment. We currently have on-going work with these hospitals, installed critical care equipment, and providing essential supplies. We are providing a minimum of $500,000 worth of medical supplies every year which are currently used to treat over 500,000 patients.

• **Our Education** programs train new English Professors and provide English text books to 5,000 students through the Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies. We participate in cultural exchanges with private citizens between our two countries in the arts and sports. In April of 2012 GRS took the Largest Delegation of US Citizens since the Korean War to tour the DPRK. The *Sons of Jubal*, a 150-member all-male chorus and orchestra from the Atlanta area successfully performed twice in North Korea and three times in Beijing, China April 10-23, 2012. GRS continues to work on bringing the DPRK National Symphony Orchestra to perform in the United States. This upcoming project will be designed as a historical non-governmental cultural exchange for the fine arts. In April 2007 and 2009, we brought the Grammy Award winning band *Casting Crowns* to the spring festival in Pyongyang, where they played both their own
popular music and some Korean favorites. The song Amazing Grace—for which Casting Crowns received a festival award—was particularly well-received, as was the Korean tune White Dove Fly High (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ERT6Cm7fu-A). Since 2001, GRS has coordinated four successful music exchanges with the DPRK, two sports teams, and various educational exchanges representing the fields of medicine, health, ESL, agriculture, and science. All total GRS has coordinated over 40 successful cultural exchanges between the US and the DPRK.

• In addition to these four primary programs, GRS also collaborates with other USNGOs to implement emergency rapid response to annual disasters. Since 1997 we have participated in these disaster responses with over $15 million in essential medicines, first aid supplies, hygiene supplies, food, and nutritional supplements.

One of the key values GRS brings to this complex challenge is the ability to establish genuine relationships with key officials. We have been able to work in nearly every province of the country and have the ability to work with the local communities. By focusing on long range plans and steering clear of political entanglements, we can negotiate more effectively and respond more directly to humanitarian and social needs. This experience results in relationships at both the central and local levels. We have found a niche in which we can operate effectively and relatively independent of the broader political environment.

The GRS model embodies three main principals: relationships, respect, and reconciliation. We are excited to expand our long term commitments to new communities and to continue nurturing current relationships. The total number of people directly benefiting from our current efforts totals over 1,000,000 annually.

In the final phase of our long-range plan, we venture to engage the DPRK through innovative, economic channels; the commercial component will mark each new initiative. Even as GRS transitions to Phase III, the four program sectors, which are characteristic of Phase II, are still within GRS’ mission because these Phase II initiatives are the foundation upon which Phase III is built. In this presentation I will explain the three
phases as it relates to an American’s experience coordinating our capacity building efforts in North Korea.

Since its inception in 1997, Global Resource Services, Inc. (GRS) launched a 20-year master plan designed with an end vision of reconciliation. Programs aim to build self-sufficiency by partnership with the DPRK to develop three critical resources—health, education, and income.

By working closely with national and community leadership in a way that protects dignity and builds mutual respect, Phase I focused on administering humanitarian aid and disaster response. Our Food Security and Global Health programs were the foundation of Phase I, both of which evolved into Phase II. Through our relief efforts, 250,000 beneficiaries were fed daily and provided basic necessities across three provinces in the DPRK. Under the Food for Peace Program of USAID, GRS, in collaboration with four other American NGOs, reached nearly one million beneficiaries. The opening of an operational center in Beijing in 1998 was instrumental in supporting the logistical needs of all phases.

Phase II marked a transition from humanitarian aid to the more holistic community development mission. In 2002, GRS decided it had the resources to begin new agricultural development and capacity building projects. We asked the North Koreans what
kind of assistance would be most useful. “Goats,” the North Koreans said.

The North Korean goal was improved nutrition for children by increased dairy production. The North was already dairying goats, but they didn’t give much milk. So the North Korean Ministry of Agriculture asked GRS to provide more productive Nubian goats from the U.S.

GRS anchors every project in a partnership between U.S. and North Korean universities and research institutions, so its first step was to form its U.S. university partnership group. A GRS board member, Dr. Max Lennon, a past president of Clemson University, put GRS in touch with U.S. experts on goat dairies at Texas A&M, the University of Kentucky, Auburn University, and Langston University in Oklahoma. The experts volunteered their time to GRS and traveled to North Korea seven times over the next two years, for visits of 2-3 weeks each trip.

GRS also worked with animal husbandry experts in the Ministry of Agriculture’s Goat Research Institute to form a counterpart team of North Korean officials, academics, farm managers, and veterinarians. We work with the appropriate DPRK government ministries to get the right partners on the DPRK side, and then, as we identify project sites, we bring in the local officials and managers who will actually operate the projects.

The North Korean experts—veterinarians, farm managers, and a dairy engineer—visited the U.S. twice for three-week training stints at the U.S. partner universities.

During those back and forth visits, the Americans and North Koreans together designed project parameters that would meet North Korea’s need for increased dairy production.

We traveled together around the DPRK, to find the most suitable site for what would become the North’s largest goat farm. The North Korean and U.S. experts together concluded the Nubian goat could not tolerate the North’s harsh winters. We decided to develop a new breed of goat in the DPRK, inseminating the North’s hardy native goats with semen from less hardy but more productive Nubians. We sent that semen from the U.S.

We also provided alfalfa seed, so the farm could produce its own feed for the goats, and the equipment needed for a winter feed barn. The farmers provided the material
needed to build the barn and all the labor to build it. We also imported the dairy processing equipment from Israel to process the goat milk into cheese and yogurt for schoolchildren. We provided the equipment, as well as technical support on installation and operation. North Korean engineers in the community did all assembly and follow-on work.

GRS complies fully with U.S. sanctions against the DPRK. As we were transitioning from Phase I to Phase II, we knew that we would have to figure out how to maneuver the U.S. export regulations. I asked James Min, an Ohio international trade lawyer and GRS board member, to vet everything sent to the North for the goat project. Mr. Min is Korean-American, but the reason I recruited him was his expertise on sanctions law and enforcement. As it turned out, the main line moving the goat milk through the facility, a two-inch stainless steel pipe, was determined to be dual-use and thereby in violation of U.S. law. So I asked the Israeli manufacturer to redesign the dairy and use a 1.5 inch stainless steel pipe instead so that we could be compliant with the regulations.

I always get asked about monitoring. GRS funds nearly all its projects from private contributions. GRS must show its donors that projects assist beneficiaries as envisioned.

We try to take a very pragmatic approach to monitoring and accountability. We consider the end goal of the project, the end vision of reconciliation, the 3R strategy which empowers everything we do. We don’t approach monitoring, accountability, and evaluation as a way to catch our North Korean partners in diversion. We approach it from the perspective of how can we work together to ensure the project is effective and accomplishes what we agreed should be accomplished. This is important for the local community leaders so that they can demonstrate to their constituents they are taking care of their area of responsibility. They also understand that we have to report to our supporters that the resources they provide are being used in a responsible and effective manner. If we don’t work together on this, the resources will stop coming.

For example, in the goat project, when we finished the discussion with our North Korean partners on feed parameters, the North Koreans hemmed a little and said, ‘You haven’t brought up monitoring. Everyone we work with wants to know about monitoring.’”

In this project, we had two groups of beneficiaries: the goats and the schoolchildren. I told our North Korean partners, the semen should produce new goats. The feeding
program should produce healthier goats and less loss during the winter. So over the next many months we should see more goats and healthier goats. We have toured the schools and hospitals where the products will be distributed. We have seen overall signs of moderate to chronic malnutrition. As we travel to the communities served by the goat farm on a regular basis in the future, we should see some of the same beneficiaries healthier and recovering from malnutrition as a result of the impact of this project. It is not rocket science. Results are the best indicator that what we are doing together is effective. Our DPRK partners agreed. Monitoring is built into the project, in the form of live goats and healthier children. In order to break a cycle of mistrust, systemic to the context in the DPRK, like in any partnership, you have to demonstrate trust to get trust. This is the maxim we employ along with “trust but verify” (To borrow President Reagan’s maxim). This has worked for everybody, including our donors.

The goat farm started with 1,500 goats, provided by the North Koreans. Only 800 survived the first winter. By the second year, the farmers were wintering the goats in barns they’d built and feeding them grain from GRS-provided seed. The number grew to 3,000 over the next couple of years. As the breed improved with the goat semen sent by GRS, dairy production for children’s meals quadrupled to 600 tons a year. We continue to visit the project a couple of times a year but haven’t provided support since 2008; the project has become self-sustaining and continues to grow.

A distinctive of our Phase II projects is that the workers involved receive some additional benefit from the success of the project. At the dairy, production workers can keep 10 percent of the output for personal use. Workers sometimes sell those dairy products at markets in the countryside. I see this as incentive to maximize production and nurture the context for the emergence of Phase III. Every GRS project is a partnership. In the goat project, the North Koreans provided land, labor and buildings, including all the materials needed to erect the structures. GRS provided goat semen, seed for feed, milking and dairy processing equipment, and technical advice. If each side contributes equally, each side has equal equity in success. This is very important.

The Community Development Wheel© (CDW) was the signature model for our Phase II programs, which included all four program sectors of Capacity Building, Food
Security, Global Health, and Education. The CDW encompasses cooperative farm projects that required the application of the 3R strategy, which enabled GRS to partner with local, provincial, and national actors even in sensitive political climates, to develop self-sustaining food production programs. As mentioned previously, Capacity Building Programs provide fresh water wells, cisterns, and distribution systems to over 300,000 beneficiaries annually in four different provinces. This included installing emergency back-up generators as part of the USAID/OFDA Emergency Generator Project.

The Education Program coordinated the numerous music, sports, and educational exchanges; this includes bringing in the largest delegation of U.S. citizens since the Korean War to the DPRK in April 2012, and the ongoing effort to bring the DPRK National Symphony Orchestra to the U.S.

As we built up our Global Health Programs, our medical advisors met with their counterparts to discuss what kind of projects the North Koreans were wanting. One of the first Phase II type projects they wanted was training in laparoscopic surgery. This was concerning to our medical team because of the technicality of an effective program. The North Korea doctors told us they understood that this procedure cut patient recovery time and improved outcomes. With limited resources in their country, decreasing patient recovery could have a significant effect and benefit their patients. Those benefits are real and made sense, but still our GRS medical team was thinking, “This is an advanced technique that may not be appropriate for the North. It requires a very high skill level, and even if we could train some surgeons to do it, they would have trouble replicating the training in their own country.”

Through discussions with North Korea’s Health Ministry and Ministry of Education, GRS established a partnership with the Pyongyang National Medical University. In 2002, six months after the Koreans made their first request; GRS brought a team of North Korean doctors for three months of training to the University of Mississippi Medical School, Auburn University in Alabama, and Beth Israel Medical Center in New York. Two U.S. surgeons then went to Pyongyang for a month to train North Korean surgeons and nurses. That training included pre-operative preparation, joint operations on patients, and post-operative recovery. The North Koreans then returned for a month to the Uni-
versity of Mississippi for advanced training. GRS surgeons and engineers made three more training trips to North Korea. Despite our GRS Medical Advisors initial misgivings, the impetus to scale up the training came from the North Koreans themselves.

This project is now self-sustaining. Our doctors visit the North about once a year, and we see North Koreans we haven’t trained doing the procedures we trained their teachers in, and they’ve mastered the techniques. At this point, 150 North Korean surgeons have been trained in laparoscopy, and they now perform 20,000 procedures a year. Our GRS Medical teams have observed that the North Korean physicians have excellent skills but work in a resource poor environment—which pushes them to substitute ingenuity for technology. Training in laparoscopic surgery is quite expensive, in part because of the equipment. In the U.S., medical students use a laparoscopic surgery simulator, a high-priced piece of equipment. Part of what the simulator does is impose a barrier between hands and eyes, so surgeons learn to follow their hand movements magnified on a monitor, rather than looking directly at their hands. In North Korea, students use a simple box, with high-resolution cameras inside it, in place of the simulator. They are able to master the technique using this much cheaper solution.

Now as GRS transitions to Phase III, we are positioning our leadership to provide the superstructure for an American business membership association, administered by GRS staff pro tempore, to facilitate economic engagement and exchange between American business communities and the DPRK business communities; this includes additional business missions, pilot corporate investments, and capacity building workshops for DPRK state actors on international legal frameworks, foreign investments, labor and employment law and standards.

Dealing with difficult relationships, the first step to resolution is understanding. You can never get progress if you don’t understand where the other party is coming from, the factors that motivate or threaten them. While we might not agree with the North’s military policies and priorities. It’s important for us to try to understand how they see the world, and why they see it that way. Until you reach that point of understanding—it’s not a question of agreeing—you’re stuck in relationship dysfunction that neither side can get past.
The precursor to our transition to Phase III has already been developed. In 2006, some of our business and legal experts worked through GRS to offer one-week to ten day courses in American English held in Beijing for professors from the Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies. Our team has taught many subjects including legal concepts and terminology. During these seminars on legal education, the North Korean Professors asked questions about U.S. licensing practices. Our GRS experts taught international trade law and the specialized vocabulary of contracts.

One of our GRS experts gave an overview of the U.S. judicial system. During this discussion one of the DPRK Professors asked about the difference between a lawyer and a lobbyist. During these seminars each student had a workstation, with internet access, and we could see a young student was doing Google searches on NBA scores, and another was downloading a Britney Spears MP3 file. One of our GRS instructors recalls thinking, “That’s exactly what students in the U.S. would be doing.”

It is important for Phase III to become a reality and for GRS to be a significant catalyst for reconciliation to continue our efforts to build bridges of understanding. This will not only model our 3R Strategy, but will help put energy behind movement toward normalizing relationships. Bringing the DPRK’s National Symphony Orchestra to the U.S. tops our agenda of unfinished business. We spent three years arranging a U.S. concert tour. The Symphony was to have played a three city tour starting in Atlanta and a final performance at Lincoln Center in April 2012. The Symphony is the national pride of the country—more than the monuments, the architecture. Music and artistic ability are especially honored and respected in Korean culture. The Symphony represents the best of their country, something the people are particularly proud of and because of the importance of the Symphony to the North Korean people, and its visit would represent much more than musical cultural exchange. It would help make other things possible.

GRS will leverage the 16-year relationship with local, provincial, and national actors and niche regional and technical expertise, developed over Phase I and II, to promote and establish economic ventures. In the final phase, a permanent liaison office in the DPRK will be established. An organic outflow of this will be the replication of the GRS model in third countries in collaboration with DPRK partners.
GRS’ most complex undertaking in North Korea to date was bringing the Sons of Jubal chorus to perform at an international arts festival in April 2012. This project demonstrates the level of trust that can be developed and what can be accomplished when politics and government officials from all sides step back and allow private citizens to engage. The chorus, 150 musicians and educators from Georgia, landed in Pyongyang the day after what the North declared was an unsuccessful satellite launch, widely seen in the U.S. as a missile test. Given the sour political mood between the U.S. and North Korea, chorus members didn’t know what kind of welcome they would receive.

When the chorus music director, Dr. Jon Duncan of Atlanta, returned to the U.S., he recalls this question at a press conference, “You were there to sing as a Christian group in a communist country. Were there any restrictions on what you could sing?” Dr. Duncan responded, “The short answer is no, but the longer answer—still no—is more interesting.”

We made an advance trip to Pyongyang in January 2012, to discuss the chorus’ visit and scout performance locations. The North Korean officials organizing the festival asked Dr. Duncan about the music the chorus would perform. He answered that his traditional program was a mix of classical music, popular Broadway tunes, and songs of faith. The chorus had also worked hard to learn songs in Korean and planned to sing those as well. “What kinds of songs of faith?” the North Koreans asked. Dr. Duncan explained these would be chosen for their theme of reconciliation—“Amazing Grace,” “Thou, O Lord” from Psalm 3, and “Battle Hymn of the Republic.”

“Songs of faith,” the North Koreans initially said, “this could be a problem.” So when the Sons of Jubal arrived in Pyongyang in April 2012, they weren’t sure what program they would actually perform. Immediately upon the chorus’ arrival, officials from the DPRK’s Ministry of Culture met us and said, “Please do your full program, including your songs of faith.”

The chorus included early in its program a song known to every North Korean, “Red Sky of Steel Refined.” The group sang the lyrics both in English and in Korean, and the audience response was thunderous. “Red Sky” tells of a father’s love for his people, and for North Koreans, that father is Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s first and longest-serving leader. But for the members of the chorus, the lyrics told of God’s love for His
children. “That’s the thing about music. It’s universal, because it’s open to interpretation,” reported Dr. Duncan. “We connected to the audience with that song, because we had clearly worked so hard on something that had a particular meaning for our listeners. We sang it in their own language. And the audience responded in the way that touches the hearts of musicians everywhere.”

The Korean audience gave the same thunderous response to a song that followed “Red Sky,” the “Battle Hymn of the Republic.” When we introduced “Battle Hymn,” to the audience we explained the significance of that song in American history--that it had been written during our Civil War, that its singing during the war transcended North and South because it had been sung so widely on both sides even as the war raged on. It has been reported that during one battle in the Civil War in America, when each side heard the other singing this song, they decided they had more in common with each other than different. The audience in the DPRK connected to it in a way that Americans may have during our Civil War.

Perhaps most surprising of all, was the response when the Chorus sang ‘Amazing Grace,’ the audience, which included many North Korean musicians, hummed along. The North Koreans unexpectedly asked the Americans to give the same program in the same hall the next evening. The Sons of Jubal stayed in the DPRK for almost a week, and, in addition to performances at various venues around Pyongyang, traveled south to the DMZ, approaching it from the North Korean side. The chorus members were taken to a room their North Korean guide called the exchange room--half in North Korea, half in the South, a thin black line down the middle to separate the two sides--exchange room, they were told, because bodies are exchanged there. As our North Korean guide took us to the DMZ line, he gave us a stern lecture about American imperialism, American aggression, that he said the United States had committed against North Korea and its people. “We held off the American invasion,” the solider told us. He was very severe. His presentation was difficult for all of us to listen to, but especially for the oldest members of our group, who had been in the Korean War. The 150 Americans listened in silence.

When the soldier finished, someone in the group asked him to take our pictures,
then, he got in the pictures, we started talking, we smiled, he smiled, and the whole mood changed. Before we left, the soldier in uniform—the same guy—asked us to sing the Star Spangled Banner—on the North Korean side of the DMZ!

In line with our program priorities, we work with are those who administer the policies set by the senior leadership—central and local government officials, farm managers, educators, and health professionals. Our counterparts are generally well-trained and motivated but lack the resources they need to do their jobs. The people we work with want a better future for their country. We make a particular effort to demonstrate who America and Americans really are by engaging the DPRK young people, whenever we have opportunity. When I read about North Korea in the international press, I often feel like I’m reading about life on some alien planet, a place where nothing works, and where robotic people live in a joyless, treeless moonscape. The reality is more complicated. Over the 16 years I have been traveling to the DPRK, the country has changed. North Koreans take pride in their architecture; in newer sections of the city, pastel-colored buildings rise 40 stories and more. Traffic moves in the wide avenues, increasingly late model passenger cars made in North Korea in a joint venture with Fiat. Residents are well-dressed and have the look of people with places to go. While there’s energy in their movement, the people themselves are smaller and thinner than South Koreans, the result of long-term food shortages—a hardship that appears to be shared at least to some degree among the populace in urban and rural areas. While many western North Korea watchers maintain the elite is concentrated in Pyongyang while the rest of the country suffers, it is interesting to note that nearly everyone I’ve met in the capital has relatives—parents, siblings, children—who live in other parts of the country. When I’m in the countryside, residents often tell me they have family in the capital.

Life in the countryside is definitely harder than in the capital, akin to the gap in living standards between rural and urban areas in many countries. Work in the countryside is more likely to involve manual labor, like farming, as opposed to office work. The clothing is functional, as opposed to the fashion in Pyongyang. Some highly educated people I have worked with in the countryside say they’d rather live outside of Pyongyang because the air is cleaner and their houses are bigger. They also say it’s easier to grow
their own food to supplement their rations, though intervals between government-
provided rations may be longer.

I often question press reports that the North’s leadership tries to convince the North Korean people they are living in a socialist paradise. People know they are hungry and their children are hungry. They tell us this is the most difficult time since the period after the Korean War. While the North Korean media blames this on the U.S., I couldn’t say whether everyone believes that or not. North Koreans are polite to us up front as individuals, and over time we can develop friendships, but anti-American feeling is pretty deep.

Given North Korea’s mistrust of the United States, the first time GRS goes into a new community the local people are suspicious. Initially, there is usually fear about working with us and this is something we have to overcome. The fact that we keep going back to the same communities on a long-term basis, and always have Korean speakers on our team, has helped us a lot. The GRS experience is that over time attitudes change. It takes a couple of years, but we ultimately develop working relationships and friendships with the people and communities where we work. Usually, North Korean officials, from the central and local governments, help us develop relationships in the community.

GRS’ end goal of reconciliation would mean our children can freely be friends with their children. North Korea would become a normal part of the international community. One in three North Korean children wouldn’t be malnourished. Reconciliation is also important for the international community. When President Clinton visited the DMZ in 1994, he called it the “scariest place on earth.” In some ways it’s just as dangerous today. With reconciliation, we wouldn’t be facing a constant threat in Northeast Asia. We would be able to use our own resources more wisely to help our own people.

I have no hand in the nuclear and missile issues on the U.S. national security agenda. That’s between governments. But, as Americans travel and work in North Korea, and North Koreans come to the U.S. for training, these steps can build mutual understanding and lead to better outcomes. Our focus is on human security. And the fact is, our success in increasing food production inside the North, and improving access to health care and education there, comes from working cooperatively with our North Korean counterparts.
GRS’ work is about change—change in the North such as modernization in health and agriculture, change in the relationship between the U.S and the North—and that means building positive relationships with key change agents in the DPRK.
Capacity Building and North Korea: 
The Chinese Experience

HAN Xian-dong 
(Pyongyang Business School)
북한의 개발역량 강화: 중국의 경험

능력 구축이란 일반적으로 인재의 육성, 조직 기구의 발전과 제도나 법률체계의 발전 등을 포함한 개념이다. 지난 30여 년 동안 중국의 개혁개방과정이 어떤 측면에서 능력 구축이란 과정이라고 말할 수 있다. 그 동안 중국은 유학생과 공무원들을 선진국으로 보냄을 통해 개혁개방 정책을 지속적으로 추진하는 추동력을 육성하고 있는 동시에 정부조직 구조와 법률체제를 많이 변화시켜서 중국국가차원뿐 아니라 사회차원의 능력이 많이 강화되었다. 지금 조선이 실질적으로 이미 체제의 전환기에 들어가서 인재의 육성과 관련 법률체제의 구축에 착수하여 그의 개발 능력을 강화하고 있다. 이런 차원에서 보면 국제사회가 어떤 종류의 포로젝트를 만들어 조선의 인재 육성 사업에 도움을 제공할 것은 큰 의미를 있을 것이다.
Abstract

Capacity Building and North Korea:
The Chinese Experience

Capacity building is a concept which generally encompasses the cultivation of talent, the enhancement of organizational system a, and the development of a legal system. In some respects, the reform and opening which China embarked upon over thirty years ago can be viewed as an exercise in capacity building. Throughout this reform period, China has built momentum by continuously pushing reform and opening through the dispatch of civil servants and exchange students to advanced countries. Over the same period of time, the PRC reformed its legal system and the organizational structure of the government which spurred the strengthening of capacity in both societal and national dimensions. North Korea, which has entered into a transitional period, is currently strengthening its developmental capacity by undertaking to foster talent and to develop a related legal framework. In consideration of these developments, it would be very meaningful if the international community put together a project which could contribute to North Korea’s talent promotion initiative.
Ⅰ. 서론

능력 구축이란 상대적으로 넓은 내용을 갖고 있는 개념이며, 일반적으로 다음과 같은 세 방면의 내용을 포함한다. 첫째, 인재의 육성(human resource development)이다. 이 과정에서는 주로 이해, 기술, 정보와 지식의 접근 등에 대한 훈련을 통해 사람들에게 직무를 수행하는 능력을 제고시킨다. 둘째, 조직 기구의 발전(organizational development)이다. 그것은 주로 관리구조, 관리과정과 절차의 개선과 관련된다. 그것은 하나의 조직 내부의 각 부서간의 관계개선뿐만 아니라 다른 조직이나 부문들 사이의 관계개선을 포함한다. 서부의 관계 개선을 통해 각각 부문간의 관계는 더 조화롭게 되며, 문제를 해결하는 효율도 높일 수 있다. 셋째, 제도나 법률체제의 발전(institutional and legal framework development)이다. 주요 법률과 규정의 제정을 통해 각 조직, 제도 및 부문은 전체적인 수준과 단계에서 능력과 효율이 제고된다. 능력 구축은 종합적인 프로젝트(project)라고 할 수 있으며, 여기서 서술한 세 부문은 서로 영향을 미칠 수 있고 서로 촉진할 수 있다. 그렇지만 그 중 인재의 육성이 가장 핵심적인 부분이라고 할 수 있다. 연수와 훈련을 통해 사람들 사상성향과 태도 그리고 행위방식을 변화시킴으로써 조직기구와 법률체제의 발전과 변화를 촉진시킬 수 있기 때문이다.

개발도상국이나 전환기에 처한 국가들에 있어서 능력 구축은 매우 중요한 과제라고 할 수 있다. 중국은 1970년대 후반기부터 개혁개방 정책을 실시했으며 지금까지 이미 30년이 넘었다. 중국 개혁개방의 과정도 사실 능력 구축의 과정이었다. 그러한 과정을 통해 지난 30여 년 동안 중국의 사상관념이나 행위능력, 중국의 조직기구나 법률체제는 모두 대단한 변화가 발생하였다. 그러한 변화로 인하여 중국의 국가능력뿐만 아니라 중국의 사회능력도 크게 제고되었다. 그렇기 때문에 중국의 그러한 과정이 성공했고 할 수 있으며 관련된 중국의 경험이 참고할 만한 가치를 갖고 있다 것이다.

오늘의 시대는 지구화 시대이다. 비록 여러 가지 원인들로 인해 조선의 체제 전환과정은 매우 느리지만, 우리나 조선의 인정 여부와 상관없이 조선체제는 사실상 이미 전환과정에 들어갔다고 할 수 있다. 이런 차원에서 볼 때 조선의 능력구축 문제를 논의하는 것은 큰 의미를 갖고 있다. 왜냐하면 이 문제가 조선내부 개인들의 사상과 행위방식의 변화뿐만 아니라 조선정부의 관리능력 제고와 미래 정책의 방향, 심지어는 한반도와 동북아 국제정세의 발전과 밀접한 관계를 갖고 있기 때문이다.

이 글이 주요 다음과 세 부분의 내용을 포함한다. 첫째, 주로 중국의 개혁개방 과정에서 능력 구축의 실천과 경험을 고찰하고 소개할 것이다. 둘째, 이미 시작한 조선의 능력 구축
과 이에 대한 중국의 참여 상황을 고찰할 것이다. 그리고 마지막으로 결론 부분에서는 대안적인 전이를 제시하고자 한다.

Ⅱ. 능력 구축: 중국의 경험이

1970년대 말부터 개혁개방 정책을 실시한 중국은 능력 구축 분야에서 큰 성과를 이루었다고 말할 수 있다. 지난 30여 년 동안의 경험을 보면 중국은 주로 다음과 같은 세 가지 측면에서 능력 구축을 진행해오고 있다.

1. 인재의 육성

개혁개방 정책을 실시한 후 중국은 많은 외국전문가들을 초청하여 그들에게 중국에서 일하게 하는 동시에 많은 유학생과 정부 공무원들을 해외로 파견하여 그들에게 해외에서 공부와 연수를 시켜 인재를 육성해오고 있다.


북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망

국외에서 공부한 유학생들이 중국으로 돌아와 대학, 과학연구기관, 국유기업, 정부 기관에서 일하고 중권 역할을 담당하면서 중국의 국가능력과 사회능력의 성장을 촉진하는 중요한 역량이 되었다. 물론 학업을 끝내고 중국으로 돌아오지 않고 해외에서 체류하는 중국유학생도 많았다. 그런데 해외에 체류했던 중국학자들이 최근에는 중국으로 귀국하는 경우가 많아지고 있으며, 그들이 중국의 대학, 과학연구기관, 비정부기구, 민간사회 등에서 일하면서 중국과 세계를 소통하는 다리가 됨으로써 중국에 많은 변화를 가져오고 있다.

개혁개방정책의 발전에 따라 중국은 계속해서 유학생을 해외로 보내는 동시에 정부의 관리능력을 제고하기 위해 계획적으로 정부관원을 선발하여 해외로 보내고 그들에게 개혁개방과 관련한 지식를 공부하도록 했다. 그런 프로젝트들 중에 가장 대표적인 것이 바로 1998년에 시작한 "신세계 하버드 고급공무원연수 프로젝트"이다. 이 프로젝트는 중국공산당 중앙조직부에서 연수할 간부에 대한 선발을 책임졌는데, 매년 12명을 선발하였다. 선발된 간부들은 일반적으로 국장급 이상의 간부이었고 하버드대학교에서 4개월 또는 2~4주의 연수를 받았다. 2002년 이후 이 프로젝트에서 선발된 간부의 규모가 매년 60명 정도로 확대되었다. 2003년 중국공산당은 인재공작회의를 열고 대규모 간부 연수를 전개하라는 결정을 내리고 5년 동안 전국현급 관급, 장관급 이상의 간부들이 적어도 한 번의 연수를 받아야 한다고 결정하였다. 그 이후 재정상황이 좋은 지방의 성(省)이나 시(市)에서 계획적으로 관원들을 선발하여 해외로 보내고 그들에게 3~6개월 동안의 연수를 받도록 했다. 그리고 그들의 주요 목적지는 미국이었다.


이러한 과정을 통해 많은 중국간부들이 해외에서 공부한 경험을 가지게 되었다. 북경시의 경우 1999년부터 북경시장급 이상의 간부를 선발하여 그들에게 해외연수를 시키기 시작하였으며, 국장급 간부와 처장급 간부의 연수기간은 각각 1개월과 3개월이었다. 1999년부터 2008년까지 북경시가 해외로 보내는 처장급 이상의 간부들이 모두 1119명에 달하였다. 이외에도 지난 30여 년 동안 중국은 해외로 대수의 경제와 사회관리 분야의 고급관광을 파견하였다.
재원 낭비나 연수효과의 미흡한 등으로 인해 그 동안 중국관원들의 해외연수는 많이 비난을 받았지만 중국관원들이 해외에서 공부와 연수하면서 그들의 시야를 넓혀고 그들의 사상과 행위의 변화를 야기시킨 것도 사실이라고 말할 수 있다.

2. 조직기구의 발전


3. 제도와 법률 체제의 발전


2003년부터 2008년까지의 제10기 전국인민대표대회와 그 상임위원회는 헌법수정안 초안, 법률초안, 법률해석초안과 관련된 결정초안 등 106건을 심의하였으며, 그 중의 100건을 통과시켰다.

2008년 3월부터 직무를 수행한 제11기 전국인민대표대회와 그의 상임위원회는 2009년 8월까지 법률 229건을 제정하였다. 같은 시기 중국국무원은 행정법규 682건을 제정하였으며 지방인민대표대회와 그 상임위원회는 지방법규 7000여건을 제정하였다. 상하(深圳)을 비롯한 다섯 개 경제특구는 법규 200여 건을 제정하였고 국무원 부문과 지방정부가 규정 20000여건을 만들었다. 이러한 법률, 법규와 규정들도 기본적으로 중국의 경제, 정치와 사회 등 분야의 활동을 관리하도록 할 수 있으며, 이로써 중국의 정부관리나 경제와 사회활동이 점차 규범화 되고 있다고 할 수 있을 것이다.

바로 위에 서술한 세 가지의 능력을 구축을 통해 지난 30여 년 동안 중국은 정부차원뿐만 아니라 사회차원에서도 거대한 변화가 발생하였으며, 중국 자체의 현대화가 촉진되는 동시에 중국도 점차 국제사회에 융합되어 있다.

Ⅲ. 조선의 능력구축과 중국의 참여


비록 조선의 개혁개방 속도는 느리고 정체상태에 빠져 있지만 위에서 서술한 정책들의 실행에 따라 조선도 관련 능력구축을 시작하였다. 실제 상황을 보면 조선이 중앙계획경제체제에 대한 개혁을 아직까지 하지 않았고 또 관련 정부부처에 대한 개혁과 조정도 시작하지 않았지만, 그의 능력 구축의 시도는 주요 다음과 같은 두 가지 측면에서 나타나고 있다.

첫째, 관련 제도와 법률체제의 구축이다. 1984년 9월에 조선이 '합영법'을 제정하였으므로
며, 1991년 12월에 나진·선봉 자유경제 무역구를 설치한 후 『외국인투자법』, 『합작법』과 『외국독자기업법』을 제정하였다. 1992년에는 조선이 헌법 제37조를 수정하였으며, 1993년에 특별한 지역에 대한 투자에 적용하는 『자유경제무역지법』과 금융기구의 투자에 적용하는 『외국인투자은행법』 등을 제정하였다. 1995년에 조선이 계속해서 『대외경제계약법』, 『대외경제민사법』, 『공증법』 등을 제정하고 이미 존재한 법이나 새로 제정한 법에 대한 실시 세칙을 수정하거나 제정하였다. 비록 조선의 이러한 법률체계는 강한 조선 특색을 가지고 있어 국제적인 관례에 부합하지 않은 점이 많지만 법률을 제정하는 것 자체와 조선이 점점 법률 체제를 갖고 행정명령과 개인이 사회경제와 사회생활을 관리하는 상태에서 벗어나고 있는 것을 보여준다. 2010년 중국과 조선이 나진·선봉 경제무역구와 황금평과 위화도경제구의 개발에 대한 연합 지도위원회를 설치한 후 조선이 또 다시 『나진·선봉 경제무역지법』을 제정하여 『황금평, 위화도경제구법』을 제정하였다.

둘째, 인재의 육성과 관련하여, 어려운 예산과 국제환경 등의 요소로 인해 냉전체제가 해체된 후에 조선이 해외로 파견한 고찰단이나 방문단과 유학생 수가 많이 감소하였다. 하지만 최근 몇 년 동안 그런 상황이 다소 개선되고 있으며 일단 조건이 나아지면 조선당국이 보다 적극적인 태도를 보일 수 있을 것이다. 물론 중국이 주요 목적지가 되어 있다. 최근 10년 동안 중국에 온 조선의 대표단 상황이 아래의 표와 같다.

### 중국을 방문한 조선 대표단 상황

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북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 자식공유: 성과 및 향후전망
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위 표의 자료는 필자가 지난 및 년 동안 중국을 방문하거나 고찰한 조선대표단에 대한
신문보도를 기초로 간단히 정리한 자료로 중국을 방문한 조선대표단의 전부를 포함하지
는 않는다. 이로부터 보았을 때, 중국을 방문하거나 고찰한 조선대표단은 국가차원뿐만
아니라 지방차원도 볼 수 있다. 일반적으로 조선대표단의 규모는 크지 않았지만 대표단
성원들이 중국에서 본 것이 그들의 사상에 영향을 미칠 수밖에 없을 것이다.
조선유학생 상황에 대하여는 냉전체제가 끝난 후 조선이 해외로 파견한 유학생의 수
가 대폭 감소되었다는 것은 주지의 사실이다. 하지만 최근 이러한 상황의 변화 움직임이
나타나고 있다. 중국에서 공부하고 있는 조선유학생은 중국과 조선의 관련 협의에 따라
매년 교환 유학생 60명 정도의 규모를 유지하고 있다. 지금 중국에서 공부하고 있는 조
선유학생 총수는 수 백 명 정도인데, 그들 중에는 공비유학생이 있고 자비유학생도 있다.
심양(沈陽)에 위치한 동북대학은 조선유학생이 가장 많은 중국대학이며 현재 100명 정도
의 조선 유학생들이 공부하고 있는데, 그들 중에는 조선의 김책 공업대학교에서 온 교수 9
명이 포함되어 있다. 전공을 보면 조선유학생의 대다수는 이학과 공학을 공부하고 있고
외국어나 법률을 전공으로 하는 조선유학생들도 있다. 자비로 중국에서 공부하고 있는 조
선유학생들의 대부분은 그들의 부모가 중국에서 일하고 있는 경우이다.
중국으로 대학교 교사들을 파견하고 있는 것으로 나진-선봉경제무역구와 황금명, 위
화도경제구를 설치한 후 조선정부는 2011년 11월부터 지방관원들을 중국으로 보내 그들
이 중국에서 훈련을 받도록 했다. 이 프로젝트에서는 “나선(羅先)경제무역구와 황금명, 위
화도 경제구 관리관원연수반”을 꾸리고 연구기한은 3주로 한다. 매기 피교육자의 수
는 100명 정도인데, 각각 덕진대학과 대련행정학원에서 연수를 받으며 연수내용이 주로
중국의 개발구 건설에 대한 이론과 실전 등이다. 지금까지 이 프로젝트를 통해 이미 3회의
교육이 이루어졌다. 조선이 정부관원들을 중국으로 보내고 그들에게 연수를 받도록 하는 것은 중국과 조선
의 경제협력이 과거 무역을 주요방식으로 한 모델에서 무역, 투자와 개발구 건설을 동시
에 추진하는 모델로 전환하고 있다는 것을 보여준다.
중국을 방문한 조선 대표단 성원들과 중국에 있어서 공부한 조선유학생과 정부관원들이 이
러한 과정을 거쳐 사상에 어떠한 변화가 있었는지에 대한 실증적인 연구(empirical
study)는 없지만, 중국의 경험으로부터 유추해 보면 그러한 변화가 있었을 것으로 추정할
수 있다.

북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 자식공유: 성과 및 향후전망
Ⅳ. 대안적인 건의: 결론을 대신하여

지난 30여 년 동안 중국의 능력구축은 성공했다고 할 수 있는데, 중국의 경험을 보면 그러한 성공에는 필요 조건이 있다. 우선 중국의 안보환경이 개선되었다. 1978년에 시작된 중국의 개혁과 개방은 중국과 미국의 관계 개선의 전제하에서 진행될 수 있었다. 비록 그럴기는 했지만, 최초 중국의 개방시험지로 중국의 정치중심에서 2300킬로미터 떨어진 광둥성과 북진성(福建省)연해주가 위치한 작은 도시들이 선택되었다. 대내적인 개혁도 먼저 안휘성(安徽省) 농촌에서의 시험을 거쳐 농촌지역부터 시작되었으며, 5년 후에 비로소 도시에 있는 공장 개혁이 시작되었다. 개혁의 내용을 보면 중국은 먼저 관리방식에 대한 개혁부터 시작하여 개혁을 10년 동안 지속적으로 진행한 후 비로소 물가개혁을 하고, 15년 후에 다시 소유제 개혁에 들어갔다. 그래서 중국의 개혁개방과정은 조심스러운 과정이라고 할 수 있으며 그 과정은 느꼈지만 중요한 것은 지속되었다는 것이다. 조선당국은 당시 중국당국과 유사한 사유(思維)를 가지고 있을 것이다. 국가안보가 보증되지 못한 상황에서 지속적인 개혁개방과정도 없을 것이다. 그래서 조선의 지속적인 변화를 원한다면, 국가안보에 대한 그들의 관심을 고려해야 한다.

그 다음으로 능력구축과정에서는 새로운 인재의 육성이 가장 중요하다고 생각한다. 개혁개방정책이 시작되자마자 중국고위관원들이 해외로 가서 선진국의 상황을 고찰한 후 그들의 원래 생각을 포기하였다. 해외로 파견된 대규모의 유학생들이 중국의 개혁개방을 지속적으로 추진한 중요한 투자였다. 그린데 인재 육성을 성공적으로 추진하기 위해 중요한 요소는 예산과 경비이다. 중국이 개혁개방을 시작했을 때 예산 상황이 어려웠기 때문에, 홍콩과 외국의 회사나 재단이 관련한 프로젝트를 만들어 중국 관원들의 고칠비용이나 중국 유학생의 비용을 제공하였다. 유명한 하버드 연구 프로젝트의 경비는 바로 홍콩의 신세계회사가 제공한 것이었다. 그래서 국제사회는 어떤 종류의 프로젝트를 만들어 조선 유학생들에게 도움을 제공하는 것이 조선의 능력구축에 중요한 의미가 있을 것이다.
North Koreans at Home and Abroad: Case Studies in Educational Exchanges

Capacity Building and North Korea: Pyongyang University of Science and Technology
Ko Dong-hoon (Pyongyang University of Science & Technology)

Experiences in Capacity Development Programs in the DPRK: Opportunities, Challenges and Successes
Katharina Zellweger (Stanford University)

Educational Exchanges with North Korea: A Russian Experience
Vladimir I. Kurilov (Far Eastern Federal University)

Discussants
Zang Hyoung-soo (Hanyang University)
Tsuchiyama Jitsuo (Aoyama Gakuin University)
Kim Seok-hwan (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
Capacity Building and North Korea: 
Pyongyang University of Science and Technology

Ko Dong-hoon
(Pyongyang University of Science & Technology)
북한의 개발역량 강화:
평양과학기술대학 사례

평양과학기술대학(PEST)은 2010년 10월 개원 이래로 북한의 교육성과 국제재단인 NAFEC (동북아교육문화협력재단)이 공동으로 운영 하고 있다. 평양과학기술대학은 북한 학생 들에게 완전히 영어로 구성된 학부 및 대학 원 프로그램을 제공하고 있으며, 매년 100명의 학부생과 30명의 대학원생을 선발 하고 있다. 현재 400명의 학부생과 100명의 대학원생이 3개의 기숙사에서 마을하며 수학 하고 있다. 평양과학기술대학은 대한민국, 미국, 캐나다, EU, 중국을 비롯한 여러 국 가들의 수많은 개인과 단체의 인도주의적 배려로 운영을 지속하고 있다.
Abstract

Pyongyang University of Science and Technology
- Tomorrow’s Leader in Global Education

Pyongyang University of Science & Technology (PUST) located at Rak Rang district in Pyongyang, DPRK, is jointly operated by the Ministry of Education, DPRK and an international foundation (The North-East Asia Foundation for Education and Culture, NAFEC in Seoul) since its opening in October, 2010. PUST offers both undergraduate and graduate programs to DPRK students in a fully English speaking environment. PUST admits 100 undergraduate students and about 30 graduate students each year. Currently 400 undergraduate and 100 graduate students have enrolled and lived in three dormitories. PUST is the work of a countless number of concerned individuals and donors from South Korea, the United States, Canada, the European Union, China, and many other countries that have come together in a spirit of humanitarian concern.
PUST has been founded to build a higher education institution that will help DPRK develop the necessary economic and intellectual infrastructure to function as a member of the international community as an equal partner and pave the way for an open society. All the curricula were very similar to those of western universities and textbooks and teaching materials are directly brought mainly from the States. Currently, about seventy international faculty and staff from 10 different countries serve the PUST students in a hope of fostering future generation with globalized mind.

By promoting academic meetings, both faculty and student exchange programs with international universities, and study abroad program, PUST tries to vitalize the exchange between North Korea and the outer world including South Korea in the near future. These exchange programs and study abroad programs will play an important role in establishing the academic cooperation system in Northeast Asia as well as in Europe. PUST already successfully hosted 1st International Conference at PUST campus in October, 2011 and will held 2nd one this coming October. Among participants were a Nobel laureate, an astronaut, and a House of the Lord member along with 32 world prominent scholars.

PUST already sent three ECE (Electrical & Computer Engineering) graduate students for their master degree in London (University of Westminster) last September and two ALS students in Harbin, China, as part of exchange research program. Four IFM (International Finance & Management) students had visited YUST (Yanbian University of Science and Technology) for their research from last October to this past April. This year again PUST will send its students to Europe and China: four ALS students had already gotten admissions with full scholarships from Uppsala University, Sweden and two IFM students from Cambridge University, two ALS students are on the way to Harbin University.

PUST became an official IELTS test site in DPRK in the middle of pursuing study abroad processes. In addition to this exchange program, 18 students and 5 NK faculty members made a week-long China trip to Beijing and Tianjin in June, 2012. It was an eye opening experience for them to carry throughout their lives that also satisfies our vision of globalization. This international trip will be continued with more countries in mind. PUST will send out its first crops next year! Forty five graduate students will graduate with master
degree in March, 2014 and 100 undergraduate students in October, 2014.

PUST’s goals are:
• to assemble a first-rate faculty and student body with proven academic potential;
• to educate DPRK students who can contribute their talents to aiding their country to reach its optimum potential in academic, social and economic development;
• to form an industry cluster with foreign firms operating in North Korea to provide first-hand experience to students seeking practical knowledge;
• to raise future generations of innovative global leaders.

Research Programs:
PUST seeks to increase the efficiency of both scholarly and research capacities through a centralized organizational structure. To accomplish this, PUST will establish a Research and Development Center to provide an active and creative environment focusing on:
• training in the fundamentals of research;
• maintaining an operation that is conducive to the development of advanced sciences;
• encouraging the interdisciplinary nature of research.

During their academic studies, students will have the opportunity to put theory into practice, engaging in research that caters to their interests. Each academic program will operate its own division within the center that will serve as the basis for interdisciplinary and collaborative research. Joint programs with research centers of other educational institutions, including foreign universities, also will be encouraged.

Collaboration with Other Universities:
The successful establishment of PUST is a task that requires unprecedented cooperation among individuals and institutions internationally. A number of cooperative agreements have already been signed with South Korean and US universities, including
several European universities who are cooperating through an Erasmus Mundus project, but PUST is open to still other agreements.

**Academic Departments - (Both undergraduate and graduate)**

*ECE (Electrical and Computer Engineering)*

ECE training will help the young people of North Korea to look beyond their borders and become proficient in the areas of electrical engineering and computer science. The development of electronic industries will aid North Korea to become economically self-reliant and supply needed expertise in the IT field.

*IFM (International Finance and Management)*

IFM will train management or supervisory level students in international finance and market economy to find ways to stimulate economic development in North Korea.

*ALS (Agriculture and Life Sciences)*

Students will be trained in agricultural and life science areas of study to help North Korea produce environmentally friendly food and maintain an adequate supply of food for its citizens.

*FL (School of Foreign Languages)*

Intensive English is taught to all students at PUST to prepare them for taking their major class lectures which are taught in English.

Undergraduate students take one 90 minute speaking/listening class and one 90 minute reading/writing class every morning, Mon-Fri, for two semesters. These are assessed classes, with graded homework, unit tests and final exams. In the first semester, classes start with a pre-intermediate level textbook, and then in the second semester, intermediate level textbooks are used. They have additional English workshops for four
afternoons each week which are more relaxed, additional practice sessions. These one-
hour workshops include further listening practice, pronunciation, and ‘clinic’ times, 
where students are able to ask questions about issues arising from the morning classes.

Graduate students study intensive English for one semester; they take one 90-minute 
reading/writing class and one 90 minute speaking/listening class every morning from 
Mon-Fri. Upper-intermediate to advanced level English textbooks are used. In addition, 
they have afternoon workshops for pronunciation, listening and ‘clinic’. Later in their 
course of study, they receive classes in speech/presentations and in thesis writing skills.

In addition to English, all PUST students are to learn Chinese as a second language. 
Undergraduate students take 80 hours per semester for two semesters while graduate 
students take 120 hours for one semester.

**SMS (School of Medical Sciences)**

SMS planning to open next year will train students and perform research in medical 
science areas such as Medicine, Dentistry, public Health, and Nursing in addition to 
Medical school.

**IC (Industrial Cluster)**

Through the international corporations that take residence within PUST, top-
level human resources will be trained at PUST to increase the competitive edge and joint 
venture businesses to aid in economic development in DPR Korea.

**Join our Faculty**

PUST plans to recruit approximately 200 faculty members over the next ten years 
from prestigious universities and research institutions in the United States, Europe, 
South Korea, and other countries who will provide a diverse education and exposure to 
the best thinking in the educational world. All instruction is to be given in English. 
These faculty members will lead in the classroom work and in the research laboratories
as permanent faculty members or as visiting faculty members or special lecturers who rotate in and out of the campus on a carefully planned basis. Academics holding doctoral or master’s degrees who are interested in joining in this exciting work are invited to contact us at the email address provided.
Experiences in Capacity
Development Programs in the DPRK:
Opportunities, Challenges and Successes

Katharina ZELLWEGER
(Stanford University)
북한의 젊은 세대 사이에서 세상이 어떻게 돌아가는지에 대한 지적인 호기심이 크게 증가하고 있다. SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation)는 북한과의 모든 프로젝트와 프로그램에 다양한 요소의 역량강화 프로그램을 포함한다. 그 변화가 느린 과정으로 진행되기 때문에 결과가 쉽게 관측되지 않지만 트레이닝 코스, 교육프로그램, 다른 국가로의 여행 등은 북한이 세상을 바라보는 관점과 그들의 환경에 영향을 주는 시발점이 된다. 새로운 아이디어와 생각을 이해하게 될 뿐만 아니라 점진적으로 프로젝트와 프로그램에 예속되기로써 장기적인 영향을 줄 수 있을 것이다.
Abstract

Experiences in Capacity Development Programs in the DPRK:
Opportunities, Challenges and Successes

The hunger for information in the DPRK, for learning how the world functions, has increased especially among the younger generation. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation included different elements of capacity development in all its projects and programs with the DPRK. Although the results in this field cannot be assessed easily because change is a slow process, training courses and educational programs as well as exposure tours to different countries are all initiatives with an impact on how North Koreans view the world and their own circumstances. New ideas and concepts could not only be understood, but also gradually included into projects and programs, thus having a long-term impact.
Capacity building and knowledge sharing with North Korea is indeed a topic with great relevance at present. Little did I realize what a short encounter with a North Korean official at a UN meeting in Beijing in August 1993 would lead to! In fact, since spring 1995 I have been actively involved in humanitarian aid and development assistance to the DPRK, including during five years, from 2006 to 2011, as a resident in Pyongyang heading the office of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

My talk will focus on the following main points:

• Examples of capacity development projects in the DPRK and
• The challenges and the opportunities

In Pyongyang, as one of the few resident agencies, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) experimented for several years with various projects in the field of capacity development.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines capacity development as the process through which individuals, organizations, and societies obtain, strengthen, and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time.

Regarding North Korea, during the past couple of years a higher level of interest in learning how the world, especially the business world, functions has been noted among the younger generation of officials, business managers and other professionals in the DPRK capital, Pyongyang. The hunger for information has increased and is still growing!

Training courses and educational programs as well as exposure tours to different countries are all initiatives with an impact on how North Koreans view the world, their own circumstances too, and thus a process of questioning has begun. Moreover, such exposure can never be taken away from a person, even if the situation might tighten or become more restrictive again. It is, however, a slow process and measuring results is extremely difficult. But change coming from ‘within’ is more likely to be sustainable, while change ‘forced’ on a people tends to lead to failure.

From the onset of interacting with North Korean partners through humanitarian aid projects, there was a clear recognition that hand-outs rarely produce sustainable
solutions and if organized discreetly, various capacity development projects were appreciated. For example, already in 1998 Caritas, the DPRK and the Central European University in Budapest pioneered business education programs with courses offered in Budapest and in Pyongyang.

Engagement opportunities in this field exist and more than in other countries, capacity development in North Korea is imperative for effective assistance and requires a strongly contextualized approach because people have hardly any information on, and experience with, the concepts of international cooperation.

All SDC projects and programs included elements of capacity development, including those in the agricultural sector or staff training courses for national project officers at the Pyongyang SDC office. In addition to training arranged in the country, SDC also sent, on average, about 80 to 100 persons abroad annually.

Examples of such projects are:

1. International training for diplomats and other government officials (including a 3-month training program in security issues for military officers, or attendance at peace mediation courses)
2. Study tours, conference attendance and short-term training abroad (with the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing various courses in the legal field, in banking and finance were conducted, usually lasting six weeks and for groups of about 15 persons)
3. Long-term training abroad (one academic year)
4. Workshops in different fields for national and international experts, in Pyongyang
5. The Pyongyang Business School

Two success stories:

An interesting food security project which Switzerland initiated in 2004 is called **Sloping Land Management**, through which degraded land on steep hills - cultivated due to chronic food shortages - is restored by applying an improved and sustainable agro-forestry approach. Preventing soil erosion, improving soil fertility, reintroducing
bio diversity and producing agricultural crops (such as vegetable, maize, upland rice, berries, fruits, herbs) are low-cost steps. The focus is on training with small amounts needed for start-up support. The incentives for workers, almost all women, are the produce - which they are allowed to keep for themselves and their families, or for sale or barter. By now the DPRK government plans to restore 150,000 ha of degraded sloping lands based on this approach (Source: Factsheet, SDC Pyongyang, February 2013) - hopefully proof that successful pilot projects can lead to policy change.

The training components of this project were:

- In-country training sessions at the grass-roots level for user groups, provided by ICRAF China using a participatory approach - held 2 to 3 times per year
- Training for forest managers for extension work for the user groups
- Provision of printed materials such as books, manuals/leaflets in Korean and English
- Long-term training for 13 scientists from the Ministry of Land and Environmental Protection - over a period of several years, for 1 academic year in Kunming, China
- Annual national workshops for other DPRK and foreign agencies interested in SLM, for networking and knowledge sharing
- Exposure to SLM pilot sites for county level- officials from other provinces

The Pyongyang Business School is another case in point. Four cycles were conducted, each one with 12 monthly seminars of 3 days attended by 30 to 35 middle managers (about one third were women!) from different companies and organizations, including universities. SDC had a contract with the Hong Kong Management Association and lecturers were flown in regularly. Overall, the program was like a ‘mini-MBA’ and popular by the participants.

The kind of training included was:

- Monthly lectures by Hong Kong professionals in English with simultaneous translation
- Group work and case studies - leading to peer and team learning
• Hand-outs in Korean and English
• Individual coaching for participants
• Provision of a handbook with business school lectures and other books related to business

In order to receive a diploma, a final examination with multiple choice questions and a presentation of a group project had to be passed.

Let me give you some comments from feedback I was given:

• “I understand the world trends in business now much better. Customer orientation is of special interest to me. My boss appreciated what I have learned.”
• “The professors from the Hong Kong Management Association are great. I am dreaming of becoming a big business woman. I received a lot of new tools from this course. Patriotism is not enough; we need to think in business concepts.”
• “I work at a bank. We give a lot of loans; so far we only looked at the capital status of the applications. Now I have learned to evaluate a company, look at the leadership and the quality of management and so on. The lecturers gave us academic theory and practical examples. It was easy for us to learn.”
• “I am a professor at the Kim Il Sung University. The course has been very people oriented. I am much clearer about terms and definitions in the business world. I am impressed by the teaching methodology, the attitude to work and the energy of the lecturers. I still have a lot to learn; I will change the way I teach.”
• “I am the youngest participant. I want to open a new business immediately and apply customer orientation and all the tools I have learned.”

I think these statements speak for themselves.

And now, some of the many challenges:

• Development projects need to include governance, gender, private sector partnerships and partnerships with civil society (NGOs).
• Capacity development projects require active, long-term relationships and trust.
• Results cannot be assessed easily and evaluations are difficult to carry out; change is a slow and time-consuming process.
Knowledge of cultural and social norms of the host country is important. One-approach-fits-all does not work; adaptability as well as a willingness to be flexible when needed, is essential.

The selection of participants is challenging - be aware that sometimes the one person you think is the least qualified, is in fact the most important one in the group as he/she can probably influence higher levels in the hierarchy.

The language barrier and different interpretation of concepts (market vs. planned economy) can create misunderstandings; we need to reach out, listen and learn from each other.

**China’s growing influence:** North Korea shares a border of 1420 kilometers with China. The two provinces of Jilin (27.4 million inhabitants) and Liaoning (43.7 million) count for over 70 million people, many eager to do business with North Koreans. Chinese companies investing in North Korea are gaining concessions like preferable trading terms and port operations. The strong UN and US sanctions, which also affect international aid agencies such as the UN and NGOs negatively, are pushing North Korea increasingly into the arms of China. The Kaesong Industrial Park, now closed, was the only main cooperation project left from the 10 years of sunshine policy.

Nevertheless, a variety of **opportunities for economic, social and cultural engagement** exist for the international community to consider:

- Develop e-learning programs for adult education (fields: health, including the disabled, or training for nurses; agriculture and environmental issues; international law, business education, banking and finance – to name a few)
- Offer scholarships for young North Korean professionals to study abroad
- Provide professional books, DVDs, magazine subscriptions to university libraries
- Arrange academic, cultural and sport exchange, both bilateral and multilateral

As a result of international sanctions, North Korea is isolated, and moreover the isolation is also a result of the country’s own policy of isolationism. Still, as the above examples show, there are constructive roles we can involve in - for the betterment of North Korean society and for changes yet to come on the Korean peninsula.
Educational Exchanges with North Korea: A Russian Experience

Vladimir I. KURILOV
(Far Eastern Federal University)
러시아와 북한의 교육교류 경험

이 논문에서는 러시아가 북한과 진행한 교육교류에 대한 전반적인 현황에 관해 논의한다. 특히 북한과의 교육교류가 가장 활발한 FEFU(극동국립대)의 사례에 대하여 토론할 것이다. 극동국립대의 북한과의 교육 협력 사례는 매우 흥미로운데, 그 이유는 북한 뿐 아니라 남한의 주요 대학들과도 활발한 교류를 하고 있기 때문이다. 남·북한의 교수진들이나 학생들이 같은 기숙사를 공유하고 대학 측에서 개최하는 국제포럼이나 대학 행사에 함께 참여함으로써 서로 소통할 수 있는 특별한 기회를 가진다.

왜 이러한 사례가 중요하다? 어느 국가든 국제사회에서 완전히 고립되는 것은 위험하다. 특히 고립된 국가가 핵무기를 가지고 있다면 더욱 그러할 것이다. 때문에 고립된 상태를 극복하는 방법 외에 다른 대안은 없다. 차후 북한이 정치적으로 붕괴하였을 때, 이러한 북한의 교육상태를 벗어나기 위하여 교육자들의 역할이 더욱 중요해질 것이다. 러시아와 같은 사례들을 중심으로, 국제사회는 제3국에서 개최되는 교육·문화·학술 포럼 등에 남북 대학들의 참여를 지원해야 할 필요를 밝히고자 한다. 이러한 지원은 인도적 측면에서도 필수적이다.
Educational Exchanges with North Korea: A Russian Experience

This article provides a general outline of North Korean educational exchanges with Russia, but focuses on FEFU’s own experience for the simple reason that FEFU’s background in this area is the largest in Russia. This experience is especially interesting because FEFU closely cooperates with the leading universities of both Koreas. This cooperation created unique opportunities for communication between North Korean and South Korean faculties and students as they shared the same dorms and attended the same university events and international forums hosted by FEFU.

Why do we feel that this is important? Any nation trapped in complete isolation becomes dangerous, especially if it has nuclear weapons. There is no alternative except to overcome this isolation. When politicians fail, educators may matter much more in finding a way out of the deadlock. Based on the Russian experience, the idea of an international foundation supporting educational, cultural and research forums with participation of universities from both Koreas in “third” countries is suggested as a necessary part of the humanitarian help package.
I. Political Positions and Non-Political Considerations

We collaborate with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea not because of sharing the Juche Idea or liking the development of nuclear weapons. We consider the situation in the Korean Peninsular as the most dangerous in the world. For Vladivostok, located near the North Korean border and the nuclear tests grounds, it is like sitting on a bomb.

The position of Russian Federation is clear: our country is one of the initiators and participants of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Together with the People’s Republic of China, Russia voted for UN Security Council Resolution 2094 of March 7, 2013, imposing severe sanctions on North Korea.

However, these sanctions have nothing to do with educational exchanges and cultural collaborations. We are sure that both Russia and China would veto any resolution completely isolating North Korea. And, there is a good reason why: isolation is dangerous. Every isolated nation behaves like a cornered person, or any living being: it defends and attacks.

As for me, in 1970’s I was the Secretary of the Far Eastern State University Communist Party organization when Vladivostok was a “prohibited” city for foreigners, but I did a lot for the internationalization of my university as FESU President in 1990s. My first visits for establishing close partnerships were to the Republic of Korea and the USA in 1990 when the USSR still existed. Does this mean that in 1970s and 1990s I was a completely different person? No, I remained the same. The only thing that changed and mattered was overcoming informational and physical isolation from the outer world.

I believe that many strong political devotions are a kind of religion. They have sacred values, and they defend themselves. Every religion should be respected although each of them can be peaceful or dangerous depending on given circumstances - recall Christianity and Islam in the Middle Ages.

Even in the 20th century, strong and sincere Christian beliefs and morals of many European leaders did not prevent the First World War just like the strong humanitarian traditions of Germany did not prevent the Second. Many Germans of that time sincerely
believed that they participated in a “preventive” war.

Even democracy is not an exception; it can be like an aggressive religion too. The Kosovo bombing in 1990’s, the Iraq invasion in 2000’s and the Libya events in 2010’s are obvious examples. And a “preventive” bombing of North Korean nuclear objects is a considered agenda.

As a general observation: any religion or strong political commitment, or even patriotism, may become dangerous and aggressive when they defend their sacred values or feel a threat to their very existence.

A small country with scarce natural resources, and cornered by the whole world, is in a much more desperate situation than prosperous and developed countries sending their bombers for “humanitarian” purposes. There is an alternative, and we think it is the only reasonable one.

One university mission is to build bridges between nations and mentalities, not walls. Staying out of politics, we are out of antagonism. We keep finding values and new knowledge to share, not to divide us. When politicians fail to find a way out of a deadlock, universities can create an environment in which political enemies have a chance to see, hear and learn to respect each other. Education and culture are the universal languages that unite people.

We believe that the way of educational and cultural exchanges with DPRK is more productive and beneficial for the global community than the way of sanctions and isolation. We should talk with this country not encapsulate it.

II. North Korean Students in Russia

Before the collapse of Soviet Union, the Russian language remained the main foreign language in North Korea: 60% of secondary school students attended Russian language classes. In 1990’s, their number sharply decreased. However, among the older generations, many North Koreans still speak Russian, and more than 100,000 of them worked or studied in Russia during 1970-80’s.

These relations declined sharply after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. The
2000’s began to see their slow revival. In 2004, an intergovernmental agreement was
carried out between Russia and DPRK providing scholarships for academic mobility.
Since then about 30 Russian federal scholarships have been available annually for several
Russian universities to enroll North Korean citizens into one year full-time, on-campus
professional development programs. One third of them, 10-12 scholarships, were received
annually by Far Eastern National University (now FEFU), and several more scholarships
in engineering by another major Vladivostok higher educational institution, Far Eastern
Technical University (FESTU, now merged into FEFU). Most of the remaining schol-
arships were distributed to two Khabarovsk HEIs - Far Eastern State Transport University
and Khabarovsk State University.

The exact number of these federal scholarships available for each university varied
from year to year but always remained at this limited scale. For 2013/2014, FEFU
received 22 federal scholarships from this program.

There have also been one-time initiatives to increase the number of scholarships.
For example, as a result of the railroad trip of Kim Jong-il to Russia in a special train, and
his agreement with President of Russian Federation, a large group of North Korean
students went to Far Eastern State Transport University to study railroad engineering
as part of the project to reconstruct the railroad connecting North Korea with Russia.

Besides intergovernmental agreements, mostly involving adult students with
professional background, a very limited number of young North Korean students are
enrolled in higher education degree programs on a paid basis usually as undergraduates.
These students are distributed among many Russian universities in very small groups or
even study individually. For example, FEFU now has 10 professional development students
from North Korea but only 2 enrolled in bachelor’s programs.

Most Korean students in Russia study in natural sciences and engineering but with
some in Russian language.

According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics*, Russia is in 6th place among
many countries that host DPRK students. The hosting countries with the largest number
of students are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The memories of various Russian faculty and classmates communicating with North Korean students throughout Russia are very consistent. For this reason, we cite only two of them before giving more details about own experience.

Alumni of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Moscow:

“North Korean students attended the same classes with us Russians. There were no problems with them. Koreans were strictly controlled by their country, each of them had to wear on their chest an icon with a portrait of Kim Il Sung, and kept his icon in the dorm’s room. Good guys.”

A faculty member of the Far Eastern State Transport University, Khabarovsk:

“North Korean students work hard, they are disciplined and usually demonstrate good academic performance. Their weakest point is expressing their personal opinions. It is very difficult to get them speaking on their own. They always try to guess first, what answer is expected by the instructor. It is a strong mentality, formed by all their lives. Once, to revive their creativity, I asked them to illustrate their projects by their own handwritten posters. Students stumbled with this part of their assignments. Finally, they came out with striking images. One of the students’ posters featured a man with a very evil, mask-like face like in Eastern theaters. He was standing above the Globe and poured a black liquid on it from a bucket. Near him, a freight train was standing, full of nuclear bombs, a nuclear submarine, nuclear power plants, etc. This illustration was about ecological threats to our planet, radio-active wastes in particular.”

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The following table shows the number of international students in certain countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* [http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx](http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx)
Ⅲ. FEFU Experience: Soviet and Pre-Soviet Periods

The partnerships of my university with both Koreas are unique and challenging: it seems impossible to maintain friendly and fruitful relations simultaneously with each of such bitter political enemies.

But our historical background is really helping us to maintain these friendly relations. The history of FEFU relations with Korea began far before division of this country. On September 1, 1900, the Department of Korean Philology was established at the Institute of Oriental Studies, now FEFU, by Professor Grigory V. Podstavin. It was the first department of this discipline in the world outside of Korea.

As for the North Korea, many leading FEFU specialists in Korean Studies still keep warm memories about their young years, 1980’s. Their first international trips from isolated Vladivostok of that time were to DPRK for continuing practical training in Korean language. They found there a beautiful country with ideally clean streets and squares, blossoming parks, and friendly, joyful people.

As for the South Korea at that time, there were no diplomatic relations at all. In our University library, we saw excellently published DPRK journals in perfect Russian. They were illustrated with beautiful color pictures of North Korean life and sober black-and-white pictures of riots and protest demonstrations in South Korea. Trade relations and limited exchanges between USSR and the Republic of Korea began only in 1989, while official diplomatic ties were established only in 1991.

Ⅳ. FEFU Experience: Encounter with the Other Korea and the World, 1990’s

I was among the first Russian people who visited South Korea before diplomatic relations were established. But my short way from Vladivostok to Seoul was made through Moscow. It was my first travel abroad, and I made it in July 1990 by invitation of Dr. Park Jae Kyu, President of Kyungnam University. Partnership with him and with Kyungnam University started in early 1990’s and continues today.
By middle 1990’s, we completed some unique projects, for example, the largest foreign investment in the history of Russian education: the KOHAP Group investment to construct the FESU Korean Studies Building. It cost over $1 million while FESU spent almost $1 million dollars more to equip this building.

At that time, it was a huge amount of money for us. Salaries and costs in Russia of that time remained very low so we managed to hire the best local building company for construction works that would cost far more than $10 million dollars today. It was my first encounter with Korean business practices. Before the first transaction for the construction of this building, KOHAP required guarantees from an eligible, external auditing institution that the money would be spent strictly for relevant purposes. But no Russian company was available to take this responsibility. Finally, the money was transferred with my word as the only guarantee.

The construction and equipping were completed in 10 months. In 1995, the FESU Higher College of Korean Studies was opened; it still remains the largest institution of its kind outside of the Korean peninsula.

The Higher College of Korean Studies closely cooperates with many universities in the Republic of Korea. Through these many years, its activities have been supported by the Korea Foundation, Korea Research Foundation, Koryo Academic Foundation, Doosan Foundation, and other institutions. The College established many leading research and social initiatives fostering relations with the Republic of Korea: the Center for Korean Studies/Korean Research Center, the Russian Association of College Korean Studies, the Russian Association of Korean Scholars, the Far Eastern Center of Russian-Korean Cooperation, and the Center of “Bohai” Archeological Research.

In mid-1990’s, Mr. Lee Se Ung, Chairman of Shin IL Educational Foundation, became one of the best and most well known foreign friends of my University. He has organized publishing FEFU books in Korea with excellent quality along with many unique cultural events that we hosted, including Korean ballet performances and ancient national garment shows in Vladivostok.

In 1997, we began our collaboration with Seoul National University. At first we were fellow members of the Association of Pacific Rim Universities, to which FESU
and SNU were invited among the initial founders, then by a direct top-level partnership agreement. The total list of our Korean partners would occupy a major part of this article.

No less extensive are our partnerships with the best universities of China, Japan, USA, and many other countries, that were established in that time. It was an overwhelming internationalization of the whole University which had been completely isolated from the external world for many decades with the exception of a few faculty members lucky enough to visit North Korea and Vietnam in 1970-80’s. This internationalization helped us to launch innovative educational and research programs, change the entire mental orientation of our faculty and students, and become one of the top 10 Russian universities by early 2000’s.

But among these successful relations with so many countries, we revived our relations with North Korea in 2000’s, including agreement with Kim Il Sung University, the leading North Korean institution of higher education plus top-level relations with the North Korean Government. The apotheosis of these relations was the award to Kim Jong-II of an Honorary Doctor degree from our University. He earned this degree not as a political leader but as a major contributor to educational and cultural relations between our University and North Korea. Certainly, this award was a shocking event for many of our friends and partners from other countries.

In 2007 I was awarded the Order of Friendship of the 1st Degree, DPRK’s highest government award for foreign citizens, “for significant contribution to the development of Russian-Korean cooperation in education, science, culture and communication between the Russian Far East and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.

Why did we, and are continuing, do all this and more for a country that is shunned and isolated by most of the world?
V. Facilitating the Dialogue between Two Countries of One Nation: the 2000’s

The current agreement of cooperation with Kim Il Sung University was signed between the two universities in 2003. It provides for students and faculty exchange programs, joint research programs and conferences to be held at FEFU in which scholars from both Koreas participate. FEFU also collaborates with the Pyongyang University of Foreign Languages and the Committee of Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries, DPRK.

FEFU has donated more than 7,000 volumes of research and educational materials to the libraries of Kim Il Sung University and the People’s Palace of Education. The Orthodox Church that was consecrated in Pyongyang in 2006 was also supported by FEFU.

In 2005, according to an intergovernmental agreement between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, groups of North Korean postgraduate students started to study and do research at FENU and FESTU, now united as FEFU. Annually, 10-12~ North Korean students in arts and sciences are enrolled at FEFU since then; 22 will arrive for the 2013/2014 academic year. Their tuition fees, accommodation and stipends are covered by Russian federal scholarships. Each of the students will be enrolled in one-year postgraduate professional development programs at FEFU.

In total, about 100 North Korean postgraduate students have studied at FEFU or the universities that merged into FEFU. FEFU faculty and staff have rather friendly memories of these students. The North Korean students earned wide respect through their excellent academic performance, hard work and energy combined with unique talents. In their leisure time many North Korean students were busy with painting, sewing and other handcrafts that created overwhelmingly beautiful decorative artworks as presents for their Russian and international friends.

Students and faculty members of both Koreas are in contact with each other on the FEFU campus. However, the first appearance of these students on the campus of our University included quite a shock: they had to share a dormitory floor with South Korean students. The shock was mutual. The International Department started to receive angry
delegations and written petitions from students from both countries demanding separate accommodations. We refused.

Eventually, those conflicts transformed into friendships. Students started to offer mutual help with Russian language, went shopping together and began joyful discussions of North Korean and Southern Korean accents. They even started attending informal joint international parties.

This socializing went further soon. A group of several North Korean students made an agreement with Dr. John Croom, a US citizen and professor of a joint dual degree program. He started to teach them English on a voluntary basis - usually cheerful discussions in English on various topics. This informal class continued weekly through the year. The students gave Dr. Croom some North Korean ideological booklets and their own handcrafts, they respected each other and no catastrophe resulted: the American professor was not converted to Juche philosophy, and he did not try to convert them to anything. But they saw friendly and good human beings in each other.

Dr. Croom remembers “a group of young journalists that wanted to improve their English, and with me, learned as well that friendship and respect have no ideology.” He continues, “In a business writing class, our text book stresses that ‘communication is always between individuals’, not stereotypes or nationalities or genotypes but individuals. I have never seen this more true than with this group of North Korean students.”

FEFU often provides opportunities for contact between the Koreas which has seemed impossible anywhere else. In 2004, the presidents of the leading universities of both Korean countries met in Vladivostok for the first time in history. They walked together and celebrated the 105th anniversary of our University: Dr. Chung Un-Chan, President of Seoul National University and Dr. Seong Ja Rip, President of Kim Il Sung University (DPRK). The photo of this event was later published as a sensation by several foreign journals.

Since that time, we have organized several research forums where participants from both these countries sat at one round table, also the first time in history. Such contacts, though small, help to break the wall mounted almost 70 years ago between the two countries of one great and talented nation.
But why should Russia, and FEFU in particular, be alone in supporting such events? We often get requests from North Korean researchers wishing to visit us and collaborate with us. But our funding is not unlimited. Many countries spend much for humanitarian aid to North Korea but with little result in “ice breaking”. But education and the opportunity to look at the outer world and to overcome isolation is also humanitarian aid. We think that it makes sense to consider establishing an international charity foundation, providing support for education of and meetings between researchers from both Koreas in third countries. We believe that such funding should be an important part of the humanitarian aid package.
Engaging North Korea through Capacity Building: Evaluation and Prospects

Singapore as an Aspirational Platform: The City State’s Role and Potential in DPRK Capacity Building

Andray Abrahamian (Choson Exchange)

Capacity Building at the Kaesong Industrial Complex: Implications for North Korea’s Special Economic Zones

Lim Eul-chul (Kyungnam University)

Possibilities and Prospects for South Korean Engagement with North Korea in Knowledge Sharing/Capacity Building Projects

Kim Taek-yoon (Seoul National University)

Discussants

Philo Kim (Seoul National University)
Cho Bong-hyun (IBK Economic Research Institute)
Kim Keun-sik (Kyungnam University)
Singapore as an Aspirational Platform: The City State’s Role and Potential in DPRK Capacity Building

Andray ABRAHAMIAN
(Choson Exchange)
국문초록

북한의 개발역량 강화를 위한 도시국가의 역할과 잠재력:
싱가포르의 지향점

싱가포르는 실용주의와 독보적인 리더십 체제를 기반으로 한 이데올로기를 유지하면서 동시에 그 특유의 사회적, 정치적, 경제적 모델을 고집해 왔다. 도시국가 싱가포르는 민주주의 국가이지만 독립 이전인 1959년부터 The People’s Action Party라는 독보적인 단일 정당에 의해 운영되어 왔다. 특기할만한 경제 발전과 다른 여러가지 요소들로 하여금 싱가포르는 북한이 역량강화 프로그램에 참여할 수 있게끔 하는 매력적인 옵션이 될 수 있다. 평양에서 본격적으로 새로운 경제체제의 변화가 시작된다면 북한을 역량강화 프로그램에 참여시키기 위한 플랫폼으로서 싱가포르의 활용가치는 더욱 높아질 것이다.
Singapore as an Aspirational Platform:
The City State’s Role and Potential
in DPRK Capacity Building

Singapore has long championed its model of social, political and economic organization, while crafting and ideology that centers on pragmatism and is embodied in exceptional leadership. Despite having a democratic system, the city-state has been ruled by a single party - the People’s Action Party - since 1959, before it was even independent. These and other factors, not least of all Singapore’s exceptional economic development trajectory, make Singapore an extremely attractive option for North Koreans to engage in capacity building programs. Should the decision be taken in Pyongyang to wholeheartedly explore economic policy change, Singapore’s usefulness as a platform for training will also be high.
Ⅰ. Introduction

The national platforms from which actors seeking to encourage positive economic policy change in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea operate are varied and all face certain restrictions. North Korea’s structural position vis-à-vis Japan and South Korea limits certain possibilities. Those two states have domestic political concerns that are constraints, as well. China engages in capacity building and takes a neutral-to-positive laissez-faire approach to investment in its neighbor.

Meanwhile, Europe is located far away and has a relatively small imperative to act on North Korea issues. Finally, the US is the DPRK’s avowed enemy. The need for other platforms to engage on economic issues has never been greater and might be provided by Asian countries such as Mongolia, Vietnam and Singapore. Singapore in particular has some advantages that warrant exploration.

This paper will attempt to explore the prospects for engagement using Singapore as a model and platform from which to engage North Korea on economic policy and development issues. It will first briefly attempt to sketch aspects of the Singapore model, while highlighting how aspects of it are recognizable and thus aspirational to North Koreans. Singapore’s history as regional champion and exporter of its model and national narrative will also be discussed before attempting to evaluate prospects for capacity building with Singapore as a base.

Ⅱ. Singapore-DPRK Relations

Right now Singapore, it is fair to say, is more important to the DPRK than the DPRK is to Singapore. Singapore doesn’t maintain an embassy in Pyongyang, but the DPRK does in Singapore. DPRK citizens can enter Singapore visa-free. Singaporean businesspeople can also obtain a visa waiver and tourists, though not visa-free, (as Malays are) can enter North Korea without paying a visa fee. Singapore is one of North Korea’s largest trading partners; estimates vary year-on-year, but the island state regularly appears to be in the DPRK’s top ten. North Korean elites travel to Singapore for medical treatment, while
diplomatic missions to Southeast Asia frequently use the city-state as a hub. Kim Jong Nam is even reported to be spending ever more of his time in Singapore.

There is a small but active coterie of North Korean businessmen in Singapore. And conversely, there is a visible Singaporean influence in Korean consumption in the capital: beer, soft drinks and other processed foods are imported from Singapore; supermarkets, cafes and fast food restaurants have been set up by Singaporean businesspeople. From both sides, as far as North Korea goes, this amounts to a successful relationship.

However, Singapore is cautious not to be seen as too hospitable to country that is so at odds with the United States. However, its self-styled status as something of a “Switzerland of Asia” means it does not wish to take a particularly hostile position either1). For North Korea’s part, to quote a Pyongyanger: “Kim Il Sung told us to work with and learn from Singapore. It is a good country, even though it is an ally of the USA!2)”

III. The Singapore Model

There is, after all, a fairly recognizable ‘Singapore Model’, embedded as it is the broader “East Asian Development Model” narrative. Singapore, like South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong began its rapid economic growth through the export of initially labor-intensive manufactures, followed by shifting to higher value-added products as comparative advantage shifts.

The state has played a heavy role developing economic sectors that it considers important. It has also vigorously defended free trade principles and rule of law in order encourage investment. Unlike the other Asian Tigers, Singapore’s economic development has always depended heavily on service industries. The development of these industries in Singapore as well as trade and infrastructure-dependent industries was driven by the perceived stability of the country in a region with large markets and natural resources

2) comment in a meeting in 2013
to be exploited\(^3\). Singapore’s economy has also consistently imported labor, both for high-income white-collar workers and for lower-income physical laborers.

For at least some theorists, the success of Singapore’s development is attributed to the resolution of the unnecessary polarity of “state plan vs. the market”: extensive planning in the absence of a rigid central plan allowed market activity to thrive in a controlled fashion\(^4\).

The stability, which so attracted foreign firms, is in no small part due to the fact that the state has been ruled by a single party - the People’s Action Party - since 1959, before it was independent. It carries several of the hallmarks of democracy, including free elections, freedom of association and the ability to form opposition parties. By 2000, there were over 20 political parties in Singapore, but all have been consistently overwhelmed by the organizational and ideological power of the PAP. Despite opposition gains in recent years - in 2011 the PAP won the lowest percentage of the popular vote ever at 60.1% - Singapore is frequently characterized as the hallmark example of an “illiberal democracy”\(^5\).

However, Singapore’s leaders have by any measure done an exceptional job at tackling the forms of corruption that blight many developing countries. It placed fifth overall in Transparency International’s 2012 ranking of least corrupt countries, a full 15 places above the US and 40 above South Korea. (The other two Asian Tigers, Taiwan and Hong Kong, places 15\(^{th}\) and 37\(^{th}\), respectively. China ranked 80\(^{th}\).)\(^6\) One scholar has gone so far as to state that Singapore has been almost unique in that “national interests, albeit narrowly defined by a narrow elite, are consistently placed ahead of any particular benefits for the rulers.\(^7\)”

Interestingly, some recent editorials have called for the new generation in Chinese

\(^6\) [http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/#myAnchor2](http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/#myAnchor2)
leadership under Xi Jinping to study Singapore’s anti-corruption system. In particular, such editorials have praised the Singaporean mix of heavy punishment for corruption, an independent monitoring agency in the form of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and the high wages earned by civil servants, which is meant to offset the attraction of the risk of accepting bribes.

### IV. Exporting Narratives

While Singapore’s handling of corruption is an issue being debated in today’s PRC, Singapore’s leadership has been self-consciously seeking to export its model and exert its influence on Asian development narratives since the 1980’s and through the 1990’s. Many of its positions were simply far more acceptable to regional leaders over the last 30 years and indeed the familiarity and associability of Singaporean political and social culture has helped pave the way for economic and academic interactions with countries considering economic reforms. North Koreans today, like Chinese and Southeast Asians over the last generation, find a useful familiarity in the Singaporean model. This has been partly due to Singapore’s successes and the also peculiar force of personality that was former Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew.

As China began to experiment with economic reforms in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, Singapore became involved in counsel and support as the result of decisions and relationship building at the highest levels. As Ezra Vogel writes, starting from Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 visit to Singapore, “Deng and Lee Kwan Yew had a “a special relationship” that “enabled them to communicated with a mutual respect on a common wavelength.” They quickly formed an exclusive mutual admiration society, to the extent that Vogel claims only one other non-mainland Chinese person formed such an intense bond with Deng. He further claims:

Deng admired what Lee had accomplished in Singapore, and Lee admired how Deng was dealing with the problems in China. Before Deng’s visit to Singapore, the Chinese press had referred to Singaporeans as the ‘running dogs of American imperialism.’ A few weeks after Deng visited Singapore, however, this description of Singapore disappeared from the Chinese press. Instead, Singapore was described as place worth studying for initiatives and environmental preservation, public housing and tourism.

Lee and Deng met again in 1980, 1985 and 1988. In many ways, from this period on the Chinese model of development began to draw heavily on the Singapore model. (Perhaps an irony here is that from 1978, Singapore was promoting its “Learn from Japan” campaign in which Japanese models for management, employer-employee relations and higher skilled labor industries were held aloft.9)

Singapore has been steadily welcoming and training Chinese officials since Deng came away impressed by his 1978 visit. A second wave of “Singapore fever” followed Deng’s 1992 Tour of southern China when he praised Singapore as a country that China must learn from. A third wave dates from around 2007 provincial governments began sending cadres down to study in Singapore10).

The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy can be seen as an exercise in soft-power projection. Established in 2004 as school of the National University of Singapore, it provided an institutional base from which to train officials from around the region and the world. This has become the focal point for the sort of programs that have been conducted since the 1980’s. Furthermore, in 2009, Nanyang Technological University set up the Nanyang Center for Public Administration, specifically to train Chinese officials with graduate courses in the Chinese language. NTU has been engaged in such trainings since the early 1990s, but this is a new and formalized program. Importantly, the two governments worked closely to establish the school. The Chinese side has borne much of the cost, including tuition11).

As noted, key aspects of Singapore’s model have incorporated into Chinese reforms.

These include media and information policy, in which censorship and pressure is employed in a limited fashion; agenda setting is used to guide public debate and opinion, rather than total information blackout. An important shift was also ideological, in that economic growth became central to the concept of modern China, rather than an offshoot of another ideology. Maoism’s “Better Red than Expert” was replaced by Deng’s proverbial cats.

Related to this and most important, of course, was the use of market forces to drive development. While the Chinese state still targets key sectors and supports Chinese enterprises in order to boost competitiveness, it has become far less keen to dictate highly specific industrial plans, as it (and the two other Tigers, South Korea and Taiwan) was once wont to do. In that sense, it followed Singapore’s lead over than the models of the other Tigers in allowing a largely unfettered free enterprise system to drive economic growth12).

Singapore has also acted as platform for capacity building programs for its earlier hinterland of Southeast Asia. Singapore was quick to establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam, in 1973. Since Doi Moi, more than 13,000 Vietnamese have received training in Singapore under the Singapore Cooperation Programme. The two governments cooperated on the foundation of Vietnam-Singapore Training Centre in Hanoi in 2002 to focus on capacity building for Vietnamese officials13). Similar training centers were established in Vientiane, Yangon and Phnom Penh. Singapore’s government currently runs a series of “Training Compendiums” for Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos covering both private and public sector management issues14).

Thus, you might say that Singapore has had considerable experience interacting with and training of the officials of China, Vietnam and others as they experimented with economic reform measures. Perhaps more importantly from a North Korean perspective, it is perceived to have played a positive role in supporting development in China and Vietnam without pushing for regime change.

13) http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/hanoi/foreign_policy.html
14) http://www.scp.gov.sg/content/scp/iai_programmes

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북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망
Indeed, Singapore has explicitly resisted some aspects of American and western norm-setting. As noted, Singapore’s influence generally has in no small part been due to the unique status of Lee Kwan Yew. As his recent book blurb puts it, “when Lee Kuan Yew speaks, presidents, prime ministers, diplomats, and CEOs listen.” This has been an outsized influence given the rather small nation-state that he presided over.

Lee’s prominence in world affairs became an opportunity for him to champion his view of Asianness in arguments that many conservatives in the region felt were very compelling. His role in the “Asian values” debate loomed especially large in the 1990’s. This paper cannot explore this debate; it will suffice to say that the core was the claim that Asian cultures do not place the same premium on individual freedom as the West. As such, Asian political goals and structures can and should also diverge from Western ones. Furthermore, authoritarian political systems can and do deliver better economic results than other systems, as evidenced by the “Asian Tigers”.

One might agree that the “‘Lee hypothesis’ is, in fact, based on very selective information, rather than on any general statistical testing of the wide-ranging data that are available,” or that there is “little general evidence that authoritarian governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial in encouraging economic development,” as Amartya Sen writes. On the other hand, conservative statesmen in several Asian states felt the argument was a strong justification for their policy tools and political systems.

Even into this decade he has been reiterating this main point that the hegemony of Western, particularly American norms could be resisted:

America’s sense of cultural supremacy is again evident when the American media praises Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, or Thailand for becoming democratic and having a free press. It is praise with condescension, compliments from a superior culture patting an inferior one on the head. And it is this same sense of cultural supremacy which And it is this same sense of cultural supremacy which leads the American media to pick on Singapore and beat us up as authoritarian, dictatorial; an overruled, over-

15) http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/lee-kuan-yew

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restricted, stifling, sterile society. Why? Because we have not complied with their ideas of how we should govern ourselves.17)

For some, even as the Asian values debate has cooled, Lee’s voice continues to be an important Asia-located resistance to Western cultural norms. Indeed, as our North Korean friend put it, “even though,” it is a US ally, it is a respectable one to a variety of Asian nationalists, in that Lee and his successors have vigorously defended the nature of their social system as a historical, economic and social necessity. It is difficult perhaps to overstate the value of this to a North Korean audience.

Singapore presents an official ideology which also resonates with North Koreans, that of “rugged independence under the enlightened leadership of the PAP” (People’s Action Party), with Lee as “the ideological capstone of the system.” Peter Wallace Preston sees this as the lynchpin of the creation of a “National Past”, which for Singapore rests on the idea of “underdevelopment” and that a polity can move from that condition to one of “development” through visionary and determined leadership. This ideology was then writ onto a macro scale and exported abroad.19) These claims, while contestable, have a certain linkage to North Korea’s ideological framework. Though there are vast differences, not least of which are communism and race-centrism, there exists the common threads that development and independence are a struggle to be won. In particular, those are things to be won by exceptional leadership.

Indeed, both countries also have in common the fact that their existence as independent states truly does seem unlikely. Singapore was born as an independent country in 1965, kicked out of Malaysia and with the “Konfrontasi” between Indonesia and Malaysia in full swing, it was unlikely that such a small island could maintain itself apart as an independent nation - absent a national history and with a polychratic citizenry - from its two large neighbors. Certainly in the period after independence, its prospects for remaining a sovereign state did not look strong. (Part of Singapore’s “National Past”

19) Ibid. p. 120
then, is the idea that out of this unstable, dangerous period, a relentless pragmatism forged a nation.)

Meanwhile, there have been widespread predictions of the DPRK’s collapse ever since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. A prominent publication just last year acknowledge as much with its multi-connotation carrying title: “The Impossible State”. Really, the more likely result for both states is that by 2013 they would have been spoken about in the past tense. The shared concept of struggle and beating the odds has the potential to serve as a factor in trust-building.

If one wants to be somewhat pithy, one can even point to the fact that Singapore has seen a father-son transition of leadership. Lee Hsien Loong succeeded his father, though there was a fourteen year gap while Goh Chok Tong held the reigns from 1990 to 2004. Even then, the leadership felt the need to create the position of Minister Mentor as a position for Lee Kuan Yew in the Cabinet. It was created in 2004, allowing him more official influence over the next generation of leadership. He resigned the post in 2011 but many Singaporeans still refer two the father and son in the familiar nicknames “PM Lee” and “MM Lee”.

Likening the Lee power transition with the Kim family transitions may appear to be a flippant comparison at first, but when combined with the Asian values debate and Singapore’s state ideology, it can be read as highly appealing to a North Korean audience. Certainly, they are extremely well acquainted with the concept of having all the values of the nation being perfectly embodied by a single leader.

There are also “socialist” policies, which play favorably for a North Korean audience. Perhaps most notably, while there is an active private property market, about 80% of Singapore residents live in a Housing Development Board flat20). With a renting-to-buy scheme linked to the national pension program, home ownership is above 90%21). This is the highest rate in the world. Certainly, Choson Exchange participants on a study trip to Singapore in 2011 remarked at how surprising this number was. Pyongyang has

20) http://www.mnd.gov.sg/homesweethome/conversation_public_housing_media_radical_idea_remove_income_ceiling.htm

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so far failed to coherently channel a response to the slow realization that both domestic and international market forces are an inevitable part of the social landscape. Singapore provides an Asian example of market forces being harnessed to socialist ends.

Finally, North Koreans have already experience with capacity building in Singapore. Though there has been a gap of several years now, Nanyang Technological University and ING Bank helped organize several training programs for North Koreans during the late 1990’s, when there was some hint of an economic opening and thus market opportunity. Participants came from a variety of academic institutions and the Korea National Insurance Company.

There are of course vast differences between China’s position in the early 1980’s and North Korea’s now. Regarding Singapore, there were cultural synergies, which made relationship building relatively easy. Singapore was also at the time highly incentivized to continue expanding its hinterland as an island state without its own large domestic market, agricultural or heavy industrial base. These imperatives do not exist between North Korea and Singapore today.

Nonetheless, for North Koreans, Singapore’s political, cultural and economic position in Asia today makes it an attractive option for capacity building and other exchanges. There is generally the sense that Singapore is a safe venue for training: there aren’t the values that are implicit in Western capacity building. Singapore’s model is broadly recognizable to North Koreans and Singapore’s mode of exporting that model is also non-threatening. Also, and not least, it is a happy alternative to China. The North Koreans’ opinion of China, always quite poor, has never been lower in the post-Cold War era than it is in mid-2013.

V. North Korea Today

If we can sometimes detect a mild disgust with the rambunctious, chaotic Beijing that North Koreans encounter when they leave their country, one certainly sees the aspirational impression that Singapore has during Choson Exchange programs in Singapore. Perhaps when North Koreans travel to Europe, the widely divergent history, cultural
and development trajectory of that continent makes it difficult to see the adaptability of the European experience. In Singapore, the cultural and historical similarities have the opposite effect. The achievements there seem more adaptable. “This,” one feels the Koreans are thinking, “is doable.”

Of course, feeling inspired and having the capacity to act on knowledge gained or relationships built are not the same thing. For truly transformative developmental change in North Korea, a major set of decisions will be required from the very top of Pyongyang’s leadership. It was only after Deng decided on serious movement towards economic reform that he and Lee Kwan Yew formed a close working relationship. With all of the major capacity building and educational programs Singapore has developed for China and its ASEAN neighbors, there has been an unmistakable eagerness on the part of those governments. Singapore is, for its part, not interested in pushing for change, but is willing to contribute to reform agendas when approached to do so.

As yet, there is a deep ambivalence about changing economic policy in the DPRK. There have been over the last several years sporadic indications that the new leadership recognizes the limited nature of Songun (military-first) as a long-term solution to maintaining domestic support and achieving development goals. There was a noticeable shift in the content of Kim Jong Il’s later on-the-spot guidance tours, strongly hinting towards the citizenry that the military would take a back seat. Since his death, certain events in Pyongyang could be read as part of an ongoing conflict over both control of assets and of policymaking institutions as the military’s control of the commanding heights is loosened. Not least of these would be the ouster of Ri Yong Ho and the rehabilitation of Pak Bong Ju.

Some kind of conflict over control of foreign trade organs has also taken place over the last several years, with a Joint Venture & Investment Commission (JVIC) established as a government institution to be a “one-stop shop” for investors. The same year that JVIC was set up, 2009, the Daepung International Investment Group was re-purposed along the lines of a holding company model as a vehicle for attracting foreign direct investment. Daepung is now defunct.

North Korea was also rife with rumors of economic reform measures in 2012. Under
the ‘June 28th Policy’ of economic management measures in 2012, agricultural producers were to receive 30% of production, while workers in small and medium-sized enterprises were to no longer receive state distribution, instead being paid entirely in cash. It was to go into force nationwide on October 1st, but that date came and went with no sign of reforms. There is speculation that the measures will be attempted in 2013 instead.

Kaesong aside, Pyongyang also appears to see Special Economic Zones as a way to experiment with and yet control economic growth. Rason’s trials and tribulations - though relative successes - are well known: it continues its slow but superior growth to other regions in the Northeast of the DPRK. Kim Il Sung even once referenced Singapore in describing the SEZ, saying “Like Singapore, let’s resolve to make the Rason trade zone contribute to the improvement of people’s lives." 22"

Hwanggumpyong’s development has seen even greater trials. That SEZ is seeing little to no development: its main function appears to be a repository for dirt. There have also been discussions with various parties about creating and dispersing SEZs around the provinces to create regional economic zones. This would of course require significant capital and investment.

In the end, all these things must ultimately be read as an attempt to find a way to improve the existing system rather than truly overhaul it. Such signals and measures are piecemeal and don’t amount to a sustainable program of reform. If there is one lesson well learned by cadres and other economic actors in North Korea, it is not to get out ahead of any economic policy, especially absent very clear signals from the center of power. Debate does take place over economic policy in elite circles, but consensus or imposition of consensus has yet to emerge.

Certainly, Pyongyang has not shown anywhere near the commitment to reform that would see it investing its own resources in training officials overseas. Capacity building programs both in and out of North Korea still generally depend on the generosity of others. Therefore, while Choson Exchange has run successful programs in Singapore

and North Korean authorities are generally supportive of such programs, scaling the numbers of participants upwards to maximize impact remains a challenge.

Moreover, Singapore’s improved relationship with China developed at a time when the US and China were also moving towards a more functional relationship. Despite its ‘rugged independence’, Singapore is a trade-dependent country, with a large banking sector. Its alliance with the United States is its key relationship in foreign affairs. As such, Singapore is still extremely sensitive to political-economic developments in the United States. Given the state of DPRK-US relations, Singapore is generally cautious about engaging North Korea. North Korea’s outlier status creates certain inhibitions in Singapore’s risk-averse policymaking circles.

VI. Conclusion

So, to put it succinctly, is the Singapore model adaptable to the DPRK? The short answer is “maybe”. Ultimately, much of Singapore’s experience as a small island in Southeast Asia will of course not be applicable to a still-socialist, once-industrial, divided, Northeast Asian state. However, the forms and successes of Singapore’s political and economic governance are both accessible and attractive to North Korea today, perhaps moreso than any other options in the Asia-pacific region and abroad. Singapore never fails to draw a positive response in conversation with North Koreans and it tends to be represented affirmatively in North Korean media.

The real potential in Singapore as a platform for capacity building will come if and when Pyongyang makes a more significant commitment to experiment with economic policy changes. Then, one imagines, organizations the world over will more readily find resources to contribute programs tailored to North Korean officials and other actors. Singapore will continue to be a competitive platform from which to engage the DPRK as its model and development narrative will remain a key, non-threatening selling point.
Capacity Building at the Kaesong Industrial Complex: Implications for North Korea’s Special Economic Zones

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개성공단의 역량 강화: 북한 경제특구의 함의

이 글에서는 우선 일반 북한 근로자들을 대상으로 한 인적자원 개발에 초점을 맞춰 다양한 capacity building 사례들을 검토하고, 이를 토대로 북한의 추가적 경제특구 개발 및 운영과 관련한 시사점을 도출하였다. 북한 근로자의 자율성이 여전히 제한되어 있지만 남한측 기업과의 지식공유를 통해 생산성 향상을 도모할 수 있었다. 개성공단에서의 대규모 북한 인력을 대상으로 한 지식공유를 통한 역량개발 경험은 분명히 다른 경제특구 개발에도 적지 않은 기여를 할 것으로 보인다. 특히 북한은 경제특구를 성공적으로 운영하기 위해서는 인적 역량과 법제도적 역량을 강화하는 것이 무엇보다 중요하다는 점을 깊히 인식하게 되었다. 북한은 특히 법·제도, 세무·회계, 보험 등 특정 분야에 대한 관심과 학습 의지를 드러내기도 했다. 개성공단은 북한 사회에 시장경제에 대한 새로운 지식과 경험을 전수함으로써 개혁과 개방을 앞당길 것이다.
Abstract

Capacity Building at the Kaesong Industrial Complex: Implications for North Korea’s Special Economic Zones

This paper will focus on the diverse efforts aimed at improving the capacity of North Korean workers at the Kasesong Industrial Complex. The paper will then use this analysis as a basis to draw out implications for the development and operation of special economic zones in North Korea. While the autonomy of North Korean workers is still limited, they were nonetheless able to bring about improvements in production through knowledge sharing with South Korean companies. The knowledge sharing that occurred at Kaesong Complex with a large group of North Korean workers will clearly make a considerable contribution to the development of other special economic zones in the country. North Korea has now realized the importance of strengthening its human resources and legal capacities for the successful operation of special economic zones. North Korea has also displayed an interest and the will to learn about specific fields including legal systems, finances, and insurance. Having passed down new knowledge and experience about market economics to North Korean society, the Kaesong Industrial Complex will advance reforms and opening in the country.
I. Introduction

Special economic zones are generally defined as “designated areas in countries that possess special economic regulations that are different from other areas of the country and that generally implement measures that are aimed at bringing in foreign direct investment.”¹)

Originally, special economic zones were operated by developing countries pursuing economic development to secure competitive power in exports and expand foreign trade. However, following China’s establishment and operation of four special economic zones in the country’s south-eastern region in 1979 as part of the country’s economic opening policy, the SEZ was transformed into a way for socialist countries to make the shift to capitalism.²)

China used the SEZ strategy to open the country’s economy and develop the basis for the high degree of economic growth it enjoys today. Similar special economic zones have also been established in Russia, Eastern Europe and Vietnam. North Korea has been no exception. North Korea established its first free economic trade zone in the Rajin-sinbong (Rason) region in 1991, and this was followed by further zones in Sinuiju (September 2002), Kumgangsan (October 2002), Kaesong (November 2002), and the Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Islands (2010). In short, the success of Chinese SEZs spurred the establishment of similar zones in North Korea, a country which has been plagued with both a lack of foreign currency and a chronic economic difficulties.

North Korea’s SEZ is the centerpiece of the country’s response to the socialist economy crisis, which is aimed at pursuing a “planned and controlled compromise with the market economic system.” However, in reality, the level of reform and opening of North Korea’s domestic economy has been lower and more passive than China’s. Nonetheless, for a country that has long maintained a closed economy in the name of “self-

reliance” and “self-regeneration,” there is no doubt that these moves are nonetheless major changes from policies of the past.

North Korea established its own SEZs by borrowing from the Chinese SEZ model and was motivated by the desire to invigorate its economy through capital brought in from developed western countries. However, the only successful SEZ in operation is the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which has been heavily invested in by South Korean companies. North Korea has recently appeared to desire a further expansion of the country’s economy by establishing another SEZ in the Hwanggum-Wihwa Islands region, but it is unclear whether this will be successful.

China’s early strategy of establishing SEZs was focused on implementing the “four modernizations” emphasized by Deng Xiaoping aimed at introducing advanced technology, management skill, modern knowledge, open policies and market economy related laws and institutions. The role of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, in contrast, is more restricted than the Chinese SEZs, and is simply focused on using low-paid labor to produce goods that are sold and exported to world markets, including South Korea. However, despite being fundamentally a product production center, the Kaesong Industrial Complex has the potential to develop into a full-scale SEZ replete with distribution infrastructure, technology development, education and training facilities, and financial and commerce infrastructure. The diverse experiences that North Korean workers have had in Kaesong Complex will play a considerable role in expanding the development of SEZs in the future.

The capacity building of North Korean workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, however, has thus far been limited. South Korean workers have generally been in charge of the complex’s development and management. While the role of North Korean workers has in fact expanded gradually across different fields, it has still been limited. The building of capacity did take place relatively systematically in the establishment of a system of law and improvements in operation and production. The former provided knowledge and know-how to North Korean managers, who were made up of those dealing with North Korean law. This also led to an increase in the development of law systems and operational ability in the complex. In particular, North Korean authorities showed a very proactive
attitude toward learning tax, insurance, financial and other market economic systems in order to increase revenue. The latter concerned the increase in production ability following the provision of education and training to ordinary North Korean workers.

This paper will examine a wide variety of capacity building cases by focusing on the human resources development of ordinary North Korean workers. It will then draw out implications for the current and future development and operation of additional SEZs in North Korea. 3)

II. The Current State of Operations at the Kaesong Complex and the Management System of North Korean Workers

The Kaesong Industrial Complex is now the only joint economic cooperation project between North and South Korea that, in bringing together North Korean workforce and territory and South Korean capital and technology, has been able to produce results. A number of labor-intensive manufacturing companies from South Korea have entered the complex and have been using cheap North Korean labor to make profits. The significance of the Kaesong Industrial Complex is drawn from the fact that South Korean companies have employed large amounts of North Korean labor, and that North Korea opened a considerably large military region to South Korean companies for business purposes. During the process of operating the complex, North Korea has learned about the mechanism of market economics and know-how concerning opening its economy to the international market. However, there is considerable interest in what the ill effects of a large number of North Koreans being hired by and managed by South Korean companies will have on maintaining the regime.

3) Beginning operations in December of 2004, the Kaesong Complex was closed down and its workers withdrawn by North Korea in April 2013. South Korea has also withdrawn its workers and the complex is now facing a total shutdown eight years after it was created.
1. Current State of Investment, Production and Employment

A total of 123 South Korean companies hired approximately 53,500 North Korean workers since South Korean companies entered the complex in 2004 and before the complex closed in early April 2013. A majority of these South Korean companies are textile manufacturers (72, 58.5%), 23 are machinery companies (18.7%), 13 are electronics companies (10.6%), and the remaining nine are chemical companies (7.3%).

While textile companies largely produce labor-intensive products, machinery companies operate using a production method combining technological-intensive and labor intensive forms. More than 80% of the companies in the complex are mid-sized companies engaged in manufacturing activities.

Despite the worsening of inter-Korean relations following the 2010 Cheonan ship sinking and sanctions placed on North Korea by South Korea and the international community, the Kaesong Complex has continued to increase its production rates. The complex increased its profits by $66,850,000 from 2009 ($256,470,000) to 2010 ($323,320,000),

and increased by 25.3% in 2011 to a total of $401,850,000. From January to November 2012, the complex made a profit of $433,080,000.

Table 1. The Kaesong Industrial Complex’s Development by Year Changes in the Kaesong Complex by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Businesses Operating</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Workers</td>
<td>11,160</td>
<td>22,538</td>
<td>38,931</td>
<td>42,561</td>
<td>46,284</td>
<td>48,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output (US $ in million)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Korean companies at the complex employed 53,500 North Korean workers as of April 2013. Approximately 4,000 to 5,000 new workers were added to the workforce each month from 2009. The table below provides such information as North Korean workers’ academic background and age. Most of the workers (81.9%) were high school graduates, while only 9.6% and 8.5% were graduates of universities or vocational schools,
respectively. The average age for male workers was 41.2 and 35.3 for female workers, a higher average than in the past. Female workers were a majority at 72% of the workforce. A total of 64% of the workforce were employed by textile companies, while 14% were employed by electric companies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Background (%)</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
<th>Age Distribution (%)</th>
<th>Gender(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The Management System of North Korean Workers in the Kaesong Industrial Complex

The Kaesong Complex is located very close to South Korea at only five kilometers from the DMZ and 60-70 kilometers from Seoul. However, the complex operates under North Korean laws. While the complex is located within North Korean territory, it is isolated spatially from North Korea’s other regions. This situation has directly affected the laws that are applied in the complex.

Isolated from other North Korean regions, the purpose of the Kaesong Industrial Complex is for South Korea-based companies to establish businesses, build factories, hire North Korean workers, and sell what these factories produce in the South Korean market. The North Korean constitution and laws are applied to all areas of the complex including the establishment of businesses, real estate, construction, labor conditions and safety, health, sanitation, environment, taxes and finances. North Korean law also applies to areas such as vehicular use, foreign currency management, advertising, access, and security. However, North Korean law rarely applies to matters of inheritance and marriage or issues concerning politics, diplomacy, military and other matters with no relation to the economy.5)

5) Kaesong Industrial Complex Law and Regulation System Research Group, “The Evolution and Future of the Law System in the Kaesong Complex,” (Seoul: Kyungnam University, Institute for
According to the “Kaesong Industrial Complex Labor Regulations,” the process of hiring workers is in the order as follows: 1) conclude a contract between the business and employment agency; 2) employment agency finds workers; 3) workers are chosen by business; 4) an employment contract is made between the business and worker; 5) business provides employment agency with fee; 5) labor guidelines are written up through negotiation with the head of the employees’ union.6)

North Korea does not have a labor market because it is a socialist planned economy. In theory the government guarantees employment for its people by placing them into jobs. This reality has impacted the employment system in place at the complex, and a special system of “employment agencies” was established. This system does not allow companies to directly hire workers through advertisements or interviews, but instead requires them to apply to the employment agencies for more workers. These employment agencies first negotiate with administrative organs in other regions for workers and place them into jobs.

Workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex must be North Korean, but in exceptional cases South Korean or other foreign workers may be hired if the proper documents are submitted to the Kaesong Industrial Complex Management Committee and North Korea’s Central Special Zone Guidance Development Department.7) Approximately 10 South Korean, Chinese, German and Australian workers have been employed in the complex to manage technology or quality control duties.

In the beginning, cultural differences between North and South Korea caused considerable issues between South Korean companies and their North Korean partners. South Korean companies viewed their relationship with North Korean workers as one between the “employer and the employed,” but North Korean workers viewed the relationship as an “equal partnership.” Specifically, North Korean workers mentioned that “North Korea manages North Korean workers,” or “North Korea was given the right to hire and

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6) These measures prescribed by the Kaesong Complex Labor Regulations, clauses 9, 10, 11, and 13.
fire workers when the Kaesong Industrial Complex was first established.” In reality, management of North Korean workers is done by the North Koreans.

North Korean managers are divided into managers, general affairs managers, unit leaders, and team leaders. This diverse set of managers has responsibility over regular workers onsite (see diagram below). South Korean business managers have traditionally not been allowed to give direct orders to North Korean workers. However, as time passed, the opinions of South Korean businesses have become reflected in the hiring process, placement, production and technology guidance, and there was a gradual increase in South Korean managers giving direct orders to North Korean workers. Despite this, however, South Korean managers can only give orders by going through high ranking North Korean managers. Generally speaking, the South Korean head of the Kaesong Complex transmits orders to the North Korean managers, which are then transmitted to the ordinary workers by the unit and team leaders. As a result, South Korean businesses could only provide North Korean workers with technological guidance. These points distinguish the Kaesong Complex from all other types of SEZs.

8) Interview with Chae Dongjin, the head of Daemyong Blue Jeans, May 11, 2012.
Table 3. The Management Structure of the North and South Korean Workforce in the Kaesong Complex

However, the hardline attitude North Korean managers held initially gradually grew more liberal with time. The desires of South Korean businesses began to be heard during negotiations with North Korean managers, and management of North Korean workers became much more stabilized compared to the past as South Korean companies gained rights to manage workers more directly. For example, while the manager and general manager positions were filled according to pre-established methods, there were cases where South Korean businesses were given the right to participate in the hiring process of a unit and team leaders. While orders to ordinary workers continued to go through the managers, team and unit leaders, day to day orders were sometimes given directly by South Korean managers. In other words, North Korean managers did not block justified orders made by South Korean managers toward North Korean workers. That being said, if orders made by South Korean managers had no direct relationship with the work at hand or if something unexpected came up, South Korean managers would have to generally negotiate with North Korean managers first.

North Korean managers would usually prepare hiring plans by department after
considering the abilities and background of the workers. There were also cases where a South Korean manager would interview a North Korean worker and then discuss with a North Korean manager about workers who held special skills such as office work or those who may pose a problem before separately making the decision to hire. As these experiences accumulated, the process of hiring by the companies became more diverse depending on the needs for production management a product or the company’s own hiring practices.

There were cases in which the introduction of the South Korean human resources management system, strict control over work hours and work attitudes, led to improvements in focus and production rates. There were also cases in which humane treatment and improvements in welfare benefits increased the sense of belonging among North Korean workers and led to their own leadership in increasing production. While North Korean managers could ask South Korean businesses to improve the labor conditions of their workers, they refrained from switching worker’s placements temporarily and also agreed they should play a cooperative role with South Korean businesses. On the other hand, there were cases in which more authority and responsibility was given to North Korean managers in order for North Korean workers to more quickly familiarize themselves to the complex and maintain stable production rates.

III. Cases of Capacity Building for North Korean Human Resources at the Kaesong Industrial Complex

1. General Characteristics in the Development of Human Resource at the Special Economic Zones

Generally speaking, when a business with a relatively high level of technology enters a SEZ they are allowed to conduct research and development (R&D) with more freedom than companies outside the zone, and the zone becomes a center for spreading and developing technology in the country. This function not only improves the competitive power of the SEZ itself but also improves the overall technological level of the country’s economy. Technology, production, human management, marketing and the know-how brought...
in by companies is spread throughout the country from the SEZ. Companies within the SEZ hire large numbers of workers, and the workforce’s competitive power is improved by them having received education and training. The expansion and development of the SEZ leads to the promotion of not only workforce training but the entrance of more human capital.9)

However, the impact that a SEZ can have on the development of a country’s human resources can vary greatly by country and by policy. In many low-income developing countries, the production occurring in a SEZ is merely simple, low-income manufacturing that does not require a high level of human capital. As a result there are many cases in which workers in a SEZ remain low-skilled workers. However, in countries like China where overall policies geared toward reform have allowed the free establishment of domestic companies, the business knowledge and technology from foreign companies has spread widely enough to bring about a rise in the quality of workers and overall business management.

There are many cases in which SEZs in developing countries are comprised of low-paying, labor intensive manufacturing companies such as clothing and other light industries, and this type of business structure does not tend to change over long periods of time. In some countries, the passage of time has allowed the transformation to businesses like electric companies that require a higher quality of human capital. However, even in these cases the transformation to a higher level of business structure was slow because the SEZs were mainly composed of labor intensive factories, and it took many years for high capital and technology intensive manufacturers to enter the SEZ.

2. Cases of North Korean Human Resource Capacity Building at the Kaesong Industrial Complex

“Human capital” generally refers to the collective skills, knowledge and other intangible assets of individuals that can be used to create economic value. Generally

9) KOTRA-Business Research Center, “A Strategy to Deepen, Expand and Develop the Inter-Korean Cooperation Districts,” Research Project Commissioned by the Ministry of Unification, February 2013,
speaking, the higher one’s education level the higher one’s production becomes, which in turn increases one’s quality of life. This basic point can also be applied to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The first task in successfully developing the complex is to develop North Korean human capital and transform it into a productive resource. The development of North Korea human capital at the complex is closely connected with the task of raising production through a wide-variety of education and training.

In fact the main reason for South Korean companies to enter the complex in the first place has been to raise their competitiveness through cost-reductions, making it all important for them to improve the production level of North Korean workers. As a result, the managers of South Korean businesses have promoted efforts to localize operations by improving the capabilities of North Korean workers’ production, management technology (quality, production, materials, etc.) and administrative support. Most South Korean businesses agree that this continuous education has positively impacted the improvement of North Korean workers’ production. The greater roles North Koreans have played in the complex operations has contributed to the increase in the efficiency of complex operations and constructed a harmonious communication and cooperation system between the North and South Korean workforce. 10)

A. Knowledge Sharing

The knowledge shared by South Korean businesses has ranged from basic computer skills education and business safety to more advanced topics like production technology education, sharing of business goals and information concerning business practices overseas and the international market environment.

For example, company A provided its North Korean employees with computer training, and brought in foreign experts for more high level training. All new employees are provided with at least one month of computer training and practical experience, and

11) Please see Park Cheon Jo, The Actual Study no the Actual Conditions of Labor Management at the Companies in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, University of North Korean Studies,
as a result line workers, security officers, and even those working in restaurants become familiar with computers. Line workers in particular have to become familiar with enterprise resource planning (ERP)\(^{12}\) and must receive computer training as a result.

After the North Korean unit leaders take practical education they then provided this education to the ordinary workers. In the beginning the team and unit leaders were educated through two types of textbooks concerning production and quality control, while the education for new workers was conducted by unit leaders who had received the education already. Higher level education was provided by lecturers brought in from South Korea and documentation was provided to teach them about new technology.

Company B provided their workers with not only basic office and production training but also education related to the international market environment and the need to secure international competitive power. In short, this company gave their workers education in sewing, general management, clothes cutting, quality control and theory. The education was provided through PowerPoint presentations and textbooks produced by the company along with videos showing each production process.

This company also provided regular education to both new workers and veteran workers in quality and production management. Unit leaders were provided constant education, and this usually took place during lunch time or after work had finished in the afternoon. Education for the entire workforce took place twice a year during the off season for a period of five days. South Korean resident employees would become lecturers and teach about production management, quality control, safety guidelines, labor management, and then would hold circle discussions by unit.

Company C had North Korean workers who met the technology level requirements of the company, but production issues led South Korean resident employees to provide practical education to North Korean unit leaders every Wednesday. These education sessions focused on understanding production products and their market, along with a wide-range of other information concerning their work. The company reported a 10% rise in production rates after the education program began.

\(^{12}\) ERP systems integrate international and external management information across an entire organization.
The educational area emphasized the most by South Korean companies is quality management. This is because quality competitiveness is just as important as price competitiveness in order for the company to earn profits. As a result continued efforts to improve quality was essential. These efforts bore fruit when the company and workers worked together toward the same goals. For example, during the process of moving towards a joint goal of implementing “quality certification” spontaneous efforts by North Korean workers to improve quality can bring about major results and a change in thinking about the importance of quality.

When Company D realized early on that huge differences in capabilities among North Korean workers and a low understanding of customer satisfaction led to a large quantity of defective products being produced, the company successfully used the “quality certification system” to improve the situation. The company’s president oversaw a drastic decrease in defective products during his stay there. In addition, because bonuses were not permitted the company provided its workers with special meals for their performance and improved their working conditions by installing exercise equipment. These improvements led to an improvement in work efficiency rates and the quality reform campaign led to the disappearance of defective products, which had reached almost 700 per month during the initial period.

Company E saw results when it provided education to North Korean managers about quality control and the importance of paying on time. The company explained that poor quality and late payments would lead to the withdrawal of buyers, and that this would lead to the halt of production and the end of the business. After this, the North Korean managers understood the importance of quality control and making payments on time, and encouraged an improvement among workers by posting the phrase “payments on time equals life, quality is pride.” This positively impacted the production levels of the workers.

B. Ways of Knowledge Sharing

1) Technology Guidance by Resident South Korean Workers

Knowledge sharing occurred in the form of technology guidance aimed at improving...
the productivity of North Korean workers. During the initial process of establishing a production line after businesses moved into the complex, long-term resident South Korean engineers conducted technology training for North Korean workers. This training was the most direct method of influencing the companies’ production. There were many differences in productivity according to the level of interest the South Korean engineers displayed toward the training.

Company F conducted training for new employees in sewing...and held a weekly theory class using the company’s textbooks. After this theory class was finished, students went through a week of practical training. Those employees who showed promise were selected to be unit and team leaders, who in turn taught other employees the skills they learned. The workers’ productivity and product quality improved if South Korean managers provided them with guidance every day; however, if this guidance was not provided the opposite occurred. When South Korean managers conducted trainings they first modeled what needed to be done, mindful of the passive attitude towards the work by the North Koreans. This method improved the effects of the training greatly. After receiving the proactive training by South Korean managers, North Korean workers were able to improve their productivity due to their high understanding of the product they were making.

Meanwhile, the understanding North Korean workers had toward the South Korean managers was important for the education and training process. In the beginning, North Korean workers had the tendency to “test” South Korean managers. One example of this was having multiple people ask the same questions to the engineer about the technology in question. When this occurred, if the South Korean engineer was well prepared and provided good explanations the impact of the trainings improved. However, if this was not the case, the impact of these trainings was less successful.

During the training process, the area that South Korean engineers particularly showed caution towards was the content of the training textbooks. Due to the ongoing ideological and political confrontation between North and South Korea, North Korean workers refused to continue the trainings if the textbook contained sections that were hostile or negative toward the North Korean government and state. For example,
during a computer skills class, the textbook in the course had a picture of a poster of the movie “Two-Faced Spy.” This became an issue and even led to the halt of the class.

2) Use of North Korean Educators

There were many cases in which members of the North Korean workforce were cultivated to become instructors of productivity education. Company F selected those who had entered the company first and provided them with education. While the first round of education was done by South Korean engineers, a class leader was selected from among the students and became a teacher’s assistant. He or she then went on to teach incoming North Korean workers.

3) The Use of Overseas Engineers

Some companies brought in Chinese engineers for set periods of time to provide trainings. Chinese engineers had grown up in a similar socialist environment as the North Koreans and as a result were able to maintain friendly relations with North Korean workers and held successful trainings. Company A had a factory in China, and brought in six Chinese unit and team leaders to train North Korean workers for two months. Interpretation between the two groups was handled by a Chinese-Korean worker. The training began with the fundamentals and later headed into more advanced topics involving production. Some companies sent their North Korean workers abroad for training but after finding that this was ineffective they brought in foreign engineers to the complex for training instead. In general, South Korean companies have reported that the trainings provided by Chinese engineers were very effective.

4) Overseas Training

South Korean companies sent North Korean workers abroad for training to either improve their productivity or develop their own human resources. The only place the workers were sent was China, where many of the companies had factories. These overseas trainings took place only from 2004 to 2006.

These overseas trainings required South Korean companies to first negotiate with...
the Central Special Zone Development Guidance Department, the managing body of the complex. As a result, the trainings were initially very restricted, and it was a three month process from when the companies suggested overseas trainings to the workers actually leaving the country. This was mainly due to the fact that North Korean officials conducted a laborious process of examination for those selected to participate in the trainings.

The North Koreans originally stated that South Korean companies could interview the workers selected for the trainings in advance, but this rarely happened. The time spent abroad by the workers was usually a short two months. The North Koreans also sent managers along with the workers for their protection. Workers’ pay was given to these managers during the training period. The pay was usually 60-70% of the basic wages given to ordinary workers and there were other costs on top of this including food costs, transportation costs, etc. Before sending them abroad, South Korean companies had to consider carefully what role the trainee would have after returning.

C. Achievements and Limitations

1) Achievements

The biggest success of the trainings was that workers gained an improved understanding of the productive they were making and the production process. The trainings quickly reduced the number of defective products being produced. Education focused on circulation routes of the products and marketing also improved the workers’ understanding of the market economic system.

North Korean workers also came to understand that economic activity was maintained through close relations with other countries; that companies require competitiveness in order to survive in the market system; and that unlike in the socialist system, companies cannot receive protection from the state.

A summary of the above cases shows that the reactions of North Korean workers to South Korean managers’ orders and education went through three phases of evolution. The first phase was hostility. When a South Korean manager ordered North Korean workers to do something they would respond with hostility about why they are being
ordered around. As a result South Korean managers had to give orders through the North Korean managers. The second phase was silent agreement. After one or two years the North Korean workers followed orders without any problems. Sometimes the workers would not even raise objections when South Korean managers gave direct orders to them. The third phase was a proactive attitude. North Korean workers would do their work without having South Korean managers ordering them to. In the beginning, the workers would not do something even if they were ordered to; however, in the end, they ended up doing things proactively without having to be ordered to do so.

2) Limitations

The North Korean government has adopted a number of measures aimed at restricting direct contact between North and South Korean workers inside the complex. South Korean managers and resident workers were able to share knowledge with ordinary North Korean workers through North Korean managers and unit and team leaders. Of course, as explained before, while there was a gradual increase in cases where education was directly given to North Korean workers, generally speaking direct contact or conversation was difficult between the two groups. For example, if a South Korean manager attempted to talk with a North Korean worker, the worker would not respond and bring a manager to talk to instead. Moreover, high North Korean managers did not come alone to meetings with South Korean managers. Individual actions were not permitted and North Korean workers had to meet with South Korean managers in twos or more. These restrictions were the basic cause of the limited effect of education-based knowledge sharing at the complex.

IV. Conclusion: Implications for Future Special Economic Zones in North Korea

That its planned economic system is the cause of North Korea’s inability to extract its economy from chronic difficulties is well known. Neither individual tastes nor capabilities can be developed within a system that does not respect dynamic standard
changes or freedom. North Koreans have a low desire to learn in the classroom, and the same is true for laborers learning technology in the factory. In short, this structure lowers the level for people to improve their capabilities. A SEZ like the Kaesong Industrial Complex is somewhat removed from this planned economic system and thus allows a certain level of human resources development. The cases above show that while the freedom of North Korean workers is still restricted, they are capable of improving their productivity through knowledge sharing with South Korean businesses.

The large scale human development experience at the Industrial Kaesong Complex will clearly contribute considerably to the development of other SEZs in the country. In particular, North Korea has become deeply aware that it is important to strengthen human resource capabilities and laws in order to successfully run a SEZ.

The North Korean officials who belonged to the General Bureau for the Special Zone Development Guidance observed SEZs in China and Vietnam five times between 2005 and 2009 along with South Korean officials. The common messages these officials heard during these trips were that proactive efforts by the promoting agency and incentives are needed to promote foreign capital; free and quick passage and communication provide the basis for competitiveness; countries running SEZs need to abide by international standards in order to bring in international businesses; and that there is a need to provide perfect infrastructure and support for companies. North Korea showed interest and a motivation to learn about law, taxes and finances, and insurance systems.13)

This paper has shown that the perception and change in attitude by North Korea toward the building of law system capabilities is worth examining. The efforts by the country to learn during the process of establishing laws for the complex and the successes in experimentation with the market economic law system and building independent capabilities in legislation will likely spread to the rest of the country and play a considerable role in changing North Korea’s overall system of law. In fact, the experience North Korea has accumulated in the complex has already impacted the development and legislation process for SEZs in other areas. Experts consider the passage of the

Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Islands Economic Zone Law “on December 3, 2011, and the same day passage of the Rason Economic and Trade Zone Law as having been influenced by the experience the country had in operating the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

The Chinese and Singapore government’s jointly developed China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park is viewed as the most successful of the modern complexes in China. While the two country’s relationship did encounter difficulties it is well known that the Singapore run knowledge sharing program for Chinese officials contributed greatly to the project’s success. Officials from both sides acquired a great deal of knowledge and experience during the process of working together, and this same phenomenon was put on display at the Kaesong Industrial Complex to some extent as well. If the Kaesong Industrial Complex is opened again in the future, the South Korean government should establish a more systematic knowledge sharing program to help construct a modern law system in North Korea and to develop the skills of North Korean administrators and managers.

By transferring new knowledge and experience about the market economy system to North Korean society the Kaesong Industrial Complex will speed up reforms and opening in the country. However, North Korean authorities are concerned that the joint economic project with South Korea will bring about changes that could weaken their regime. North Korea needs to lessen the undesirable factors that could affect the regime during the process of knowledge sharing. The Kaesong Industrial Complex is not there to threaten the North Korea with opening and reform but is rather there to show North Korea what is beneficial and what is not, and allow the country to gain the confidence to move towards change.
Possibilities and Prospects for South Korean Engagement with North Korea in Knowledge Sharing/Capacity Building Projects

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(Seoul National University)
지식 공유 및 역량 강화를 위한
남북 공동프로젝트의 가능성과 전망

본 논문은 북한의 개발역량을 지원하기
위하여 국제사회가 추진해 온 역량발전 사업
의 현황을 소개하고 향후 대북한 역량발전
프로그램의 구조적인 제약에도 불구하고 한
국이 도모할 수 있는 파트너십의 가능성을
타진하고자 한다. 이를 위하여 개발역량발
전의 이론적 소개와 지금까지 추진되어 온
대북한 지식공유와 교육훈련 프로그램을 무
역, 행정 거버넌스, 그리고 시장제도교육을
중심으로 시사점과 한계점을 정리하여 유형
화를 도모한다. 마지막으로 통일시대를 대
비하는 북한 개발역량강화를 위한 남북한
파트너십의 가능성을 전망하며 전략적 접근
법을 제시한다.
Possibilities and Prospects for South Korean Engagement with North Korea in Knowledge Sharing/Capacity Building Projects

This paper begins by introducing the current state of capacity development work which has been driven by the international community in support of North Korea’s capacity building efforts. It then aims to explore the potential for South Korea to promote an inter-Korean capacity development partnership despite the structural limitations hindering South Korea’s current efforts to advance capacity development in North Korea. To that end, this paper outlines and classifies critical points and deductions through the exploration of the following topics: a theoretical introduction to capacity development enhancement, inter-Korean knowledge sharing efforts and the trade of education and training programs which have taken place thus far, administrative governance, and market structure education. The paper establishes that there is potential for an inter-Korean partnership in the interests of strengthening North Korean capacity development in preparation for Korean unification. Finally, the conclusion offers strategic approaches for achieving such a partnership.
I. 들어가며

북한의 개혁·개방에 관한 학문적 연구는 지금까지 상당한 규모의 자료를 축적하여 왔다 (정영철, 2004; 정세진, 2000). 그러나 이러한 개혁·개방연구가 실질적으로 이른바 ‘개발 협력(development cooperation)’이라는 분야에서 제공하는 다양한 정책적 프레임과 연결하려는 시도는 아직 결을 수 단계라고 볼 수 있다. 이는 여러 이유가 있겠지만, 무엇보다도 공식적으로 북한에게 제공되는 식량원조 및 인도주의적 지원 자체가 한국이 개도국에게 지원하는 일반적인 공적개발원조(ODA)와는 다른 형태의 계정으로 추산되기 때문에 국가 대 국가로 지원되는 ODA를 북한에게 공식적으로 적용할 수 없으며, 따라서 기존 ODA 집행에 항상 따르는 원조조건 및 원조효과성과 같은 제도적인 논의가 북한의 경우 자동적으로 배제되거나 다른 방식으로 동원되어야 한다. 이러한 대북원조의 현주소는 늘 북한에首饰기 논쟁으로 번지기 십상이며, 특히 남북관계가 정착단계에 접어들게 되면 대북지원의 정당성을 선뜻 옹호하기가 어려운 상황에 처하게 되고 북한에 대한 인도주의적 지원은 결국 실제 정치안보화(political securitization)되어 통제의 대상으로 전락하게 된다(Buzan et al., 2001).

이러한 배경 하에 본 연구는 남북한 간의 직접적인 양자원조관계가 아니라 제3의 국제기구, 관련국가 내지 비정부기구(NGOs)를 통한 다자지원을 중심으로 북한의 개발협력을 위한 남측의 전략적 접근을 도모함으로써, 상대적으로 대북지원의 정치화의 위험을 최소화하고 대북사업의 지속성을 유지하기 위한 방식으로 북한의 개발역량강화에 초점을 맞추고자 한다. 개발협력을 위한 역량발전(capacity development)은 개도국이 사회·경제개발을 위하여 범분야적(cross-cutting)으로 교차하는 모든 개발 프로젝트의 기초가 되는 과정이라는 점에서 정치적 민감성을 축소시킬 수 있으며, 특히 북한을 위한 역량발전 사업을 제3자를 통한 다자지원으로 집행할 경우에는 남측의 개입을 간접화시키므로써 더 더욱 정치화의 위험도를 낮출 수 있다. 이는 남북한 간의 공식적인 교류가 끊긴 이 명박 정부에서도 다자채널을 이용한 북한의 역량개발 프로그램을 지속적으로 추진하였다 는 점에서 확인될 수 있다.

1) 이명박 정부가 들어서 2008년 이후 계속해서 이어져 온 남북한 대치상황은 양 측 모두 경제협력을 비롯하여 다양한 부문에서 협력관계를 유지할 수 없게 만들어 왔다. 2010년 5·24 조치로 남북한 간에는 위탁가공교역 몽촌 1988년 이후 계속되어 왔던 남북 간 일반 무역마저 끊어졌다. 이에 북한은 동년 11월 연평도 포격사건로 갈등하게 대응하였고, 2011년 여름에는 경전적으로 발효된 금강산국제관광특구법에 따라 금강산특구 내에 있는 남측 자산에 대한 법적 처리를 단행하였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 북한의 역량발전을
다시 말해, 북한의 역량발전을 위하여 대북사업을 추진하는 것은 북한이 자본주의 시장경제에 편입할 수 있는 기초 작업을 지원하는 것이라 할 수 있으며, 이는 주로 시장경제, 무역, 공공행정과 같은 자본주의체제에 대한 지식공유(knowledge sharing)와 기술지원 (technical assistance: TA) 형태로 구성되는 교육훈련과정이 제공되어 중장기적으로 북한이 자본주의 세계체제에 연착륙할 수 있는 확률을 높이는 것이다(이종무 외, 2012; 박형중 외, 2009). 따라서, 북한이 개발의 주체로서 제도적 역량강화를 스스로 추진할 수 있도록 국제사회와 함께 우리의 정부가 선도하는 역량발전의 국제협력체제를 구축하고 이를 체계적으로 지원할 수 있는 전략적 방안을 시도하는 것이 본 연구의 목적이 된다.
이에 본 연구는 개발협력을 위한 역량발전에 관한 개념적·이론적 토대를 검토하고, 2000년대에 들어와 한국 정부와 국제사회가 추진한 대북 역량발전 프로그램을 크게 시장경제, 공공행정, 무역관련제도로 나누어 살펴본 후, 앞으로 북한의 역량발전에 대한 한국 정부의 전략적 대응방안에 대한 정책적 제언과 한계점을 제시하는 것으로 구성되어 있다. 요컨대, 북한의 역량발전에 대한 시각을 개발학적 관점에서 고찰하고자 한다.

II. 개발을 위한 역량발전과 정책이전


위한 프로그램을 제3의 기구를 통하여 한국 정부기관이 추진하였다는 것을 여러 채널을 통해 확인할 수 있다.

북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망
금융기구와 상관없이 가능하기 때문에 그리고 실제로 이들 개발주체에 의해 대북사업이 진행되어 왔기 때문에 국제개발금융기구에 국한되지 않고 국제원조사회에서 논의되고 있는 역량발전에 대한 개념과 정책을 분석하는 것이 중요하다. 탈냉전 이후 국제사회에서 통용되는 역량발전과 정책이란에 관한 논의를 살펴보므로써 수원국의 국가 역량과 역량발전의 관계와 역량발전사업에 제공하는 기술이전과 지식공유에 대한 경험적 이해를 도모한다.

1. 역량발전과 국가 역량


하지만 역량발전에 대한 국제적 관심에도 불구하고 ‘역량발전’에 대한 일반적인 개념 정의는 아직까지 국제사회에서 합의되지 않은 상태이다. OECD는 역량발전을 총체적으로 개인・조직・사회가 시간이 흐름에 따라 능력을 촉발・강화・창조・적응・유지하는 과정으로, UNDP는 장기간에 걸쳐 개인・조직・사회가 시간이 흐름에 따라 자신들의 개발목표를 설정하고 달성할 수 있는 역량을 획득・강화・유지해나가는 과정으로, 그리고 세계은행은 개발목표를 이루기 위해 제도적 역량 분야(주권의식, 정책, 기관)에서의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이끌어나가는 지도자・연합체・기타기관에 의한 현지 주도의 변화를 지지하고 이вл
북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망


특히, 세계은행은 개발협력의 측면에서 국가의 역할 및 기능에 대해 문제의식을 갖게 되었다. 대부분의 개발원조가 양자 차원이든 다자 차원이든 국가를 매개로 제공되기 때문에 수원국의 국가역량(state capacity)에 대해 주목하게 된 것이다. 세계은행은 개발을 위한 역량(capacity for development)을 국가가 지속가능한 토대 위에서 개발목표의 설정과 이를 이루기 위해 자신들이 갖고 있는 자원을 효과적이고 효율적으로 이용하는 것으로 개발원조를 투명하고 책임성 있게 운영할 수 있는 제도와 정책이 준비되어 있는 수원국일수록 원조효과성이 증대한다고 규정하고 있다(World Bank, 1998). 이는 그동안 개발지원이 소기의 성과를 거두지 못한 데에는 수원국에 만연한 부패나 부실한 제도, 정부 기능의 미비 또는 거버넌스 부재 등 수원국의 국가역량이 매우 취약하기 때문이라는 인식이 깔려 있다. 따라서 개발 효과성에 대한 논의에서 수원국의 국가역량, 개발을 위한 역량에 대한 논의를 소위 'good governance'라는 새로운 개념에 전략적 목적을 담고 있다.

이와 같이 국가의 기능, 국가 역량에 대한 다양한 분석들이 존재하고 개발역량이 국가 역량과 다양한 측면에서 연결되는 것은 각각의 분석에 따라 개발을 위한 역량발전 전략이 다양하게 존재할 수 있다는 것을 의미한다. 따라서 어느 특정한 전략 또는 정책만을 고수하면서 그것이 옳다고 주장할 수는 없는 것이다. 또한 한 국가의 역량발전을 위해 외부에서 할 수 있는 것은 매우 제한적이기 때문이라는 것을 인정하고, 수원국의 주인이식에 기초해서 그들의 요구에 입각하여 추진한다는 지원 원칙을 견고하게 지킬 필요가 있다.

2) 예컨대 개발도상국의 한 대도시가 쓰레기 관리하기 위해 필요한 역량발전을 추진할 경우, '개인적' 차원에서는 지방자치단체의 청소관리 직원 개인들의 충분한 지식 및 기술 습득이, '조직적' 차원에서는 쓰레기 관리 조직의 경영 강화, 그리고 '사회적' 차원에서는 정책과 제도를 포괄하여 쓰레기를 배출하는 주민과 청소관리국 간의 책임분담을 강화, 분리수거와 관리 기준, 벌칙 등의 제도 수립, 쓰레기 감량 목표 등의 정책 마련, 쓰레기 문제에 민감한 사회 조성 등의 세 단계에 걸친 포괄적인 노력을 포함하는 것이다(한국국제협력단, 2010: 144-145).
2. 역량발전을 위한 기술협력과 지식공유

정부가 국민의 세금으로 조성하여 수원국에 공여하는 개발원조는 일반적으로 유상과 무상으로 분류하여 이해하고 있으나 그 대상, 전달 주체, 개발 프로그램의 집행 내용에 따라 다양하고 구체적인 유형으로 분류할 수 있다. 여기에는 프로젝트형 지원(project-based support), 프로그램형 지원, 기술협력, 예산지원, 식량지원, 재난구호, 부채탕감, 시민단 체기관 및 다른 NGO를 통한 간접원조 등이 포함될 수 있다. 최근에는 개발도상국의 무역을 진흥하기 위한 지원과 취약국가에 대한 지원도 강조되고 있다(UNDP, 2008).

역량발전을 위한 기술협력이란 기술수준, 지식, 기술적 노하우 및 생산능력 향상기법의 전수를 통한 인적자원개발을 위해 기획된 지원활동을 의미한다. 기술협력의 가장 중요한 목표 중 하나는 제도개발이다. 그리고 제도개발의 필요조건은 인적자원개발이다. 사람과 기관의 역량발전은 주요 정부기관의 정책분석 및 개발관리 능력 향상에 매우 중요한 요소이다. 기술협력은 다양한 도구를 통해 이루어질 수 있다. 교육훈련, 전문가 파견, 정책 및 기술 자문, 조사 및 연구 준비를 위한 지원, 그리고 과학, 연구 및 기술개발을 위한 기여금 조성이 모두 기술협력에 해당한다. 이러한 기술협력은 크게 '독립적' 기술협력과 '투자 관련' 기술협력으로 분류된다. 독립적 기술협력은 위에서 언급한 바와 같이 인간의 지식, 자본 증가 또는 현존하는 자산을 활용할 수 있는 능력을 향상시키는 활동들로 구성되어 있다. 여기에는 기본적으로 교사·자원봉사가·전문가와 같이 인적 자본의 공급과 관련된 활동 또는 교육·훈련·자문과 같이 인적 자본 개발과 관련된 활동에 대한 지원을 포함한다.

투자 관련 기술협력은 수원국의 물질적 자본의 증대를 목적으로 한 프로젝트 및 프로그램의 기획 및 실행에 기여하기 위한 용역에 재정지원을 하는 것을 의미한다. 이러한 용역에는 컨설파인 서비스, 기술지원, 투자 프로젝트 집행과 관련된 기술제공 그리고 프로젝트 실행을 위해 공여국이 고용하는 인원(프로젝트 매니저, 기술자 등 전문가)도 포함된다(한국 국제협력단, 2010: 336).

그러나 기술을 공여하는 것만으로 수원국의 개발역량을 강화하는 데에는 한계가 있다. 기술협력의 성공률은 수원국의 정책 및 원조 수신 구조의 효과성에 비례하고 기술협력의 계획·관리 그리고 목표의 정의가 불분명한 경우 지원이 실패할 가능성이 높다. 그뿐 아니라 공여국에 의한 자국 전문가들의 자격을 활용하는 기술협력이 이익이 반영된 이른바 '개발 산업'을 육성하는 부작용을 낳는다. 따라서 최근에는 위와 같은 부작용 예방 및 수원국의 주의적사 및 참여적 개발 정신 고양이라는 만들에 입각하여, 공여국 전문가 파견 또는 공여국내 교육훈련을 지양하고, 수원국 내에서의 또는 수원국 인력이 주도하는 기술협력을 지향하고 있다(김태균, 2013).
이러한 역량발전을 위한 기술협력과 지식공유는 북한이 국제금융기구에 정식 가입하기 전이라도 이루어질 수 있다. 북한이 국제금융기구에 가입하는 경우에는 회원국으로서 자금지원을 비롯한 여러 가지 지원을 받을 수 있지만, 가입 이전에도 공식적인 자금지원은 아니더라도 기술지원 등 북한이 국제사회에 적응하는 데 필요한 노하우를 무상으로 습득할 수 있다. 이는 국제금융기구 가입 이전에도 기술협력을 적극 활용한 베트남의 사례를 통해서도 알 수 있다. 기술협력은 국제금융기구에 가입하여도 지속적으로 이루어지는 것이나, 북한이 국제사회에 성공적으로 편입하기 위해서는 국제금융기구 가입 이전이라도 적극적으로 추진되어야 하는 필요조건이다(장형수 외, 2008). 북한이 국제금융기구에 가입하기 이전의 기술협력으로는 북한관료들에 대한 자본주의 교육을 위한 교육 프로그램과 북한경제에 대한 종합보고서 작성 등의 기술지원을 들 수 있으며, 2000년대에 지속적으로 진행되어 온 대북한 개발역량발전 사례의 분석은 아래와 같이 크게 시장경제, 공공행정, 그리고 무역관련 제도로 구분하여 접근할 수 있다.

### III. 북한의 개발역량발전을 위한 지식공유 및 교육훈련 사례

북한에 대한 개발역량발전을 위한 사업은 보통 북한 공무원을 대상으로 하는 (재)교육 사업으로 전개되고 있으며, 대부분의 경우 북한이 향후 개혁·개방을 추진하여 서방세계와의 협력관계를 발전시킬 때 필요한 새로운 개발역량에 관련된 사업들로 구성되어 있다. 아직까지 주로 기술협력으로 정의될 수 있는 제한된 방식의 개발협력 프로그램이 북한의 공공부문 개발역량 강화를 위한 부문별 사업으로 이어지고 있다(이종무 외, 2012).
북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망

<표 1> 최근 10년간 시장경제교육 참여 현황(1997-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>연도</th>
<th>참여횟수(번), 참여율(%)</th>
<th>연도</th>
<th>참여횟수(번), 참여율(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4(4.5%)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11(12.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5(5.6%)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10(11.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4(4.5%)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>19(21.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5(5.6%)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8(9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18(20.2%)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5(5.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>합계</td>
<td>89(100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

자료: Park and Jung (2007)

북한교육부문의 대외협력관계는 주로 두 가지 유형으로 정리된다. 첫째, 북한 유학생 및 실습생 해외파견 교육이다. 이는 다시 북한과 정치적 우호국가 내지 중립국가와의 과학, 기술, 문화 교류협정에 의한 유학생 파견이나 국제기구나 국제단체들의 후원에 의한 유학생 파견 두 가지로 세분화할 수 있다. 둘째는 북한이 필요로 하는 과학, 기술, 문화, 언어 분야의 외국 전문가들이 북한에 들어가 북한 관계자들을 교육하는 유형이다. 이러한 형태의 교육은 많은 경우 국제기구 관계자나 국제기구가 정한 해외전문가들이 북한에 들어가 특정 사업에 대한 교육을 진행하는 데, 외부전문가 초청에서 가장 선호도가 높은 분야는 영어나 러시아 등과 같은 언어교육이다. 그러나 최근에 들어와 경제, 무역 분야에 대한 외국 전문가 초빙이 잦아지고 있으며, 대표적인 사례로는 UNIDO 지원 하에 운영된 나진기업학교와 유엔인구기금 지원 하에 북한 경제, 통계 전문가들을 교육한 전문통계교육이 있다. 또한 <표 1>와 <표 2>가 보여주듯이, 90년대 후반부터 지금까지 북한 개발역량과 시장경제교육에 북한이 참여한 2004년도까지 증가하다가 그 이후로 주춤하고 있는 것을 알 수 있으며, 이러한 개발역량 사업 개최 장소가 주로 북한과 외교관계가 있는 국가에서 이루어지고 있으며 한국과 미국과 같은 국가들에서는 최소한의 사업이 이루어지는 것으로 집계되고 있다.
<표 2> 지역・국가별 북한 개발역량강화 사업 개최 장소(1997-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>지역</th>
<th>국가</th>
<th>개최 수</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>아시아</td>
<td>중국</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>베트남</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>호주</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>싱가포르</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>말레이시아</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>일본</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>브루나이</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>인도네시아</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>대만-중국</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>캄보디아</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>유럽</td>
<td>스위스</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>이탈리아</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>벨기에</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>스웨덴</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>독일</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>리시아</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>영국</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>네덜란드</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>헝가리</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>기타</td>
<td>북한</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>미국</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>한국</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1997-2007 10년 동안 북한에게 제공되었던 개발역량 강화를 위한 지식공유 교육프로 그램은 크게 7가지 형태로 전달방식을 구분할 수 있는데, 이는 서적과 자료 교환, 산업현 장시찰, 단기교육훈련, 장기교육훈련, 회의주최, 공동연구, 그리고 제도 신설 등으로 나누 어진다(<표 3> 참조). 각각의 전달방식에 대한 가능성(feasibility), 비용(cost), 효과성 (effectiveness), 지속가능성(continuity)을 기준으로 지난 사업들을 평가한 결과 가능 성 기준에서는 서적자료교환, 산업현장시찰과 회의개최, 단기교육훈련, 장기교육훈련과 북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망
공동연구, 제도신설 순으로 나타났고, 비용 면에서는 제도신설, 장기교육훈련, 산업현장 시찰・단기교육훈련・회의개최・ 공동연구, 서적자료교환 순으로 높게 나타났으며, 효과성 기준에서는 제도신설, 산업현장시찰・단기교육훈련・ 공동연구, 서적자료교환과 장기교육훈련, 회의개최 순으로 높게 나타났고, 지속가능성 면에서는 제도신설, 단기교육훈련, 서 적자료교환과 장기교육훈련, 산업현장시찰・회의개최・ 공동연구 순으로 높게 조사되었다. 제도를 구축하는 것이 가능하다면 비용, 효과성, 지속가능성 면에서 가장 이상적인 개발 역량사업의 모델이 될 수 있는 반면, 북한 당국의 협조를 얻을 가능성이 가장 낮기 때문에 현실적으로 타당성에 심각한 문제가 발생한다. 현실적으로 가장 가능한 대안은 교육훈련 으로 북한 관료들이 경치엘리트들을 제3국으로 초청하여 자본주의 시장경제제도에 대한 교육을 받게 하는 프로그램으로 이는 1-2개월에 걸쳐 단기간에 집행되는 단기연수훈련과 1년-2년에 걸쳐 보통 석사학위나 디플로마를 취득할 수 있는 장기연수훈련으로 나누어질 수 있다. 이 중에서도 북한 관료들에게 실질적으로 시장경제교육 및 기타 공공행정 정역량을 제고할 수 있는 방식의 교육 프로그램은 장기교육훈련이라고 평가할 수 있다. 이는 단기연수교육에서 얻을 수 있는 훈련효과보다는 장기연수교육이 북한 관료에게 전달할 수 있는 내용에 보다 효과성이 뛰어나다고 볼 수 있기 때문이다. 그러나 장기교육프로그램이 현실화되기 위해서는 안정적인 재원 확보와 연속성 있는 교육프로그램을 특정 교육기관에서 마련해야하며, 이러한 교육사업에 대하여 북한 당국이 어느 정도 사전에 합의하는 과정의 문제가 발생하게 된다는 현실적인 문제가 있다.

표 3 지식공유를 위한 교육훈련프로그램의 종류와 가능성 탐정

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>종류</th>
<th>가능성</th>
<th>비용</th>
<th>효과성</th>
<th>지속가능성</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>서적자료교환</td>
<td>매우 높음</td>
<td>매우 낮음</td>
<td>중간</td>
<td>중간</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>산업현장시찰</td>
<td>높음</td>
<td>중간</td>
<td>높음</td>
<td>중간</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>단기교육훈련</td>
<td>중간</td>
<td>높음</td>
<td>낮음</td>
<td>낮음</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>장기교육훈련</td>
<td>낮음</td>
<td>중간</td>
<td>낮음</td>
<td>낮음</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>회의</td>
<td>높음</td>
<td>낮음</td>
<td>중간</td>
<td>낮음</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>공동연구</td>
<td>매우 낮음</td>
<td>매우 높음</td>
<td>매우 높음</td>
<td>매우 높음</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>제도신설</td>
<td>매우 낮음</td>
<td>매우 높음</td>
<td>매우 높음</td>
<td>매우 높음</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


주요 국제기구들이 추진해 온 개발도상국의 역량발전을 위한 사업들을 바탕으로 북한에게 경험적으로 적용해 온 개발역량 사업들을 시장경제교육, 무역, 공공행정 부문으로 나누어 정리함으로써 1997년부터 추진되어 온 사업들의 정책적 함의를 살펴보도록 한다.

북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망
이 세 부문은 김정일 체제부터 추진해온 개혁·개방의 주요 핵심 역량과 직접되는 분야의 정부 역량이기 때문에 중요하다고 볼 수 있다. 그러나, 이 세 부문은 북한 정권에게는 악화된 경제상황과 기근문제 등을 토대로하는데 필요한 개혁입과 동시에 개방을 위한 역량강화가 지나칠 경우에 발생할 수 있는 북한 정권에 대한 도전과 같은 부작용이 공존하는 이중적인 기회공간으로 북한 정권은 인식할 가능성이 높다. 김정일 체제와 마찬가지로 김정은 체제에서도 시장경제교육, 무역, 공공행정의 세 부문은 북한체제의 시장경제화를 주도하는 데 중요한 역할을 하는 국정관리의 역량발전 분야이며, 이를 위하여 국제사회에서 지원되는 개발협력 프로그램을 북한 정부가 실행하는 데 있어 시장경제를 어느 정도까지 포용하겠는가 북한 정권의 의지가 미미 반영되어 있다고 볼 수 있다. 그는 극적으로 북한 경제체제의 주요 구성단위인 국영기업을 어느 정도까지 민영화하여야 하는지에 대한 현실적인 문제로 이어질 수 있는데, 여기에는 국영기업의 완전 개방화, 제한된 개방화 전략, 그리고 민영화 없이 국영기업의 경쟁력 강화에만 초점을 맞추는 전략까지 다양하게 구성이 가능하며 북한 정권이 어떠한 목표로 개발역량강화에 협력하는지에 따라 실질적인 역량발전의 결과물이 차등화될 것이다. 국방위원회가 이러한 정책 결정에 있어 주요 핵심 국가기관으로 개입하기 때문에 향후 시장경제에 관련 있는 부분의 역량발전 사업에 획기적인 전환이 이루어지는 기회를 얻지 못할 것으로 예상되며 이는 전적으로 군부 중심의 체제 안정이라는 보다 북한의 본원적인 목표가 개혁·개방을 통한 경제회생이라는 시급한 문제 보다 우선시되는 정책성이 높 수반된다는 것을 의미한다.

1. 시장경제 및 거시경제관리


3) 김정은 체제가 도입된 후 북한 경제 시스템의 변화와 북한의 시장경제에 대한 긍정적인 접근이 목도되고 있다는 논문에 반하여 아직도 시장경제에 대한 관심의 방향이 제한적이고 김정일 체제와 연속성을에서 김정은 체제의 정책변화를 해석해야 한다는 조심스러운 전략가 지배적이다.
북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망

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<td>1997</td>
<td>1차 호주국립대학 학위과정</td>
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<td>97/7-98/6</td>
<td>중앙통계국 관료 5명</td>
<td>호주</td>
<td>시장경제체제 및 관리경제</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>제1차 단기 금융교육</td>
<td>헝가리 Central Union University</td>
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<td>자본주의 제도</td>
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*그림 1* 시장경제교육 발전과정

*표 4* 북한의 시장경제 및 거시경제관리 교육 참여

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<td>뉴욕주립대 법대, 북경대학, 아시아재단</td>
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<td>4명의 북한대학생</td>
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<td>국제무역촉진위원회 연구진들</td>
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<td>해외산업시찰</td>
<td>스톡홀름 경제단, European Institute of Japanese Studies</td>
<td>10월</td>
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<td>Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University, 미국 동아시아연구소, 스톤리재단</td>
<td>2월</td>
<td>외무부, 무역성, 중앙은행 관료 5인</td>
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<td>UNESCOP, 한국전문가협단 지원</td>
<td>7월</td>
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<td>방콕 (태국)</td>
<td>북한경제개발을 위한 교육 마련, 참관실태를 교육</td>
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</table>

다양한 사업 중 가장 최근의 사례 중 중요한 두 가지를 보다 자세하게 분석할 필요가 있다. 첫째로, 2009년 10월부터 11월까지 걸쳐 실시되었던 '시장경제 교육훈련(Market Economics Training)'에서 몇 가지 함의를 찾을 수 있는데, 먼저 이 시장경제교육 프로그램의 주체가 대한민국 기획재정부라는 점을 들 수 있다. 일반적으로 북한 당국은 이러한 기술협력이나 지식공유 프로그램을 통하여 시장경제교육을 받는데 있어 주 협의체가 국제기구였다는 점에서 남한의 정부기관과 시장경제교육을 위한 협력을 시도한다는 의의를 줄 수 있다. 훈련의 장소는 중국 Dalian University이었고 북측 참가자는 북한 국가계획위원회와 외무성에서 참가한 북한 공무원 40명을 대상으로 자본주의 시장경제 원리에 대한 교육 프로그램을 실시하였다. 교육 프로그램의 내용은 자유시장경제 이론을 중심으로 수요·공급법칙, 무역, 산업정책, 지적재산권, 환율정책, 그리고 주식시장에 관한 전반적인 자본주의 시장경제의 운영체계 등으로 이루어졌다. 2010년에도 이 교육훈련 과정을 지속하기로 협의를 하였으나, 후속 작업이 이루어졌는지 확인된 바 없으며 결국 남북한 독자적인 협의를 통한 개발역량강화 사업을 운영하는 데에는 국제기구보다 정치성이란 변수로 인하여 지속가능성을 안정적으로 확보하기가 어렵다는 것을 확인할 수 있다.

두 번째 사례로 2011년 7월에 태국 방콕에서 개최된 '북한을 위한 경제개발 교육 프로그램(Education Program for Economic Development of DPRK)' 사업협력안을 들 수 있다. 조직의 주체는 대한민국 전문집단의 재정적 지원으로 UNESCAP이 매개자 역할로 참가하기로 계획되었는데, 이 개발역량 교육사업은 2011년 7월 21일 UNESCAP에게 북한이 직접 북한경제개발을 위한 교육 프로그램을 제공해 줄 것을 요청하고 특히 남한의 전문가들이 본 프로그램을 맡어서 추진해 줄 것도 아울러 요청하여 시작되었다고 보고되고 있다. 이러한 북한 요구의 이유가 언어장벽을 없애기 위한 것이라 해석하고 있다. UNESCAP은 이러한 북측의 요청을 남측 정부에게 전달했으며 북한의 개혁개방을 위한 역량발전이라는 목표를 위하여 재정적 지원 및 전문인력의 참가로 이 훈련 프로그램을 남한 정부가 적극적으로 지원해 주길 요청하였다. 그러나 천안함 사건과 연평도 포격사건으로 엄여볼은 남북협력 분위기로 인하여 남한 정부로부터 실질적인 교육제공 의사가 전달되지 않는 것으로 알려지고 있다.

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4) Yeonhap News Agency.
5) Yonhap News Agency. 22 July 2011.
2. 공공행정

세계은행의 CPIA에서 중요한 평가기준으로 제시하고 있는 ‘공공행정의 질(Quality of Public Administration)’의 평가기준은 주로 수원국 중앙정부의 공무원(교원, 보건복지사, 경찰 포함)이 얼마나 효과적으로 정부정책을 입안하고 서비스를 전달하도록 교육받고 제도적으로 안정화되어 있는가를 판단하는 평가이다. 주요 평가 기준은 정책조율 및 반응도, 서비스 전달 및 조작상의 효율성, 성과와 윤리의식, 그리고 임금의 적정성과 급료보상관리 등 4 가지로 구성되어 있다(OPCS, 2010: 38). 또한 공공행정역량은 중앙행정과 더불어 지방행정이 얼마나 체계적으로 정비되어 중앙정부와 지방정부 간의 유기적 연계를 꾸할 수 있는가에 있고 실제로 1990년대 후반부터 유럽개발정책관리센터(European Centre for Development Policy Management)가 개도국의 중요한 역량개발의 교두보를 지방행정능력 강화에 두고 있어 북한의 국정관리 역량발전에 있어서도 다차원적인 공공행정역량 프로그램이 추진되어야 할 것이다(이종무 외, 2011: 141). 그러나 아직까지 일회성에 그치는 단일적인 교육 프로그램이 북한의 공공행정역량을 위해 제공되고 있으며, 지방행정에 대한 고려는 아직까지 포함되지 않고 있는 한계가 있다.

따라서, 여기에서는 북한 관료들의 개발정책에 관한 전반적인 역량발전을 위하여 제공된 다양한 교육훈련 프로그램을 중심으로 분석하고 북한 공공행정의 역량강화 프로그램에서 찾아볼 수 있는 주요 특징을 도출하고자 한다. 시장경제교육 프로그램과 마찬가지로 1997년부터 본격적으로 북한의 공공행정 관련 교육 프로그램이 기획되었으며 2011년까지 진행된 사업 목록은 다음〈표 5〉에서 확인할 수 있다.

〈표 5〉 북한의 공공행정 관련 교육 참여

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>연도</th>
<th>프로그램</th>
<th>주최기관</th>
<th>참가자/기간</th>
<th>교육내용</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>산업시찰</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15명 경제관료, 상하이 - 산업현장 방문</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>해외산업시험</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2월</td>
<td>중앙정부 재정성 관료 20인, 중국</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>제4차 북한관료법률 세미나</td>
<td>뉴욕주립대, 베트남, 베트남, 아시아교원</td>
<td>4월</td>
<td>사회과학원, 대외경제협력 축신위원, 김일성대학, 재정성</td>
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<td></td>
<td>경제교육</td>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>5/22</td>
<td>국제무역출준위원, 포틀랜드대</td>
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</tbody>
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북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망
<table>
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<th>참가자 정보</th>
<th>장소</th>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>제1회 도서관 및 정보과학 현장학습</td>
<td>아시아제도</td>
<td>1월</td>
<td>교육부 관료, 김책 관내, 민주대학 관계자들</td>
<td>샌프란시스코, 보스턴, 워싱턴 DC, 뉴욕</td>
<td>산업시험</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>제1회 KUT/SU 협력연구</td>
<td>시라큐스대, 한인회</td>
<td>3월, 6월, 12월</td>
<td>김책공대 관계자들</td>
<td>미국, 북한</td>
<td>전자시스템 도입 및 도서관 관리교육</td>
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<td>제1회 북·중 세계경제 공동연구</td>
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<td>4/29 - 9/3</td>
<td>정제전문가 6명</td>
<td>북한</td>
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<td>10/5</td>
<td>한국사회학회, 조선대학교 학자 6명</td>
<td>삿포로</td>
<td>협력망 구축방법 교육</td>
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<td>10/26 - 11/3</td>
<td>내각, 노동당, 교육기관 출신의</td>
<td>한국</td>
<td>한국 경제개발 소개</td>
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북한의 개발역량 강화를 위한 지식공유: 성과 및 향후전망
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<th>참가자 정보</th>
<th>장소</th>
<th>교육내용</th>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>제2차 KUT/SU 연구협력</td>
<td>시라큐스 대학 및 한인회</td>
<td>4월</td>
<td>김책공대 연구진들</td>
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<td>전자도서관 시스템 교육</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>3월, 6월</td>
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<td>미국</td>
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<td>한국-캐나다 컴퓨터 그래픽 디자인 기관</td>
<td>일본, 나라, 네탕(Global Aid Network)</td>
<td>7월</td>
<td>그래픽 전공학생 15인</td>
<td>평양</td>
<td>컴퓨터 그래픽 디자인 분야 1년 학위 과정</td>
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<td>시라큐스 대학 및 한인회</td>
<td>7/31-8/20</td>
<td>김책공대, 외무성 관계자</td>
<td>복경</td>
<td>영어 교육</td>
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<td>시라큐스 대학 및 한인회</td>
<td>8월, 11월</td>
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<td>9월</td>
<td>경제, 재정전문가 10인</td>
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<td>여러나라 정부기관 방문</td>
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<td>UNESCO, 한국 남북협력기금</td>
<td>8월</td>
<td>북한정부대표단</td>
<td>벨기에, 네덜란드</td>
<td>산업장 및 교육기관 방문</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>세션반개발목 표 달성에 필요한 평가기구를 위한 통계역량 강화</td>
<td>UNESCO, 필리핀 통계연구 협력센터</td>
<td>5/23-6/16</td>
<td>북한 통계중앙국 15인</td>
<td>마닐라(필리핀)</td>
<td>북한의 통계기술을 국제수준에 맞추기 위한 교육</td>
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</table>

공공행정 관련 교육 프로그램 중 주목할 만한 최근 사례로 2010년 1월 인도에서 개최된 ‘공무원 기술교육 및 훈련(Technician Training)’이 있다. 북한 측 참가자는 미확인되고 있으나, 조직의 주체는 한국 남북협력기금의 재정적 지원을 받아 UNESCAP이 공무원 교육훈련사업을 추진한 것으로 알려져 있다. 보도된 바로는, 한국 정부가 남북협력기금에서 약 19억 원을 UNESCAP이 추진하는 북한 공무원 역량강화 교육훈련 프로그램에 재정적으로 지원하기로 계획하고 인도에서 이 프로그램을 개최하여 북한 관료들의 전반적인 행정능력 수준을 고양시키는 데 목표를 두었다. UNESCAP에서 제공하는 다양한 공무원 기술교육 및 훈련 프로그램은 산업별로 진행되었는데, 에너지, 환경, 교통 및 수송, 그리고 지역협력 등을 아우르는 다양한 프로그램이 제공되었다고 알려져 있다.6)

또 주목할 만한 공공행정 역량 강화 사업 사례로 ‘새천년개발목표 달성에 필요한 평가업무를 위한 통계역량 강화(Improving Statistical Capability for Assessing Progress in Achieving the MDGs)’가 있다. 2011년 5월 23일부터 6월 16일까지 필리핀 마닐라에서 북한 통계중앙국에서 참가한 15명의 관료들을 대상으로 UNESCAP과 필리핀 통계연구훈련센터(Statistical Research and Training Center: SRTC)가 주최가되어 UN의 새천년개발 목표(MDGs)에 관련된 통계기법을 교육・실시하였다. 2000년대 들어와 최빈국을 비롯하여 각 개도국들은 UN이 진두지휘하는 MDGs 정책과 이와 연결된 국제개발협력 프로그램의 혜택을 받기 위하여 적극적으로 자국의 통계자리를 UN 기준에 맞게 정비하고 정기적으로 보고하여 UN의 요구에 부합하는 데 열의를 보이고 있다. 마찬가지로 UN의 입장에서도 원조를 보다 효과적으로 제공하기 위해서 수원국의 정확한 통계보고가 중요한 판단기준이 되고 있다. 이러한 국제개발협력의 면역에서 북한도 국가통계를 집행하는 행정관료들의 역량을 제고할 필요가 있으며 이에 UNESCAP에서 제공하는 통계교육 프로그램에 적극적으로 참가하게 된 것으로 이해되고 있다. 2011년 필리핀 마닐라에 소재한 SRTC가 북한의 통계훈련 프로그램을 전담하게 되고, 주요 교육 내용으로는 최근의 계량통계 기법 소개, 통계분석 프레임워크 만들기, 데이터 및 코딩하는 방법 등 MDG와 직결되는 통계기법에 대한 역량강화를 위한 교육프로그램으로 구성되었다. 이론적인 수업 이외에도 SRTC는 북한 측 참가자에게 중앙의 필리핀 통계시스템(Philippines Statistical System: PSS)과 각 지방정부에 설립되어진 통계국에 방문할 기회를 주어 실질적으로 어떠한 유기적인 통계정책이 실시되고 있는지 경험할 수 있는 기회를 제공하였다고 보도되고 있다.7)

6) http://chosonexchange.org/?p=162.

3. 무역관련

무역에 관한 역량발전은 보통 ‘무역을 위한 원조(aid for trade: AfT)’라는 원조 형태의 일환으로 이해될 수 있으며, 이는 수원국의 경제기반시설 확충과 생산능력 제고, 그리고 개인의 경제참여 역량강화에 방점을 두고 있다(UNDP, 2008). 성공적인 AfT의 판단 기준은 수원국의 수출확대와 수출상품의 다양화, 수원국의 무역증진, 경제성장 및 빈곤퇴치 등으로 다양하게 설정될 수 있으며, AfT의 성과는 수출증가, 지역 무역 통합, 고용창출과 해외투자 유치 등에서 확인할 수 있다. 그러나 아직까지 북한의 경우는 전형적인 AfT 방식의 역량발전 프로그램을 도입하기에 수원 기구의 준비가 부족하다고 판단되며, 현실적으로 북한에서 급진적인 시장제도와 무역정책을 서구사회로부터 받아들이기에는 아직 요원하다고 볼 수 있다. 따라서 무역관련 역량개발 교육훈련 사업은 주로 유럽 선진국이나 베트남·중국과 같은 사회주의 체제 하에 개혁·개방을 성공한 국가들의 산업 시찰 내지 국제무역에 관한 교육이나 컨퍼런스가 주된 내용으로 제공되어 왔다.

제한된 형식에서도 무역 부문은 구조정책 분야 중 중요한 요소로 인식되고 있으며, 주로 상품 무역을 어떻게 장려하는지, 즉 무역규제, 무역체제의 투명성과 예측가능성, 그리고 투자서비스에 대한 제도적 정비가 얼마나 진행되고 있는지에 초점을 두고 있다. 북한은 국제무역 관행에 맞게 국내적 제도를 정비하는 작업을 이미 2000년대 들어와 시작하고 있으며 특히 아래 <표 6>과 같이 독일의 한스 자이델 재단(Hanns Seidel Foundation)과 같은 국제 NGO의 지원으로 다양한 무역관련 역량발전 프로그램이 진행되고 있다(Seliger, 2010a).
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북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 자산공유: 성과 및 향후전망

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주의 경제 시스템 교육 프로젝트(Friedrich Naumann Foundation)가 무역관련 북한 역량강화 사업으로 최근에 추진된 사례로 구분될 수 있다. 이 교육 프로젝트가 실시된 장소는 뮌헨, 드레遜, 베를린 등으로 이루어지는 독일의 주요 행정 도시였으며, 참가자는 소규모의 조선노동당 및 북한 정부의 상급관료로 구성되었다. 프리드리히 노이만 재단은 한스 자이델 재단과 마찬가지로 독일정당 중 자유민주당(Free Democratic Party)의 지원을 받아 민주주의 개선과 북한에 개선한다는 취지하에 독일의 지역NGO의 도움을 받아 북한 조선노동당 및 북한 정부의 상급관료들을 위 세 도시로 초청하여 연수프로그램을 실시하였다. 연수프로그램의 주요 내용은 독일의 엔지니어링 기술과 지속성 있는 무역제도를 소개하는 것으로 세부적으로 법률제도, 인권, 경제적 자유를 기반으로 무역을 통한 북한의 민주주의 확충과 독자적인 경제개발 가능성이 주가 되었다(Wrobel, 2010; Taylor and Manyin, 2011: 11). 북한의 개혁-개방에 영향을 미칠 수 있는 프로그램들을 준비하여 무역과 민주화라는 경제-정치개방에 관한 교육훈련을 시도하였으나 프로그램이 지속적으로 연계되지 못하고 중단되었다는 점에서 정치성이 가미된 개발역량사업은 연속성을 가지고 사업을 지속해 나가기 어렵다는 시사점을 이 사례에서 찾아볼 수 있다.

Ⅳ. 북한의 개발역량공진을 위한 남북공동프로젝트의 한계와 시사점

1. 북한 개발역량 프로그램의 한계

실질적으로 국제사회에서 추진한 대북한 개발역량발전 교육프로그램이 성공한 사례가 없다고 해도 과언이 아닐 정도로 지금까지 두려한 실적을 거두지 못하고 있는 것이 현주소이다. UN 기구와 NGO, 그리고 대학기구 및 교육전문기관이 시장경제 관련 이론과 실제 경험을 북한 관료들에게 전달하려는 노력이 다각적으로 추진되어 왔지만 교육 프로그램의 성과가 기간, 그리고 북한 측의 진정성 등의 복합적인 이유로 북한의 개발역량발전을 도모하는 국제협력이 소기의 목적을 달성하는 데 난항을 겪고 있다. 여기에는 다음과 같은 북한 맥락에 배치된 한계들이 있다(이종무 외, 2012).

첫째, 세 부문의 개발역량발전 프로그램에서 공통적으로 나타난 한계점은 모두 단발성으로 진행된다는 특징에 있다. 이는 본질적으로 주권 주체인 북한 당국의 비협조적 자세에서 비롯된다고 볼 수 있지만 공여 주체 역시 잠재적인 프로그램으로서 개발역량 사업을 추진하려는 노력이 부족한 것이 사실이다. 안정적인 재정 확보와 두려한 프로그램 실행

북한의 개발역량강화를 위한 자식공유 성과 및 향후전망
주체가 공여 기관 사이에서 협의되지 않은 상황에서 즉각적인 대응으로 교육훈련 프로그램을 기획하기 때문에 프로그램 간에도 연계성이 떨어지는 문제가 있다. 특히, 시라큐스 대학과 한스 자이델 재단과 같은 추진기관이 수년에 걸쳐 북한에 대한 교육훈련 사업의 연계성을 유지하려고 노력했으나 재원 마련의 문제와 무엇보다도 북한 당국의 협조적인 태도로 인하여 실질적인 효과성을 거두지 못하였다.

둘째, 다양한 주체가 기획하는 유사한 프로그램들을 겹치지 않게 조정하는 조율기제가 없기 때문에 북한의 개발역량을 위한 교육훈련프로그램의 정책일관성이 떨어지고 중복사례에서 발생하는 비용이 증가하게 된다. 시장경제교육, 무역, 공공행정 세 분야에서 실시된 역량강화프로그램의 성격을 살펴보면, 분야 내에서도 반복되거나 중첩되는 경우가 많으며, 분야 간에도 유사한 주제가 다양한 공여주체들 사이에서 반복되는 것을 확인할 수 있다. 셋째, 국제금융기구 중 아시아 신경제개발주요등에 중요한 공여주체인 세계은행과 아시아개발은행이 제공할 수 있는 개발역량강화 교육훈련 프로그램에서 북한이 배제되어 있다는 한계점이 있다. 핵개발과 장거리미사일 프로그램 등의 이유로 아직 북한이 국제금융기구에 가입하고 있지 않고 있는 관계로, 국제금융기구에서 제공하는 안정적인 재원을 바탕으로 보다 체계적이고 장기적으로 기획된 역량발전 프로그램이 북한에는 적용이 되지 않는다. 단, 국제금융기구에 가입하기 전에도 북한의 개발역량 강화를 위한 신뢰성을 설치할 가능성을 배제할 수 없지만 아직까지 구체적으로 현실화된 신뢰기관이 없는 것이 현실이다(장형수 외, 2008: 29-31). 따라서 북한 개발역량에 관심이 있는 개별 공여 국가와 국제NGO, 그리고 아울러 공여주체로부터 재정적 지원을 받아 교육프로그램을 대신 운영하는 UNESCAP과 같은 UN기구가 기획하는 북한 역량발전 강화 프로그램은 국제금융기구의 프로그램보다 다분히 단계성을 땀 수밖에 없고 연속성이 현저하게 떨어지게 된다.

넷째, 프로그램 구성에서 북한 측과 소통이 부족하며 상호 간의 교육사업에 대한 기대치가 비대칭적 구조로 형성되어 있다. 국제원조사회가 원하는 북한의 제도적 역량에 대한 기대수준과 현재 북한이 보유하고 있는 역량 간에는 갭이 분명히 존재하며, 국제기관에서 지원되는 역량강화 프로그램에 관하여 북한당국과 사전에 명확하게 협의하는 과정이 생략되어 있어 상호 간의 객관성을 뚜렷하게 하려는 노력을 하고 있다. 지금까지 대북 개발역량강화 프로그램들에 참가하는 북한 관료들의 선정을 북한 당국이 전적으로 장악하고 있어 프로그램 주체들의 의사가 반영되기 어려운 구조로 이루어져 있다는 한계가 있다.
2. 북한 개발역량의 국제협력에의 정책적 함의

1997년 이후 본격적으로 추진되어 온 북한의 개발역량 발전을 위한 국제협력을 시장경제교육, 무역, 공공행정 분야로 나누어 분석한 결과, 향후 북한 국가역량 발전의 각 분야별 접근에 대한 몇 가지 시사점을 도출할 수 있다(이종우 외, 2012).

첫째, 북한의 개발역량 발전을 위한 프로그램은 앞서 살펴본 바와 같이 내재적인 한계가 있으므로 불구하고 다양한 이해당사자(stakeholder)가 참여하고 협력할 수 있는 공간으로서 차후 북한의 개혁・개방을 위한 혁명적 플랫폼으로 구상될 가능성이 있다. 특히, 거시경제관리과 무역 부문에서 이러한 형태의 사업이 추진되고 있으므로, 독일 NGO가 주축이 되어 자국의 정책과 국제기구의 협력 하에 북한 정부와 개발역량 프로그램을 진행할 정도로 역량발전이라는 분야는 기존의 전통적인 정부 간 협력사업을 넘어서 다양한 행위자가 함께 추진할 수 있다는 점에서 기술협력의 정치적 기회구조가 확대된다고 할 수 있다. 문제는 이러한 다양한 공여주체들을 어떠한 방식으로 하나의 통합된 협력체로 견인할 것인가, 그리고 다원화된 이해당사자들과 수원국의 북한이 보다 투명하고 안정적이며 지속적으로 교육훈련사업을 진행하기 위하여 상호 신뢰를 쌓을 수 있는가가 관건이다(Freeman et al., 2010). 따라서 이렇게 변형된 스테이크홀더리즘(stakeholderism)의 긍정적인 효과를 대북 역량강화 프로그램에 활용할 수 있도록 한국이 중재자 역할을 수행하는 시나리오를 준비하여야 할 것이다.

둘째, 국제기구와 국제NGO 주최의 역량발전 프로그램에 참가하는 북한 측 참가자 명수, 성별, 직업군, 직합도 등을 북한당국이 엄격하게 통제하고 결정하기 때문에 실질적으로 역량발전 프로그램에서 본래의 목표를 달성하는 데 한계가 있다. 참가자 선발과 교육 프로그램의 내용, 그리고 프로그램의 상설화 등에 대한 현실적인 결정에 대한 프로그램 제공자와 수혜국 간의 긴밀한 협의가 사전에 필요하며, 이러한 정책 조율기능을 제3의 공여주체에게 일임하거나 아니면 한국 정부가 주도적으로 추진할 수 있도록 구상할 수 있다. 북한과 특정 단기 및 장기연수프로그램을 협의할 때 북한 측 참가자 선정에 대한 어느 정도의 권한을 공여주체들도 공유할 수 있도록 제도화시키는 것이 중요하다.

셋째, 시장경제교육, 무역, 공공행정 부문에 실시한 다양한 북한 개발역량발전 관련 프로그램 중(단기교육, 장기교육, 산업현장시찰, 회의, 공동연구 등)에 장기교육 프로그램이 북한 측이 선호하는 방식임과 동시에 공여주체 입장에서도 현실적으로 가장 효과적인 결과물을 생산할 수 있다고 판단되는 방식의 프로그램이다. 현재 대북 역량발전사업이 가지고 있는 가장 심각한 문제는 사업기간의 단발성에 있다는 것인데 이를 해결할 수 있는 현실적인 방안은 1년 이상의 장기연수프로그램을 활성화하는 것이고 이를 위해서는공여국의 교육...
기관, 재정적 안정도, 프로그램의 지속성 등이 체계적으로 고려되어야 한다는 현실적인 문제들이 있다.

넷째, 북한을 위한 개발역량 발전관련 연수교육 프로그램을 보다 효과적으로 추진하기 위해서 프로그램이 개최되는 장소에 대한 전략적인 접근이 필요하다. 지금까지 북한이 개발역량강화 프로그램에 참가하기 쉬운 조건을 제공한다는 측면에서 중국과 같은 전통적인 북한의 우방국가에서 교육 프로그램을 실시하는 것이 2000년대 중반까지의 주된 방식이었다 (<표 3-2> 참조). 이는 한국이나 한국의 우방국을 개최 장소로 선택하는 것이 현실적으로 불가능하며, 중국・인도와 같은 제3국을 선택할 경우 한국정부와 정책적 조율의 경험 이 상대적으로 축적된 중국을 선호하는 경향이 강하였다는 것을 의미한다. 그러나 2000년 대 후반부터 트렌드가 변화하게 되었는데, 유럽 국가들이나 캐나다, 호주, 스웨덴과 같은 비 미국 지역의 유럽 국가에서는 북한 관료를 대상으로 장기연수프로그램을 석사 학위 취득 과 연결시키는 경향이 강하며, 실제로 북한 측의 연수 참가관료들도 한국보다는 유럽 국가 내지 캐나다, 호주와 같은 선진국가에서 실시하는 역량강화 프로그램에 참가하는 것을 개인적으로 선호하는 것으로 알려져 있다. 예를 들어, 캐나다 University of British Columbia에서 제공했던 한국학 석사 프로그램이나 호주 Australian National University에서 추진하고 있는 연수프로그램, 그리고 스웨덴 교육기관에서 기획하고 있는 북한 관료 역량강화사업이 상대적으로 기존의 역량강화 프로그램보다 호응도가 높으며 실질적인 성과도 높을 것으로 기대되고 있다. 이는 북한 스스로가 연수프로그램의 주 최가 중국이나 주변 아시아국가에서 실질적으로 시장경제와 무역 등의 자본주의경제에 대한 지식을 얻을 수 있는 서유럽과 북아메리카, 그리고 호주로 확장되고 있다는 것을 알 수 있다. 따라서 한국 정부도 북한 역량강화 사업의 개최지를 다변화하고 특히 최근에 주 목받고 있는 캐나다, 호주, 스웨덴의 교육기관과 긴밀한 협의를 통하여 사업을 조율할 수 있다는 것을 기대할 수 있다.
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